



**CIA FILE ON**  
**REINHARD GEHLEN**  
**VOL. VI**



@fileandclaw322

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

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*EYES ONLY*

SECRET 091350Z JUL 68 CITE MUNICH 3810

DIRECTOR INFO BONN

RYBAT CATUSK

REFS A. EGMW-15886

B. MUNICH 2993 (IN 90419) \*

1. PROPOSE UTILITY FAREWELL TOUR ARRIVE WASHINGTON FOR WEEKEND 7/8 SEPTEMBER, MAKING HIM AVAILABLE FROM 9 SEPTEMBER ON FOR MEETINGS, DISCUSSIONS, ETC. SINCE THIS IS FORMAL FAREWELL VISIT, SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS WILL PLAY IMPORTANT ROLE. UTILITY INTENDS TO HOST OFFICIAL RECEPTION AT ALIAS DESSAU'S RESIDENCE FOR LEADING FIGURES OF COMMUNITY, AND REQUESTS OUR ADVICE RE WHO SHOULD BE INVITED. DESSAU PLANNING A PULLACHER ABEND FOR ALL WOFIRM STAFFERS WHO ARE PULLACH ALUMNI. ANOTHER EVENING MUST BE SET ASIDE FOR RECEPTION BY GERMAN AMBASSADOR. LEAVE TO HQS REST OF SCHEDULE.

2. UTILITY HAS NOT AS YET MENTIONED ANY PARTICULAR HQS COMPONENTS WITH WHICH HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS, MOSTLY WITH REFERENCE TO HIS ROLE AS A CATUSK HISTORIAN. ALSO HAS NOT SPECIFIED ANY GEOGRAPHIC POINTS HE WOULD LIKE TO VISIT OR RE-VISIT BUT MOST PROBABLY WOULD WANT A TRIP TO NEW YORK ON THE WAY BACK, WITH A VISIT TO UNITED NATIONS AND A SOCIAL MEETING WITH MR JOHN BOKER.

*9 JUL 68 / N 46649*  
*Don't want*  
*a USIB function*  
*on dinner for G.*

SECRET

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PAGE 2 MUNICH 3810 S E C R E T

3. UTILITY MAY WISH TRAVEL ONE WAY VIA SURFACE. HE WOULD USE ALIAS AND WOULD APPRECIATE ESCORT. IF TRAVELING BY SURFACE, WE PROPOSING SS UNITED STATES OR AMERICAN EXPORT LINES TO MINIMIZE CHANCES ANYONE RECOGNIZING HIM, WHICH MIGHT BE THE CASE WERE HE TO TRAVEL GERMAN LINES. BELIEVE ALL TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE HERE, BUT WILL REPORT DEFINITELY AS SOON AS PICTURE IS CLEAR.

4. UTILITY FIGURES TENTATIVELY ON ACCEPTING INVITATION FROM [ ] TO VISIT LATTER'S CABIN IN THOUSAND ISLANDS FOR FEW DAYS. [DESSAU] WOULD MEET IN OTTAWA AND ACCOMPANY UTILITY ON CANADIAN LEG, RETURNING WITH HIM TO WASHINGTON VIA NIAGARA FALLS TO ARRIVE CIRCA 6 SEPTEMBER. UTILITY WOULD SPEND RESTFUL WEEKEND WASHINGTON PRIOR BEGINNING OFFICIAL SIDE OF VISIT ON 9 SEPTEMBER. UTILITY WILL ALLOW SUFFICIENT TIME FOR ALL WHO MAY WISH HOST A SOCIAL MEETING WITH HIM.

S E C R E T

BT

\* UTILITY (1) prefers, with Hqs concurrence, to make his farewell visit to Hqs in September.

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DATE 2005

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C/E/G

7830/9266

23 JULY 1968

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(date and time filed)

(reference number)

(pico)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

DIR 18831

MUNICH INFO: BONN

23 22

342 JUL 68

CATUSK UTILITY

Proposed dates for UTILITY (1) visit weekend  
REF: MUNICH 3810 (IN 46649) \* of 7/8 Sept., making him available from 9 Sept.  
on for meetings, discussions, etc.

1. DATES FOR UTILITY VISIT SATISFACTORY. ARRANGING ACTIVITIES SCHEDULE FOR WEEK 9 SEPT. SHALL KEEP ALIAS DESSAU INFORMED AS APPROPRIATE.

2. <sup>3</sup> AUTHORIZED AS ESCORT OFFICER. ASSUME UTILITY WILL PAY OWN TRANSPORTATION TO AND FROM WOLADY WITH WOFIRM PAYING COSTS INTERNAL TRAVEL AND REPRESENTATIONAL ENTERTAINMENT.

3. HQS REDUCING AMOUNT REQUESTED IN <sup>5</sup> CATUSK PROJECT RENEWAL FOR UTILITY VISIT TO \$2500 WHICH SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT COVER TRAVEL AND PER DIEM FOR ESCORT OFFICER, UTILITY TRAVEL TO OTTAWA, AND HEADQUARTERS ENTERTAINMENT.

4. HQS MAKING ALL ARRANGEMENTS FOR CANADIAN PORTION TRIP IN CONJUNCTION WITH <sup>2</sup> ALIAS DESSAU.

END OF MESSAGE

EUR/FI/CI ☐ (telecord in draft)

EUR/B&F ☐ (telecord in draft)

C/FI Staff ☐ (telecord in draft)

C/CI Staff ☐ C/EUR ☐

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UNCLASSIFIED

WEST GERMANY

NEWSPAPER INTERVIEW WITH  
RETIRED BND CHIEF

5 319 0192 68

24 July 1968

Four  
DIRM 3C

Late June 68

CINCUSNAVEUR REP 09108

Munich, FRG, 1 Jul 68

H.D.D.SNYDER, LT, USNR

DOCUMENTARY

R.S. PATTEE, CDR, USN

Report forwards a translation of excerpts of an interview with the retired chief of the West German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) which were published in the West German newspaper "Abendzeitung" of 1 July 1968, pp. 3 and 5. A copy of "Abendzeitung" is submitted as enclosure (1).

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DATE 2001 2005

Excerpts of an Interview with the Former BND Chief General Gehlen Published by the West German Daily Newspaper "Abendzeitung":  
The Great Stranger for Eighteen Years: A Visit With General (Ret.) Reinhard Gehlen, Retired Secret Service Chief

1. NEIGHBOURS ACTED AS HIS BODYGUARD

Among the scattered hills of the community of Berg, an inconspicuous forest road leads down to the eastern bank of the Lake Starnberg. Every morning, for 18 years, unless he was travelling or sick, the man living out there, used this narrow, green road to go to his mysterious headquarters in Pullach near Munich. His name became a legend, and very often, photographers sat in trees or behind bushes to take pictures of him; pictures which have been a desired item all over the world. They failed.

CINCUSNAVEUR (w/encl)  
REP GER (w/encl)  
WICKER (w/encl)  
[ ] (w/encl)  
ALUSNA Bonn (w/encl)

1 Enclosure  
1. One (1) copy of  
the "Abendzeitung" of  
1 July 1968

UNCLASSIFIED

CINCUSNAVEUR REP 09108

Thus, our correspondent, Jochen Wilke (VOLUNTAS), described his visit with retired General Reinhard Gehlen, chief of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) (Federal Intelligence Service), who retired on 1 May 1968. Wilke's report on his visit was published in a recent issue of the magazine "Neue Revue" from which the following passages have been extracted:

If you are ready now to follow me inconspicuously to General Gehlen then please leave behind all your TV imaginations, or you will be very disappointed. No lurking assassins. No chirping wireless set inside a ball-point pen. No gun holster. No periscope on the chimney. No camouflaged entrance through which you can reach the "Holy of Holies". Even the modern radar antenna in the garden, later on turns out to be the clothes-drier installed for the convenience of his wife. Instead, a wide open entrance for the visitor, and a medium-sized, slim man in a gray summer suit steps out of the house to welcome the guest. Just as if you were visiting an acquaintance somewhere. Even the distrustful shepherd was locked up before my arrival. The dog likes to snatch at moving trouser-legs. "Should we not close the gate?", I asked the general. With a wave of his hand he replied: "Oh no, that will be done by somebody in the family".

## 2. CLANDESTINE SIGNS AS A WARNING

Believe me, it is hard to understand that the chief of the BND was never caught face to face, although dozens of experienced photographers chased him. Nevertheless it is a matter of fact, although he moved about quite freely at home as well as abroad. He was travelling much and even made camping trips, certainly not to public places, but to guarded places equipped with radio-telephone. There are some photographs from those days, but naturally taken from distances which do not permit recognition of his face.

For a long time the photograph showing Gehlen as Wehrmacht Officer was the only one existent (it is published with this article). A second picture, which is also published herewith, shows Gehlen in a sailing boat together with one of his daughters. He frequently attended the Sunday meeting of the Protestant church in Berg, went shopping, participated in the parents' consultations of the school and visited his neighbours regularly as is customary in the countryside. They knew his true name. And no photographer got to him? For this, Gehlen has a very sympathetic explanation on hand. He is convinced that his fellow citizens made a sport of screening him against strangers. They played the James Bond game voluntarily and gave him clandestine signs if strangers had been in the store when he shopped. "Once I got a rather excited warning telephone call from the pharmacy that there was a suspicious car and somebody inquiring about me". The general informed the police. They found reporters from BBC in London had come to Berg to locate the house of the BND Chief. They did not find it.

Furthermore, shortly afterwards a newspaper with loud claims of self-congratulation published a photograph with the name of "Gehlen", but actually showing quite another general - the Knight of Niedermeyer. We are sitting in the living room around the tea-table. Mrs. Herta Gehlen née von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, the retired president and a friend of his who talks to him with his old pseudonym "Dr. Schneider". In the background, the garden slopes toward the lake, much sun, books on the wall and a strikingly beautiful engraving of the old Moltke, still the idol of every German General Staff Officer. No maid appears. Mrs. Gehlen does the serving herself. The whole house shows a modesty, very rare with respect to the representatives of our state. It is quite different to sit opposite a 67-year old gentleman named Gehlen in the friendly atmosphere of a tea hour, from encountering him on the jungle paths of the secret services. The person who is dependent upon guesses, suspicions and rumors would shiver with this man and his incomparable intrigues. He would take him for the intellectual issue of Batman, icy and cunning, ready for any infamous action. Prestige can be also detrimental, for Gehlen can be imagined capable of anything even that there is no Gehlen - that he is a phantom. The man who is considered to be an international star of the espionage profession said: "And you have to think as well that I volunteered for the university when I was a young officer, primarily in order to prevent getting detached for the secret service". The well-known German saying refutes: As the tree is bent, the tree is inclined.

Suddenly the conversation turned to memoirs. Will Reinhard Gehlen take up his pen? That is a subject which makes publishers and magazine editors think of immense editions. But at this time, this question seems to be of no interest to him. As a professional, he is conscious of the fetters which will bind him when writing

his memoirs. The secrecy limits him more than anything else. Therefore his literary efforts will be restricted to an official report on his secret service career for the government.

Besides his old hobby waits for him, which he will enjoy thoroughly this summer: aquatics. Accidentally, because of the housing problem in Munich in 1949, he was forced to purchase an old house at the Lake Starnberg, here on this estate, the general became an enthusiastic sailor. His new boat lies down on the shore. He saw it at an exhibition in Essen and then he bought it by telephone for few thousand marks. ("Of course with a trailer, to transport it.....").

Travels? Without order, except of official duties? And freer than before, like a normal tourist? A long-drawn Yes from the mouth of the retired president - but here, the second voice, the voice of "Dr. Schneider", makes itself heard: Probably, I have something to do beforehand. And from the leisure time already a piece is cancelled. "Now, I shall show you the house", the general said, "if you are interested." We step out on to a small veranda to start the round and here Gehlen appears as he is known from the old photos - the man with the dark sun glasses, which I now actually saw him wearing for the first time, due to the long rays of the setting sun above the lake. If he'd also turn up his collar now, then he'd resemble precisely the descriptions I have read about him previously.

### 3. A HOUSE OF HIS OWN FROM THE MAIL ORDER FIRM

The house is similar to a bungalow and came from a mail order firm. A few personal touches made by the house-owner himself have worked miracles and the marks of the standardized type of construction have disappeared. For instance, the collar, the added room with the General's writing desk, its walls lined with books, the garden, and the small fully automated kitchen. This is a house for a married couple, where a guest can spend the night also. His son and family live in the old house, a Bavarian style frame-house, which is situated 50 yards up the hill from the general's. His son Christoph Gehlen is a physicist in Munich. If the two daughters come for a visit, they can choose where to stay - with the parents or with their brother. The houses are on the same estate.

While guiding me through the house, the general recalled his visits to America. There all rooms were shown him candidly when he inspected a house or an apartment. The same with him and he doesn't omit even the bedroom, in spite of the feeble protests of his wife; the protest of all housewives in civilized countries. "But it is not yet tidied up!" Oh! Before I forget, in the course of this tour I finally discovered something which is remotely reminiscent of the exciting profession of the house-owner. I refer to the battery-powered alarm system. Oddly enough, I did not find a television set. General Gehlen never watches any of the TV espionage or secret service series. "They are all very fantastic", I said.

"Yes," the expert replied, "and certainly romantic, too. In reality, the modern intelligence service, with its electronic and computer techniques, consists to a great extent of statistics, documents and diligent work".

What can be said about the person of the general? You already know that he is medium-sized and that he wears a grey suit. From a foreign press report it could be learned that he may not be a normal man, he may be a superman; without heart, only brain.

I have known General Gehlen for many years - admittedly as an outsider, as a journalist - and I disagree with this image. He has a good heart and appreciates the people around him; he is a thoughtful human being. Occasionally, the chief of a secret service must make critical decisions. This is the natural way of such institutions. Yet there is no evidence that Gehlen ever denied humanity and human ethics. If he had not become an officer then he would likely have applied himself to medicine. He has a burning interest in psychology and psychiatry. His intimate friends assert that he was out for a "curer of souls". Gehlen, the son of a publisher, obtained his character molding in the "Reichswehr" and the General Staff. He calls himself a reluctant chief of the secret service because of his earlier striving against transfer to the counter intelligence during his tour in the "Reichswehr". In a new French book ("Le général gris") compiled from several sources, one can find the following description of General Gehlen:

A mixture of intellectual, realist and diplomat; resembles British colonial colonel in plain clothes. Wears a ~~leading~~ with battered rim and turned-up coat-collar. ~~I saw a~~ bank clerk.

UNCLASSIFIED

5 319 0192 68

CIRCUMNAVIER REP 09108

The same source reports that the department of state-security in East Berlin keeps the following personal description in readiness:

Height: 1.72 meter. Figure: slim. Hairs: few, sparse, nearly bald-headed. Face: pale. Nose: pointed. Gray moustache like Hitler.

Resembles a bank executive. Generally he wears a Tyrolian hat with a green band, which looks shabby. Sport coat in trench-coat form.

I don't want to break the security regulations of the BND when I state that the comparison with Hitler's moustache is only meant to be a polemic. The moustache of Gehlen is more elegant.

Comments of Approving Officer:

The major significance of this newspaper article would appear to be as a public statement to both hostile and friendly governments that General Gehlen is now officially disassociated with BND and truly retired and that, if and when he travels, he will be merely Reinhard Gehlen, retired general. The publication of the first photograph since 1944 of General Gehlen is noteworthy and re-emphasizes this thesis.

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DATE 2005

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(reference number)

(picn)

20826

CITE DIRECTOR

TO MUNICH  
CATUSK UTILITY

31 14 34z JUL 68

REF: MUNICH 3810 (IN 46649) N.K.

1. HAVE YOU MADE ANY FIRM TRAVEL PLANS RE UTILITY? IF YOU DEPART ON UNITED STATES 29 AUGUST, SUGGEST YOU SPEND FEW DAYS IN NEW YORK, 4 TO 7 SEPTEMBER, TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON BY TRAIN ON 7 OR 8 SEPTEMBER.

2. OFFICIAL ACTIVITIES HERE WILL NOT BEGIN UNTIL AFTERNOON 10 SEPTEMBER WITH RECEPTION AT HQS. PLAN FORMAL DINNER SAME EVENING TO INCLUDE LEADING OFFICIALS INTEL COMMUNITY AT WHICH INSCRIBED WOFIRM SEAL WILL BE FORMALLY PRESENTED.

3. ALIAS DESSAU HAS RESERVED EVENINGS 12 SEPTEMBER FOR RECIPROCAL SMALL DINNER HIS HOME HOSTED BY UTILITY AND 13 SEPTEMBER FOR LARGER PULLACH REUNION HIS HOME.

4. MHRUSH EMBASSY WILL HOLD RECEPTION EVENING OF 11 SEPTEMBER.

5. UTILITY COULD DEPART WASHINGTON 14 SEPT FOR BUFFALO,

/CONTINUED/

31 July 68

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SECRET PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR 20826

VISIT NIAGRA FALLS AND PROCEED BY CAR TO ☐ SUMMER HOUSE.

DESSAU WILL ACCOMPANY FOR THIS LEG OF TRIP AND WILL PROVIDE DRIVER FOR CANADIAN VISIT.

6. UTILITY COULD RETURN TO GERMANY BY AIR FROM CANADA AT DATE HIS CHOICE OR RETURN TO STATES FOR SIGHTSEEING. PLEASE ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

C/EUR ☐

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

*IDENTITY*

Richard J. Hall  
Unit Director  
Neighborhood Resources Center  
3052 S. Grattan  
Chicago, Illinois 60608  
USA

July 31, 1968

General Reinhard Gehlen  
Ministry of Defense  
Bonn, Germany

Dear General Gehlen,

The children of this center have been making a study of prominent military leaders in the recent history of Germany and they have asked me to correspond with you. We wish to know what prompts man to feel such a deep sense of duty to his country.

The children really would like to obtain an autographed picture of you so they might include it with their study of your life. This study is being made into a display which will be available to schools and youth groups so that other children may also learn. However, they understand that your position as Chief of Intelligence prohibits such a picture being available.

Perhaps you could give us this information? Could you tell the children what prompted you to become a military officer and thus serve your country?

The children extend to you their best wishes and will appreciate any cooperation your kindness might allow you to make.

Sincerely,

*Richard J. Hall*  
Richard J. Hall  
Unit Director

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16 19 57z AUG 68

CITE DIRECTOR 25206  
DIR

TO: MUNICH

INFO: BONN

CATSK UTILITY

REF: DIRECTOR-23163

1. SINCE TIME GROWING SHORT AND FORMAL ARRANGEMENTS MUST BE MADE, WOULD APPRECIATE FIRM ITINERARY.
2. HQS ARRANGING HOUSING/TRANSPORTATION FOR [ ].

END OF MESSAGE

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16 Aug 68

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SECRET 171130Z AUG 68 CITE BONN 6131

17 AUG 68 IN 72458

DIRECTOR INFO MUNICH

CATUSK UTILITY

REF DIR 25286

WISH TO CALL HQS ATTENTION TO FACT        ] TDY IN WASHINGTON  
BEGINNING 9 SEPTEMBER COINCIDES WITH UTILITY VISIT. DO NOT  
WISH BECOME ENTANGLED WITH UTILITY SCHEDULE SINCE        ] IS  
BEST ESCORT BUT IT WOULD PROBABLY BE GRACEFUL IF        ] INCLUDED  
IN MAIN SOCIAL EVENT OF VIST AND--IF SEPARATE--PRESENTATION  
OF AWARD OR WHATEVER.

SECRET

BT

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cc, cc/OPS, FI 2

SECRET 201109Z AUG 68 CITE MUNICH 4237

DIRECTOR INFO BONN

(\*Requested itinerary.)

CATUSK UTILITY

REF DIRECTOR 25286 \*

20 AUG 68 IN 73785

1. FOLLOWING SCHEDULE HAS BEEN WORKED OUT WITH UTILITY:

6 SEPT 68 -DEPART MUNICH AT 1115 VIA PANAM 103,

CHANGE IN LONDON TO PANAM 106, ARRIVE  
DULLES AT 1745.

7-9 SEPT -REST

10 SEPT -AFTERNOON - CALL AT HQS.

-EVENING - FORMAL DINNER WITH LEADING OFFICIALS  
OF INTEL COMMUNITY.

11 SEPT

-GERMAN EMBASSY ACTIVITIES AS ARRANGED BY  
ALIAS DESSAU. (COMMENT: UTILITY WILL SEND  
SEPARATE MESSAGE TO DESSAU EXPRESSING STRONG  
PREFERENCE FOR SIMPLE, INFORMAL MEETING WITH  
AMBASSADOR AND ONE OR TWO OTHER PEOPLE AS  
COURTESY, WITHOUT FANFARE.)

12 SEPT

-EVENING - SMALL DINNER AT DESSAU'S HOME.

13 SEPT

-EVENING - PULLACH REUNION AT DESSAU'S HOME.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

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AB	✓
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EX	✓
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[ 20 Aug 1968 ]

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PAGE 2 MUNICH 4237 S E C R E T

14-15 SEPT -REMAIN IN WASHINGTON AREA, SIGHTSEEING OR  
TAKING SHORT TRIPS (POSSIBLY WILLIAMSBURG<sup>6</sup>).

16 SEPT -TRAVEL TO NEW YORK CITY.

19 SEPT -DEPART NEW YORK VIA SS UNITED STATES.

25 SEPT -ARRIVE BREMERHAVEN, MID-DAY.  
DEPART FOR MUNICH VIA RAIL.

26 SEPT -ARRIVE MUNICH.

2. PLEASE ADVISE IF, AS ESCORT, ☒ <sup>3</sup> AUTHORIZED ACTUAL  
EXPENSE BASIS FOR TRAVEL ASSIGNMENT TO AND FROM U.S. AND ACTUAL  
COST BASIS, PER EUR DIV FIELD NOTICE 17, IN U.S.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

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DATE 2005

ORIG: ☐ :gd  
UNIT: E/G/CE  
EXT: 5871  
DATE: 23 AUGUST 1968

MESSAGE FORM  
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(date and time filed)

(reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR

27.40.2

TO: ☐ MUNICH INFO BONN 3 22 30 Z AUG 68

CATUSEK UTILITY

FOR ☐ ☐

REF: MUNICH-4237 (IN-73758) - The Station provided the schedule for UTILITY (2) visit.

1. REF SCHEDULE SATISFACTORY.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS RE SUITABLE TOPICS FOR

☐ UTILITY DISCUSSION.

3. IN ORDER ARRANGE WOBONE CUSTOMS CLEARANCE ASSISTANCE UPON ETA DULLES, NEED KNOW ALIAS, DPOB, AND TYPE PASSPORT UTILITY USING FOR TRAVEL.

4. ☐ AUTHORIZED ACTUAL EXPENSES NOT TO EXCEED \$30 PER DAY FOR ENTIRE TRIP.

END OF MESSAGE

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EUR/SUPPORT ☐

SSA/DIS ☐

C/E/G ☐

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23 Aug 68

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CS/RE, CI, CI/OPS, FI 2, DDS 2 SECUR 4

SECRET 261405Z AUG 68 CITE MUNICH

MUNE  
4325

DIRECTOR INFO BONN

26 AUG 68 IN 78389

CATASK UTILITY

REF DIRECTOR 27402 \*

1. DOCUMENTATION FOR UTILITY:

ALIAS: MR. RICHARD GEBLER

DPOB: 5 APRIL 1903, SCHWEIDNITZ, GERMANY/POLAND

OCCUPATION: MINISTERIALRAT

PASSPORT: MINISTERIALPASS NO. M-3485, VALID UNTIL 15 APRIL 1970.

2. RECALLING ABORTIVE TRIP TO U.S. IN 1956, FOR HIS PART UTILITY DOES NOT SEEK POSTPONEMENT TRIP AT THIS TIME SINCE HE NO LONGER IN POSITION OF AUTHORITY OR RESPONSIBILITY HE HOPES IT WILL STILL BE CONVENIENT FOR HQS, AND HE IS LOOKING FORWARD TO VISIT WITH GREAT ANTICIPATION.

3. SUGGESTED DISCUSSION ITEMS FOLLOW SEPARATELY.

SECRET

BT C/S Comment: \* Requested info needed with regard to UTILITY (1) forthcoming visit.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

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**SECRET**

26 Aug 68

U2601

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SECRET 031637Z SEP 68 CITE MUNICH 4418

DIRECTOR INFO BONN

CATUSK UTILITY

REF EGMA 71886

3 SEP 68 IN 340939

1. ATTENTION INVITED TO REF, TELEPOUCHED 3 SEP 68,  
WHICH WILL BE OF INTEREST TO THOSE INVOLVED IN PLANNING  
FOR UTILITY VISIT.

2. IF POSSIBLE, PLEASE PROVIDE GUEST LIST FOR AWARD  
CEREMONY AND BLACK-TIE DINNER PRIOR [ ] UTILITY  
DEPARTURE 6 SEPTEMBER.

SECRET

BT

4 SEP  
4 1968

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

SECRET [ ]


DISP NO - EGMA-71886  
DATE - 3 SEPTEMBER 1968  
FILE NO - 32W-2-28/13  
[ ]  
TO - CHIEF, EUROPEAN DIVISION  
INFO - CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY  
SUBJECT - RYBAT CATUSK UTILITY  
UTILITY'S VISIT TO HEADQUARTERS  
ACTION - SEE PARA 4  
REF - DIRECTOR 27402

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SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

1. QUOTED BELOW IS TEXT OF LETTER /MAILED 31 AUGUST 1968/  
FROM UTILITY TO IDENTITY A. IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT IDENTITY A  
WAS THE IMMEDIATE POST-WAR OFFICER IN GERMANY UNDER WHOSE OFFICE  
UTILITY'S GRUPPE WAS FIRST ESTABLISHED.

" I THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR LETTER FROM AUGUST 6,  
AND YOUR VERY KIND WORDS ON OCCASION OF MY RETIREMENT. IT IS  
REALLY AMAZING THAT IT IS ALREADY NEARLY 25 YEARS AGO THAT YOU  
MADE THE DECISION WHICH WAS NOT ONLY THE STARTING POINT FOR THE  
REBIRTH OF A NEW GERMAN INTELLIGENCE BUT ALSO THE BEGINNING OF  
A CLOSE AMERICAN-GERMAN FRIENDSHIP. YOUR COUNTRY INVESTED A LOT  
OF VALUES, ON THE MATERIAL SIDE AS WELL AS ON THE SIDE OF  
HUMANITY. I AM SURE THAT WILL PAY AND WILL NOT BE FORGOTTEN BY  
THE PRESENTLY LIVING GERMAN GENERATIONS.

TO YOUR SPECIAL REQUEST -- OF COURSE WE MAY CONTRIBUTE  
TO YOUR WRITING ALL THE DATA WHICH ARE AVAILABLE TO US OR ARE  
STILL IN MEMORY. SINCE I MYSELF WAS NEARLY EXCLUSIVELY  
OCCUPIED WITH THE EASTERN FRONT AND THEREFORE PUT MY FRIEND  
IDENTITY B IN THE LEADING POSITION OF 'FREMDE HEERE WEST', I  
ASKED TWO PEOPLE TO WORK ON THESE DATA -- IDENTITY C AND  
IDENTITY D. ATTACHED ARE SOME ADDITIONAL DATA ABOUT THEM.  
SECPET RYBAT EGMA-71886 - PAGE 1



C.S. COPY FILED 32W-2-28/13

I AM, OF COURSE, WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE A PREFACE NOT MORE THAN 1,000 WORDS, AS YOU WANT, AND I HOPE THAT I MAY FULFILL YOUR EXPECTATIONS. BY THE WAY -- IF THE PRESENT EVENTS DON'T MAKE NECESSARY A CHANGE, I WILL BE IN WASHINGTON FROM SEPTEMBER 7 TO ABOUT SEPTEMBER 15. SO, IF YOU ARE INTERESTED, I WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR A DISCUSSION DURING THIS TIME. YOU MAY REACH ME VIA WOFIRM. WITH ALL GOOD WISHES."

2. IN VIEW OF THIS CORRESPONDENCE AND THE INFORMATION TO IDENTITY A FROM UTILITY THAT LATTER EXPECTS TO BE IN WASHINGTON AREA IN SEPTEMBER, [REDACTED] MAY WISH TO CONSIDER INVITING IDENTITY A TO ONE OR MORE OF THE RITUALS PLANNED FOR THE RECEPTION OF UTILITY. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT IDENTITY A HAS ASKED UTILITY TO WRITE PREFACE FOR IDENTITY A'S BOOK.

3. SUGGESTED ITEMS FOR DISCUSSION WITH UTILITY AT HQS ARE AS FOLLOWS --

A. HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR A BRIEF TOUR D'HORIZON ON CURRENT EVENTS IN EUROPE.

B. HE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEARING ONE OF OUR WORLD COMMUNISM EXPERTS EXPOUNDING ON SOVIET SUBVERSION AROUND THE GLOBE, AS REFLECTED BY STUDENT/LABOR AND OTHER GROUPS IN DEMONSTRATIONS.

C. UTILITY'S OWN PLANS FOR RETIREMENT, TO INCLUDE SOME ESSAYS /UNSPECIFIED/, PLUS REVIEW OF ARCHIVES FOR EVENTUALLY DONT HIS OWN MEMOIRS. HE HAS ASKED IF, FROM TIME TO TIME, HE COULD MEET WITH [REDACTED] TO CLARIFY CERTAIN POINTS AS THEY MAY ARISE.

D. HIS POTENTIAL POLITICAL PLANS AND CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THEY MIGHT BE ACTIVATED.

4. UTILITY IS BRINGING WITH HIM A NUMBER OF COPIES OF A FORMAL PHOTOGRAPH OF HIMSELF TO BE DISTRIBUTED TO INDIVIDUALS



SECRET/RYBAT TELEPOUCH - EGMA-71886 - PAGE 3

WITH WHOM HE HAS DEALT IN THE PAST TWENTY YEARS. PERHAPS IT  
WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR HEADQUARTERS TO PROVIDE GUEST LIST FOR  
PRESENTATION CEREMONIES AND/OR BLACK TIE DINNER IN ORDER TO  
ASSIST UTILITY IN IDENTIFYING THOSE TO WHOM HE WOULD LIKE TO  
PRESENT A PHOTOGRAPH.

[                      ]

ATTACHMENT -- U/S/C

LIST OF IDENS

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SECRET/RYBAT EGMA-71886 - PAGE 3

BT

TO - C/EUR, COS/GERM.

FROM - COB/MUNICH

EGMA-71886 IDEN

IDENTITY A - MAJ GEN EDWIN L. SIBERT  
/POST-WAR G-2/  
RFD, VINEYARD HAVEN, MASS, ZIP 02568

IDENTITY B - V. ROENNE

IDENTITY C - BRIG GEN /RET/ LOTHAR METZ

IDENTITY D - COL ANTON STAUBWASSER

SECRET/RYBAT EGMA-71886 - SEPARATE COVER IDENTITY

BT

EGMA-71886 IDEN

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UNIT: *E/G/CE*  
SET: 5871  
DATE: 4 SEPT 68

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*CSRF C1 C1OPS, F12*

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(title)

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(page)

**SECRET**

*04 19 00Z SEP 68*

CITE DIRECTOR

*30017*

TO **MUNICH**

INFO: BONN

**CATASK UTILITY**

REF: MUNICH 4418 (IN 84093) \*

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SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

1. RE PARA 2: WOFIRM CONTINGENT: [ ] [ ] [ ]

[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ASCHAM,

[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] , AND CHIEFS WOROMP AND

WOYARD. OTHERS ARE GEN MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, MR. THOMAS L.

HUGHES, LT. GEN. JOSEPH F. CARROLL, DR. LOUIS W. TORDELLA,

*13*  
@ DESSAU AND UTILITY.

**END OF MESSAGE**

2. [ ] *13* ] AND @ DESSAU *13* ] WILL MEET AT AIRPORT.

**END OF MESSAGE**

\* Munich asked that Hqs forward a guest list for award ceremony and black-tie dinner.

AN	<i>2</i>
AB	<i>X</i>
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*C/EUR* [ ]

*4 Sept 68*  
*C/E/G* [ ]

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RI/AN, MPS/PSG-3, FI-2 CI/OPS  
DDP, AddP, CCS-2, CSFS, 25/DO

SECRET 051503Z SEP 68 CITE MUNICH

**MUNICH**  
4450

5 SEP 68 IN 86094

DIRECTOR, BONN INFO FRANKFURT, BERLIN, HAMBURG, SWPE/STUTTGART M

CATUSEK UTILITY

1. UTILITY AND [ ] ARRIVING DULLES 6 SEPTEMBER  
VIA PANAM 107 AT 1745.

2. [ ] ACTING UNTIL [ ]  
RETURN FROM ESCORT DUTY 26 SEPTEMBER.

SECRET

BT

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5 Sept 68

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UNIT: DC/E/G  
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(classification)

(date and time filed)

(of file) (reference number) (init)

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17 14 19Z SEP 68

CITE DIRECTOR

TO [ ]

PRIORITY MUNICH

INFO: BONN

DIR 33566

CATUSK UTILITY

17 Sept!

[ ] AND UTILITY DEPARTING NEW YORK ON PANAM

102. WILL ARRIVE MUNICH 18 SEPT, 0905 LOCAL TIME.

END OF MESSAGE

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SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
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DDA ADD, FI 2 CCS2, CSRS

SECRET 181243Z SEP 68 CITE MUNICH 4632

DIRECTOR, BONN INFO FRANKFURT, BERLIN, HAMBURG, SWPE/STUTTGART

CATUSK

10 SEP 68 IN 94396

UTILITY AND ☐ ARRIVED MUNICH 18 SEPTEMBER. ☐ ☐

RETURNING TO DUTY 19 SEPTEMBER.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

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SECRET

18 Sept 1968

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW		DATE 19 September 1968 lc	
TO: C/E/G/CE - [ ]		C NO. [ ]	
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA 16/ [ ]		SUBJECT: UTILITY	
IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.			
PRO I	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER		
PRO II	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION		
FIELD TRACES	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA		
RI TRACES	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA		
OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA		
RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE		
GREEN LIST	OTHERS (See Remarks)		
NOTICE:	FIRST	SECOND	THIRD AND FINAL
REMARKS:			
<p>The FBI has made reference to the following information:</p> <p>data re J. Gehlen sent to Agency 5/5/61.  data re Irving D. Toner sent to Agency 1/5/62 &amp; 12/22/61.  data re W. B. Niezgoda-Strusiewiez sent to Agency 5/3/55 p. 6.</p> <p>Please locate and review, and comment on the significance of this information.</p> <p>[ ] X4127  X7672  X4127</p> <p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  DATE 2005</p>			

SECRET

25 September 1968


MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : UTILITY [ ]

1. In reference to your request for review and comments dated 19 September 1968 on data provided by the FBI, the following applies:

- a. Data re J. GEHLEN sent to Agency 5/5/61. The FBI is referring to DBF-76938, dated 5 May 1961, [ ] Subject: Johannes (Giovanni) GEHLEN. The document is a report containing biographic and other information on Subject, who is known to this Agency. He is a half-brother of UTILITY. The information is non-derogatory.
- b. Data re Irving D. TONER sent to Agency 1/5/62 and 12/22/61. The FBI is referring to DBF-98142, dated 5 January 1962, filed in [ ] [ ], and to DPT-97472, dated 22 December 1961, filed in [ ] [ ]. The documents refer to Irving David Toner, who appears to be a compulsive writer of crank letters to the FBI. An anonymous letter reporting that Reinhard GEHLEN, head of the West German Intelligence Service occasionally visited the U. S. was received by the FBI and forwarded to this Agency. This Agency and the FBI conducted an investigation in an attempt to determine the source of the letter. It was subsequently determined via hand writing analysis and personal interview that Toner, inspired by an article on Gehlen in Time Magazine, had corresponded with the FBI. Other pertinent correspondence on this matter is contained in DBF-93438 dated 2 November 1961 and DBF-94067, dated 9 November 1961. The information is non-derogatory to UTILITY.
- c. Data re W. B. Niezgoda-Strusiewicz sent to Agency 5/3/55 p. 6. The FBI is referring to DFB-5327, dated 21 May 1955, date of report 5 March 1955, filed in [ ] [ ] Subject:

SECRET



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NW 002670



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Witold B. STRUSIEWICZ. STRUSIEWICZ, a former member of the Polish Army who collaborated with the Germans during World War II and worked for the Agency in the immediate post-war years, wrote to General Gehlen soliciting employment, using a cover name. The END referred the case to the Agency; owing to the fact that Subject was residing in Chicago, the Agency referred the case to the FBI. A subsequent investigation revealed Subject's true name and past intelligence history, which was passed to the END. Since it is entirely possible that the END eventually contacted Subject, the Agency posed no objection to the FBI requiring Subject to register as a foreign agent. It is not felt that the data is derogatory.

2. Please refer any questions to [ ]  
E/G/CE.

[ ]  
C/E/G

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee  
2 - E/G/CE  
1 - E/G/IS

SECRET

24. 9. 1968

Dear Mr. Brown,

After careful consideration I came to the conclusion that it is not a good idea to make now in a rush the discussed outline. It is necessary to think everything over thoroughly, what should be mentioned etc, and this will take a certain time since I am kept busy now with several other things. First of all I should discuss the whole matter with my lawyer before taking any other steps. Besides, I have to leave in a few days and have to prepare my trip carefully. The necessary time would not be available even for a brief discussion. So I hope you will not be disappointed and understand my position.

633302 ← I enjoyed our discussion on various of your subjects very much and I hope you will have satisfactory talks with General Metz and Colonel Staubwasser. The new phone number of General Metz, is Munich 86 26 62. He lives at a suburb: Gauting, Zugspitzstr. 15. You know the address and phone number of Colonel Staubwasser, whom I suppose you will meet after his leave which ends next Monday.

I wish you some pleasant days in Munich, maybe you have fun, at the "Oktoberfest".

Sincerely yours,

Dr. SCHEIDER

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SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

25 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Complications Caused by Anthony (Tony) BROWN  
During Visit to Munich

1. Background: On 20 September 1968 General SIBERT (U.S. Army Retired) visited the U.S. Consulate, Munich, seeking guidance as to how he could best contact Dr. Schneider. The undersigned was brought into a meeting between Consul General CREEL and General SIBERT to assist the latter. The undersigned was able to place General SIBERT in telephonic contact with Dr. Schneider. General SIBERT explained that his purpose in visiting Munich was to discuss with Dr. Schneider the latter's contribution to a book which General SIBERT is writing about World War II. He further explained that he was accompanied by one "Tony" BROWN, a British subject, who has been retained by Harper and Row to help General SIBERT in the preparation of his book. BROWN was with General SIBERT during the latter's visit to the Consulate but remained in the cafeteria during General SIBERT's meeting with Mr. CREEL. The undersigned met BROWN in the Consulate cafeteria shortly thereafter in the company of General SIBERT while awaiting Dr. Schneider's call. During an informal chat BROWN indicated that he was lecturing at a university in California and that he was formerly a journalist with a daily newspaper in London. The undersigned's initial impression of BROWN, who was extremely hung over from a heavy night of drinking, was that he possessed all the attributes of an unpleasant journalist type, i.e., loud, somewhat arrogant, overly inquisitive, and excessively gabby. General SIBERT indicated that one Fnu CANFIELD (nationality unknown), apparently also a writer, would be joining SIBERT and BROWN in Munich for their discussions with Dr. Schneider. General SIBERT and BROWN were registered at the Splendid Hotel, Maximilianstrasse. After we arranged contact between General SIBERT and Dr. Schneider we assumed that our role in this situation was over.

2. On 24 September 1968 Mr. Tom KELLY, Chief Visa and Citizenship Section, U.S. Consulate, Munich, received a telephone call from Mr. BROWN who requested the Consulate's assistance in cashing a personal check which had been left with Mr. BROWN by

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A/c aa to ECMA 72128

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General SIBERT when the latter departed Munich on or about 23 September. When Mr. KELLY advised BROWN that the Consulate was prohibited by regulation from cashing checks from private citizens, BROWN, who was obviously under the influence of alcohol, demanded that he talk with Consul General, explained that he was here on a very important mission with General SIBERT to discuss matters of importance with Dr. Schneider, stated that the undersigned knew all about the mission and indicated that his mission was at the behest of, or at least had the tacit approval of EOS. BROWN further stated that he was to be a house guest of Dr. Schneider at Starnberg and that he had an important meeting with Dr. Schneider at the latter's home on the afternoon of 24 September, and that the Consulate had to help him since he otherwise would not be allowed to check out of his hotel because he did not have sufficient cash to pay his bill and the hotel would not accept General SIBERT's check.

3. Mr. KELLY tried to reach the undersigned who was temporarily unavailable and did contact Mr. Walter WAGNER of OCA, asking him if he knew anything about BROWN. When WAGNER heard Dr. Schneider's name mentioned he realized it was not his business and referred Mr. KELLY to the undersigned. Mr. KELLY finally reached the undersigned who advised KELLY that General SIBERT and Mr. BROWN were on a private visit to Munich to discuss certain aspects of their book with German military figures, that General SIBERT had visited Mr. CREEL and had spoken with the undersigned and that the Consulate was aware of their mission. The undersigned emphasized, however, that no element of the U.S. Government was sponsoring BROWN and SIBERT. The undersigned confirmed to KELLY that General SIBERT was indeed a retired U.S. Army General and Mr. KELLY agreed to contact the management of Hotel Splendid to advise them that General SIBERT was who he claimed to be and then suggest to them that they might hold General SIBERT's check in lieu of payment by Mr. BROWN until the latter could attain sufficient funds to pay this bill. Mr. KELLY did call the management of the hotel and also contacted Mr. BROWN, and since nothing was heard from them again, it was assumed that some suitable arrangements were made between them.

4. As previously reported, the undersigned suggested that Dr. Schneider be informally advised to use caution in his relationship with Mr. BROWN. From brief contact with him to date, it appears that he is capable of causing security problems through his actions.

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FYI: It should be noted that on the morning of 20 September General SIBERT mentioned in BROWN's presence that the only address he had through which he could reach Dr. Schneider was that of Mr. LUKAS (true name) with the U.S. Army address.

OCA Representative

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE CALL FROM OCA REPRESENTATIVE

0945, 26 September 1968

Mr. Tony Brown, British journalist associated with U.S. Army General SIBERT (Ret), is presently staying at the Hotel Splendid in Munich and has run up a bill of approximately DM 4,000, which he has been promising to pay for the past several days and has failed to do so. About DM 1,000 are telephone charges.

The OCA Representative contacted Mr. KLINKS, manager of Hotel Splendid, Maximillianstr, and found the latter very courteous and reasonable. Mr. KLINKS speaks excellent English. The OCA Representative told Mr. KLINKS that he was an officer at the United States Consulate General in Munich, but was calling unofficially concerning the indebtedness of Mr. BROWN. OCA Representative explained that, as BROWN is not a U.S. citizen, the Consulate cannot become officially involved; however, because we did not desire Gen SIBERT's name tarnished by involvement in a police action, we would try to assist in settling the matter.

Mr. KLINKS stated that he understood, and appreciated the position taken by the OCA Representative. He consented to cooperate by delaying a complaint to the police, which he had intended to register on 26 September. Mr. KLINKS stated that he believed BROWN was unstable.

The OCA Representative told Mr. KLINKS that we would arrange to have a friend of Gen SIBERT's come to the hotel and pay the bill (again stressing that this would be done only in respect for Gen SIBERT and not because of any official obligation by the Consulate General). Mr. KLINKS said that he would not be available between 1330 and 1500 because of a medical appointment, but requested that the "friend of Gen SIBERT" contact him before or after that period. The OCA Representative recommended that the person who contacts the hotel speak only with Mr. KLINKS personally, and have sufficient cash to pay a bill in excess of DM 4,000.

(At this point, OCA Representative received  
a telephone call from BROWN on another line.)

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REPORT OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN OCA REPRESENTATIVE AND TONY BROWN

Circa 1000 hours, 26 September 1968

BROWN told the OCA Representative that he was having a little "difficulty" at his hotel. He said he wanted to do the right thing and fully intended to pay the bill; however, he had not received the money he has telegraphed for from Harper and Row, his publishers--but the hotel manager would not even believe that he had sent for the money and was pressing him to pay immediately. BROWN said the basic cause of his inability to pay the bill was that he had given his travellers checks to Gen SIBERT and "Mr. CANFIELD" to enable them to travel on; and he was not able to cash the personal checks he had received from Gen SIBERT and Mr. CANFIELD in exchange. BROWN asked the OCA Representative to contact the hotel manager and assure him the bill will be taken care of, and the OCA Representative agreed to assist in this manner. (The OCA Representative did not tell BROWN that he had already discussed the matter with Mr. KLICKS.)

The OCA Representative asked BROWN about a report from Mr. KELLY of the Visa Section that BROWN had attempted to cash personal checks through the U.S. Consulate General. BROWN said that the OCA Representative was all wrong, as he, BROWN, had made no such attempts. The OCA Representative, speaking firmly, told BROWN that Mr. KELLY had made this statement, which the OCA representative was merely repeating, and that the OCA Representative wanted to make it abundantly clear to BROWN that BROWN was not representing the United States Government in any fashion and was not to use the names of official Americans or Germans for his own purposes. BROWN said that of course he understood he was here on a commercial assignment and had no intention of involving persons in official governmental status. BROWN repeated that he just wanted to do the right thing, and keep this problem among "ourselves."

Circa 1030 hours, 26 September

BROWN called the OCA Representative and told him he had just received word from American Express that the money he was waiting for had arrived, and that he intended to pick it up and pay the hotel bill right away.

(The OCA Representative telephoned Mr. KLICKS and told him he understood BROWN now had sufficient funds and would pay his bill on 26 September; however, Mr. KLICKS should advise the OCA Representative if BROWN failed to settle the bill)

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SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE CALL FROM OCA REPRESENTATIVE

1250 hours, 26 September

Mr. KLINKS had called the OCA Representative and informed him that BROWN had paid DM 2,400 only, and that he would like to get the entire amount outstanding today. KLINKS said he intended to cut off all services at the hotel for BROWN in order that no additional charges would accumulate. The OCA Representative said he did not believe, however, that KLINKS will go to the police, at least not right away.

After receiving this information from KLINKS, the OCA Representative again spoke with BROWN and told the latter that the entire affair was becoming very embarrassing and that he should obtain funds and pay what he owed to the Hotel Splendid without delay. BROWN stated that he simply had not received enough money to pay the entire bill, and he couldn't understand why Mr. KLINKS was so upset because he would certainly pay in full as soon as possible. The OCA Representative told BROWN that there was still a sizeable sum owed the hotel, and the manager's concern was not unreasonable. BROWN said that he had asked only for 2,000 (dollars or mark-equivalent?), and at another point said he had asked for 750-- apparently BROWN had received less than he requested, whatever the amount.

The OCA believes that BROWN will continue efforts to obtain more funds to pay the hotel, as BROWN has too much to lose by running out on a debt. In this regard, BROWN remarked to the OCA Representative that he hoped his firm would not hear of this matter.

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In an effort to pass the above information to Mr. Lukas, latter's secretary called Dr. Schneider's office and asked if Mr. Lukas were expected there. Dr. SCHNEIDER came on the line and asked for the latest developments (having been briefed earlier in the day by Mr. Lukas). Dr. SCHNEIDER was informed that BROWN had made only a partial payment and still owed the hotel between 1600 and 2000 Marks, for which the Hotel manager was seeking immediate payment. Dr. SCHNEIDER said that he did not feel he was under any obligation or commitment to BROWN, as he was working only with Gen SIBERT. Dr. SCHNEIDER had met Mr. CANFIELD, a business representative of Harper and Row, and Mr. BROWN through Gen SIBERT. Dr. SCHNEIDER said that BROWN impressed him as an amusing person and a competent writer (who probably liked to drink pretty well),



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but he did not gain the impression that BROWN was unreliable to the extent reflected by the present situation. Dr. SCHNEIDER said he found it very surprising that BROWN could have incurred so large a bill at the hotel. When Dr. SCHNEIDER was informed that a considerable part of the total represented long-distance telephone charges, he said it would be interesting to know the names of individuals BROWN had called.

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1400 hours, 26 September 1968

The OCA Representative called to say he had heard from BROWN to the effect that Mr. KLIKES had agreed to hold the two personal checks of Gen SIBERT and Mr. CANFIELD as security for subsequent payment by BROWN. BROWN said he was moving to another hotel on the afternoon of 26 September and would contact the OCA Representative to let him know his address.

(Mr. Lukas advised Dr. SCHNEIDER that the matter appeared to be settled, and that he would brief him completely on 27 September.)

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26 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: More on Anthony "Tony" BROWN

REFERENCE: Our Memorandum on Mr. BROWN dated 25 September 1968

1. The Visa and Citizenship Section of the U.S. Consulate, circa 0900 hours on 26 September 1968, received a telephone call from Mr. KLINKS, the owner of the Hotel Splendid, Maximilianstr., Munich, regarding problems Mr. KLINKS was having with Mr. BROWN's hotel bill. Mr. KLINKS advised that the hotel bill was something over DM 4,000 at the present time and that although Mr. BROWN kept assuring him that he would be receiving money by wire, Mr. KLINKS was unwilling to provide any further services for Mr. BROWN and that he had no choice but to take the matter to the German police. Mr. KLINKS was reluctant to take this action and asked if something could be done to settle Mr. BROWN's hotel bill.

2. The foregoing was brought to the attention of OCA immediately. OCA in turn called Lukas to advise him of this new development. Lukas requested that OCA contact Mr. KLINKS and persuade him not to take the planned action with the police. OCA was also authorized to inform Mr. KLINKS that a friend of General SIBERT's would visit Mr. KLINKS on the afternoon of 26 September 1968 and settle Mr. BROWN's bill.

3. OCA called Mr. KLINKS shortly thereafter and explained that although the Consulate was unable to take any official action in this matter inasmuch as Mr. BROWN is a British subject, informal inquiries had established that personal friends of General SIBERT would be willing to settle this hotel bill immediately so as to avoid any embarrassment for General SIBERT who was well known as a reputable retired U.S. Army general. Mr. KLINKS was delighted at this news and assured OCA that he would take no police action and that he did not want to cause any embarrassment for General SIBERT or the United States. KLINKS further stated that he had gained the impression that Mr. BROWN was somewhat unstable and had also observed that he was an extremely heavy drinker. He further advised that whoever came to settle the bill should come before 1330 hours or after 1500 hours on 26 September inasmuch as he had a medical appointment which would take him away from the hotel for that period. He also requested that whoever visited

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the hotel deal with him directly rather than with one of the hired help. Mr. KLINKS thanked OCA for its interest and apologized for taking up time. In short, he was a perfect gentleman.

4. As OCA was passing the aforementioned information to Lukas' secretary, OCA received a call directly from Mr. BROWN who advised that he was having considerable trouble with his hotel bill. Mr. BROWN stated that he had carried sufficient Traveler's Checks to take care of his travel and living expenses but that he had signed a large portion of these Traveler's Checks over to General SIBERT and Ross CANFIELD when they departed Munich earlier in the week. Both of these gentlemen gave BROWN personal checks in the same amount but BROWN was unable to use these personal checks to pay his hotel bill. He further stated that he had wired Harper and Row for \$2,000 to be sent via American Express and expected to receive this momentarily. Mr. BROWN asked if there was anything OCA could do informally to assure the hotel management that BROWN and SIBERT were reputable people, were on a valid business mission, and that their bills would be paid by Mr. BROWN upon receipt of the funds for which he had wired. OCA told Mr. BROWN that OCA would be willing to call the hotel owner and attempt to hold off police action (OCA had already done so) but that this could be done only on an informal basis and not as an official call from the U.S. Consulate. Mr. BROWN made several hints during the conversation to the effect that it would be to the advantage of everyone concerned if this question of the hotel bill could be quashed. During the course of the conversation OCA advised Mr. BROWN that OCA was somewhat unhappy about the turn of his conversation with Mr. KELLY for it was understood that he attempted to imply to Mr. KELLY that his business in Munich was sanctioned by certain elements of the United States Government. Mr. BROWN assured OCA that he had no intention of making such implications during his conversation with Mr. KELLY. OCA did not pursue this on the telephone with Mr. BROWN but the facts of the matter as previously reported are clear.

5. OCA passed the foregoing information to Lukas' secretary and circa 1030 hours on 26 September OCA received another call from Mr. BROWN in which he stated that the money had arrived and was waiting for him at American Express. He planned to pick it up soonest and settle his hotel bill that same morning. He urged OCA to keep this problem "amongst ourselves" so as to avoid further embarrassment. The information in the foregoing paragraph was transmitted to Lukas' secretary.

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6. OCA is attempting to reach Mr. KLINKS at the Hotel Splendid to advise him that Mr. BROWN has stated that he now has sufficient funds to pay his bill and that General SIBERT's "friends" will not visit him on the afternoon of 26 September unless Mr. KLINKS advises OCA later in the day that Mr. BROWN has not settled his account.

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27 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Mr. Anthony (Tony) BROWN

REFERENCES: Previous Memos, Same Subject, dated 25 and 26  
September 1968

1. OCA reached Mr. KLINKS by telephone again at circa 1230 hours on 26 September to advise him that we had learned from BROWN that he had received funds from Harper and Row and would pay his hotel bill soonest. Mr. KLINKS stated that Mr. BROWN had just paid DM 2,400.00 on a bill of over DM 4,000.00 and that the difference was still outstanding. Mr. BROWN had promised to wire for additional funds. Mr. KLINKS stated further that he was cutting off all services to Mr. BROWN until the account was settled.

2. OCA then contacted Mr. BROWN at the hotel by telephone. Mr. BROWN explained that he had only asked for \$750.00 from Harper and Row, not realizing that his bill would be so high and that he planned to wire for more money immediately. (Mr. BROWN had previously informed OCA that he had asked for and was expecting \$2000.00.) Mr. BROWN stated further that he planned to talk with Mr. KLINKS soonest and to work out a solution by offering to leave his passport on deposit with Mr. KLINKS until the additional funds arrived. Mr. BROWN again requested that we keep knowledge of this whole incident restricted, because he felt that if the people with whom he is dealing in Munich (Dr. SCHNEIDER) learned of the matter, they would be upset and thus might upset negotiations with them. OCA assured Mr. BROWN that we would do everything possible (informally) to keep the matter out of the hands of the police.

3. Circa 1330 hours on 26 September Mr. BROWN again called OCA and advised that he had made an arrangement with Mr. KLINKS wherein Mr. BROWN deposited with Mr. KLINKS two personal checks (one from Gen. SIBERT and one from Ross CANFIELD) as security until he received additional cash to settle the hotel bill. Mr. BROWN was moving out of the Hotel Splendid and would seek other hotel accommodations. Mr. BROWN stated that he would let OCA know as soon as he had found other quarters.

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4. As of 1030 hours on 27 September 1968 OCA has had no further word from Mr. BROWN nor have we heard from Mr. KLICKS.

OCA

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MEMO FOR RECORD

0945, 4 Oct 68

Dr. Schneider's secretary called Lukas' office to ask if we had any information on the whereabouts of Mr. Tony Brown. A call had been received by Dr. Schneider's officer from the Vier Jahreszeiten Hotel stating that they had Mr. Brown's baggage, and he had not been in the hotel for two days. Whether or not Brown's bill at the hotel has been paid was not discussed by Dr. Schneider's secretary and the caller from the hotel. She said she did not know how the Vier Jahreszeiten had obtained the telephone number of their office.

The secretary stated that she understood that Brown had intended to travel to Hannover to interview a German lady for information on the book being written by Gen Sibert. The secretary knew the lady in Hannover and had contacted her only to find that Brown had been expected there, but had not appeared. The lady in Hannover had made hotel reservations for Brown, which he did not claim.

Brown recently contacted a member of GAMMA (unidentified, but probably an individual recommended to Brown by Gen Sibert). This GAMMA member had permitted Brown to borrow some photographs and books, and was concerned that Brown had not yet returned them.

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Following the above telephone conversation, Lukas' secretary checked with the OCA office who reported that he had heard nothing from Brown since the last call he received during the difficulties at the Hotel Splendid.

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1015, 4 Oct 68

Lukas' secretary telephoned Dr. Schneider's secretary and advised her that we had no information which would assist in locating Mr. Brown, but that we were still trying.

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After relating above information to Lukas by phone, Lukas' secretary telephoned Dr. Schneider's secretary to report that Lukas had no information on Brown at the present time. When questioned whether she knew Gen Sibert's current address, she replied in the negative and also advised that Dr. Schneider was out of the country. She said that the man

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who had given books and photographs to Brown was worried that these might be in the baggage Brown had left at the hotel and would like to talk to Mr. Lukas about recovering them. She was given Lukas' home phone number, and said she would attempt to call him direct; however, she did not plan to be in her office the afternoon of 4 October. (Note: She did not reach Lukas, but above info was passed to him via his own office.)

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Early afternoon, 4 Oct 68

OCA called to say that Mr. Klicks of the Hotel Splendid in Munich talked with Mr. Tom Kelly of the U.S. ConGen Visa and Citizenship Section on 4 October, and showed him a telegram received by Mr. Klick's bank from the National Bank of Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts:

THE CHECK DRAWN ON EDWARD L. SIBERT PAYABLE TO  
ANTHONY BROWN IN AMOUNT OF \$440.85 REPORTED STOLEN.  
STOP PAYMENT HAS BEEN PLACED.

Mr. Kelly reiterated to Mr. Klicks that the U.S. ConGen was merely attempting, unofficially, to assist Gen Sibert. Mr. Kelly assured Mr. Klicks that he would try to pass the information about the stop-payment order on to Gen Sibert and assured Mr. Klicks that it was not Gen Sibert's intention that Mr. Klicks would lose money owed to him.

The OCA Representative telephoned the Vier Jahreszeiten Hotel and inquired for Mr. Brown. The hotel informed him that Mr. Brown had checked out two days ago.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

7 October 1968

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Settlement of Operational Bill

1. This morning I was asked to act as a courier to pay an operational bill at the Hotel Splendid, Maximilian Strasse 54, Muenchen, Germany. I was given an envelope containing DM 1800, a blank receipt and instructed to get the receipt signed and pick up a "stopped" check from Edward L. Sebert. I was further instructed to deal only with a Mr. Klicks the hotel manager.

2. I returned to my office and called the Hotel Splendid and made an appointment to meet Mr. Klicks at 12:30 today, Oct. 7, 1968.

3. Upon meeting Mr. Klicks at 12:30 he presented me with an unpaid bill of DM 1247.15 instead of the amount of DM 1754.58, which was on the receipt that I had been given. He explained to me that the difference of DM 507.43 had been paid by Mr. Brown. He further explained that payment on the check to Mr. Edward L. Sebert had been stopped in the United States, and that he had been notified of the stop payment action by telegram. He gave me the copy of the telegram which is attached to this memorandum.

4. I therefore paid him DM 1247.15 from the DM 1800.00 which I had been given. He gave me in return two signed receipts, one for DM 1247.15 on which he wrote in his hand, "This covers bills on which check to Anthony Brown was drawn" signed by Mr. Klicks. He also signed the receipt which I had, stating that he received DM 1754.58, which he did not receive. Both receipts are attached to this memo.

5. Mr. Klicks was very friendly and cordial to me. He was only interested in receiving payment for his outstanding bills. He asked me if I were from the American Consulate, to which I replied that I was "a courier" sent to pay the bill. I then thanked him and left.

6. I am returning the following:

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(a) One telegram from the National Bank Vineyardhaven, Mass. to Bankhaus H. Aufhauser.

(b) One receipt signed by Mr. Klicks for DM 1247.15, with attached bills for Mr. Anthony Brown from the Hotel Splendid.

(c) One receipt signed by Mr. Klicks for DM 1754.58.

(d) DM 552.85, which is the change from the DM 1800.00 given me to pay the bill, which I paid for DM 1247.15.

~~BOB~~ Staff Member

**CONFIDENTIAL**

18 October, 1968

Mr. Lukas

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Dear General Sibert,

It was nice seeing you again and to meet Mr. Canfield. In the meantime I received a letter from him confirming the points of our conversation. It was all clear and fair.

But Mr. BROWN became quite a problem. When I called him up in order to give him the new address of General Metz, he tried to persuade me that he would make the outline for my book at the same day (24 September). I refused his offer and wrote him accordingly. Nevertheless he called the US Consulate, Munich, explained that he was here on a very important mission with General Sibert, to discuss matters of importance with me, that he was to be a house guest of mine at Starnberg and that he had an important meeting with me at my home on the afternoon of 24 September. The reason was that he could not pay the hotel bill and had difficulties in cashing a personal check which had been left with him by you. This amount was paid by the American side in order to avoid difficulties with the police which otherwise would have been called in by the hotel. The main reason for this help was to keep your reputable name out of an eventual scandal if newspapers got hold of the story. On 26 September, Brown moved to the Hotel "Vierjahreszeiten". On 30 September, he met Colonel Staubwasser after he had seen General Metz on 25 September. Both gentlemen gave him photographs and other material with the request to return it as soon as possible. They are worried about their material because Brown has disappeared since then. He also did not see Mrs. Lisa with whom he had an appointment. On 3 October, my secretary received a phone call from the Hotel "Vierjahreszeiten". The hotel asked for the whereabouts of Mr. Brown, who had left his luggage at the hotel but was not seen there since two days. I do not know how the hotel got my office telephone number nor whether Brown paid his

hotel bill, but I wonder why Mr. Brown told the hotel manager that he had come over from the States to meet me. The hotel manager requested that we inform him as soon as we know anything about the whereabouts of Mr. Brown

Dear General Sibert, I feel very sorry about this development but I think you should know what happened. Please let me know who will refund the amount of DM 1.247,15 to the American office in Munich, and what shall be done with the Hotel "Vierjahreszeiten" (luggage of Mr. Brown, hotel bill ?). The reputation of Mr. Brown has suffered quite a bit and I think it cannot be in our mutual interest to get mixed up with his wrong statements and his strange way of behaviour. General Metz and Colonel Staubwasser are very anxious to get back their material and I would be grateful if I could inform them soon that Mr. Brown will return the material as soon as possible.

Hoping to see you again in a foreseeable future

with cordial regards

yours

S/DR. SCHNEIDER

THE ARMY AND NAVY CLUB  
WASHINGTON

28 October 1968.

Dear [redacted] Representative,

General Belmont called me today & suggested that I should write to you and let you know what happened in Munich.

First of all let me say that if you have incurred any financial expense on my behalf, as I understand you have from

Dr. Schneider, I would you please send me an account of my account and your bill will be settled immediately. His name & address is: JAMES L. NIXON,

220 Ventura #5A,

PALO ALTO, CALIF.

Secondly in regard to the Hotel Splendid I appear to have left there owing \$300. I kept as a guarantee two checks, one for \$150 & the other for \$485. These were given to me by the other members of my party in settlement of their accounts with me. To my surprise an attempt has been made to cash these checks even though you, most kindly, agreed to have settled the bill. This, I think, establishes the nature of the people who are at the Splendid. Furthermore, I called the manager & asked him to bill me. I have heard nothing whatever from him. I have

THE ARMY AND NAVY CLUB  
WASHINGTON

came in mine that I received the bill of the hotel with the \$1,000 I had cabled to me from New York.

Finally, I have to go to Frankfurt for lunch expecting to return to the Fort session that same day. While in Frankfurt urgent business made it necessary for me to return to New York, & I could not return to Munich to pay my bill, collect my baggage, or to collect a further \$750 which had been cabled to me. [Although I did in fact pay part of the Fort session bill before going to Frankfurt]. Therefore I wired the hotel asking them to bill me. This I reinforced with a telephone call to the management from Washington. Again I have heard nothing.

When I receive the bill I will cable the remittance.

I hope you will accept that not at all this trouble has been caused by my assuming liability for my colleagues. I thought the cheques would be negotiable, but they were not & therein lies the embarrassment.

Please accept my most sincere apologies for any difficulties caused you.

Yours sincerely,

AC Brown

S E C R E T

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

29 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Mr. Anthony BROWN

1. At 1045 hours on 29 October 1968 the undersigned received a long distance telephone call at his office from Subject, calling from the Army-Navy Club in Washington, D.C.

2. Subject stated that he had received a "rather unpleasant" letter from Dr. SCHNEIDER in which the latter stated that the undersigned had been forced to pay a circa 1600 DM hotel bill at the Hotel Splendid. Subject was calling to advise that he would send a check for reimbursement as soon as he had a few problems on his end straightened out. (During the entire conversation Subject referred to Dr. SCHNEIDER as Der Alte.) Subject further advised that he was having problems with General SIBERT regarding this hotel bill and that he had also received an "unpleasant" communication from him.

3. Because we were talking on a trans-Atlantic call and because we had received no advice to the effect that Dr. SCHNEIDER was planning to use the undersigned's name in open correspondence with Subject, Subject was advised (truthfully) that the undersigned had not paid the Hotel Splendid bill, nor had any contact with the hotel since Subject's departure.

4. Subject then requested that the undersigned contact the Hotel Vier Jahreszeiten and attempt to straighten out the problem Subject had at that hotel, indicating that it was also an unpaid bill. The undersigned advised Subject that we had no intention of becoming involved with the Hotel Vier Jahreszeiten with regard to any of Subject's business with that hotel. Subject attempted to imply that it would be in the best interests of all concerned (including WOFIRM, by vague allusion) to get these problems squared away as soon as possible. The undersigned advised Subject that his financial problems with hotels and individuals were not our concern and that we did not want to become personally involved. Subject was most apologetic and stated frequently that he understood our position but he continued to beg assistance in these matters to the point where the undersigned concluded that Subject was either drunk or he is mentally unbalanced.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

-2-

5. We talked for approximately 10 minutes on these matters, although the undersigned continually attempted to break off the call.

6. Subject asked during the telephone call whether there was "one of your people" in Washington whom he could contact to straighten out this matter, and mentioned that he would be happy to be contacted by our Hqs. Subject was advised that there was no one in Washington whom he should contact. Subject indicated that he would be staying at the Army-Navy Club in Washington for the next several weeks.

7. At the conclusion of the call the undersigned advised Subject in firm tones that the matter of his unpaid hotel bills and problems with the General and Dr. SCHNEIDER should be soluble by direct contact between him and the principals.

OCA Representative

S E C R E T



<b>DISPATCH</b>	CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>	PROCESSING ACTION	
			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, EUR			NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Base, Munich <i>Woff</i>			MICROFILM
SUBJECT CATUSK <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UTILITY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			
<p>Transmitted for Headquarters disposition is the 1946-1966 portion of Munich's dossier on Subject, together with a related file of press clippings.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">[ ]</p> <p>Attachment: A/S, H/W</p> <p>Distribution: 3 - EUR w/att</p> <p style="text-align: right;">DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005</p> <p style="text-align: right;">GROUP I EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION</p>			
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER EGMT-16900	DATE 1 October 1968	
	CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>	HQS FILE NUMBER	

SECRET

<b>REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW</b>		DATE <div style="text-align: right;">30 October 1968 lc</div>	
TO: <div style="text-align: center;">C/E/G/CE -</div>		C NO.	
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA		SUBJECT: <div style="text-align: right;">GEHLEN, Reinhard</div>	
IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.			
PRO I	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER		
PRO II	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION		
FIELD TRACES	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA		
RI TRACES	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA		
OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA		
RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE		
GREEN LIST	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHERS (See Remarks)		
NOTICE: <input type="checkbox"/> FIRST <input type="checkbox"/> SECOND <input type="checkbox"/> THIRD AND FINAL			
REMARKS:  <div style="margin-left: 40px;"> 1. In accordance with your request of 23 July 1968 for an SRD to cover Subject's official farewell visit to the United States and Agency Headquarters, up-to-date National Agency Checks were run with non derogatory results.   2. No SRD will be made, however, since Subject has retired from the BND and since his visit to the U. S. has been completed.   3. CI/OA is closing its file on this case. </div>			

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
AAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

ORIG: C  
UNIT: E/G/CE  
EXT: 1172  
DATE: 12 November 1968

MESSAGE FORM  
TOTAL COPIES:  
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ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS		SECRET
1		
2		
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10		

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO \_\_\_\_\_ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID  
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CE FILE NO.

COMP:

C/EURS

☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE

VR

C/ETSD, DDP, ADDP

(classification)

(date and time filed)

(refile)  
(reference number)

**SECRET**

CITE DIRECTOR

49706

TO

PRIORITY MUNICH

RYBAT

FOR [ ]

REF: EGMA-71886

32W-2-28/13

E/G/CE  
413  
MAB

1. SEIBERT VISITED UTILITY IN MUNICH DURING SEPTEMBER. IT APPEARS HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ONE ANTHONY BROWN WHO, AFTER SEIBERT LEFT, GOT INTO SOME SORT OF TROUBLE INVOLVING AN EXPENDITURE OF DM 1,247.15, APPARENTLY AT THE HOTEL SPLENDID.

2. SEIBERT HAS SINCE HEARD FROM UTILITY WHO SAYS THE BILL WAS PAID BY "THE AMERICAN SIDE" TO AVOID EMBARRASSMENT FROM THE POLICE. SEIBERT NOW IN WASHINGTON WANTING TO REPAY THE SUM ADVANCED BY THE AMERICAN SIDE.

3. WE HAVE HAD NO REPORTING ON THE ABOVE INCIDENT. SEIBERT IN WASHINGTON FOR TWO DAYS, AND WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR REPLY BEFORE HE LEAVES.

END OF MESSAGE

AC/EUR

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

**SECRET**

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

AUTHENTICATING  
OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

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SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 382B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED		CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES 16	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
ADVANCE COPY <input type="checkbox"/> ISSUED <input type="checkbox"/> SLOTTED  BY: _____ AT: _____ Z  DISSEM BY: 8 PER _____ ACTION: C/EUR 5 <input type="checkbox"/> RID COPY		<b>SECRET</b> (When Filled In) REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED INDEX: <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO CLASSIFY TO FILE NO _____ X-REF TO FILE NO _____ FILE RID <input type="checkbox"/> RET. TO _____ BRANCH <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY <input type="checkbox"/> SIG.		1	6
				2	7
				3	8
				4	9
				5	10
INFO: C/R/SD, DCL, D/DCL, DDP, ADDP, CS/RE, C/FLZ					
FILE VR: C/C1					

SECRET 131306Z NOV 68 CITE BONN 7814

MUNICH INFO DIRECTOR

RYBAT CATUSK

33327 13 NOV 69

1. EVENING 1 NOV <sup>1</sup>LNWILT REP BONN HAD LONG SESSION WITH FRIEND OF LONG STANDING, LT. COL. RUDOLF ROTHE. AS EVENING PROGRESSED, ROTHE BECAME MORE AND MORE OUTSPOKEN RE HIS DISMAY OF OLD FRIEND <sup>2</sup> [ ] ON WHOM HE HAD COUNTED ON REVAMPING <sup>3</sup>CATUSK, PRIMARILY BY FIRING SOME OLD RETINUE OF UTILITY. UNFOR- <sup>4</sup>TUNATELY, HOWEVER (SO MOANS ROTHE), <sup>2</sup> [ ] NOT ONLY FAILED TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL, BUT HE ALSO AGREED GIVE UTILITY <sup>4</sup>AN OFFICE IN <sup>3</sup>CATUSK HQS COMPONENT AND A SECRETARY, THEREBY PERMITTING <sup>4</sup>UTILITY, WITH HELP HIS LITTLE BLACK BOOK (WHATEVER IS MEANT BY THAT), TO PULL ALL THE STRINGS IN <sup>3</sup>CATUSK AS HERETOFORE. FURTHER- MORE, ROTHE CLAIMED <sup>2</sup> [ ] MADE GRAVE MISTAKE BY APPOINTING ALIAS WINTERSTEIN AS CHIEF COLLECTION (BESCHAFFUNG) WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS INCOMPETENT BRAGGART.

2. ROTHE ALSO STATED IT WELL KNOWN WENDILAND DID NOT COMMIT SUICIDE SOLELY BECAUSE OF BOUTS OF DEPRESSION, ESPECIALLY SINCE HE IN BEST OF SPIRITS MORNING OF SUICIDE, BUT THAT POOR AND INEPT PERSONNEL HANDLING BY <sup>2</sup> [ ] LARGELY RESPONSIBLE

SECRET

GEHLEN

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED		CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
ADVANCE COPY <input type="checkbox"/> ISSUED <input type="checkbox"/> SLOTTED  BY: _____ AT: _____ Z  DISSEM BY _____ PER _____ ACTION <input type="checkbox"/> RID COPY		<b>SECRET</b> (When Filled In) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED INDEX: <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. _____ X-REF TO FILE NO. _____ FILE RID <input type="checkbox"/> RET. TO _____ BRANCH <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY <input type="checkbox"/> SIG. _____ INFO: _____ FILE. VR. _____	1 _____ 6 _____ 2 _____ 7 _____ 3 _____ 8 _____ 4 _____ 9 _____ 5 _____ 10 _____		

PAGE 2 BONN 7814 S E C R E T

FOR DRASTIC ACT. ROTHE STATED IT WELL KNOWN WITHIN CATUSK<sup>3</sup> THAT WENDTLAND AND MANY OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS RECEIVED LARGE LOANS FROM CATUSK<sup>3</sup> IN ORDER BUILD HOUSES OR BUY PROPERTY AND ARE REPAYING LOANS AT ANYWHERE FROM TWO TO FIVE MARKS PER MONTH. ROTHE IMPLIED LOANS MADE FROM CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS AND SOMEHOW WENDTLAND'S KNOWLEDGE OF ALL NAMES OF PERSONS WHO HAD RECEIVED THESE LOANS PLUS FACT HE REALIZED HE WOULD NOT BE APPOINTED VICE PRESIDENT, MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO WENDTLAND'S DECISION COMMIT SUICIDE. ROTHE CLAIMS THIS PROBABLY COULD HAVE BEEN AVERTED IF [ <sup>2</sup> ] HAD BEEN A MORE ASTUTE EVALUATOR OF HUMAN IDIOSYNCRASIES AND BEHAVIOR. ROTHE SAID IT WELL KNOWN FACT [ <sup>2</sup> ]'S WEAKEST POINT IS HIS TOTAL INABILITY JUDGE PEOPLE (EIN SCHLECHTER MENSCHENKENNER). ROTHE ALSO STATED THAT [ <sup>2</sup> ] HAS CHOSEN A MEMBER OF THE FRG JUDICIARY (DUNDESAN-WALTSCHAFT) TO BE HIS DEPUTY.

3. PLS KEEP IN MIND WHEN READING ABOVE THAT OBVIOUSLY SOMETHING MUST HAVE SOURED ROTHE ON CATUSK<sup>3</sup> AND HE SOMEWHAT INEBRIATED WHEN ABOVE STATEMENTS WERE MADE. ON OTHER HAND, HOWEVER, PAST INFO GAINED FROM ROTHE ALWAYS TRUE OR VERY CLOSE TO TRUTH--FH FAR HE CANNOT BE ACCUSED OF FABRICATIONS AND/OR IDLE GOSSIP.

S E C R E T

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ACTION: 9EURS

☐ RID COPY

**PRECEDENCE**

SECRET 130949Z NOV 68 CITE MUNICH 5389

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

RYBAT CATUSK

REF DIRECTOR 49706

1. DM 1,247.15 HAS BEEN CONTRIBUTED BY UTILITY;  
THERE IS NO MONEY OWED TO THE "AMERICAN SIDE." GEN  
SEIBERT WILL PROBABLY RECEIVE EXPLANATORY LETTER FROM  
UTILITY VERY SHORTLY.

2. MEMO FOR RECORD WILL BE POUNCHED TO HQS ON THIS  
INCIDENT.

SECRET

E/G/CE

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

CS COPY

**SECRET**

13 NOV 68

320-2-28/13

*ma. b*

~~SECRET~~/RYBAT TELEPOUCH

DISP NO- EGMS-8270

FILE NO- NONE

DATE - 5 DECEMBER 1968

INDEX - NONE

FILM - NONE

TO - CHIEF OF BASE, MUNICH

INFO - CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY

FROM - CHIEF, EUR

SUBJECT- RYBAT CATUSK

ACTION - SEE BELOW

REFS - MUNICH 5389, 13 NOVEMBER 1968

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

WHEN MAY WE EXPECT MEMO FOR RECORD ON GENERAL SEIBERT INCIDENT?

DISTRIBUTION -

BY TELEPOUCH

2 - COB/MUNICH

2 - COS/GERMANY

~~SECRET~~/RYBAT EGMS-8270

DESENSITIZED

per DOI 70-17

HQS DISTRIBUTION -

2 - E/G/CE

1 - E/G/IS

1 - E/REG

1 - RID

PREPARED BY - [ ]

RELEASED IN DRAFT BY - [ ]

[ ] E/G/CE

[ ] DC/E/G

3P

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
TO	Chief, European Division	X	MARKED FOR INDEXING (See Att.) sheet
INFO.	Chief of Station, Germany		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief of Base, Munich		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	CATUSK Visit to Munich of Anthony BROWN, Journalist with Brig Gen Edward L. SIBERT		
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			
FYI			
<p>1. In connection with his farewell visit to the States in the summer of 1968, UTILITY came into contact with Brig Gen Edward L. SIBERT, USA (Retired), who was the Theater G-2 at the time of the establishment of U.S. relationships with CATUSK. Gen SIBERT gave the go-ahead signal that brought CATUSK under U.S. Army sponsorship. Through the years there has been an infrequent contact between Gen SIBERT and UTILITY. In retirement Gen SIBERT has been working on a book based upon his wartime and immediate postwar intelligence activities, not including any detailed section with regard to CATUSK. Gen SIBERT requested UTILITY to write a 1,000-word preface to his book, which UTILITY agreed to do.</p> <p>2. Subsequent to UTILITY's return from the United States Gen SIBERT appeared on the scene along with a Mr. Anthony BROWN, ex-London Journalist and currently representative of Harper and Row, SIBERT's publishers. Gen SIBERT had lost the directions furnished by UTILITY for getting in touch with him, hence SIBERT called at U.S. Consulate General in Munich requesting to be put in contact with UTILITY. On receipt of this request at the Consulate, [ ] called the office of COB Munich and obtained the unlisted telephone number of UTILITY, which [ ] in turn furnished to Gen SIBERT. UTILITY and Gen SIBERT met, and Anthony BROWN was introduced to UTILITY by Gen SIBERT. After Gen SIBERT's departure from Germany, the manager of the Hotel Splendid where BROWN was staying contacted the U.S. Consulate General, since the manager understood that Gen SIBERT was sponsoring BROWN, and complained that BROWN had not paid a sizeable bill at the hotel. The manager said that he intended to take the matter to the police--which would make the incident subject to exposure and exploitation by the Munich press. To avoid this, Munich Base contacted UTILITY who stated that, although he was not immediately able to do so, in a few days he would certainly be willing to honor Gen SIBERT's</p> <p>-CONTINUED-</p> <p>ATTACHMENT: (Under Separate Cover)</p> <p>Memos/Letters</p> <p>Distribution: 13 - C/Eur Div w/att 2 - COS/Germany w/att</p> <p>12/15/68 S/C</p> <p>RECEIVED DISPATCH DEC 16 1968</p> <p>3/100000</p> <p>[ ]</p>			
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE	
[ ]	EGMA-72,128	10 December 1968	
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQ'S FILE NUMBER	
		324-002-028/1	

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EXEMPTION 3B2B  
Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act  
DATE 2009



CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T RYBAT [REDACTED]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER TEGMA-72,128
		Page 2 10 December 68
<p>check left by BROWN to satisfy the debt at the Hotel Splendid. With this assurance, [ ] drew an advance to cover Gen SIBERT's check. The hotel was paid, UTILITY refunded the money, and the advance was repaid in full.</p>		
<p>3. At [ ]'s request, UTILITY wrote to Gen SIBERT explaining that Munich Base had been reimbursed for what it had expended, and should be considered out of the picture. In addition, UTILITY strongly urged Gen SIBERT to maintain control of BROWN and to insure that he made no further contact on this matter with the U.S. Consulate General or OCA offices.</p>		
<p>4. Attached are a number of memoranda and copies of letters which describe this charade in detail. These memoranda/letters were written during development of the case in order to have as coherent as possible a wrap-up account of what took place, and with/by whom, on the supposition that this tempest could be controlled locally without deluging Headquarters and Bonn with a stream of blow-by-blow reports. A general outline of these events was given to [ ] on his recent visit to Munich Base.</p>		
<p>5. UTILITY was greatly embarrassed at the turn of events and apologized profusely with many expressions of appreciation to us for taking the emergency initiative that kept Gen SIBERT and "Die Gruppe UTILITY" from another splash in the press.</p>		
<p style="text-align: center;">[ ]</p>		
FORM 53a 5-60 (47)	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T RYBAT [REDACTED]	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED         </div> <div>PAGE NO. 2</div> </div>

DB 16794

S E C R E T RYBAT TELEPOUCH

DISP NO EGMT-17171

DATE 16 DECEMBER 1968

TO CHIEF, EUROPEAN DIVISION

INFO CHIEF OF STATION, GERMANY

FROM CHIEF OF BASE, MUNICH

SUBJECT RYBAT CATUSK

GENERAL SIBERT/ANTHONY BROWN INCIDENT

REF EGMS-8270, 5 DEC 68

MEMO FOR RECORD ON SUBJECT POUCHED VIA EGMA-72128 16 DECEMBER 1968.

E 1  
DISTRIBUTION VIA 'TP'

3 - C/EUR

2 - COS/GERMANY

S E C R E T RYBAT DISPATCH EGMT-17171

BT

*Per instructions  
from E  
the and Executive  
Director want to see  
memo for record*



*Received 3 Jan 69  
and routed as above.  
Not routed per  
C/EK*

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
1E 2005

GROUP 1  
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downgrading and  
declassification

REINHARD GEHLEN  
Präsident des BND a.D.  
Generalleutnant d.R.a.D.

8181 BERG BEI STARNBERG, DEM 4 February, 1969  
WALDSTRASSE 68



Dear Mr. Helms,

Not only the United States but also all cooperating Intelligence leaders in the West complain the death of the Honorable Mr. Allen Dulles who was for all of us a symbol of seriousness and honesty in our common efforts to work for a peaceful world. It is not accidental that in the past in order to avoid his name in written documents we used the cover name "The Gentleman". He always proved to be not only an outstanding American official but also a friend of Germany. During all the years I admired his foresight, his experience and his broadmindedness. So I will always remember this great man as representative of the American intelligence effort during a long time. We participate in your grief.

Sincerely yours

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING												
		SECRET	PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED										
TO	Chief, European Division			MARKED FOR INDEXING											
INFO.	Chief, WOBONE			NO INDEXING REQUIRED											
	Chief [ ]			ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING											
FROM	Chief [ ]			ABSTRACT											
SUBJECT	CALL/UTILITY/SECUR Letter to UTILITY			MICROFILM											
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES															
<p>1. During one of his recent visits to UTILITY [ ] [ ] was given a letter which was written to UTILITY by IDENTITY. He also provided a copy of a letter written another MHRUSH officer.</p> <p>2. Rather than reply to the letters in the dark UTILITY has asked us to advise him, if possible, of just who IDENTITY is and what the organization he represents is. Munich has no traces of either.</p> <p>3. Any information Headquarters may develop for us would be appreciated.</p> <p>EGMS-2563</p>															
ATTACHMENT: U/S/C TNP 2 - letters IDENTITY			DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005												
DISTRIBUTION: 3 - C/EUR w/att usc tnp 3 - C/WOBONE w/att usc tnp 3 - [ ] w/att usc tnp			<table border="1"> <tr> <td>DATE TYPED</td> <td>DATE DISPATCHED</td> </tr> <tr> <td>6 Feb 1969</td> <td>12 FEB 1969</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">EGMT-17235</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER</td> </tr> </table>			DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED	6 Feb 1969	12 FEB 1969	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER		EGMT-17235		HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED														
6 Feb 1969	12 FEB 1969														
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER															
EGMT-17235															
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER															
CROSS REFERENCE TO			CLASSIFICATION												
			SECRET												

REINHARD GEHLEN

6181 BERG DEI STARNBERG, DEN 28. März 1969  
WALDSTRASSE 68

Lieber Mr. Helms!

Zu Ihrem Geburtstag möchte ich Ihnen sehr herzlich meine besten Wünsche aussprechen. Mögen Sie sich im neuen Lebensjahr bei der Last Ihrer Arbeit weiter guter Gesundheit erfreuen und möge Ihr Dienst sich auch weiterhin so erfolgreich entwickeln wie bisher. Ich kann mir vorstellen, daß Ihre Arbeit recht schwierigen Belastungen unterliegt und daß die aus der Natur der Sache sich im nachrichtendienstlichen Bereich immer ergebenden Schwierigkeiten ebenso wie die versuchte politische Untergrundeinwirkung des Gegners eine zunehmende Belastung der Aufgaben des Nachrichtenchefs mit sich bringen. Deswegen möchte ich Ihnen vor allem gute Gesundheit wünschen und ausreichende Möglichkeit zur Entspannung im Kreise Ihrer Familie.

Nachdem ich mich zur Zeit in der mehr passiven Rolle des Zuschauers auf der politischen Bühne befinde, denke ich oft und gern an die langen Jahre der Zusammenarbeit mit Ihrem Dienst aber auch Ihnen persönlich mit Dank zurück. Es ist das doch eine einzigartige Sache gewesen.

Mit einer Empfehlung an Ihre verehrte Frau Gemahlin bin ich mit herzlichen Grüßen an Sie in Verbundenheit

Ihr ergebener

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005



DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

FORM 302DA  
3-65

USE PREVIOUS  
EDITIONS

MFG. 1

CE

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION		CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES 20	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY		
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED		<b>SECRET</b> (When Filled In)  REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED  INDEX: <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO  CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. _____  X-REF TO FILE NO. _____  FILE RID <input type="checkbox"/> RET. TO _____ BRANCH <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY <input type="checkbox"/> SIG. _____	GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION		1	5
ADVANCE COPY <input type="checkbox"/> ISSUED <input type="checkbox"/> SLOTTED			2	7		
BY: _____ AT: _____ Z			3	8		
JUDGE BY 5 PER _____			4	9		
ACTION _____			5	10		
<input type="checkbox"/> RID COPY INFO: _____ FILE VR. R/AN DCI D/DCI DDP ADDP CSRF						

419

SECRET 081328Z APR 69 CITE 10370

8 APR 69 IN 31148

DIRECTOR

CATUSK UTILITY

1. ON 3 APRIL, UTILITY PASSED TO [ ] OFFICER  
LETTER FOR [ ] CONTAINING BIRTHDAY GREETINGS.  
TRANSLATION FOLLOWS. ORIGINAL BEING TRANSMITTED BY POUCH.

2. " DEAR [ ]. ON THE OCCASION OF YOUR BIRTHDAY  
I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS. IN THE  
COMING YEAR MAY YOU ENJOY CONTINUED GOOD HEALTH DESPITE  
THE BURDEN OF YOUR OFFICE AND MAY YOUR SERVICE CONTINUE  
TO DEVELOP AS SUCCESSFULLY AS IN THE PAST. I CAN IMAGINE  
THE STRAINS IMPOSED ON YOU AND THAT INTELLIGENCE WORK PER  
SE CREATES DIFFICULTIES AND THE POLITICAL SUBVERSIVE  
ACTIVITIES OF THE OPPONENT ADD TO THE RESPONSIBILITIES  
AND BURDENS OF YOUR OFFICE. IT IS BECAUSE OF THIS THAT  
I WISH YOU GOOD HEALTH ABOVE ALL AND HOPE YOU WILL FIND  
PLENTY OF OPPORTUNITY TO RELAX IN THE CIRCLE OF YOUR FAMILY.

SINCE I HAVE TAKEN ON THE ROLE OF PASSIVE  
OBSERVER OF THE POLITICAL ARENA, I OFTEN THINK BACK WITH  
PLEASURE ON THE LONG YEARS OF COOPERATION WITH YOUR

*Gehlen*

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION		CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED		<b>SECRET</b> (When Filled In)	GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION	1	6
ADVANCE COPY <input type="checkbox"/> ISSUED <input type="checkbox"/> SLOTTED				2	7
BY: _____ AT: _____ Z				3	8
DISSEM BY _____ PER _____				4	9
ACTION <input type="checkbox"/> RID COPY				5	10
		REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED			
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		BRANCH <input type="checkbox"/> DESTROY <input type="checkbox"/> SIG.			
		INFO: _____			
		FILE, VR, _____			

PAGE 2 [ ] 0370 S E C R E T

SERVICE AND WITH YOU PERSONALLY. IT WAS A UNIQUE  
EXPERIENCE.

WITH KINDEST REGARDS TO YOUR WIFE AND SINCEREST  
GREETINGS TO YOU I REMAIN, UTILITY."

S E C R E T

**SECRET**

ORIG: [ ]  
JNIT: C/EUR  
EXT: 5881  
DATE: 10 APRIL 1969

MESSAGE FORM  
TOTAL COPIES: 16

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1	6
2	7
3	8
4	9
5	10

TABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 4 PER #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO \_\_\_\_\_ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID  
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: [ ]

EUR 6

☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE VR DCI, A/DCI, DDP,

ADD. RIAN, CS/R

(elle)

(plan)

(classification)

(date and time filed)

(reference number)

SECRET

11 19 03 APR 69

CITE DIRECTOR

9.1.7.2.9

MAB

TO BONN

CATUSE UTILITY

REF: BONN 0370 (IN 31148) \*

1. PLEASE PASS FOLL MESSAGE.

2. DEAR UTILITY. I WAS BOTH PLEASED AND HONORED TO  
RECEIVE YOUR KIND WISHES ON MY BIRTHDAY. CORDIALLY.

END OF MESSAGE

\* UTILITY (1) passed to Munich Base Officer letter for [ ] containing  
birthday greetings.

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SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

DCI

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

DDP [ ]

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

AUTHENTICATING  
OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.



<b>DISPATCH</b>		CLASSIFICATION		PROCESSING ACTION	
		S E C R E T			MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO	Chief, European Division			XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.					ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Chief [ ]				MICROFILM
SUBJECT	CATUSK/UTILITY Letter for [ ]				
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES					
<p>REFERENCE: [ ] 0370</p> <p>We are forwarding under separate cover the original of UTILITY's letter for delivery to [ ]</p> <p>[ ]</p> <p><i>Message passed to TCI 15 May 69.</i></p> <p>Attachment</p> <p>Distribution: 2 - C/EUR w/att USC</p> <p>GROUP I - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION</p>					
CROSS REFERENCE TO		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER		DATE	
		EGNT-8603		APR 23 1969	
		CLASSIFICATION		HQS FILE NUMBER	
		S E C R E T			

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SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

NEIGHBORHOOD RESOURCE CENTER  
449 W. 26th Street  
Chicago, Illinois 60616  
Phone 225-3923

The Neighborhood Resource Center is a community service post, specializing in jobs (training, counselling, placement, and follow-up). The N.R.C. target service area is between 22nd & 35th Street, Canal & Halsted. Job applicants are welcome from any part of Chicago.

The N.R.C. is funded by the federal Office of Economic Opportunity and co-sponsored by the private Chicago Commons Association.

#### GENERAL JOB PLACEMENT

1. We develop job openings in the local community and in the loop area. We set up interviews for applicants after counselling with them and emphasize training programs for these jobs.
2. We are pledged to find 100 summer jobs for students ages 16-21 who are planning to return to school this fall.
3. N.R.C. will help train and place young women with some clerical and sales skills. NRC wants to expose youth to a variety of jobs to improve their chances for better jobs in their future.

#### JOB TRAINING

1. English Class for Spanish Speaking people every Tuesday and Thursday 7-9 PM. Typing Class every Wednesday 6 P.M.

#### FAMILY SERVICE

1. Emergency food clothing, and transportation money for neighbors in need.
2. Food Buying Club- Fresh food is delivered from Water Street Market for neighbors to buy wholesale every Friday.
3. Summer Day Camp- A neighborhood committee is planning and coordinating with local youth agencies to run a Summer Day Camp, one for teens 13-17 and one for tots 6-12.
4. Counselling- NRC will help when it can, but usually refer to an appropriate agency.


#### COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION

NRC will help any group or individual solve a problem in order to improve the consitions of life in this community.

Attachment# 2

SECRET  
(When Filled In)

20 October 1969

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE				
SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
[ ] 9246 IN 72397 24 Oct 69 RYBAT [ ]		2. RI FILE NO.		
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.		4. DATE
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE	
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION				
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.		
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
14.  <p>... ON 20 OCTOBER UTILITY MUCH TO HIS SURPRISE (HE DESCRIBED IT TO [ ] AS "LIKE A BOLT OUT OF THE BLUE") WAS CALLED IN FOR FIRST TIME IN A YEAR BY [ ] FOR ADVICE AND COUNSEL. ONE OF THE TOPICS DISCUSSED WAS THE QUESTION OF FILLING THE VICE-PRESIDENCY SLOT. [ ] WAS OVERHEARD SAYING THAT UTILITY'S ADVICE WAS TO ATTEMPT BY ANY MEANS TO STALL FURTHER AND TO LEAVE THE SLOT OPEN.</p>				
15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 				

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

UTILITY 201

# Evaluation of Gehlen by [ ]

1 December 1969

This evaluation is based on my personal experiences and contacts with Dr. S which started in 1945. During the last few years I have seen and spoken Dr. S. on a number of occasions. My last and rather long meeting with him was in June of this year.

I believe that the high opinion I have about Dr. S. both in terms of his political and professional integrity, is the result of the simple fact that I have never found throughout the many years I have known him that there was a discrepancy between what he told me and what he did.

I'm convinced that the major motivating factor for his decision to seek contact with the Americans, was his strong anti-communist conviction and his realization that only the U.S. would be in a position to muster enough strength to implement policies designed to stop the further expansion of Communist domination. Dr. S. had arrived at this conclusion, i.e. the necessity of working with the Americans, still during World War II.

I'm equally convinced that Dr. S. had and has no political ambitions what his own person is concerned and therefore any comparisons with other politically minded German military leaders of the past is an exercise in futility. As result of the development of the "Gehlen organization" which employed a good number of former professional officers (among them was a fairly high percentage of former General Staff Officers), Dr. S. found himself in a position of considerable influence when the Bundeswehr was founded and many of the top officers transferred from his organization to the newly established German armed forces. However, again I fail to see that Dr. S. attempted to exercise any influence beyond strictly intelligence matters and through his intelligence reports which provided part of the background material for German policy- and decision-makers in their dealings with the challenges presented by Soviet policies.

There were at least three good reasons for getting the collaboration of many professional officers especially during the early phase of the organization. Dr. S. had very good grounds to be highly suspicious of the operations and of the field organization as set up by Mr. B. In the persons of the former professional officers he had reliable personnel which could keep an eye upon the rather shady dealings of B. and of some co-workers. The second reason for getting military personnel was their technical or staff skills. And finally the third reason was that recruitment was markedly influenced by personal acquaintanceship in order to reduce security risks. The repeated assertion of the practice of "nepotism" within the organization, a charge which allegedly was also made by Chancellor Adenauer, must be evaluated in view of the difficulties to recruit dependable personnel. In my opinion, the motivation of Dr. S. when permitting or even encouraging the employment of relatives, was his concern with the security of his operation.

In many of my discussions with Dr. S. he expressed his life's ambition which simply can be stated as an effective contribution to maintain and secure the Western cultural heritage against Communism. He at times had serious doubts if many of the Western statesmen really understood the

*ing Albert (was?)  
here?*

devious methods and tactics of the Soviet leaders and he also was annoyed by some of the lack of trust he experienced from the side of the Western Allies. However, he did not blame them for certain "friendly infiltrations" into his organization and operations. I recall that he gave me some specific illustrations and remarked that the "friendly side" could have obtained the same information by merely asking for it.

Dr. S.'s pro-Western attitude is based both on his preference for the political systems in the Western countries and on the realization of the common opponent or enemy. Throughout the many years of my acquaintanceship I have not once had reason to doubt his pro-Western, and especially pro-US attitude.

The question of the influence of former German military leaders upon Dr. S. was raised. It is my impression that neither Seekt nor von Schleicher had been mentioned by the Dr. as individuals who had merited his admiration. His condemnation of "party-generals" such as Keitel was most pronounced. He had great admiration for Halder, also regretted that von Blomberg was victimized. I presume that his opinion of Halder was caused by two factors, his personal integrity and professional proficiency.

While Dr. S. was - and still is - frequently pictured as a very cool and emotionless individual, I had the opportunity to experience his strong humane side. His concern for his employees always impressed me. Probably his deep felt opposition toward Communism derives from the same concern for humanity.

*I feel v. B was a v. foolish man (a view shared by his daughter incidentally) & while he did not deserve the treatment he got, he was not really victimized.*

<b>DISPATCH</b>		CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>		PROCESSING ACTION	
TO Chief, [ ]				MARKED FOR INDEXING	
INFO. Chief [ ]				NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
FROM Chief, European Division				ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
SUBJECT <b>CATUSK - Letter for UTILITY</b>				MICROFILM	
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES					
<p>[ ] has asked that a letter, transmitted under separate cover, be delivered by [ ] to UTILITY.</p>					
<p><b>Attachment:</b> As stated u/s/c</p> <p><b>Distribution:</b> Orig &amp; 1 - Addressee w/att u/s/c 2 - [ ]</p>					
<p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005</p>					
CROSS REFERENCE TO		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER <b>EGMS-8865</b>		DATE <b>13 JAN 1970</b>	
		CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>		HQS FILE NUMBER <b>8 January 1970</b>	
Hqs. Distribution: 1 - E/G/CIL 1 - E/G/IS 1 - E/REC 1 - RID&P		ORIGINATING OFFICE: <b>E/G/CIL/[ ]</b> OFFICER: [ ]    TYPIST: <b>/dk</b> EXT: <b>1172</b>			
		COORDINATING OFFICE SYMBOL:    DATE:    OFFICER'S NAME:			
		OFFICE SYMBOL:    DATE:    OFFICER'S NAME:			
		OFFICE SYMBOL:    DATE:    OFFICER'S NAME:			
		OFFICE SYMBOL:    DATE:    OFFICER'S NAME:			
		OFFICE SYMBOL:    DATE:    OFFICER'S NAME:			
FORM 1-63 <b>53</b> USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 11-66		(40) <b>DISPATCH</b>			

EGMS-8865

24 February 1970

Dear E

I am attaching 3 clippings of the "Münchener Merkur" with reports about SPD meetings in Frankfurt and Munich. It may be interesting for you to have these clippings because they show the state of mind of a big part of the younger generation in the SPD. Surely there is no doubt that the elder people of the party may be conscious of our constitution which is a democratic and parliamentary one. The more it is remarkable that nowadays it is possible to discuss ideas with acclamation which are in fact communist ideas. I suppose, that Tom will have reported to you the several discussions I had with him about my fears with regard to the coming development. I am afraid we are already on the way to a communism of Yugoslavian brand. Of course this development will proceed step by step and not tomorrow, but if nothing will be done against it nor prepared for the case that this development will reach a decisive phase, then Europe may be lost to the West after a period of years. You remember our discussions about similar possible developments in France and Italy. Of course these developments go in the same direction but in a different way. Since the internal situations in France, Italy and Germany will influence each other, it may be that under certain circumstances in some years we may have suddenly an unexpected turn-over to "socialism" (really communism) in Western Europe. By the way I am startled about the fact that so many young people of good families are attracted by the new socialist ideas which are related to communist ideas (APO, SDS and so on). I hope you understand my letter and its sense, I would not like to alarm you, but I suppose the development has to be closely observed.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

RGMS-2265A4

- 2 -

When will you be in Germany on your next trip? I would appreciate if you would have time for a discussion on the above mentioned subject.

With many regards from my wife and my children to you and your family,

cordially yours,

DR. KTOR SCHNEIDER



SECRET

Munich  
9 March 1970

Martin

Dear

The Doktor is in a very pessimistic mood these days and I'm sure you are not surprised. He is not only concerned about the government in power, but also with respect to the BND. He states this further in the inclosed letter and furnishes you with some pertinent newspaper clippings. Although the Doktor says that I will have reported to you the several discussions we had, etc, we both know his sentiments and there is little value in reporting them each time they are expressed. There is nothing new except, of course, for the fact that a left-of-center government is now in charge. Not too surprising in the Doktor's view is that the leadership of the new government and its political party are people who have mellowed through the years and quite probably may be considered patriotic and loyal citizens of the Federal Republic. His biggest fear, however, is that so many of the young second generation SPD'ers coming up are addicted to radicalism, APO, SDS, etc.

The Doktor is particularly hopeful that he will get to see you again if you come over in the spring or summer. He is looking good and has no complaints except that the thrombosis he had in his left eye has cut vision in that eye by 40%. He and his successor are no nearer together than they were a year ago when you saw both of them last. You can sympathize with Gerd, I'm sure, since he has been given quite a hard time in Bonn and is truly "hin und her gerissen."

\*\*\*\*\*

/s/ [ ]

]

(Extract from Letter to [ ]

] from [ ]

]

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

SECRET

Uality 201

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET		PROCESSING ACTION		
TO Chief [ ]				MARKED FOR INDEXING		
INFO. Chief [ ]				NO INDEXING REQUIRED		
FROM Chief, European Division				ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING		
SUBJECT CATRIBE/UTILITY Letter for UTILITY				MICROFILM		
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES						
<p>We are transmitting under separate cover a sealed personal letter</p> <p>from [ ] to UTILITY.</p> <p style="margin-top: 50px;">[ ]</p> <p>Attachment: As stated u/s/c</p> <p>Distribution: Orig &amp; 1 - Addressee w/att u/s/c</p>						
<p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 9828 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005</p> <p style="text-align: right; margin-top: 20px;">25 MAR 1970</p>						
CROSS REFERENCE TO		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER ECMS-8982		DATE 19 March 1970		
		CLASSIFICATION SECRET		HQS FILE NUMBER		
Hqs. Distribution: 1 - E/G/CIL 1 - E/G/IS 1 - E/REG 1 - RID/D&P		ORIGINATING				
		OFFICE E/G/CIL/ [ ]		OFFICER [ ] /dk		EXT. 1172
		COORDINATING				
		OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME		
<div style="text-align: right; margin-right: 50px;"> RELEASING [ ]  [ ] </div>		OFFICE SYMBOL C/E/G	DATE 19 Mar	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE [ ]		
		(40)				
		DISPATCH				

[ ] 8982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

1 April 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EUR

Heinz Herre 'phoned me last evening to wish me a happy birthday and then reminded me that General Gehlen's birthday is on 3 April. Heinz says the old gentleman is lonely and would probably appreciate some kind of a remembrance from me. Would you please forward this note.

*ut*  
Richard Helms  
Director

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

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<b>DISPATCH</b>		CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>	PROCESSING ACTION	
TO	Chief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		MARKED FOR INDEXING	
INFO.	Chief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
FROM	Chief, European Division		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
SUBJECT	CATRIBE/UTILITY Birthday Greetings		MICROFILM	
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES				
<p>Under separate cover is a birthday message for UTILITY from</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1. Please deliver.</p>				
<p>Attachment: As stated h/w u/s/c</p> <p>Distribution: Orig &amp; 1 - Addressee w/att u/s/c 2 - <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> w/o att</p>				
<p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005</p>				
3 APR 1970				
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE		
	EGMS-9015	2 April 1970		
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER		
	SECRET			
Hqs. Distribution: 1 - E/G/CIL 1 - E/G/EC 1 - RUW/D&P	OFFICE		OFFICER	TYPIST
	E/G/CIL/ <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			/dk
	COORDINATING		EXT. 1172	
	OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME	
	OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OF	RELEASED
	C/E/G			
FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 11 69		DISPATCH		

EGMS-9015

REINHARD GEHLEN

8131 BERG bei STARNBERG, DEM 6 May 1970  
WALDSTRASSE 66

Executive Registry

70-3132

Dear Mr. Helms,

I want to thank you very much for your kind birthday letter and your birthday congratulations which were forwarded to me by Heinz Herre. It was very kind of you to remember this day in spite of the pressure of your work. I can imagine that during the last months the working conditions have been and still are difficult for your service and for yourself. My thoughts and those of my friends are with you, wishing you good success.

Again just under the present circumstances I remember with gratitude our agreeable cooperation.

With best wishes and regards to you and Mrs. Helms, also from my wife,

Sincerely,



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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2001 2005

## CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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DISSEM BY: 8 PER: \_\_\_\_\_

ACTION UNIT

ACTION NO.

658

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NATIONAL WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005SECRET 241447Z JUL 70 CITE 2173DIRECTOR INFO ☐

24 JUL 11 29077

OWOMUSE UTILITY ☐ visit of David Kahn to UTILITY.1. UTILITY HAS ADVISED ☐ (WHOM HE MET PER☐ INTRODUCTION 9 JULY) THAT DAVID KAHN ☐

AMERICAN AMATEUR CRYPTOLOGIST AND AUTHOR, HAS REQUESTED  
INTERVIEW WITH HIM WEEK 27 JULY. KAHN STATES HE WRITING  
BOOK ON WW II GERMAN INTELLIGENCE, HAS BEEN RESEARCHING  
GERMAN MILITARY ARCHIVES IN FREIBURG, NOW STATING MUNICH  
AND SEEKS APPOINTMENT UTILITY.

2. UTILITY WOULD APPRECIATE, PRIOR MEETING KAHN,  
HQS READING ON KAHN AND ANY SECURITY RESTRICTIONS HQS  
FEELS SHOULD BE PLACED ON HIS INTERVIEW. WE TEND ACCEPT  
THIS AT FACE VALUE IN CONTEXT APPARENT UTILITY DESIRE  
CONTINUE LOW KEY RELATIONSHIP ☐ AND REQUEST ANY  
GUIDANCE HQS CAN GIVE US FOR PASSAGE UTILITY, IF POSSIBLE  
PRIOR 28 JULY.

3. ☐ MENTIONED KAHN IN LIGHT VEIN DURING  
INTRODUCTORY SESSION WITH ☐ 21 JULY BUT PASSED HIM  
OFF WITH REMARK THAT HE HOPED KAHN WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH

CS COPY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
AUG 12 1970  
DOC. INFO. SER.

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24 Jul 70

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION		CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY	
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED		<b>SECRET</b> (When Filled In)	GROUP 1	1	5
ADVANCE COPY <input type="checkbox"/> ISSUED <input type="checkbox"/> SLOTTED			EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION	2	6
BY: _____ AT: _____			REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED	3	7
DISSEM BY _____ PER _____			INDEX: <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	4	8
ACTION UNIT		CLASSIFY TO CS FILE NO. _____		X-REF TO CS FILE NO. _____	
ACTION NO. _____		<input type="checkbox"/> FILE RID <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN TO _____		BRANCH _____	
FILE, VR					

PAGE 2 [ 2173 S E C R E T

FREIBURG RESEARCHES AND NOT BOTHER [ 1 ONLY [ I TRACE,

APART FROM RECOLLECTIONS HIS MAGNUM OPUS ON AMERICAN  
 CRYPTANALYTIC EFFORT, IS CARD REF TO EGMA 56075, 8 SEP 61,  
 WHICH NOT HELPFUL.

4. FILE [ 1. GP-1.

S E C R E T

SECRET

4216

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION		CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES	ROUTING AND OR INITIALS-SEEN BY
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED		<b>SECRET</b> (When Filled In)	GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION	5
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ACTION UNIT	FILE, VR	<u>RE/AN, DDP, ADDP, CE, CA-5, CI/IC-2, CI/RA,</u>		
ACTION NO.	<u>Secur 4, FI-2, CA/PRO</u>			

SECRET 241740Z JUL 70 CITE C 7371

DIRECTOR, INFO: C J, C 1

MHORDER CATRIBE C J C 1

REFS: A. C 1-8849; B. EGNT-1449

copy to C/CI WEST

24 JUL 70 129314

1. C J TOLD C J 23 JULY THAT SPIEGEL WAS PLANNING EXTENDED SERIES OF ARTICLES ON CATRIBE AND JKLANCE WHICH WAS TO START IN SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER. C J UNDERSTOOD ARTICLES INCLUDED SHARP ATTACKS ON BOTH ORGANIZATIONS AND ON HIS PERSONNEL DECISIONS FOR CATRIBE.

2. C J HAD TALKED PRIVATELY WITH AUGSTEIN AND HAD PERSUADED HIM TO REMOVE OBJECTIONABLE PASSAGES. C J DID NOT EXPLAIN WHETHER HE HAD SEEN ARTICLES IN DRAFT OR HOW HE COULD BE SURE DAMAGING PASSAGES WOULD BE IDENTIFIED AND OMITTED. ALSO DID NOT SPECIFY SUBJECTS OR CONTENT OF THESE PASSAGES. HOWEVER SEEMED CONFIDENT HE HAD MATTER UNDER CONTROL TO EXTENT NO SERIOUS HARM WOULD BE DONE.

3. C J SAID SUBJECT CAME UP IN DISCUSSION WITH AUGSTEIN ABOUT UNFAVORABLE SPIEGEL COMMENTARY ON C J. C J UNDERSTANDS THAT THIS COMMENTARY ORIGINATES WITH SPIEGEL CHIEF EDITOR GUENTER GAUS, WHO WANTS C J'S JOB, OR FAILING THAT, WANTS C J'S JOB. C J WAS UNABLE TO PERSUADE AUGSTEIN STOP GAUS FROM THESE ATTACKS.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

SECRET

32W-2-25/1

C J 7371



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PAGE 2 [ 7371 SECRET

[ ] ALSO MENTIONED HE PLEASED WITH WAY CATRIBE IS  
 RUNNING AS RESULT OF NEW APPOINTMENTS THERE AND HOPES WE  
 SIMILARLY PLEASED. GP-1.

SECRET

SECRET

ORIG: E  
UNIT: F/G/CIL  
EXT: 5751/1172  
DATE: 27 July 1970

MESSAGE FORM  
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FILE, VR.

(R/AM) F12, F1/DH, CI G/OPS, DDP, RDDP, CI/50

(classification)

**S E C R E T**

(date and time filed)

27 19 03z JUL 70

CITE DIRECTOR

054255

TO ☐ PRIORITY ☐ INFO ☐

☐ CATRIBE ☐ UTILITY

REF: ☐ -2173 (IN-129077)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

1. SUBJECT OF ☐ IS CAUSE OF CONCERN FOR UKLANCE AND  
INBRAN AS WELL AS ☐ OWING PROPENSITY PUBLISH WITHOUT  
SEPARATING FACT FROM SPECULATION. REGARDED AS ADROIT INTERVIEWER  
WHO INCLINED QUOTE STATEMENTS HE HAS PUT IN MOUTH OF INTERVIEWER.  
☐ MAY WISH WARN UTILITY THAT ANY MATTER DISCUSSED WITH  
SUBJECT WILL BE ON THE RECORD AND SOURCED TO UTILITY. BBC CURRENTLY  
PLANNING/ON LATEST BOOK AND IT POSSIBLE UTILITY INTERVIEW BEING  
SOUGHT FOR DOCUMENTARY PURPOSES. WHILE UKLANCE DOES NOT WISH GO  
ON RECORD AS ADVISING UTILITY AGAINST MEETING SUBJECT, WOULD LIKE  
BE ABLE DISCOURAGE SUCH INTERVIEW IF POSSIBLE. PLS ADVISE.

2. FILE: ☐

END OF MESSAGE

FIXD FORM ☐ (in draft) 27 Jul 70  
SO/ID/CB ☐ (in draft) E  
EUR/EC/UK ☐

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**S E C R E T**

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COM 120

DIR 054255

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING	
		SECRET	PROPOSED	ACTION
TO	Chief, EUR			MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.	Chief, WOMUSE; Chief, FI/D; Chief [ ]		X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief [ ]			ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	UTILITY Meeting with David KAHN			ABSTRACT
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES		MICROFILM		
<p>REFERENCES: A. [ ] 2173, 24 July 70 B. DIRECTOR 054255, 28 July 70 C. [ ] 2289, 4 August 70</p> <p>FOR YOUR INFORMATION</p> <p>1. We asked [ ] close neighbor, old friend and convenient [ ] channel to UTILITY, to follow up reference matter with UTILITY and he was able to do so on 26 August. UTILITY said that, while both [ ] and Alias HAMMERSCHMIDT (whose advice he had also apparently sought) had cautioned him, he had finally acceded to several telephone requests and seen David KAHN. [ ] advice had been, in terms of Reference B, that the visit was not sponsored and that he might be quoted out of context; alias HAMMERSCHMIDT's was apparently that the tone of <u>The Code Breakers</u> was "adverse".)</p> <p>2. KAHN brought his wife to UTILITY's lakeside retreat and put a generally social face on the matter. He apparently was a social success. UTILITY had a very favorable impression, considering KAHN to be sincere and straightforward in discussing German intelligence activities in World War II, the topic of his current work. UTILITY said that no specific questions arose which were not already public knowledge and that no questions concerned JKALNCE activities or post-war connections with UTILITY. KAHN gave UTILITY a copy of <u>The Code Breakers</u>, said he was now off to New York to start writing the new book and received an invitation to visit UTILITY again should he be in Germany.</p> <p>3. UTILITY repeated that he appreciated the advice -- notwithstanding his having ignored it--and hoped he would be able to call on us again if similar occasions arise in the future.</p>				
4 - Chief/EUR 1 - Chief/WOMUSE 1 - Chief, FI/D 1 - [ ]		DATE TYPED 27 August 70 DATE DISPATCHED 31 AUG 1970 DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER EGMA-74298 HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER [ ]		
CROSS REFERENCE TO CS COPY		CLASSIFICATION SECRET		

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DATE 2005

EGMA-74298

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER EGMA-74298
<p>Our impression of him is that of a rather frail old man, apparently well-adjusted to his half-working, half-leisure life in pleasant surroundings, bothered by possibly serious eye trouble, but with no bitterness showing through in the brief preliminary contacts we have had with him. At this point we would anticipate neither problems nor profit in having occasional social contact with him, and will let nature take its course in so doing, unless Headquarters or Bonn wish to help nature along.</p>		
FORM 53a 5-60 (40)	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	PAGE NO. 2

5. November 1970

Lieber Mr. Critchfield!

Im Laufe der nächsten Woche wird die Tochter unseres verstorbenen Freundes Wendland zu einem Besuch in Amerika eintreffen. Sie hat gerade ihr juristisches Examen bestanden und wird später in München voraussichtlich in einer Anwaltskanzlei arbeiten. Sie wird in Washington Carlströms besuchen. Ich wollte Sie darüber nur informieren, falls Sie interessiert wären, sie zu sehen.

Mit herzlichen Grüßen in alter Verbundenheit,  
auch an Mr. H.,

Ihr

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

5 November 1970

Dear Jim,

Attached I'm sending you a copy of a series of articles concerning the BND which will be printed by the magazine "Spiegel", beginning at the end of November for several weeks. It is not quite sure yet whether this will be the final draft of the series - however, the tendency will remain the same. It was rather difficult to get hold of the material. I did not get in touch with the President about this matter because our relations are very reserved. It will be tried to prevent the appearance of this article by another side. My person is treated rather well in this series, probably because of the knowledge that I'm working historically for the Service - raising the suspicion that I might be the top source of these indiscretions. Otherwise it cannot be explained why the first draft was changed, which contained a lot of malignity against my person. However, I read only a small part of this first draft.

The inspiration to this series came from Minister Ehmke. I don't believe that the motives shown up in these articles are the true motives. There are a few hints that the other side may be involved. It is regrettable that coworkers of our Service were induced to talk by Ehmke and his new party folks and I don't suppose that the quoted sources have been the only informants. These series contain, as you will see, several subjects to be classified top secret, among these also statements about Comint and Elint which are not true in this form, but nevertheless an

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SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT  
TOP SECRET - 74486

offence against NATO interests. As the new Vice President Bloetz disposes of a close contact to the "Spiegel", it can be assumed that most of the given material went through this channel.

The tendency of the article shows that the intellectual originator or originators had the following aim:

- 1.) The person of Wessel shall be made ridiculous and unbearable, probably in order to make this position free for Nollau, the protégé of Wehner, or another person convenient to the SPD;
- 2.) The sources and "V-Leute" of the BND shall be frightened in order to have them leap off;
- 3.) The relations to other western services, already impaired now, shall be interrupted;
- 4.) Possibly in spite of all given assurances, to prepare a change of position from East to West in the political and intelligence field???

I don't know whether the measures in preparation will be successful in preventing the appearance of these series. If not, it should be considered whether an intervention of the United States with Ehmke via diplomatic channels might be successful, particularly as NATO interests are involved. I would be grateful if you would consider this step only upon a second notice from me personally in case that the efforts in preparation here prove to have no success.

The whole procedure in this matter should under no circumstances make apparant my own activity concerning this case.

- 3 -

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

*farmer*



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ACTION NO.

FILE, VR

CRAN, C/CH C/FIZ

752

SECRET 121557Z NOV 70 CITE 3508

DIRECTOR INFO 1

RYBAT 1 CATRIBE

REF: EGNA-41690 (TELEPOUCH)

12 Nov 70 205152

GA-50 RIDIAN/RU \*7387

1. REF MATERIALS LEAVING 1 12 NOV (FIRST AVAILABLE  
POUCH) AS SEPARATE COVER T/N ATTACHMENT TO EGMA-71186.

P: DAN/eur  
7670  
X 1234  
will forward

SINCE NEXT POUCH CONTAINING COVERING DISPATCH DOES NOT LEAVE  
UNTIL 16 NOV, SUGGEST ARRANGE WITH REGISTRY  
TO OBTAIN ATTACHMENTS UPON RECEIPT AND PRIOR ARRIVAL  
COVERING DISPATCH.

X430  
D-3

2. ABOVE ATTACHMENT ALSO INCLUDES LETTER FROM UTILITY  
TO ADVISING HIM DAUGHTER OF ALIAS WENDLAND WILL BE  
VISITING FAMILY IN WASHINGTON WEEK OF 9 NOVEMBER,  
SUGGESTING MAY WISH SEE HER. PLS PASS ABOVE

office  
advised.

3. FOR POUCHING COPY ATTACHMENT 16 NOV.  
PLS DELIVER TO ON ARRIVAL. GP-1.

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DATE 2005

SECRET

3508

SECRET/RYBAT TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - [ ] 41690

FILE NO - 32W-

DATE - 12 NOVEMBER 1970

INDEXING - NONE

MICROFILM - NONE

TO - CHIEF, EUR /EYES ONLY [ ]

INFO - COB, [ ] /EYES ONLY [ ]

VIA POUCH

FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, [ ]

SUBJECT - [ ] CATRIE/OPERATIONAL - UTILITY LETTER TO  
[ ] CONCERNING PROJECTED DER SPIEGEL ARTICLE  
RE CATRIE

ACTION - SEE PARA 12

REFS - NONE

1. MORNING 9 NOVEMBER [ ] IN MUNICH PASSED  
TO [ ] LETTER FROM *Bulter* UTILITY TO [ ], ENCLOSING  
VOLUMINOUS DRAFT /PAGE PROOF FORM, ESTIMATED 45,000 WORDS/ OF  
ARTICLE SERIES WHICH DER SPIEGEL PLANS PUBLISH STARTING IN LATE  
NOVEMBER 70. [ ] STATES UTILITY ASKED HIM TO PASS LETTER  
AND DRAFT TO [ ] VIA [ ], LEAVING LETTER UNSEALED AND  
INTIMATING THAT IT WAS EXPECTED THAT [ ] WOULD READ BOTH  
LETTER AND DRAFT. INFO BELOW BASED ON [ ] INTRA MESSAGE  
TO COS.

2. UTILITY LETTER STATES THAT DRAFT WAS DIFFICULT TO  
PROCURE, REPRESENTS SECOND DRAFT, WHICH UNLIKE FIRST, PAINTS  
UTILITY IN RELATIVELY FAVORABLE COLORS AND MAY RAISE SUSPICION  
UTILITY IS ITS MAIN SOURCE. [ ] REMARKED THAT INDEED SEVERAL  
CHAPTERS OF DRAFT LOOK AS THOUGH THEY COULD HAVE BEEN LIFTED  
FROM CATRIE HISTORY ON WHICH UTILITY HAS BEEN WORKING. UTILITY  
COMMENTED TO [ ] THAT HE SUSPECTED HE WOULD BE CITED BY SOME

SECRET/RYBAT EGNA-41690 /PAGE 1/

DECLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-11-91  
BY 1041  
CS COPY

EGNA-41191

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

AS HAVING BEEN A SOURCE OF ARTICLE CONTENT, HE NEITHER CONFIRMED NOR DENIED THAT THIS WAS THE CASE.

3. LETTER NOTES THAT UTILITY HAS NOT TAKEN UP MATTER WITH *Hessell* ☐ BECAUSE "OUR RELATIONS ARE VERY RESERVED". FYI FROM SEVERAL SOURCES ☐ HEARD THAT UTILITY RETAINER WILL BE TERMINATED BY CATRIBE AS OF END 70.

4. LETTER ALLEGES THAT *Shmoke* ☐ PROVIDED INSPIRATION FOR DER SPIEGEL SERIES, THAT CATRIBE DEPUTY DIRECTOR / ☐ PROTEGE/, WHO HAS CLOSE CONTACT WITH DER SPIEGEL /PRESUMABLY FROM HIS SERVICE IN HAMBURG/ CAN BE ASSUMED TO HAVE PROVIDED CHANNEL FOR MOST OF MATERIAL IN ARTICLE SERIES, AND SPECULATES THAT "OTHER SIDE" /PRESUMABLY SOVIET UNION/ MAY BE INVOLVED.

5. LETTER POSTULATES THAT AIMS OF ARTICLE SERIES ARE TO DENIGRATE ☐ IN ORDER TO CLEAR WAY FOR NAMING AS CATRIBE CHIEF *Dr. Nellan* ☐ /KNOWN AS A ☐ PROTEGE/ OR ANOTHER MAN POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE TO ☐ PARTY, TO SCARE OFF CATRIBE SOURCES, TO INFLICT DAMAGE ON CATRIBE RELATIONS WITH WESTERN ALLIES, "ALREADY IMPAIRED" /NOT FURTHER CLARIFIED, STATION DOES NOT KNOW TO WHAT UTILITY SPECIFICALLY REFERS/, POSSIBLY TO PREPARE WAY FOR CHANGE OF MHRUSH POLITICAL/INTELLIGENCE ORIENTATION FROM WEST TO EAST.

6. LETTER SAYS /WITHOUT CITING SPECIFICS/ THAT MEASURES ARE IN PREPARATION TO PREVENT APPEARANCE OF SERIES, BUT THAT IF THEY FAIL, IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE TO CONSIDER LNLUTE DIPLOMATIC INTERVENTION WITH ☐. HOWEVER, IF SUCH STEP CONSIDERED, UTILITY ASKS THAT HE BE PROTECTED A SOURCE OF INFO RE ARTICLE SERIES IN ANY ACTION WHICH UKLAN<sup>2</sup> MIGHT DECIDE TO TAKE RE MATTER.

7. UTILITY COMMENTED TO ☐ THAT HE WAS NOT PLEASED THAT ARTICLE SERIES HAD CHOSEN TO DISCUSS, NOT ALWAYS ACCURATELY,

NUMBER OF SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE TOPICS. NOTABLY IN "TECHNICAL"  
/COMINT/ELINT/ SECTOR.

8. INITIAL QUICK PERUSAL OF DRAFT BY [ ] BASE INDICATES  
KEY THEME CONCERNS RECENT CHANGES IN CATRIBE, EXPLAINING THAT  
THEY UNDERTAKEN BECAUSE MHRUSH HIERARCHY LACKED CONFIDENCE IN  
CATRIBE ABILITY AND BECAUSE OF CATRIBE RECORD OF MEDDLING IN  
INTERNAL MHRUSH AFFAIRS. ONLY PASSING MENTION OF JKLANCE  
NOTED, AND THIS PRIMARILY IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT. ONLY NAME OF  
PAST OR PRESENT JKLANCE STAFFER NOTED WAS THAT OF ASCHAM. *Allen Dulles*

[ ] HAS COMMENTED THAT ALTHOUGH THERE MAY BE A LAND MINE  
OR TWO IN DISCUSSION OF PARTICULAR OPERATIONS, ON A WHOLE  
THE DRAFT WOULD NOT APPEAR TO PRESENT SIGNIFICANT SECURITY OR  
EMBARRASSMENT POTENTIAL AS FAR AS JKLANCE IS CONCERNED.

9. PRINCIPAL PROBLEM AREAS GENERATED BY PASSAGE OF DRAFT  
TO JKLANCE ARE THOSE CONCERNING JKLANCE/STATION RELATIONSHIP  
WITH [ ] AND JKLANCE/COS RELATIONSHIP WITH [ ] IT  
WOULD SEEM THAT UTILITY, MORE THAN EVER EMBITTERED AGAINST  
QKELUSION, DISAPPOINTED THAT HE HAS BEEN RELEGATED TO OBSCURITY,  
AND RETAINING HIS PROCLIVITY FOR MEDDLING IN INTERNAL POLITICS,  
IS TRYING TO USE JKLANCE AS STALKING HORSE FOR ACTION AGAINST  
HIS ENEMIES. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT OTHER FACTORS OF PAT-  
RIOTISM, FRIENDLINESS TOWARDS JKLANCE AND NOSTALGIA FOR THE  
GOOD OLD DAYS DO NOT ALSO ENTER INTO SITUATION, BUT RATHER TO  
NOTE THE FACTORS WHICH ARE SIGNIFICANT TO JKLANCE AND STATION IN  
SAFEGUARDING OUR OWN INTERESTS, VIS-A-VIS MHRUSH GOVT AND CURRENT  
CATRIBE MANAGEMENT. BOTH [ ] AND COS CONSIDER THAT ANY  
LNLUTE INTERVENTION WITH [ ], EITHER DIRECTLY BY COS OR  
INDIRECTLY VIA AMBASSADOR OR DCM, IS NOT ADVISABLE. SPECIFIC  
RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING PROPOSED ACTION TO BE TAKEN EITHER  
BY HQS OR STATION MUST AWAIT PERUSAL OF DRAFT BY KEYWAY HQS

AND STATION HQS. AT THIS POINT IN TIME IT APPEARS THAT MOST SUITABLE ACTION MIGHT BE TO HAVE DRAFT RETURNED TO UTILITY, ACCOMPANIED BY LETTER FROM [ ] WHICH THANKS HIM FOR HIS THOUGHTFULNESS AND /WITH [ ] COMMENTING INFORMALLY NOT OFFICIALLY/ INDICATES THAT IT IS [ ] "PERSONAL OPINION" THAT CURRENT JKLANCE MANAGEMENT JUDGES THAT IT WOULD NOT BE "CORRECT" TO CONSIDER ANY INTERVENTION WITH ANYONE UNTIL THE MATTER IS SURFACED TO [ ] BY UTILITY AND [ ] HAS ASKED FOR SUCH ASSISTANCE. WISH EMPHASIZE THAT ABOVE ARE PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS, SUBJECT TO CHANGE AS SITUATION IS ANALYZED FURTHER.

10. WHILE UTILITY HAS NOT FIXED ANY DEADLINE FOR RESPONSE TO HIS LETTER, IT IS CLEAR, GIVEN TENTATIVE LATE NOVEMBER 70 PUBLICATION DATE, THAT HE WOULD EXPECT SOME RESPONSE IN NEAR FUTURE. THUS IF LETTER REPLY FROM [ ] CAN NOT BE ACHIEVED PRIOR TO LAST WEEK OF NOVEMBER, WHICH APPEARS LIKELY, THEN IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE TO PASS ORAL REPLY VIA [ ] STATION JUDGES THAT IT IS INADVISABLE TO USE DIRECT [ ] UTILITY CONTACT TO PASS MESSAGE, IN ORDER THAT [ ] AND STATION AS A WHOLE, MAY STAND CLEAR OF ANY OFFICIAL ROLE IN THIS MATTER. NOTE THAT ALL FORMAL TIES OF [ ] WITH STATION HAVE BEEN SEVERED WITH END HIS CONTRACT, THAT [ ] HAS MET UTILITY /INTRODUCTION BY [ ] , AND THAT COSI HAS NOT MET UTILITY.

11. [ ] POUCHING COPY OF LETTER AND DRAFT ARTICLE SERIES.

12. WOULD APPRECIATE EARLY REACTION RE THIS MATTER.

[ ]  
DISTRIBUTION - BY TELEPOUCH

2 - C/EUR

2 - [ ] /VIA POUCH/

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT	PROCESSING	
		PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
TO	Chief, European Division		X	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.	Chief of Station, <i>e</i>			NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief of Base, <i>e</i>			ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	CATRIBE UTILITY <i>e</i>			ABSTRACT
		Transmittal of Material for <i>e</i>		MICROFILM
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES				
<p><i>e</i> 41690 (Telepouch), 12 Nov 70</p> <p>ACTION: Please comment per Ref as soon as possible.</p> <p>1. UTILITY gave the following three documents to <i>e</i> on 6 November, for transmission to <i>e</i> through <i>e</i> Base:</p> <p>A. The attached draft of a <u>Spiegel</u> serial on the BND</p> <p>B. A letter to <i>e</i> relating to (a)</p> <p>C. Another letter to <i>e</i> on a personal matter</p> <p>2. Reference telepouch contained our comments to Station headquarters on this matter, along with COS' comments. We have little to add at this time, but will cable the results of any further analysis of the draft as soon as completed. One minor correction to reference is that <i>e</i> was introduced to UTILITY by <i>e</i>, with <i>e</i> present as the authenticated channel for whatever occasional business we might have.</p> <p>3. We should emphasize that the attached material should be treated with the utmost discretion, <del>at least until you have full clarifying details.</del> <i>Rn</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>e</i> —</p> <p>ATTACHMENTS: UNDER SEPARATE COVER</p> <p>A, B, C (as described above)</p> <p>Distribution:</p> <p>4 - C/Eur Div w/atts</p> <p>2 - COS/ <i>e</i> w/Atts</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>Atts forwarded ahead of dispatch</i> 17 Nov 70</p>				
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		DATE DISPATCHED /		
		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER EGMA=74,486		
		HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER ✓ <i>e</i>		
		CLASSIFICATION SECRET/RYBAT		

EGMA-74486

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ACTION NO. 937

SECRET 161151Z NOV 70 CITE L

3535

16 NOV 207000

DIRECTOR INFO L

RYBAT L CATRIBE

REFS A. L 3508 (W 205152)

B. EGMA 74486 (ENROUTE)

C. LEGNA 41960 (TELEPOUCH)

32 W-

AN	FI
PS	CEST
ABSTRACT	INDEX

1. UTILITY SAW L 15 NOV AND ASKED HIM CONVEY MESSAGE THROUGH L TO L THAT PROPOSED PUBLICATION DATE SPIEGEL SERIAL NOW SET BACK FROM LATE NOVEMBER 70 TO EARLY FEBRUARY 71. UTILITY APPARENTLY CONFIDENT ACCURACY THIS INFO AND HOPEFUL HIS STILL UNSPECIFIED ATTEMPT KILL STORY WILL BE SUCCESSFUL IN INTERIM. L STATES UTILITY RECEIVED PHONE CALL WHILE HE AT UTILITY HOME 8 NOV INDICATING UTILITY WOULD VISIT BONN FOR TWO DAYS DURING WEEK 9 NOV; THIS MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE RELATED TO UTILITY ATTEMPTS QUASH STORY.

2. L REPORTS THAT UTILITY ALSO SPECULATED ORALLY THAT SPIEGEL MAY BE PLANNING TIE INTO REF STORY EXCERPTS FROM UJDROWSY MEMOIRS TO DRAMATIZE EXTENT CATRIBE PENETRATION DURING BAD OLD DAYS. UTILITY HAS NOT SEEN UJDROWSY MANUSCRIPT BUT UNDERSTANDS SPIEGEL HAS ACCESS TO IT.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

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16 NOV 1970

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PAGE 2 ☐ 3535 S E C R E T

3. ABOVE MAY GIVE US A BIT MORE BREATHING ROOM, BUT  
 FOR REASONS GIVEN PARA 9 REF C, STILL BELIEVE WE SHOULD MOVE  
 THIS MATTER OUT OF PRESENT UNCOMFORTABLE CHANNEL WITHOUT DELAY.

☐ REVIEWING DRAFT AND WE WILL COMMENT FURTHER ON  
 CONTENT ASAP. GP-1.

S E C R E T

**SECRET**



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UNIT: E/G/CIL   
XT: 5751/1172   
ATE: 17 November 1970

MESSAGE CTR  
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17 Nov 70 23 51z

CITE DIRECTOR 087470

☐ INFO ☐

RYBAT ☐ CATRIBE

REFS: A. ☐ -3535 (IN-207000)

B. EGNA-41690, 12 NOV 70



1. MANUSCRIPT NOW BEING REVIEWED. PRELIMINARY REACTION  
HOWEVER IS AGREEMENT WITH STATION THAT INTERVENTION IN ANY FORM  
INADVISABLE.

2. WILL COMMENT FURTHER ON RECEIPT STATION. ☐ ANALYSIS OF  
DOCUMENT AND COMPLETION HQS REVIEW. WILL FORWARD ☐ COMMENTS  
AND REPLY TO UTILITY LETTERS AS SOON AS FORMULATED. ☐ INITIAL  
REACTION AFTER READING EGNA-41690 IS ALSO IDENTICAL STATIONS. WILL  
REVIEW TEXT NEXT FEW DAYS AND COMMENT.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

SAC/DDP James Critchfield (in draft)

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ACTION NO

172

SECRET 190918Z NOV 70 CITE L 3595

DIRECTOR INFO

RYBAT L CATRIBE

REF L 3535 (n 207000)

19 Nov 11 209563

ANALYST	FI
PS	E/G/CIL
ABSTRACT	INDEX

FOLL IMPRESSIONS GAINED UPON REVIEWING DRAFT OF  
SPIEGEL MANUSCRIPT:

1. NINE SECTIONS OF MANUSCRIPT A CURIOUS COLLAGE. PROLIX,  
RAMBLING IN STYLE, UNEVEN IN SUBSTANCE. OPENS WITH EXTRAVAGANT  
CLAIMS OF CATRIBE SUCCESSES--PREDICTING TO THE HOUR THE 1967 NE  
WAR, ANTICIPATING BY FOUR WEEKS THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA.  
LAUDS L 1AS STERN MENTOR OF CATRIBE AND L ; LATTER  
DEPICTED AS SUPINE AND HELPLESS.

2. BULK OF MANUSCRIPT GIVES A MIXED YET OVERALL  
FAVORABLE AND ROMANTICIZED DEPICTION OF UTILITY AND HIS WAR-  
TIME AND POST-WAR CAREER. PARTICULAR EMPHASIS GIVEN TO HOW  
UTILITY BEGUILLED AMERICANS INTO SPONSORING HIS ORG.  
RHAPSODIZES GENERAL SIBERT AS TRUE VISIONARY WHO WENT TO BAT  
FOR UTILITY COUNTER TO ORDERS ~~FOR~~ SUPERIOR HQS. SECTION FIVE  
CULMINATES IN STATEMENT THAT AMERICANS SO ENAMORED OF UTILITY'S  
MODEL OF AN INTEL ORG WHICH BOTH COLLECTS AND EVALUATES INFO

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PAGE 2 [ 3595 S E C R E T

THAT THEY PATTERNED JKLANCE ON UTILITY CREATION. ACCORDING TO MS, BRITISH, FRENCH AND SWISS EQUALLY ENAMORED. FROM RATHER EXTRAVAGANT PRAISE OF UTILITY, MS MOVES TO CRITICISM OF HIS HIRING NUMEROUS FORMER SD AND SS PERSONNEL AND CREATING AN ANTI-COMMUNIST SPITZELAPPARAT IN FEDREP. IMPLICATION THAT THIS AMERICAN INSPIRED. MENTIONS CATRIBE BLACK LIST CONTAINING SPITZEL REPORTS ON RED RUDI AUGSTEIN, SPD CHMN ERICH OLLENHAUER, HERBERT WEHNER AND GUSTAV HEINEMANN. MS CITES CATRIBE FRIENDS STATING ANTI-COMMUNIST PSYCHOSIS ENDED MID-50'S BUT JUXTAPOSES THIS WITH QUOTES FROM WITCH-HUNTING SPITZEL REPORTS OF 1963 VINTAGE.

3. SECTION NINE CITES EXAMPLES OF CATRIBE PENETRATIONS OF DDR GOVT AND SOVIET INSTALLATIONS. RELATES UTILITY'S OPERATION AGAINST WOLLWEBER. CITES THE GROTEWOHL SECRETARY OPERATION. STATES CHIEF INTERPRETER IN EAST BERLIN SOVIET EMBASSY WAS CATRIBE AGENT AND RELATES THAT UTILITY HAD ACCESS AGENT WORKING ON SEMENOV. SECTION NINE MENTIONS ONE DR. CAROL TARNAY AS BEING JKLANCE.

4. SECTION NINE ENDS AIMLESSLY, GIVING RISE TO CONCLUSION THAT MORE IS TO COME. SPECULATE THAT MIXED BUT

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PAGE 3 C 13595 S E C R E T

GENERALLY FAVORABLE DEPICTION OF UTILITY IN FIRST NINE  
 SECTIONS COULD BE PRELUDE TO EXPOSE BLASTING HM FOR MEDDLING  
 IN DOMESTIC POLITICS DURING HEYDAY OF CDU/CSU REIGN. GP-1.

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ACTION P.C. 366

"Eyes Only"

SECRET 201615Z NOV 70 CITE 1 3624

DIRECTOR INFO 1

RYBAT 1

23 Nov 21 1675

FOR PERIOD 7 - 20 NOVEMBER 70

1. SPECIAL COMMENTARY:

A. UTILITY PROVIDED MANUSCRIPT FORTHCOMING SPIEGEL SERIAL ON CATRIBE WHICH CURRENTLY UNDER REVIEW AT STATION AND HQS. (BASE HAS PROVIDED PRELIMINARY REVIEW IN 1 3545). (In 207158) WHILE JKLANCE INTERESTS APPEAR NOT BE SERIOUSLY DAMAGED BY TEXT, MANNER OF UTILITY HANDLING (WITHOUT REFERENCE TO 1 OR CATRIBE) AND SOME OF HIS ACCUSATIONS AS TO POSSIBLE INSPIRATION ARTICLE AND SOURCES ITS CONTENTS PUT US IN AWKWARD POSITION. WITH HQS CONCURRENCE PLAN EARLY RESPONSE WHICH WILL TAKE US OFF HOOK TO DEGREE POSSIBLE.

B. HAVE HAD INITIAL MEETING WITH ALIAS KLAUSNER, WHO RECENTLY REPLACED ALIAS ROENDORF AS CHIEF WESTERN WORLD SECTION CATRIBE BESCHAFFUNG AND THUS RESPONSIBLE FOR JKLANCE AND MOST OTHER LIAISONS. SEE NO SUBSTANTIAL EFFECT ON OUR RELATIONS ALTHOUGH KLAUSNER COMPLEX CHARACTER ON WHOM WE PLAN SUBMIT UPDATED EVALUATION.

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ORIG: E/G/CIL  
EXT: 5751/1172  
DATE: 3 December 1970

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4 DEC 70 10 10 CITE DIRECTOR 09 48 58

TO: INFO  
RYCAT  
CATRIDE

REF: DIRECTOR-087470

AM  
PO  
FBI

1. REQUEST [ ] BE PROVIDED FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE FROM [ ] FOR UTILITY:
2. [ ] HAS READ THE NINE-PART DRAFT RCVD FROM UTILITY.  
IT HIS OPINION THAT:

A. SINCE DRAFT APPEARS TO BE INCOMPLETE HISTORY ENDING ABOUT 1952, SPIEGEL PRESUMABLY WILL WANT TO COMPLETE HISTORY FOR PERIOD THEREAFTER.

B. WITH THIS MANUSCRIPT IN CIRCULATION AND IN SPIEGEL HANDS, ANY ATTEMPTED ACTION TO SUPPRESS ITS PUBLICATION THERE, EVEN IF SUCCESSFUL, WOULD MERELY GAIN TIME BUT NOT SUCCEED IN TOTAL SUPPRESSION.

C. ANY ACTION BY JKLANCE TO GO THROUGH EITHER OFFICIAL OR MORE PRIVATE CHANNELS TO [ ] WOULD NOT BE SUCCESSFUL.

IN ADDITION, IF SUCH ATTEMPT LEAKED, WHICH LIKELY, THIS WOULD

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to PAGE TWO CONTINUED

ONLY INCREASE DAMAGING EFFECT OF MANUSCRIPT CONTENTS PER SE, BUT ALSO DRAG IN NEW FACTOR OF JKLANCE SUPPRESSION ATTEMPTS WITH ALL ITS RAMIFICATIONS.

D. FACT THAT [ ] NOT AWARE MANUSCRIPT NOR UTILITY'S ACCESS TO IT ADDS TO POTENTIAL FOR EMBARRASSMENT TO ALL PARTIES CONCERNED AND DAMAGE TO CATRIBE-JKLANCE LONG-TERM RELATIONS.

E. WHILE PUBLICATION THIS MANUSCRIPT CERTAINLY NOT HELPFUL, ANY POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO NATO SECURITY PROBABLY HAS ALREADY BEEN DONE; AND IN ANY CASE IS NOT GREAT.

3. FYI: SEE NO PRESENT NEED SPECULATE NEXT UTILITY STEP IN THIS MATTER; THEREFORE NO NEED FOR STATION TO TAKE ANY PARTICULAR POSITION AT THIS TIME.

~~REMARKS: [REDACTED]~~  
~~REMARKS: [REDACTED]~~  
~~REMARKS: [REDACTED]~~

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to

PAGE THREE CONTINUED

1. YOU MAY ALSO ADVISE [ ] THAT HE SHOULD TELL UTILITY  
THAT MANUSCRIPT AND LETTER TO [ ] PASSED TO [ ] BASE,  
WHICH ASSURED SECURE POECHING TO JKLANCE HQS AND TRANSMITTAL TO

END OF MESSAGE

per [ ]  
w/ [ ]

SAC/DDP [ ]

[ ]  
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"Invalide Zeitung"

4.12.70

## Schaut der Stern-Chef wegen „Süd“

Die Vorwürfe gegen Nannen und seinen Redakteur Weidemann weist

Von unserem Korrespondent

Hamburg, 3. Dezember

Stern-Chefredakteur Henri Nannen, der nach einem vom ZDF-Moderator Gerhard Löwenthal am Mittwochabend im ZDF-Magazin zitierten Ausspruch seine Illustrierte nur mache, damit er sich morgens beim Rasieren offen in die Augen sehen könne, begrüßte seine Mitarbeiter am Donnerstagmorgen: „Ich bin heute schlecht rasiert, weil ich nun ja nicht mehr in den Spiegel schauen kann.“

Alle Stern-Redakteure, die am Mittwochabend Löwenthals „ZDF-Magazin“ gesehen hatten, verstanden die ironisch gemeinte Abwandlung des Spruches von Henri Nannen sofort. Hatte doch Löwenthal in seiner Sendung gegen den für das Stern-Ressort „Jugend forscht“ zuständigen Ressortleiter Hans Weidemann den schweren Vorwurf erhoben, er sei als Ortskommandant des italienischen Städtchens Bevilacqua für Folterungen und Hinrichtungen von Partisanen verantwortlich gewesen und außerdem sei eine nicht direkt an Sabotageakten beteiligte gewesene Italienerin auf seinen Befehl an einem Brückenmast aufgehängt worden.

Henri Nannen, der als Leutnant der von Weidemann geleiteten Gruppe „Süd“ angehörte, habe von den Vorgängen in Bevilacqua

gewußt. Der Fall müsse nicht nur unter juristischen Aspekten im Falle Weidemann gesehen werden, sondern, so Löwenthal, im Falle Nannen auch unter politischen Gesichtspunkten. Denn der Stern-Chef habe sich jahrelang als Hüter der Demokratie und als Antifaschist aufgespielt und prominente Politiker der Bundesrepublik, darunter Heinrich Lübke, Kiesinger und den Weihbischof Defregger wegen ihrer Tätigkeit in der NS-Zeit scharf angegriffen. Löwenthal: „Ob er sich beim Rasieren nun auch noch in die Augen sehen kann?“

Löwenthals Angriff auf Weidemann und Nannen hatte seinen Ausgangspunkt — nach den Worten des Moderators — am 5. November. An diesem Tage habe Bundesinnenminister Genscher eine Anfrage des Bundestagsabgeordneten Weide beantwortet, der wissen wollte, ob es zutrefte, daß die Bundesregierung dem Berliner Senator für Sport und Jugend eine Unterstützung der Aktion „Jugend trainiert für Olympia“ empfohlen habe, obwohl der Leiter dieser Aktion, Hans Weidemann, als Träger des goldenen Parteiabzeichens der NSDAP, stellvertretender Gauleiter von Essen und Obersturmführer der Waffen-SS ungeeignet sei, die deutsche Jugend im olympischen Geiste zu erziehen.

### „Hier geht es nicht um einen kleinen PG“

„Wir wurden aufmerksam“, verkündete Gerhard Löwenthal „und wir recherchierten, zumal uns die Antwort des Innenministers nicht befriedigte, daß die Aktion durch einen einzelnen nicht gefährdet sei, der in der bezeichneten Weise politisch belastet sein soll“. Löwenthal: „Hans Weidemann ist nicht ein einzelner, er ist der Bundeswettbewerbsleiter der von der Illustrierten Stern initiierten Aktionen „Jugend forscht“ und „Jugend trainiert für Olympia“. Das mache seine Person interessant genug, um seine Vergangenheit etwas näher unter die Lupe zu nehmen.

Löwenthals Rechercheure fanden heraus, daß Weidemann seit 1928 Mitglied der NSDAP gewesen sein soll. Ferner folgende Ämter bekleidet habe: Zellenleiter, Parteiredner, Gau-Geschäftsführer, Gau-Propagandaleiter, Stellvertreter des Essener Gauleiters, seit 1936 SA-Mann, 1938 Übernahme in die SS, seit 1941 Kriegsberichterstatter bei der Waffen-SS. „Hier geht es nicht um einen kleinen PG, hier haben wir einen Aktivist vor uns, dessen heutige Tätigkeit mit seiner derart belasteten Vergangenheit nicht in Einklang zu bringen ist“ (Löwenthal).

Weit schwerer als die NS-Vergangenheit des Hans Weidemann aber wog nach Meinung des ZDF-Moderators die militärische Tätigkeit. SS-Obersturmführer Hans Weidemann sei im Oktober 1944 im Schloß des oberitalienischen

Bevilacqua für das Propagandaunternehmen „Süd“ verantwortlich gewesen. In der Nacht zum 19. 10. 1944 seien von Partisanen mehrere Brücken in der Nähe des Schlosses gesprengt worden. Obwohl Personen nicht verletzt worden seien und auch der taktische Wert dieser Aktion nicht groß gewesen sei, hätten die Deutschen alle Bewohner des Ortes im Schloß zusammengetrieben, mehrere Männer seien von Schwarzhemden und Deutschen gefoltert und mit Elektroschocks „behandelt“ worden. Zwei von ihnen hätten unter der Folter ihre aktive Beteiligung an den Sprengungen gestanden, nämlich Julio Biscasso und Leonardo Rossin.

Der erste wurde aufgehängt, der zweite diente Löwenthals Rechercheuren jetzt als Beweis. Unter drei ihm vorgelegten Photos erkannte Rossin den auf dem Photo nur schräg von hinten gezeigten Ortskommandanten wieder: Hans Weidemann. Rossin erläuterte vor der ZDF-Kamera, er sei dem Tode nur dadurch entronnen, daß er einen italienischen Faschisten denunzierte, der den Partisanen geholfen habe. „Durch diese Aussage hast du dein Leben gerettet“, habe Ortskommandant Weidemann damals zu ihm gesagt. Genau wie Rossin gab auch der italienische Ingenieur Martello an, daß Italiener im Schloß von Bevilacqua gefoltert worden seien.

Der ehemalige deutsche Kriegsberichterstatter C. A. Kindler, der zum Unternehmen „Süd“

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# Istern" nicht mehr in den Spiegel?

der Illustrierten-Boss zurück: „Wissentliche Nachrichtenfälschung“

anten Gert Kistenmacher

stern" abkommandiert worden war, berichtete den ZDF-Rechercheuren, daß nicht nur der 22jährige Julio Biscasso gehängt worden sei, sondern auch ein italienisches Mädchen. Der ZDF-Sprecher: „Es gibt Hinweise von Zeugen, daß der Leutnant Henri Nannen von diesen Vorfällen Kenntnis gehabt haben muß.“ Ein Friseur aus Bevilacqua erläuterte vor der ZDF-Kamera, daß Nannen und Weidemann befreundet gewesen seien. Aber wichtigstes Indiz in der Löwenthalschen Beweiskette: Ein Plakat der Ortskommandantur von Bevilacqua mit der Ankündigung der Exekution und der Unterschrift von Hans Weidemann. Löwenthal: „Die in unserer Sendung vorgelegten Aussagen und Beweismittel sind nur die Spitze des Eisberges.“

Henri Nannen reagierte auf solche Anschuldigungen als erstes mit einem Brief an ZDF-Intendant Holzamer, in dem er Löwenthal der „wissentlichen Nachrichtenfälschung zu Zwecken der politischen Diffamierung“ beschuldigt. Hans Weidemann erstattete gegen sich selbst Anzeige und erklärte, daß er vor jeder italienischen oder deutschen Ermittlungsbehörde erscheinen werde. Der „Jugend forscht“-Leiter ist guter Hoffnung: Zwei Ermittlungsverfahren gegen ihn wurden bereits vor langer Zeit von der Staatsanwaltschaft in Stade eingestellt. Löwenthal, der auch das zitierte, bemerkt jedoch dazu, daß der Fall des erhängten italienischen Mädchens bei der Einstellung noch nicht bekannt gewesen sei.

Schon vor einem Jahr hatte Henri Nannen Informationen erhalten, daß im Gebiet von Bevilacqua recherchiert würde. Zusammen mit dem ZDF waren Redakteure der italienischen Zeitung *Domenica del Corriere* auf Weidemanns und Nannens Spuren. Der Chefredakteur dieses Blattes, Zucconi, ließ den Mailänder Korrespondenten des Stern aber wissen, seine Leute hätten in Bevilacqua nur Gutes über Weidemann und Henri Nannen gehört und er wolle diese Geschichte nicht bringen. Um so mehr, als festgestellt worden sei, daß weder Weidemann noch Nannen an den Folterungen oder Todesurteilen beteiligt gewesen seien.

Aber einen Tag vor der ZDF-Sendung erschienen bei Henri Nannen ZDF-Rechercheur Meyer und bat um ein Interview zu den An-

schuldigungen. Weder Weidemann, der bis dahin vom ZDF noch nicht angehört worden war, noch Nannen hatten am Vorabend dieser Sendung Gelegenheit, eigene Zeugen beizubringen, die ihre Unschuld bestätigen konnten. Daraus ergibt sich, laut Henri Nannen, daß nach der Sprengung von Brücken durch Partisanen in Bevilacqua ein SD-Kommando aus Este oder Padua erschienen sei und zwar in Luftwaffenuniform, das von einem „dicken, rotgesichtigen Hauptmann“ befehligt wurde. Außerdem seien faschistische Schwarzhemden dagegewesen. Sie hätten einen Teil des Schlosses beschlagnahmt und dann Vernehmungen durchgeführt.

## „Immer gutes Einvernehmen“

Weder ein Angehöriger der Einheit von Weidemann, noch der von Nannen sei dagegewesen. Für diese Angaben spricht, daß Henri Nannen gleich nach dem Krieg in Bevilacqua war und mit Einheimischen großes Wiedersehen feierte. Nannen: „Wir hatten immer ein gutes Einvernehmen.“ Dieses SD-Kommando, so Nannen, habe zwei Partisanen zum Tode verurteilt. Beide seien der Brückensprengung überführt worden. „Bis vorgestern Abend wußten Weidemann und ich und ich glaube, auch alle Leute meiner Einheit, nur von diesen zwei Partisanen. Von einem Mädchen ist uns nichts bekannt.“ Ebenso wenig weiß Nannen etwas von dem Plakat, auf dem — von Weidemann unterschrieben — die Exekution der beiden Partisanen angekündigt worden sei. „Selbst wenn er das Plakat unterschrieben hätte — Ortskommandanten wurde damals vieles zur Unterschrift vorgelegt — so beweist das nicht, daß Weidemann überhaupt etwas mit der Sache zu tun hatte“, meint Henri Nannen. Weidemann: „Ich kenne das Plakat gar nicht.“

Merkwürdig findet der Stern-Chef, daß keiner der von Löwenthal zitierten italienischen Zeugen von dem angeblich erhängten Mädchen gesprochen habe und auch nichts bekannt geworden sei, was aus dem von Leonardo Rossin denunzierten Faschisten wurde. Nannen bezeichnet den Löwenthal-Bericht kurzerhand als „Manipulation“.

Immerhin bleibt bei dieser „Nacht-und-Nebel-Aktion“ (Nannen) des Gerhard Löwenthal ein peinlicher Beigeschmack: die politische Vergangenheit des jetzt in der Jugendförderung tätigen Hans Weidemann. Aber Henri Nannen, der selbst bestätigt: „Ich weiß, daß er ein begeisterter und überzeugter Nazi war, er hat das selbst nie verschwiegen“, will seinen Redakteur dennoch nicht fallenlassen. „Ich weiß, daß er nichts Unrechtes getan hat.“ Weidemann: „Wenn es in Italien eine Sonderstaatsanwaltschaft gibt, die Kriegsverbrechen untersucht, werde ich auch dort ein Ermittlungsverfahren gegen mich selbst beantragen.“



Henri Nannen

"Inoländische Zeitung"

ATTACHMENT C  
4.12.70

## Schaut der Stern-Chef wegen „Süd“

Die Vorwürfe gegen Nannen und seinen Redakteur Weidemann weist

Von unserem Korrespondent

Hamburg, 3. Dezember

Stern-Chefredakteur Henri Nannen, der nach einem vom ZDF-Moderator Gerhard Löwenthal am Mittwochabend im ZDF-Magazin zitierten Ausspruch seine Illustrierte nur mache, damit er sich morgens beim Rasieren offen in die Augen sehen könne, begrüßte seine Mitarbeiter am Donnerstagmorgen: „Ich bin heute schlecht rasiert, weil ich nun ja nicht mehr in den Spiegel schauen kann.“

Alle Stern-Redakteure, die am Mittwochabend Löwenthals „ZDF-Magazin“ gesehen hatten, verstanden die ironisch gemeinte Abwandlung des Spruches von Henri Nannen sofort. Hatte doch Löwenthal in seiner Sendung gegen den für das Stern-Ressort „Jugend forscht“ zuständigen Ressortleiter Hans Weidemann den schweren Vorwurf erhoben, er sei als Ortskommandant des italienischen Städtchens Bevilacqua für Folterungen und Hinrichtungen von Partisanen verantwortlich gewesen und außerdem sei eine nicht direkt an Sabotageakten beteiligte gewesene Italienerin auf seinen Befehl an einem Brückenmast aufgehängt worden.

Henri Nannen, der als Leutnant der von Weidemann geleiteten Gruppe „Südstern“ angehörte, habe von den Vorgängen in Bevilacqua

gewußt. Der Fall müsse nicht nur unter juristischen Aspekten im Falle Weidemann gesehen werden, sondern, so Löwenthal, im Falle Nannen auch unter politischen Gesichtspunkten. Denn der Stern-Chef habe sich jahrelang als Hüter der Demokratie und als Antifaschist aufgespielt und prominente Politiker der Bundesrepublik, darunter Heinrich Lübke, Kiesinger und den Weihbischof Defregger wegen ihrer Tätigkeit in der NS-Zeit scharf angegriffen. Löwenthal: „Ob er sich beim Rasieren nun auch noch in die Augen sehen kann?“

Löwenthals Angriff auf Weidemann und Nannen hatte seinen Ausgangspunkt — nach den Worten des Moderators — am 5. November. An diesem Tage habe Bundesinnenminister Genscher eine Anfrage des Bundestagsabgeordneten Weide beantwortet, der wissen wollte, ob es zutrefte, daß die Bundesregierung dem Berliner Senator für Sport und Jugend eine Unterstützung der Aktion „Jugend trainiert für Olympia“ empfohlen habe, obwohl der Leiter dieser Aktion, Hans Weidemann, als Träger des goldenen Parteiabzeichens der NSDAP, stellvertretender Gauleiter von Essen und Obersturmführer der Waffen-SS ungeeignet sei, die deutsche Jugend im olympischen Geiste zu erziehen.

### „Hier geht es nicht um einen kleinen PG“

„Wir wurden aufmerksam“, verkündete Gerhard Löwenthal „und wir recherchierten, zumal uns die Antwort des Innenministers nicht befriedigte, daß die Aktion durch einen einzelnen nicht gefährdet sei, der in der bezeichneten Weise politisch belastet sein soll“. Löwenthal: „Hans Weidemann ist nicht ein einzelner, er ist der Bundeswettbewerbsleiter der von der Illustrierten Stern initiierten Aktionen ‚Jugend forscht‘ und ‚Jugend trainiert für Olympia‘.“ Das mache seine Person interessant genug, um seine Vergangenheit etwas näher unter die Lupe zu nehmen.

Löwenthals Rechercheure fanden heraus, daß Weidemann seit 1928 Mitglied der NSDAP gewesen sein soll, ferner folgende Ämter bekleidet habe: Zellenleiter, Parteiredner, Gau-Geschäftsführer, Gau-Propagandaleiter, Stellvertreter des Essener Gauleiters, seit 1936 SA-Mann, 1938 Übernahme in die SS, seit 1941 Kriegsberichterstatter bei der Waffen-SS. „Hier geht es nicht um einen kleinen PG, hier haben wir einen Aktivist vor uns, dessen heutige Tätigkeit mit seiner derart belasteten Vergangenheit nicht in Einklang zu bringen ist“ (Löwenthal).

Weit schwerer als die NS-Vergangenheit des Hans Weidemann aber wog nach Meinung des ZDF-Moderators die militärische Tätigkeit. SS-Obersturmführer Hans Weidemann sei im Oktober 1944 im Schloß des oberitalienischen

Bevilacqua für das Propagandaunternehmen „Südstern“ verantwortlich gewesen. In der Nacht zum 19. 10. 1944 seien von Partisanen mehrere Brücken in der Nähe des Schlosses gesprengt worden. Obwohl Personen nicht verletzt worden seien und auch der taktische Wert dieser Aktion nicht groß gewesen sei, hätten die Deutschen alle Bewohner des Ortes im Schloß zusammengetrieben, mehrere Männer seien von Schwarzhemden und Deutschen gefoltert und mit Elektroschocks „behandelt“ worden. Zwei von ihnen hätten unter der Folter ihre aktive Beteiligung an den Sprengungen gestanden, nämlich Julio Bisanno und Leonardo Rossin.

Der erste wurde aufgehängt, der zweite diente Löwenthals Rechercheuren jetzt als Beweis. Unter drei ihm vorgelegten Photos erkannte Rossin den auf dem Photo nur schräg von hinten gezeigten Ortskommandanten wieder: Hans Weidemann. Rossin erläuterte vor der ZDF-Kamera, er sei dem Tode nur dadurch entronnen, daß er einen italienischen Faschisten denunzierte, der den Partisanen geholfen habe. „Durch diese Aussage hast du dein Leben gerettet“, habe Ortskommandant Weidemann damals zu ihm gesagt. Genau wie Rossin gab auch der italienische Ingenieur Martello an, daß Italiener im Schloß von Bevilacqua gefoltert worden seien.

Der ehemalige deutsche Kriegsberichterstatter C. A. Kindler, der zum Unternehmen „Süd-

# Istern" nicht mehr in den Spiegel?

der Illustrierten-Boss zurück: „Wissentliche Nachrichtenfälschung“

enten Gert Kistenmacher

stern" abkommandiert worden war, berichtete den ZDF-Rechercheuren, daß nicht nur der 22jährige Julio Biscasso gehängt worden sei, sondern auch ein italienisches Mädchen. Der ZDF-Sprecher: „Es gibt Hinweise von Zeugen, daß der Leutnant Henri Nannen von diesen Vorfällen Kenntnis gehabt haben muß.“ Ein Friseur aus Bevilacqua erläuterte vor der ZDF-Kamera, daß Nannen und Weidemann befreundet gewesen seien. Aber wichtigstes Indiz in der Löwenthalschen Beweiskette: Ein Plakat der Ortskommandantur von Bevilacqua mit der Ankündigung der Exekution und der Unterschrift von Hans Weidemann. Löwenthal: „Die in unserer Sendung vorgelegten Aussagen und Beweismittel sind nur die Spitze des Eisberges.“

Henri Nannen reagierte auf solche Anschuldigungen als erstes mit einem Brief an ZDF-Intendant Holzamer, in dem er Löwenthal der „wissentlichen Nachrichtenfälschung zu Zwecken der politischen

Diffamierung“ beschuldigt. Hans Weidemann erstattete gegen sich selbst Anzeige und erklärte, daß er vor jeder italienischen oder deutschen

Ermittlungsbehörde erscheinen werde. Der „Jugend forscht“-Leiter ist guter Hoffnung: Zwei Ermittlungsverfahren gegen ihn wurden bereits vor langer Zeit von der Staatsanwaltschaft in Stade eingestellt. Löwenthal, der auch das zitierte, bemerkt jedoch dazu, daß der Fall des erhängten italienischen Mädchens bei der Einstellung noch nicht bekannt gewesen sei.

Schon vor einem Jahr hatte Henri Nannen Informationen erhalten, daß im Gebiet von Bevilacqua recherchiert würde. Zusammen mit dem ZDF waren Redakteure der italienischen Zeitung *Domenica del Corriere* auf Weidemanns und Nannens Spuren. Der Chefredakteur dieses Blattes, Zucconi, ließ den Mailänder Korrespondenten des Stern aber wissen, seine Leute hätten in Bevilacqua nur Gutes über Weidemann und Henri Nannen gehört und er wolle diese Geschichte nicht bringen. Um so mehr, als festgestellt worden sei, daß weder Weidemann noch Nannen an den Folterungen oder Todesurteilen beteiligt gewesen seien.

Aber einen Tag vor der ZDF-Sendung erschien bei Henri Nannen ZDF-Rechercheur Meyer und bat um ein Interview zu den An-

schuldigungen. Weder Weidemann, der bis dahin vom ZDF noch nicht angehört worden war, noch Nannen hatten am Vorabend dieser Sendung Gelegenheit, eigene Zeugen beizubringen, die ihre Unschuld bestätigen konnten. Daraus ergibt sich, laut Henri Nannen, daß nach der Sprengung von Brücken durch Partisanen in Bevilacqua ein SD-Kommando aus Este oder Padua erschienen sei und zwar in Luftwaffenuniform, das von einem „dicken, rotgesichtigen Hauptmann“ befehligt wurde. Außerdem seien faschistische Schwarzhemden dabeigewesen. Sie hätten einen Teil des Schlosses beschlagnahmt und dann Vernehmungen durchgeführt.

## „Immer gutes Einvernehmen“

Weder ein Angehöriger der Einheit von Weidemann, noch der von Nannen sei dabeigewesen. Für diese Angaben spricht, daß Henri Nannen gleich nach dem Krieg in Bevilacqua war und mit Einheimischen großes Wiederschen feierte. Nannen: „Wir hatten immer ein gutes Einvernehmen.“ Dieses SD-Kommando, so Nannen, habe zwei Partisanen zum Tode verurteilt. Beide seien der Brückensprengung überführt worden. „Bis vorgestern Abend wußten Weidemann und ich und ich glaube, auch alle Leute meiner Einheit, nur von diesen zwei Partisanen. Von einem Mädchen ist uns nichts bekannt.“ Ebensowenig weiß Nannen etwas von dem Plakat, auf dem — von Weidemann unterschrieben — die Exekution der beiden Partisanen angekündigt worden sei. „Selbst wenn er das Plakat unterschrieben hätte — Ortskommandanten wurde damals vieles zur Unterschrift vorgelegt — so beweist das nicht, daß Weidemann überhaupt etwas mit der Sache zu tun hatte“, meint Henri Nannen. Weidemann: „Ich kenne das Plakat gar nicht.“

Merkwürdig findet der Stern-Chef, daß keiner der von Löwenthal zitierten italienischen Zeugen von dem angeblich erhängten Mädchen gesprochen habe und auch nichts bekannt geworden sei, was aus dem von Leonardo Rossin denunzierten Faschisten wurde. Nannen bezeichnet den Löwenthal-Bericht kurzerhand als „Manipulation“.

Immerhin bleibt bei dieser „Nacht-und-Nebel-Aktion“ (Nannen) des Gerhard Löwenthal ein peinlicher Beigeschmack: die politische Vergangenheit des jetzt in der Jugendförderung tätigen Hans Weidemann. Aber Henri Nannen, der selbst bestätigt: „Ich weiß, daß er ein begeisterter und überzeugter Nazi war, er hat das selbst nie verschwiegen“, will seinen Redakteur dennoch nicht fallenlassen. „Ich weiß, daß er nichts Unrechtes getan hat.“ Weidemann: „Wenn es in Italien eine Sonderstaatsanwaltschaft gibt, die Kriegsverbrechen untersucht, werde ich auch dort ein Ermittlungsverfahren gegen mich selbst beantragen.“



Henri Nannen



## BLICKPUNKTE

MÜNCHEN, FREITAG, 4. DEZEMBER 1970

Der Schuß kam aus dem Bildschirm. Im letzten Beitrag seines ZDF-Magazins am Mittwochabend überraschte Gerhard Löwenthal seine Zuschauer mit einer Reportage, die mit dem Skandal um den Münchner Weihbischof Matthias Defregger verglichen werden kann. In der Fernsehsendung war behauptet und belegt worden, daß der Stern-Redakteur Hans Weidemann — im Impressum für „Jugend forscht“ und „Jugend trainiert für Olympia“ verantwortlich — als ehemaliger SS-Obersturmführer im Verdacht stehe, bei der Hinrichtung von zwei italienischen Partisanen im Oktober 1944 eine Rolle gespielt zu haben. Außerdem soll es Hinweise geben, daß Chefredakteur Henri Nannen damals von diesem Vorfall während des Zweiten Weltkrieges Kenntnis gehabt haben muß.

# der aus dem Bildschirm kam

Großer Wirbel um die Fernseh-Attacke gegen „Stern“-Chefredakteur Henri Nannen  
Im ZDF-Magazin schlägt Gerhard Löwenthal ein düsteres Kapitel aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg auf

Nach dem ZDF-Dokumentationsfilm waren Ende 1944 PK-Einheiten des Propaganda-Unternehmens Südstern in die norditalienische Stadt Bevilacqua bei Verona verlegt worden. Das Kommando führte SS-Obersturmführer Hans Weidemann; zu seinem Stab, der im Schloß von Bevilacqua seinen Standort hatte, gehörte der Luftwaffenleutnant Henri Nannen. Die PK-Einheiten hatten den Auftrag, die nachrückenden alliierten Truppen zum Überlaufen aufzufordern, indem sie beispielsweise Raketen mit Propagandamaterial — Pin-up-Girls, die einen herzlichen Empfang versießen — hinter die feindlichen Linien schossen.

Am 19. Oktober 1944 wurden laut ZDF-Dokumentation Brücken in der Umgebung des Schlosses gesprengt. Die deutschen Soldaten und italienische Faschisten („Schwarzhemden“), die nach dem Frontwechsel Italiens auf seiten der Deutschen weiterkämpften, nahmen verächtlich Italiener fest und trieben im Verlauf der Aktion einige hundert Bewohner im Schloßhof zusammen. Ein italienischer Partisan, der wegen der Brückensprengungen zum Tode verurteilt worden war, dann aber entkommen konnte berichtete dem ZDF-Reporterteam, daß einige Gefangene während des Verhörs von den „Schwarzhemden“ und von deutschen Soldaten geschlagen und gefoltert worden seien. Er selbst habe unmenschliche Torturen über sich ergehen lassen müssen.

Der Augenzeuge gab weiter an, er sei dem SS-Sturmbannführer Weidemann begnadigt worden, weil er den Namen eines Faschisten nannte, der sich in die italienische Widerstandsbewegung „Engeschlichen“ habe. Weidemann soll auf die Nennung dieses Namens mit den Worten reagiert haben: „Das hat dir das Leben gerettet.“

### Die Leiche über dem Fluß

Ein zweiter italienischer Häftling, der in unmittelbarer Nähe einer gesprengten Brücke festgenommen worden war, der etwa 22 Jahre alte Julio Biscasso, wurde dann, wie aus der ZDF-Dokumentation weiter hervorgeht, nach dem Verhör zum Tode verurteilt und mit einem Strick um den Hals von der zerstörten Brücke — vermutlich in der Nacht vom 20. Oktober — „in den Tod gestoßen“. Seine Leiche blieb zur Abschreckung der Bevölkerung drei Tage lang an einem Pfahl über dem Flußbett hängen. Ein weiterer Augenzeuge, der nach den Anschlägen verhaftet und im Schloß verhört worden war — er ist heute als Ingenieur tätig — gab an, daß der Hingerichtete Julio Biscasso auf keinen Fall die Hauptverantwortung für die Sprengungen getragen habe; diese Operation sei vielmehr von seinem Bruder geleitet worden.

Ein Friseur der während der Besatzungszeit im Schloß gearbeitet hatte und der ursprünglich zum Tod verurteilte Italiener haben laut ZDF-Dokumentation den SS-Sturmbannführer Weidemann und den Luftwaffenleutnant Henri Nan-



LÖWENTHAL UND SEIN ZEUGE

nen auf Fotos identifiziert. Es wird dabei betont, daß die beiden Offiziere in engen Vertrauensverhältnis standen und daß Nannen von aller Vorgängen im Zusammenhang mit der Strafaktion gegen die Partisanen Kenntnis gehabt haben müsse. Das Plakat, auf dem die Hinrichtung Julio Biscassos und das — dann allerdings nicht vollstreckte — Todesurteil gegen den zweiten Italiener bekanntgegeben wurden, trug die Faksimile-Unterschrift Weidemanns.

Im Verlauf der Recherchen stieß das Reporter-Team des ZDF dann auf eine bisher nicht bekannte Tatsache: Auf der anderen Seite der gesprengten Brücke war — offensichtlich in der gleichen Nacht — ein italienisches Mädchen gehängt worden; auch der Leichnam des Mädchens blieb, wie Augenzeugen bestätigten, drei Tage lang zur Abschreckung hängen. Angehörige der Partisanen mußten ihr Bauernhaus in der Nähe des Tatortes verlassen, das Gebäude wurde anschließend in Brand gesteckt.

Die Hinrichtung des Mädchens wurde in diesem ZDF-Dokumentationsfilm auch vor dem Kriegsberichterstatter C. A. Kändler bestätigt.

In der Sendung sagte Löwenthal wörtlich:

„Am 5. November, meine Damen und Herren, beantwortete Bundesinnenminister Genscher auf eine Anfrage des Bundestagsabgeordneten Weigl, der gefragt wurde, ob es zutrefte, daß die Bundesregierung dem Berliner Senator für Jugend und Sport eine Unterstützung der Aktion Jugend trainiert für Olympia empfohlen habe, obwohl der Leiter dieser Aktion, Hans Weidemann, als Träger des Goldenen Parteiabzeichens der NSDAP, Stellvertretender Gauleiter von Hessen und Obersturmführer der Waffen-SS, ungeeignet sei, die deutsche Jugend im olympischen Geiste zu erziehen. Wir wurden aufmerksam, und wir recherchierten, zumal uns die Antwort des Innenministers nicht befriedigen konnte. In dieser Antwort wurde durchaus zu Recht die Aktion Olympia für die Jugend besonders gelobt, zu Weidemann aber nur lapidar festgesetzt: „Den Erfolg der von verschiedenen Einrichtungen getragenen Aktion und ihre positive Wirkung auf die Jugend sieht die Bundesregierung nicht dadurch als gefährdet an, daß ein einzelner, an der Organisation Beteiligter in der durch die Anfrage gekennzeichneten Weise politisch belastet sein soll.“

Der eigenhändig geschriebene Lebenslauf des Hans Weidemann spricht für sich selbst:

Seit 1928 Mitglied der NSDAP, 1932 Stellvertretender Gauleiter von Hessen, 1933 auf Vorschlag von Goebbels in das Reichspropagandaministerium berufen. Weidemann war Reichsamtseiter der Partei und Reichsredner, er zensierte die deutschen Filmwochenschauen, 1936 trat er der SA bei und bewarb sich um die Aufnahme in Heydrichs SD. 1941 wurde der Goebbels-Günstling Mitglied einer Propaganda-Einheit der Waffen-SS. Im Beförderungsvorschlag zum Obersturmführer der Waffen-SS findet sich ein Hinweis darauf, was Weidemann anschließend machte. Er nahm am Ostfeldzug teil. Unter anderem beim Chef der Bandenkampfverbände Rußland-Mitte. Dabei auch an einem der berüchtigten Partisanen-Bekämpfungsunternehmen namens „Wintermärchen“. Der Chef dieser Bandenkampfverbände Rußland-Mitte, der General der Waffen-SS Bach-Zelewski, wurde 1962 in Nürnberg zu lebenslänglich Zuchthaus verurteilt. Im Schloß des oberitalienischen Bevilacqua war SS-Obersturmführer Hans Weidemann im Oktober 1944 für das Propagandaunternehmen „Südstern“ verantwortlich.

In ZDF-Dokumentation heißt es weiter: „Wir haben dieses Material, diese Bilder, Dokumente und Aussagen der Ludwigsburger Zentralstelle zur Aufklärung von NS-Verbrechen zur Kenntnis gebracht. Und haben den stellvertretenden Behördenleiter, Oberstaatsanwalt Dr. Artzt, um eine Stellungnahme dazu ersucht:

Sprecher: Wenn man diese vorgegebenen Fakten betrachtet, dann ist das ja wohl kein NS-Verbrechen, sondern eher ein Kriegsverbrechen.

Dr. A.: Bei diesem Tatbestand kann man zweifellos davon ausgehen, daß es sich um ein Kriegsverbrechen handelt. Vorausgegangen war ein Sabotageakt der Zivilbevölkerung, der der Behinderung der Truppenbewegung offenbar dienen sollte. Der eine Täter war ebenso zweifellos beteiligt. Er ist auf frischer Tat ertappt worden oder festgenommen worden. Nach allgemein gültiger Ansicht im Völkerrecht, auch der im Ausland vertretenen Meinungen, ist es zulässig, einen auf frischer Tat ertappten Partisanen ohne Gerichtsurteil hinzurichten. Anders liegen die Dinge bei der Erhängung des Mädchens, das an der Tat selbst nicht beteiligt war. Hier ist die Frage, ob ein Gerichtsurteil hätte vorausgehen müssen, um ihre Beteiligung zu klären, aber es ist sicher, daß sie in dieser Aktion nicht mit dem Täter gemeinsam ohne weiteres aufgehängt werden durfte.

Zur Frage, ob hier nach innerstaatlichem Strafrecht Mord oder Totschlag vorliegt, genügen meiner Ansicht nach die bis jetzt bekannten Fakten noch nicht aus, sondern es wäre zu klären, in welcher Weise, insbesondere da Folterungen vorgegangen sind, die Erhängungen stattgefunden haben. Ob etwa die Qualifika-

tionensmerkmale der Grausamkeit vorgelegen haben.

ZDF: Aber zweifelsfrei ist doch wohl, daß es entweder Mord oder Totschlag gewesen ist im Falle des Mädchens.

Dr. A.: Es ist bei dem Mädchen meines Erachtens ohne Zweifel, daß es mindestens Totschlag gewesen ist, es müßte aber durch weitere Ermittlungen geklärt werden, ob eventuell die Tatbestandsmerkmale des Mordes vorgelegen haben.

ZDF: Sie haben diesen Anschlag des Ortskommandanten gesehen, in dem sich der Satz findet, der Ortskommandant verfügt — usw. —, daß die Beteiligten gehängt werden. Heißt das, daß der Ortskommandant, der ja hier unterschrieben hat im Faksimile, damit für die Tat verantwortlich ist?

Dr. A.: Im allgemeinen wurden standgerichtliche Urteile der Bevölkerung zur Abschreckung oder Vergeltung bekanntgegeben, und der Ortskommandant war sozusagen nur der Plakatierer dieser Urteile. Aus diesem Text aber muß man annehmen, daß der Ortskommandant selbst die sogenannte Strafe hier bestimmt und auch vollstreckt hat.

Löwenthal: Soweit die von uns recherchierten Fakten, meine Damen und Herren. Hier vor mir liegt ein dickes Aktenstück, das weitere Zeugenaussagen und Angaben enthält, die die Sachverhalte bestätigen. Zwei Ermittlungsverfahren der Staatsanwaltschaft in Stade wurden zwar eingestellt, nach unserer Kenntnis aber ohne daß in Italien nachgeforscht worden wäre. Nun geht es uns nicht darum, Schuld oder Unschuld der Beteiligten festzustellen. Das ist nicht unsere Aufgabe. Wir können weder die Rolle von Staatsanwälten noch gar die von Richtern übernehmen. Mir geht es allein um den politischen Takt, um die moralische Glaubwürdigkeit von Leuten, die heute in der Publizistik und in der Jugendarbeit der Bundesrepublik wichtige Positionen einnehmen.

Nazi-Propaganda stammen. Ich wollte von Herrn Nannen die Antwort auf die Frage, ob er es verantworten könne, einen Mann mit der politischen und militärischen Vergangenheit Hans Weidemanns für Aufgaben wie „Jugend forscht“ und „Jugend trainiert für Olympia“ einzusetzen.

Seine fernschriftliche Antwort lautet: Ja, denn ich kenne Hans Weidemann seit 26 Jahren als einen begabten, warmherzigen und persönlich absolut integren Mann. Weidemann war als junger Mann ein überzeugter und begeisterter Nationalsozialist, im Gegensatz zu vielen anderen hat er das nie bestritten, aber er hat manchen rassistisch Verfolgten oder politisch denunzierten Mitbürger geschützt, vielen verfeindeten Künstlern geholfen. Emil Nolde und Ernst Barlach haben davon Zeugnis gegeben. Kein Fall ist bekannt, in dem Weidemann selbst einem Andersdenkenden unrecht getan hätte.

## Zwei wichtige Feststellungen

Auch Herr Weidemann schickte uns ein Fernschreiben, aus dem ich Ihnen zwei wichtige Feststellungen vorlesen werde:

Falsch ist unter anderem die Behauptung, daß ich zu irgendeiner Zeit unter dem SS-Obergruppenführer von dem Bach-Zelewski oder unter anderer Führung in der Bandenbekämpfung im Ausland oder sonstwo Dienst getan hätte.

Weiter heißt es in dem Fernschreiben des Herrn Weidemann:

Falsch ist die Behauptung, ich hätte mit dem Verhör oder der Hinrichtung italienischer Partisanen in Bevilacqua als Teilnehmer oder Verantwortlicher zu tun gehabt. Dieser Fall ist von der Staatsanwaltschaft Stade untersucht worden. Verdachtsmomente gegen mich haben sich nicht ergeben. Das von Ihrem Mitarbeiter beigebrachte, mir aber nicht vorgelegte Plakat, das meine faksimilierte Unterschrift tragen soll, sowie die angeblich neuen Äußerungen eines Beteiligten haben mich veranlaßt, heute bei der Staatsanwaltschaft des Landgerichts Hamburg Strafanzeige gegen mich selbst zu erstatten und eine Wiederaufnahme der Ermittlungen zu beantragen. Im übrigen bin ich bereit, vor jeder Ermittlungsbehörde zu erscheinen. Ich erwarte, daß Sie diesen meinen Beitrag zur Aufklärung des Sachverhalts in Ihrer Sendung nicht unerwähnt lassen.


## Protest beim Intendanten

Löwenthal: Das ist hiermit geschehen. Der Fall Weidemann, meine Damen und Herren, ist damit ein juristischer Fall, und in ein schwebendes Verfahren werden wir nicht eingreifen. Der Fall Nannen ist ein politischer Fall, und der wird uns wohl noch weiter beschäftigen."

Mit einem Protestschreiben an den Intendanten des Zweiten Deutschen Fernsehens, Karl Holzamer, setzte sich gestern der Chefredakteur des Magazins „Stern“, Henri Nannen, gegen die Sendung des ZDF-Magazins zur Wehr. Nannen bezichtigte in dem Schreiben den Moderator der Sendung, Gerhard Löwenthal, sowie den Autor, Jürgen R. Meier, der „wesentlichen Nachrichtenfälschung zum Zwecke der politischen Diffamierung“.

Gegenüber AP erklärte „Stern“-Chefredakteur Henri Nannen, bei der ZDF-

Sendung Löwenthals handele es sich um einen „manipulierten Bericht“, der beim Zuschauer den Eindruck habe erwecken sollen, daß der Ressortchef von „Jugend forscht“ mit der Hinrichtung etwas zu tun habe und Nannen selbst davon gewußt habe. Tatsächlich sei jedoch nach den Anschlägen bei Bevilacqua ein deutsches SD-Kommando aus der Stadt Este zusammen mit italienischen Faschisten („Schwarzhemden“) erschienen, die alle Aktionen im Zusammenhang mit den Vorfällen ausgeführt hätten. Weder Weidemann noch Nannen, noch Mitglieder ihrer Einheiten hätten etwas damit zu tun gehabt. Weder vom Tod des Mädchens noch von dem Plakat mit der angeblichen Faksimile-Unterschrift sei ihnen vor der Sendung etwas bekannt gewesen.



WEIDEMANN'S UNTERSCHRIFT  
unter dem Hinrichtungsplakat.



WEIHNACHTSFEIER 1944 BEI „SÜDSTERN“

Von links: SS-Untersturmführer Kurt Alber, SS-Obersturmführer Hans Weidemann, Leutnant Henri Nannen und Martha Kimm, die heutige Frau Nannen.

Fotos: Domenica del Corriere

## Die Leitartikel Henri Nannens ...

Der Chefredakteur einer der größten deutschen Illustrierten hat im Jahre 1965 einen derart belasteten Mann mit einer Aufgabe betraut, die unbestritten für unser Land wichtig ist. Die von ihm geleitete Illustrierte mahnt ihre Leser Woche für Woche zu besonderer Wachsamkeit gegenüber allen Überresten nazistischer Vergangenheit. Das ist zu begrüßen. Besonders bei politischer Prominenz geschieht dies mit großer Verve. Auch das oft zu Recht, wie ich meine. Wo aber bleibt da die Glaubwürdigkeit Nannens, der die Vergangenheit seines Freundes Weidemann genau kennt.

Ich könnte jetzt stundenlang aus den politischen Leitartikeln Henri Nannens vorlesen, ob er sich zu Heinrich Lübke oder zu Kurt Georg Kiesinger äußerte, zum Fall des Weihbischofs Defregger oder dem des Berliner Richters Hering. Ich frage mich, ob der Mann ein einziges Mal an die Vergangenheit seines Vertrauten oder an die Ereignisse von Bevilacqua ge-

dacht hat. Zu Heinrich Lübke schrieb Nannen damals, „die jungen Leute auf den Straßen leiden an der Verlogenheit dieses Staates. Sie tragen die Bilder Che Guevaras und Ho Tschu Minhs vor sich her. Sollten wir ihnen mit dem Bildnis Heinrich Lübkes entgegentreten?“ Und ich frage mich, sollten wir ihnen etwa mit dem Bildnis Henri Nannens entgegentreten? Im Fernsehen sagte Nannen einmal, er würde diese Illustrierte machen, damit er sich morgens beim Rasieren offen in die Augen sehen könne. Ob er das morgen früh auch noch kann? Nun, meine Damen und Herren, wir wollten Herrn Nannen selbst die Gelegenheit geben, in dieser Sendung Stellung zu nehmen. Er hat das leider abgelehnt.

Statt dessen schickte er ein Fernschreiben, aus dem ich Ihnen das Wesentliche vorlesen will, obwohl er darin unseren Film als „Nacht-und-Nebel-Aktion“ und „journalistisches Standgericht“ charakterisiert. Begriffe, die deutlich aus der alten



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221

SECRET 071417Z DEC 70 CITE C 3783

PRIORITY C INFO DIRECTOR, C

RYBAT C UTILITY

REF DIRECTOR 091858 (NOT SENT C)

1. UTILITY CONTACTED C 5 DEC, AND ASKED  
FOR URGENT TRACES ON THREE INDIVIDUALS CONNECTED WITH "HAMBURG  
AFFAIR." RESULTS DESIRED BY EVENING 8 DEC. NO C TRACES.

A. SCHROIFF, PAUL, STAATSANWALT

B. PIECHOCKY, JOACHIM

C. KLIEBHAN, FRANZ

2. BELIEVE COURTESY REQUIRES SOME REPLY TO UTILITY.  
REQUEST C TRACES AND ANY COMMENT. (IF C FEELS WE SHOULD  
ACCOMMODATE UTILITY TO GREATER DEGREE, C TRACES WOULD BE  
USEFUL.) NOTE NO IDENTIFYING DATA PROVIDED AND BACKGROUND  
UTILITY INTEREST NOT MADE CLEAR. REQUEST RELATES TO LOEWENTHAL  
TV CHARGES THAT HANS WEIDEMANN OF "STERN" RESPONSIBLE FOR WARTIME  
EXECUTION OF WOMAN PARTISAN IN ITALY.

3. POUCHING FOLLOWING UTILITY REQUESTS TO C AND WASHINGTON:

A. REQUEST FOR LNLUTE MATERIAL RE SOV NAVAL BUILD-UP  
IN MEDITERRANEAN, WHICH UTILITY CAN PASS DR. WOLFGANG HOEPKER

7 DEC 70 221058

E/G

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7 DEC 1970

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PAGE 2 [ 1 3783 SECRET

TOCIN

OF "CHRIST UND WELT" SO HE CAN SOUND ALARM ~~TOCIN~~ IN PRINT.

B. OFFER BY [

7 (DPOB 11 JUN 40,

KOENIGSBERG) TO COME TO WASHINGTON AT OWN EXPENSE AND BRIEF

[ ] ON RESULTS OF HIS SOUTHEAST ASIAN TRIP, WHICH UTILITY  
SAYS OFFERS "INTERESTING POSSIBILITIES" FOR LNLUTE.

C. RECOMMENDATION THAT JKLANCE HEAR A REPORT FROM

"WALDMAN" (PRESUMABLY ERIC WALDMAN) ON "ACTIVITIES OF THE OTHER  
SIDE" IN FEDREP.

D. UTILITY STATEMENT OF HIS INTENT TO SPONSOR A BOOK,  
TO BE WRITTEN BY "SON OF VICENZ MUELLER," AND REPORT THAT YOUNG  
MUELLER WANTS TO EMIGRATE TO SOUTH AFRICA, U.S.A. OR CANADA.  
UTILITY WILL PROVIDE FURTHER WRITTEN MATERIAL ON YOUN MUELLER.

E. QUERY WHETHER JKLANCE CAN ARRANGE TO HAVE ERIKA  
GLAESER-WALLACH (DPOB 19 FEB 22, SCHAW, GERMANY, ADOPTED DAUGHTER  
NOEL FIELD) INTERVIEWED RE ALLEGED APPROACH TO HER IN EAST BERLIN  
1950 BY LEO BAUER ON BEHALF OF COMMUNISTS.

F. UTILITY VOICED TO [ ] HIS SUSPICIONS THAT HENRI  
NANNEN [ ] PUBLISHER OF STERN) AND STERN EDITOR HANS  
WEIDEMANN HAVE TIES TO EAST BLOC, CITING "VIF" WELCOME GIVEN  
NANNEN IN LENINGRAD.

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PAGE 3 ☒ 3783 S E C R E T

4. PER UTILITY, SPIEGEL SERIES NOW DUE APPEAR FEB 71.  
 HE NOT AWARE OF ANY CHANGES IN TEXT TO DATE. REF JUST RECEIVED  
 AND WILL HVE ☒ PASS IT TO UTILITY AT NEXT OPPORTUNITY IF  
☒ CONCURS.

5. DO NOT RECOMMEND ANY REPLY TO UTILITY ON PARA 3  
 POINTS UNTIL WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO EXAMINE IN MORE DEPTH THE  
 POTENTIALLY TROUBLESOME PROBLEM UTILITY'S CONTINUED ACTIVITY  
 POSES IN OUR RELATIONS WITH CATRIBE.

6. FILE: ☒ GP-1.  
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PLS RECEIVED & FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF REQUEST

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9 DEC 70 22 22z

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
TO PRIORITY

E INFO

RYBAT E CATRIE

REF: A. E 9258 (IN-222828)

B. E 3783 (IN-221058)



CONCUR REF A STATEMENT OF PROBLEM AND PROPOSED APPROACH TO  
ITS RESOLUTION.

END OF MESSAGE

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388

PRECEDENCE

SECRET 091444Z DEC 70 CITE 1 9258

9 DEC 70 222828

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO

RYBAT [ ] CATRIBE

REF [ ] 3783 (1-221058)

AN/USAF	E/G/CIL
PS	
AS	

1. CONTENT OF REF OBVIOUSLY REPRESENTS UTILITY DABBLING IN INTERNAL FRG POLITICS, APPARENTLY IN CONNECTION WITH A CURRENT LEGAL CASE (IT IS REPORTED THAT WEIDEMANN HAS ASKED FRG AUTHORITIES TO "OPEN CASE" CONCERNING HIS WARTIME ACTIVITIES IN ORDER THAT HE CAN PROVE LOEWENTHAL ACCUSATIONS RE HIS ANTI-PARTISAN ACTIVITIES ARE FALSE). COS CONSIDERS THAT [STATION] HAS NOTHING TO GAIN IN BECOMING INVOLVED IN ANY WAY IN THIS MATTER, EITHER THRU SERVICING UTILITY INFO REQUESTS OR OTHERWISE, AND UNLESS HQS SPECIFICALLY WISHES THAT UTILITY BE ACCOMMODATED RE THIS MATTER, PLANS INSTRUCT COB [ ] TO HAVE [ ] INFORM UTILITY AS FOLLOWS: JKLANCE (NO PARTICULAR PERSON SHOULD BE CITED) CONSIDERS THAT, IN ABSENCE OF ANY INDICATION THAT ANY SIGNIFICANT JKLANCE INTEREST IS INVOLVED, IT WOULD BE "INAPPROPRIATE" FOR JKLANCE TO DISCUSS NANNEN-WEIDEMANN - LOEWENTHAL AFFAIR, WHICH IT APPEARS HAS REACHED JUDICIAL STAGE.

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PAGE 2 ☐ 9258 S E C R E T

2. FYI NO STATION TRACES RE ANY OF SUBJECTS PARA  
1 REF.

3. REQUEST SOONEST HQS REACTION RE INTENDED REPLY PER  
PARA 1 ABOVE.

4. AS INDICATED BY COB ☐ IN REF PARA 5, CONTINUING  
FLOW OF REQUESTS FOR SERVICES FROM UTILITY HAS ACCENTUATED  
EXISTING PROBLEM WITH RESPECT TO RELATIONS BETWEEN COS AND  
COB ☐ ON ONE HAND AND ☐ AND UTILITY ON OTHER.  
COB ☐ HAS MET UTILITY (INTRODUCTION BY ☐ BUT TO  
DATE COS HAS NOT. INFO TO BASE FROM VARIOUS CATRIBE SOURCES  
INDICATES THAT LONG FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN ☐ AND UTILITY  
HAS COOLED AND THAT CURRENTLY THEIR RELATIONSHIP IS ONE OF  
STRAINED POLITENESS. REGARDLESS OF WHERE FAULT FOR THIS  
STATE OF AFFAIRS LIES, IT REPRESENTS POTENTIALLY  
SIGNIFICANT DANGER TO CURRENT JKLANCE/STATION RELATIONSHIP  
WITH CATRIBE, NOTABLY ☐

5. BELIEVE THAT HQS SHARES VIEW OF COS AND COB ☐  
THAT MOST IMPORTANT JKLANCE EQUITY IN SITUATION IS MAINTENANCE  
AND IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN COS AND ☐  
AND BETWEEN COB ☐ AND ☐ IN EACH INSTANCE

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IT IS JUDGED THAT GOOD START HAS BEEN MADE ON INDIVIDUAL BASIS AND THAT VERY CLOSE COORDINATION WHICH HAS BEEN UNDERTAKEN BETWEEN COS AND COB [ ] CONCERNING CONTACT WITH [ ] HAS SERVED TO REINFORCE PARTICULAR RELATION OF EACH TO [ ] AS WELL AS GENERAL JKLANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH CATRIBE. COS AND COB [ ] BELIEVE THAT IT IS ADVISABLE AT THIS TIME TO DISCUSS WITH [ ] MATTER OF JKLANCE/STATION CONTACT WITH UTILITY. PLANNED COS MEETING WITH [ ] AT PULLACH MORNING OF 11 DECEMBER, IN WHICH [ ] WILL PARTICIPATE, OFFERS GOOD OPPORTUNITY FOR BROACHING UTILITY CONTACT ISSUE IN LOW KEY MANNER (MEETING WAS SCHEDULED AS FIRST OF SERIES OF SUCH ENCOUNTERS, TO BE HELD AT PULLACH OR IN BONN ON ROUGHLY A QUARTERLY BASIS, AT WHICH COS AND [ ] WILL DISCUSS BROAD RANGE OF TOPICS OF MUTUAL INTEREST).

6. UNLESS HQS SEES ANY OBJECTION, COS WOULD PLAN INFORM [ ] ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

A. AS [ ] UNDOUBTEDLY KNOWS, JKLANCE HAS MAINTAINED INFORMAL CONTACT WITH UTILITY, AS MATTER OF COURTESY TO LONGTIME FRIEND AND FORMER CHIEF OF AN INTEL SERVICE WITH WHOM JKLANCE HAS LONG COOPERATED. [ ] HAS MET

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UTILITY BUT COS HAS NOT.

B. COS WISHES TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDING ON PART OF [ ] WITH RESPECT TO ANY STORIES WHICH [ ] MAY HEAR CONCERNING ALLEGED CURRENT OR FUTURE CONTACT WITH UTILITY BY FORMER OR CURRENT MEMBERS OF JKLANCE. THE ONLY OFFICIAL CONTACT WITH CATRIBE SERVICE IS THAT UNDERTAKEN BY COS, COB [ ], DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVES OF COS, OR JKLANCE HQS PERSONNEL SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED TO HANDLE SUCH CONTACT. [ ] MAY BE ASSURED THAT MATTERS OF MUTUAL CONCERN TO CATRIBE AND JKLANCE WILL BE DISCUSSED SOLELY THRU AUTHORIZED CHANNELS.

C. AS MATTER OF COURTESY TO UTILITY JKLANCE PLANS TO STAY IN UNOFFICIAL INFORMAL CONTACT WITH UTILITY, VIA [ ] DURING PERIODIC VISITS AND VIA [ ] ON BASIS THAT THE MEN ARE NEIGHBORS. COB [ ] WILL NOT SEEK OUT UTILITY BUT WOULD BE WILLING TO MEET WITH HIM IF UTILITY SO REQUESTS. SIMILAR SITUATION APPLIES TO COS. LATTER WOULD NOT PLAN SEEK OUT UTILITY, BUT, UNLESS [ ] PREFERS OTHERWISE, WOULD PLAN RESPOND AFFIRMATIVELY TO UTILITY REQUEST FOR INFORMAL MEETING.

7. WOULD APPRECIATE HQS COMMENTS RE PARA 6 LINE

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PAGE 5 [ ] 9258 S E C R E T

PRIOR TO 0900 HRS 11 DECEMBER. IF COMMENTS NOT RECEIVED,

[COS] WILL NOT BROACH UTILITY TOPIC TO [ ] AT 11 DECEMBER MEETING. GP-1.

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EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DOC. SYMBOL & NO.	DATE OF DOC.	FILE CLASSIFICATION OF RECORD COPY			
[ ] 3961	18 DEC 70				

DOC. SUBJECT

[ ]

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

B. HAVE TAKEN STEPS BOTH WITH [ ] AND  
UTILITY TO REGULARIZE FACT OF LATTER'S OCCASIONAL CONTACTS  
WITH BASE AND TO ASSURE [ ] IN UNAMBIGUOUS TERMS THAT  
[BASE] IN NO POSITION TO ACT ON ANY OPERATIONAL OR QUASI-  
OPERATIONAL UTILITY PROPOSALS WHICH MIGHT AFFECT CATRISE OR MMBRUSH  
INTERESTS. INITIAL REACTIONS FROM BOTH PARTIES ENCOURAGING,  
BUT THIS WILL REQUIRE VIGILANCE TO ENSURE WE NOT CAUGHT IN  
CROSSFIRE.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

Indicate The Subject, Project Or 201 File No. In Which This Form Is To Be Filed.				
SUBJECT OF 201 (Last, First, Middle)	201- UTILITY			

<b>DISPATCH</b>	CLASSIFICATION <b>S E C R E T</b>	PROCESSING	
		PROPOSED	ACTION
TO: Chief, European Division			MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO: Chief of Station, [ ]		X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM: Chief of Base, [ ]			ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT: CATRIBE			ABSTRACT
COS-COB Session with [ ] and alias ERITZ, 11 December 1970			MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

For information.

1. Attached is a contact report, a joint effort of [ ] and [ ], detailing a meeting these two officers held with Chief, CATRIBE and his Deputy on 11 December 1970. As noted in the attachment, it is hoped that such sessions will be held approximately quarterly in the future, either in Munich or Bonn.

2. As has become obvious in attempting to draft comprehensive reporting for such vehicles as the biweekly status report, it is impossible to cover the gamut of our activities with CATRIBE in a document bearing a single security classification or sensitivity indicator. This is also the case in reporting meetings such as that described in the attachment. We have therefore chosen the rather cumbersome device of indicating in the attachment that other subjects of varying sensitivity were covered. The actual account of such conversations are being forwarded separately, in the appropriate channels, with reference to this dispatch. We apologize for this unstaendlich-keit, trust that you will be able to put the pieces together for a coherent whole, and invite you to suggest an alternative format if you can think of one, short of putting an unnecessarily restrictive classification on the whole package.

3. In terms of evaluating the attached session, we would say that it was mildly revealing and definitely useful. We hope that future such sessions will be moreso. This meeting perhaps aptly reflected CATRIBE-JKLANCE relations at the turn of the year: basically sound and friendly, not without areas of sensitivity on both sides (but preponderantly on the Gorman side),

-CONTINUED-

Attachment: HERewith

Contact Report

Distribution:

1 - Eur Div w/att  
2 - COS/C w/att

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32W-2-28/1

CROSS REFERENCE TO

CLASSIFICATION
<b>S E C R E T</b>

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
5 JAN 1971	17 JAN 1971
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	
EGMA-74,651	
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER	
32W-2-28/1	

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CONTINUATION OF  
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C 1-74,651

Page 2  
5 Jan 71

and revealing a CATRIBE that is still definitely struggling to find its place in the present governmental structure. We will work for clarification--and improvement--in all three areas in the year just beginning.

[

]

USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

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EGMA-74651 AH.

**Time and Place:**

EBRITZ

1100-1230, 11 December 1970

1. [ ] had arranged this meeting on his last preceding visit to CATRIBE, to introduce Deputy Chief LNBRAN to [ ] on 2 December. We were surprised, but not displeased, to see @BRITZ present, and he participated actively at several points in the meeting. Since the session ranged over most current joint interests, it contains reference to several sensitive matters which are being reported in separate channels. To preserve the chronological continuity of the meeting, these matters are noted as they arose, without specific identification, in the following account.

2. [ ] opened the meeting by stating that he had asked [ ] for the present session in order to have a general discussion of CATRIBE-JKLANCE relationships after [ ] had completed his first three months or so [ ] assumed command of the [ ] on 13 August 1970) of service as the Chief of Station Germany. [ ] stated that if [ ] concurred, [ ] would plan to hold such a session every three months or so, the location to be at [ ]'s convenience, either in Munich or Bonn. [ ] added that he was aware of [ ]'s crowded schedule, thus it might be easier for him to come to Munich rather than to try for some form of reciprocity with respect to the area of the meetings. [ ] replied that he heartily endorsed the idea of such periodic meetings, that he was most appreciative that [ ] had suggested the initial meeting

SECRET

-2-

and had come to Munich for it. [ ] said that he also appreciated [ ]'s thoughtfulness in being willing to have a flexible arrangement concerning both timing and location; he would like to hold some of the meetings in Bonn, but it was impossible to fix such encounters in advance. [ ] added that he hoped [ ] would take the initiative regarding the timing of the meetings; [ ] would plan to respond affirmatively concerning any meeting suggested by [ ], since he considered that close contact between the two groups at the present meeting - he gestured towards @BRITZ and [ ] - was very useful with respect to the maintenance of fruitful relations between the two services involved.

3. [ ] then stated that in opening this first of what he hoped would be a series of productive meetings he wished to underline to [ ] and @BRITZ what he had said at the time of the initial meeting with [ ] in August 1970: JKLANCE attached great importance to the maintenance of a close cooperative relationship to CATRIBE; JKLANCE had a number of close relationships with various other intelligence services, however the tie to CATRIBE was a unique one, because of the manner in which CATRIBE had come into existence and the role of JKLANCE with respect to both the birth and the development of CATRIBE; the Director JKLANCE personally was very interested in the relationship between CATRIBE and JKLANCE, and, as [ ] was aware, paid close attention to developments in this liaison. [ ] added that he considered that overseeing the maintenance of a mutually productive relationship between JKLANCE and CATRIBE constituted one of his main areas of responsibility as Chief of Station, that he took this responsibility very seriously, and, as [ ] could observe from [ ]'s frequent visits to Munich and CATRIBE, he had devoted a considerable amount of time to those aspects of the liaison with which [ ] was directly concerned. [ ] then commented that he had been particularly pleased to see the interest and skill which [ ] was exercising in his relationships with CATRIBE and that he could assure [ ] and @BRITZ that the two JKLANCE representatives were working in close harmony concerning matters involving CATRIBE. [ ] responded

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-3-

by saying that he much appreciated [ ]'s comments concerning the JKLANCE-CATRIBE relationship; for his part he could assure [ ] that both @BRITZ and he were keenly aware of the importance of the relationship to CATRIBE and that they would work very closely with [ ] and [ ] concerning matters of mutual interest.

4. CASCENE Visits: [ ] then turned to the several CASCENE visits that had taken place since he and [ ] had arrived, expressing his hope and belief that they had served to further the relationship described previously. We now particularly looked forward to the last in this series--that of @BRITZ and @HEINE next spring, and welcomed @BRITZ's thoughts on a useful program. @BRITZ reiterated that he would be working on this with [ ] after talking to [ ], the last visitor who was to return on the weekend. [ ] noted that he would be writing a Christmas note to [ ] in which he might suggest that he, [ ] spend a few days at Headquarters in the fall of 1971. We welcomed this intention.

5. Sensitive Subject (see extract in other channels).

6. Sensitive Subject (see extract in other channels).

7. [ ] Matters (see extract in other channels).

DER SPIEGEL SERIES ON CATRIBE:

8. Note: Prior to the meeting [ ] and [ ] had discussed this topic in connection with the planned discussion of UTILITY with [ ]. [ ] had agreed that the building of a "firebreak" concerning this topic was advisable (on the off-chance that UTILITY already had revealed or might reveal to CATRIBE that he had "discussed" the subject with "JKLANCE"), and had agreed re the tactics to be used in broaching the topic.

9. [ ] opened discussion of this topic by saying that he had a "sensitive" matter to discuss, i.e., the fact that he had learned that Der Spiegel planned to publish a series of articles concerning CATRIBE. [ ] said that he had been "approached indirectly" by a journalist

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who had indicated that Der Spiegel was planning a series concerning CATRIBE and who had attempted to elicit comments from [ ] concerning the performance of CATRIBE as an intelligence organization and regarding the ties between CATRIBE and JKLANCE. [ ] said that he had made it quite clear to the intermediary that under no circumstances would he make any comment concerning either CATRIBE itself or any relationship between CATRIBE and any LNLUTE agency. (Note: The story regarding the approach to [ ] by a journalist is fictional; however, [ ] did indicate to [ ] that he had knowledge of the forthcoming Der Spiegel series and did comment concerning the content of the series.) [ ] added that he had wished [ ] to know about the approach to [ ] - he assumed that [ ] was aware that the series was planned - and had wished to ask [ ] for his evaluation of the series insofar as the interests of JKLANCE were concerned, i.e., was there anything in the series which might cause difficulties for JKLANCE or which conceivably could generate a problem with respect to the CATRIBE-JKLANCE relationship.

10. [ ] replied that he was grateful to [ ] for having mentioned the topic and for the manner in which [ ] had handled the approach by the journalist. The projected series of articles were known to CATRIBE, in fact Der Spiegel had approached CATRIBE (he and @BRITZ decided that the approach was made circa May-June 1970) and had invited CATRIBE to review the draft and to comment upon it. After much discussion and thought [ ] had decided that he would accept the invitation to review the first draft. This draft indeed had been full of erroneous information and if published would have been significantly damaging to CATRIBE and JKLANCE interests (he did not amplify this statement). A second draft was now in the works, and while [ ] would not welcome its publication, he judged it to be something CATRIBE had to live with, and that it was not damaging to JKLANCE. He did not know whether or when the article would be published, although he had heard the serial might start in February 1971. In general [ ]'s comments seemed to reveal a certain fatalism about this sort of thing--one

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perhaps engendered by [ ]'s well-reported view that an intelligence agency in the modern age cannot live in a false isolation and contrived secrecy and remain forever out of the public eye. [ ] did promise to let us know if anything came to his attention which indicated that the series would continue information of concern to JKLANCE security interests.

RELATIONSHIPS WITH UTILITY:

Note: The tactics to be used in bringing up this topic and in discussing it had previously been arranged between [ ] and [ ].

11. [ ] took advantage of the general discussion of contacts, publicity, etc. to move into the question of relations with UTILITY; however, since we had not intimated that UTILITY had contacted JKLANCE concerning the Der Spiegel article, this topic arose as a new and unrelated subject. [ ] began by commenting that he wished to consult with [ ] concerning another "delicate" problem, that of contact between JKLANCE and UTILITY. [ ] went on to note that [ ] had introduced UTILITY to [ ] just before [ ] departed in July 1970, but that to date [ ] had not met UTILITY. [ ] added that he wished to make clear to CAUTOPIA that [ ] regarded [ ] and his designated representatives as the sole current points of official contact with the CATRIBE service, and that business matters would be discussed only through this channel, unless [ ] on occasion should indicate that he would like to do otherwise. JKLANCE held UTILITY in high esteem as the former chief of an intelligence service which had worked closely with JKLANCE for many years, and the personnel currently assigned to the Station - notably [ ] - wished to maintain cordial and courteous relations with UTILITY as a mark of the friendly ties which continued between UTILITY and the JKLANCE service in general. However, no element of JKLANCE - at Headquarters or within the Station - intended to raise intelligence business matters with UTILITY; nor would these elements respond affirmatively to any approach by UTILITY concerning what appeared to be CATRIBE business rather than purely a continuing personal interest in world

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affairs in general. In this respect, [ ] added, he would like to ask [ ] whether in fact UTILITY would be speaking on behalf of CATRIBE in general or [ ] in particular, in the event that UTILITY should raise any matters with JKLANCE.

12. [ ] responded promptly that at present UTILITY had no responsibility for any CATRIBE business and he would appreciate it if [ ] and his officers would handle any contact with UTILITY accordingly. [ ] said that through 1970 CATRIBE would subsidize UTILITY with respect to certain "historical work" on which he was engaged, however UTILITY no longer had any connection with current operations of CATRIBE.

13. [ ] then--and in a manner which suggested that he relished the chance to parade his credentials before [ ] proceeded to sketch the peculiar circumstances of his relationship to UTILITY. He had of course served since World War II as UTILITY's colleague, and had had the closest professional relationship with him. He was, however, a different sort of man--one with perhaps a broader outlook, foreign experience and experience in international relations--he therefore would put his own stamp, a different one, on CATRIBE. This all made his personal relationship with UTILITY rather difficult. [ ] intervened with the American term for the situation: "It's hard to follow George Washington." [ ] replied: "That says it all." He then reiterated that we should therefore not interpret any dealings that UTILITY might have with us as representing him or CATRIBE.

14. [ ] thanked [ ] for this clarification, and said that any future contacts we might have (and he anticipated none with [ ] personally) would be governed accordingly. [ ] commented that, as the person directly affected, he was still concerned that any such further contact might be misconstrued. He anticipated that UTILITY would on occasion, from the best of motives, ask us to undertake things which we absolutely would have to decline if we judged that they in any way impinged on MHRUSH or CATRIBE interests. We would do this because we simply had to, even at the expense of possibly offending

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UTILITY. We wanted [ ] to understand this, and requested that, should any rumors or reports of actions on our part not meeting this criterion come to his attention, he come to us to clear the air without the slightest hesitation. [ ] agreed to do so.

15. Relations with the Bundeskanzleramt: [ ] commented briefly on this subject, raising it within the context of a question to [ ] as to whether there had been any further movement with respect to the possible creation of a "Current Intelligence Office" in the Bundeskanzleramt (BKA), and noting that it appeared that the other "information systems," ORAKEL and KIS (Kanzlerinformationssysteme) were continuing to be developed. [ ] replied that although the questions of "current information and analysis" were very much in the front of the mind of the BKA (read [ ]), no specific steps had been taken to date.

16. Closing Remarks: [ ] turned to [ ] and asked his understanding if he or some of his officers turned down invitations to social occasions now and then. He wanted [ ] to understand that these were always for business, and not personal, reasons and that, in his own case, he simply had to restrict the number of invitations he could accept to avoid a quasi-diplomatic round that would be too much to handle. He stated that he would indeed try to attend the reception on 21 December (the first invitation he has received from [ ] it might be noted), and that in any case his wife would attend. He hoped he could entertain the Chief, LNCUFF Bonn when he visited Munich and we agreed to keep him alerted to such visits. In closing, he anticipated our intention by saying that sessions such as this were very useful--much more so, for example, than cocktail parties--and that he hoped we would repeat. We suggested doing it at about quarterly intervals.

[ ] Rm [ ] J/K [ ] Rm [ ]

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27 January 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Meeting with General R. GEHLEN  
Berg am Starnbergersee  
20 January 1971

1. The End of the History Project

I met GEHLEN at his home at Berg; at his suggestion we drove to his office in Farchach, several kilometers out of Berg. GEHLEN will close this office at the end of this month; his contractual arrangement with the Fed Rep has been terminated on 31 December 1970. He had met with WESSEL on the previous day, turned in his completed history and informed WESSEL that he was bringing out (in the next months) a book on the history of the BND.

The familiar figure of Frau KUNZE, GEHLEN's personal secretary for thirty years, appeared as we arrived at the isolated farmhouse where GEHLEN and BOHLEN have been at work for two years. Two younger secretaries were working at typewriters.

2. The Conspiracy to Undermine German Society

If there is one central theme that has dominated GEHLEN's thinking for the past twenty years it is the Moscow-controlled effort to subvert German society. The central figure has been HEINEMAN, the present President of the Federal Republic. Herbert WEHNER has figured prominently in the cast of characters although there was a period in the late Sixties when GEHLEN and WEHNER developed a close relationship. During the Grand Coalition period GEHLEN concluded that WEHNER, whatever his past, was reformed. Now he is portrayed as the "master brain" behind the conspiracy. HEINEMAN, Helena WESSEL and GEREKE continue in the main cast of characters.

Once more GEHLEN ran through the evidence. He again cited the report given him informally by MI-6 describing the arrest of HEINEMAN in Vienna during the Four Power occupation; HEINEMAN had been arrested emerging from a Soviet intelligence facility carrying a large sum of money in a small bag. HEINEMAN was linked, in GEHLEN's opinion, with the Volkstbund fuer Frieden und Freiheit, the BONIN

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affair and the whole episode of Die Nationale Zeitung in Munich. At one point GEHLEN had gone to HEINZMAN and told him that his personal secretary in the Ministry was the former secretary of Max Reimann, the German communist leader; she disappeared from this post.

Returning to the subject of Herbert WEHNER, GEHLEN recalled his failure over the years to get access to the record of the Swedish process against WEHNER in the post-war years. GEHLEN said that a writer named FREDERICK has just brought out a book titled "In Zwielficht Seiner Zeit" which suggests to GEHLEN that this author has had access to the Swedish files. A new wrinkle to the GEHLEN biographic sketch on WEHNER is that he is married to the first or second wife of SED leader ULBRICHT.

GEHLEN raised the much publicized Willi BRANDT contact with the Italian Communist Party through GACUTSI (phonetic), a member of the ICP. GEHLEN believes that some of the groundwork for BRANDT's Ostpolitik was done in this ICP channel.

GEHLEN digressed to talk about the trends within Germany. He believes that the SPD is engaged in a systematic effort to alter the social structure of Germany, gradually developing a new class struggle. The motto for the radical wing of the SPD will be "Mitbestimmung und Mitbesitz." GEHLEN's final word on WEHNER is that he continues his efforts to move NOLLAU into a controlling position in the BND.

### 3. The Spiegel Article on the BND

GEHLEN said that he understood my response on the Spiegel article and did not disagree with me. GEHLEN said that Horst EHMKE had stimulated the Spiegel effort as part of his effort to end the "mythos von Fremde Herre Ost" and to advance the concept of his "transparent modern intelligence service." GEHLEN said that the draft he sent to me has been considerably altered; he had a copy of the most recent draft on his desk which he found "more acceptable." I avoided expressing further interest.

### 4. "Der Dienst"

I told GEHLEN that I had heard that he had revised his publishing plans and now planned to bring out a modest political blockbuster. GEHLEN said this was an overstatement although he hoped the book would have political impact and popular appeal. I asked GEHLEN if he had written it himself or employed a

professional ghostwriter. I questioned whether his rhetoric on the "Red Menace" would have much popular impact. GEHLEN laughed and said that there would be no polemics and that he had used some professional talent in writing the present version.

"Der Dienst" will have ten chapters and about 400 pages. The first chapter will discuss the origin of "Der Dienst" in Fremde Herre Ost. The second chapter will be material covering the period from 1945 to 1956 when the BND was legally created as an instrument of the government. Along about chapter four or five he will get to the "Panne" of the Fifties and early Sixties. In response to my question he said that he will not ignore the FELFE case.

Much of the book will be an analysis of Soviet strategy and techniques, amply illustrated by live examples out of the history of the past quarter century.

GEHLEN assured me that "Der Dienst" will not be an attack on the present German SPD government. He added that "Der Dienst" would, to the discerning and sophisticated reader, indirectly challenge the wisdom of current German policy.

I asked GEHLEN if we were in any way clearing "Der Dienst" with authorities of the Federal Republic; he replied that he had informed WESSEL that he was writing a book. WESSEL had expressed no interest in reviewing the text prior to publication; GEHLEN planned no other action. I said that we also would prefer to exercise no claim to prior clearance; we would, I said, like to have an advance copy.

"Der Dienst" will be published in German first. He may let the Springer Verlag handle the international editions. He is still in contact with Canfield in London and, through him, Allen Dulles' book agent in the U.S., GEHLEN has made no commitment in this channel.

##### 5. Justus Duerrwanger

GEHLEN noted that his daughter and her husband were still in Paris; that Justus had only 2 1/2 years until retirement and would, given the current inflexibility of Fed Rep policy on retirement, presumably retire on schedule. There followed an exchange on the SDECE and its leaders of the past decade which was not of interest. The Duerrwangers are currently building a home in Berg; GEHLEN is providing on-the-ground technical supervision.

##### 6. A Man who has not "Stacked Arms"

My reaction to this conversation with GEHLEN is a mixture of sorrow and admiration. He is a man who has found it utterly

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EYES ONLY

impossible to disengage from the politics of the BND, Germany, Europe and the world. He is as much caught up in the politics of Europe as he was twenty years ago. There is no discernible alteration of his view of the world as it existed twenty years ago. Much of our conversation was an almost verbatim reply of our last conversation. There is, however, no evidence of senility. He is simply a stubborn old man who believes he has got it right. Characteristically, GEHLEN said that the income from "Der Dienst" will be used to either aid those who have suffered economically as a result of collaboration with GEHLEN or to finance the "few operations that I am continuing on my own."

7. Herr ZITZEWITZ

GEHLEN said that ZITZEWITZ is an international entrepreneur, arms dealer and intelligence operator who has never accepted pay from the BND but has rendered many services. The Fed Rep, GEHLEN said, had ordered the BND to terminate all connections with persons who dealt in illicit arms traffic. For a variety of reasons Herr ZITZEWITZ was planning to move his residence to France or Spain. □

I

8. Eric WALDMAN

GEHLEN very early asked me if I had seen WALDMAN. I said I had not but was in touch with him by mail. Also, I had copies of many of his articles and speeches of the past year on the subject of the "Red Menace" in Germany. GEHLEN said that he thought WALDMAN's credentials had gotten him unique access to many German circles, including the SED-Westbuero, with which he had spent much time. GEHLEN had Frau KUNZE make a copy of WALDMAN's latest article on the political situation in Germany. (I left it with □ he will forward.)

As I took my leave to drive through darkness and driving sleet back to Munich I had the feeling that this might be the last business conversation with GEHLEN--that time had finally overtaken this warrior of the Cold War. How history will judge him is not now clear; certainly he will not be judged as a man who had doubts or equivocated.

/s/ James H. Critchfield

James H. Critchfield  
SAC/DDP

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~~ROUTINE~~ [ ] UTILITY

REF: [ ] 04655 (IN-272505)

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ABSTRACT	INDEX

1. REQUEST UTILITY/ADVISE OF [ ] ITINERARY AND WHERE HE CAN BE REACHED IF STOPPING IN U.S.

2. MEMO OF CONVERSATION [ ] UTILITY INDICATES [ ] ASSURED UTILITY THAT WE "WOULD HAVE AN APPROPRIATE BUSINESS TYPE ESTABLISH A COMMERCIAL TIE TO [ ]. WE WOULD SEE WHERE IT WOULD GO FROM THERE. UTILITY AGREED." THIS IS WHAT WE WILL DO.

3. FILE: [ ]

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP

The following action is authorized: Dissemination

signed: [ ]

b. #357 - Unit C/E/G/CIL

Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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END OF MESSAGE

25 FEB 1971

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ABSTRACT	INDEX

SECRET 241110Z FEB 71 CITE [ ]

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PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO [ ] [ ] [ ]

24 FEB IN 272505

UTILITY

REF [ ] 3783, 7 DEC 70 (NOT SENT [ ])

(1221058)

T 2P

1. THROUGH [ ] UTILITY REPORTED EVENING 23 FEB THAT

CITIZENSHIP NO 201

(SEE PARA 3B REF) WOULD BE DEPARTING ON

WEEKEND FOR BUSINESS TRIP TO ASIA AND WOULD BE WILLING SEE

[ ] OR DESIGNEE EN ROUTE. HE TRANSITING U.S. IN ANY CASE,

ALTHOUGH DETAILS ITINERARY PRESENTLY UNKNOWN TO UTILITY. UTILITY

WOULD LIKE REPLY AS TO [ ] INTEREST OR NON-INTEREST BY COB

25 FEB, SINCE HE MUST PHONE SUBJECT THAT EVENING.

2. SUBJECT FIRST RAISED PER REF AND WE BELIEVE IT WAS

RENEWED IN [ ] UTILITY DISCUSSIONS JANUARY 72- OUR

RECOLLECTION IS THAT [ ] WAS CONSIDERING INTRODUCTION TO

BUSINESS CONTACT IN NEW YORK. [ ] FILE ON SUBJECT DESTROYED

BUT CARD INDICATES SUBJECT WAS, AS OF 69, [ ]

IN HAMBURG, APPARENTLY USED BY CATRIBE AS COVER FIRM FOR ARMS

ACTIVITIES, POSSIBLY IN AFRICA. NO INDICATION WHETHER SUBJECT

RELATED TO [ ] CATRIBE TRANSLATOR WHO LEFT

THEIR SERVICE 1955 AND EMIGRATED TO NEW YORK. UTILITY DESCRIBES

MICROFILMED  
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PAGE 2 [ ] 04655 S E C R E T

SUBJECT AS UNPAID FORMER "SPECIAL CONNECTION" OF CATRIBE.

3. ON FACE OF IT, SUBJECT'S BUSINESS AND HIS FORMER CATRIBE AFFILIATION MAKE HIM UNATTRACTIVE CANDIDATE FOR ANY JKLANCE CONTACT, PARTICULARLY IF ANY WORD OF SUCH CONTACT GOT BACK TO CATRIBE. SUBJECT TO ANY ARRANGEMENTS [ ] MAY HAVE MADE WITH UTILITY, RECOMMEND EITHER POLITE DECLINE OF OFFER OR, AT MAXIMUM, WILLINGNESS INTRODUCE TO BUSINESS CONTACT IN NON-INTELLIGENCE CONTEXT. BELIEVE WE SHOULD DEFINITELY AVOID ANY OFFER<sup>R</sup> CONTACT

IN FAR EAST, OR ANY MONEY. PRESUMABLY UTILITY WILL PROVIDE MORE SPECIFIC ITINERARY AND LOCATIONS WHERE SUBJECT CAN BE REACHED IN U.S. AFTER TALKING WITH SUBJECT AGAIN BY PHONE. RE<sup>c</sup>COMMEND WE NOT PROVIDE SUBJECT WITH U.S. PHONE NUMBER, BUT PUT ON "WE'LL CALL YOU" BASIS IF CONTACT DEEMED ESSENTIAL.

4. INDEX [ ]

FILE [ ]

GP-1

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SECRET 011002Z MAR 71 CITE [ ] 14703

DIRECTOR, [ ] INFO [ ]

1 MAR 1971 275908

RYBAT [ ] UTILITY

REF: DIRECTOR 114265

ADVIS	REPT
ABSTRACT	INDEX

1. UTILITY STATES DUBJ REF ARRIVING WASHINGTON 2 MARCH  
VIA TWA 709. IF CAN DETERMINE HOTEL, WILL ADVISE ASAP. OTHERWISE  
SUGGEST HQS LEAVE MESSAGE FOR SUBJECT AT AIRPORT UPON ARRIVAL.

2. FOR [ ] REQUEST [BASE] ONLY TRACES SUBJ AND HIS  
FIRM.

3. FILE: [ ] GP-1.

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**PRECEDENCE**

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14715

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO

2 MAR IN 276880

RYBAT ☐ UTILITY

REF: ☐ 14705 (N 27540)

SUBJECT REF STAYING AT WASHINGTON HILTON. GP-1.

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RYBAT [ ] UTILITY


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1. NO [ ] BASE TRACES SUBJECT REF OR HIS FIRM.

2. FILE: [ ] GP-1

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FROM	C/EUR Division			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
SUBJECT	CATRIBE/UTILITY			MICROFILM	
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES					
<p>Transmitted under separate cover is a personal note to be delivered to UTILITY from [ ]</p>					
<p>Attachment: As stated above, usc</p> <p>Distribution: 2 - COS, [ ] w/att, usc 1 - COS, [ ] w/att, wo/att</p>					
<p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 382B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005</p>					
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		<p>COORDINATING</p> <p>OFFICE SYMBOL DATE OFFICER'S NAME</p>			
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## PROCESSING ACTION

TO	Chief, European Division	X	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO	Chief of Station, [ ]		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief of Base, [ ]		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	CATRIBE Communications with UTILITY		

## ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

EGMS-9338, 22 Mar 71

For your information.

1. [ ] transmitted the letter from [ ] to UTILITY through our usual contact for this purpose, [ ] added a note of his own felicitating UTILITY on his birthday on 3 April 71. UTILITY has responded to both writers with a short note of appreciation and the reply to [ ] is forwarded under separate cover.

2. We might take this occasion to note that, since the events reported in EGMA-74651, we have not felt it necessary or desirable to have contact with UTILITY other than such social encounters as he and [ ] very sporadically have. That relationship remains cordial, and [ ] reports that UTILITY appears to have understood the JKLANCE position regarding the awkwardness of contact with him on subjects of current concern to CATRIBE. The way remains open for further direct contact with the Base should that be judged at any point to be desirable.

ATTACHMENT: Under Separate Cover  
Envelope (Via T/N Pouch)

## Distribution:

14 - C/Eur Div w/att  
2 - COS [ ] w/o att

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODSEXEMPTION 3028  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

CS COPY

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	EGMA-75,032	27 April 1971
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	✓ [ ]

EGMA-75032

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING ACTION
		SECRET	MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO	Chief, EUR	XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.	Chief, WOBOUTY; Chief, WOMUSE; Chief of Station, [ ]		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Acting Chief of Base, [ ]		MICROFILM
SUBJECT	CATRIBE Activities of David KAHN [ ]		
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			
REF: LEGMA-74298, 27 Aug 70			
<p>1. CATRIBE asked us for a security reading on David KAHN on 30 March 71, without specifying a reason. We offered to discuss the matter, in an effort to smoke out why CATRIBE was interested. After being briefed on KAHN's effort in August 1970 to film and acquire information about a CATRIBE SIGINT installation at Lauf, in connection with a film he is involved in, we advised CATRIBE that we held no derogatory political or security information on KAHN, that he was merely an aggressive journalist-writer to the best of our knowledge. They thanked us and later provided the report translated below, which we forward [ ] (UTILITY apparently did not see fit to report his interview with Subject, reported in reference, to CATRIBE.)</p> <p>2. CATRIBE's report: Writer David KAHN, DPOB 7 Feb 30, New York, resided in the Fedrep as follows:</p> <p>1 July 69: Moved to Freiburg/Breisgau from Great Neck, Windsor Gate, NY. To 1 September he resided at Hurstweg 57 in Freiburg.</p> <p>10 Sep 69: Resided at Morzhausen, Kreis Freiburg, Becherwaldstr. 29.</p> <p>11 Aug 70: Deregistered to return to USA.</p> <p>His wife, Susanne, nee FIEDLER, DPOB 18 Aug 46, Vienna, Austria resided with him from 10 Sep 69 until his departure.</p> <p>CATRIBE was informed by Bavarian Radio on 30 Apr 70 that a Mr. NORMANN, BBC London intended on 1 May 70 to film the outside of one of CATRIBE's installations. (SIGINT collection facility at Lauf). There appeared to be no security problem, since the facility would be closed for the May Day holiday.</p> <p>Distribution: //continued//</p> <p>4-EUR 2-WOBOUTY 2-WOMUSE 2-[ ]</p>			
<p>GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION</p> <p>CROSS REFERENCE TO DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER</p>			
EGMA-75226		30 June 1971	
CLASSIFICATION		HQS FILE NUMBER	
SECRET		[ ]	

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

EGMA-75226



CONTINUATION OF  
DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION  
S E C R E T

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER  
LEGMA-75226

The agreed date however was postponed by those interested until 27 May 70, on which day two men were observed photographing the main entrance to the installation. Upon being queried the men identified themselves quite willingly as representatives of ZDF (Second German Television) and BBC London, Herr BRUHNS and Mr. NORMAN respectively. They filmed the antennae array, the security fence and the main entrance to the area, without photographing the identifying official plaque by the entrance.

The reason for the photographing was stated to be that Mr. NORMAN, on contract from BDC, was making a film about espionage cases of the Second World War.

In addition, on 4 Aug 70 another man visited the installation and referring to the film activity of 27 May, asked for information about the facility. He was accompanied by a young woman. (Probably a certain Miss MILL).

These persons arrived and departed in a Triumph automobile, license plate FR-LK 97. The registered owner of this vehicle is the American historian, David KAHN, who was certainly the inquirer and is the author of the book about intelligence activity in WW II which is being filmed. There is no derogatory information on KAHN in our files.

No further investigations were undertaken, since there were no apparent security aspects.

3. We are at a loss why CATRIBE bothered to check with us seven months after the fact.

L I

GROUP I - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

FORM  
8-64 53a  
(40)

USE PREVIOUS EDITION.


CLASSIFICATION  
S E C R E T

☐ CONTINUED

PAGE NO.  
2

SECRET/ [REDACTED] TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - EGNA-42565  
FILE NO - [REDACTED], EWW-2-33/2  
DATE - 26 AUGUST 1971  
INDEXING - NONE  
MICROFILM - NONE  
TO - CHIEF, EUR  
INFO - NONE  
FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, [REDACTED]  
SUBJECT - ~~RYBAT~~ / CALL/CATRIIBE  
ACTION - NONE, FOR YOUR INFORMATION  
REFS - NONE




Per DOI 70-17

1. ON 25 AUGUST [REDACTED] ADVISED BY [REDACTED] THAT LATTER SUMMONED FRANKFURT 24 AUGUST BY HIS PUBLISHER, PETER RITNER, VICE PRESIDENT IN CHARGE PUBLICATIONS, "THE WORLD PUBLISHING COMPANY", TO HELP RITNER HANDLE THE TRANSLATION AND PUBLICATION IN ENGLISH OF "SENSATIONAL BOOK", IDENTITY A. PUBLICATION IDENTITY A BY IDENTITY B SCHEDULED COMMENCE 11 SEPTEMBER IN ALL [REDACTED] OUTLETS. PRESUMABLY [REDACTED] HAS SOME DEGREE CONTROL IDEN B./

2. [REDACTED] WAS SHOWN SECTION OF IDEN A MANUSCRIPT AND DISCUSSED MATTER WITH PETER RITNER AND IDEN C, AGENT FOR IDEN A AUTHOR. [REDACTED] NOTED IN TABLE OF CONTENTS THAT CHAPTER 7 /POSSIBLY 8/ ENTITLED "JKLANCE SUPPORT AND LIAISON". CHAPTER SUBHEADINGS WERE "PERSONALITIES" AND "FIRST CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE". [REDACTED] ASKED IDEN C IF HE COULD READ THAT CHAPTER BUT WAS TOLD IT NOT AT HAND AT MOMENT, THAT IT OBVIOUSLY DELICATE SUBJECT BUT THAT [REDACTED] COULD REST ASSURED THAT THE ENTIRE BOOK REVIEWED AND CLEARED BY [REDACTED] AND HIS PEOPLE WHO WERE "AGREED, EXCITED AND ENTHUSIASTIC" ABOUT ITS PUBLICATION. IDEN C ALSO TOLD [REDACTED] THAT THE AUTHOR HAD REFUSED TO

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SOURCE METHOOD EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
17 OCT 2005

SECRET/R Y B A T EGNA-42565 /PAGE 1/



D 32W-2-33/2

s/c 1 Oct

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EGNA-42565

GRANT PUBLISHING RIGHTS TO "THE NEW YORK TIMES" BECAUSE IT HAD PUBLISHED THE PENTAGON PAPERS. IDEN C SHOWED ☐ CORRESPONDENCE CONFIRMING THIS FACT, IN WHICH AN OFFER BY SIDNEY GRUSON TO COME SPEAK WITH THE AUTHOR WAS TURNED DOWN FOR THE REASON STATED.

3. THE DEAL WHICH "THE WORLD PUBLISHING COMPANY" HAS APPARENTLY MADE WITH THE AUTHOR GRANTS TO THE FORMER ALL NON-GERMAN LANGUAGE PUBLISHING RIGHTS. THE FIRST STEP IS TO COMPLETE AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION, FOR WHICH PURPOSE THE TRANSLATORS TO HAVE CONTINUAL ACCESS TO THE AUTHOR, WHICH SHALL SERVE AS A MASTER TRANSLATION FROM WHICH ITALIAN, SPANISH, FRENCH AND OTHER LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS SHALL BE MADE.

4. ☐ LEARNED, FROM EITHER HIS PERUSAL OF MANUSCRIPT SECTIONS OR DISCUSSIONS WITH IDEN C, THAT BOOK CONTAINS FOLLOWING ALLEGED FACTS -

A. MARTIN BORMANN - TOP SOVIET AGENT SINCE BEGINNING 1943 AT LATEST. HIS DISAPPEARANCE EXPLAINED BY FACT HE FLED TO SOVIET UNION AFTER 1945 DEBACLE, DIED IN SOVIET UNION TWO YEARS AGO. CANARIS WAS CERTAIN AS EARLY AS WINTER 1941 THAT SOMEONE IN HITLER'S IMMEDIATE ENTOURAGE PASSING INFORMATION TO SOVIET HIGH COMMAND BUT, THOUGH HE KNEW BORMANN HAD THE "ONLY UNCONTROLLED RADIO TRANSMITTER" IN GERMANY, WAS UNABLE CONDUCT INVESTIGATION OR SURVEILLANCE BECAUSE OF BORMANN'S HIGH POSITION. ALLEGEDLY FOR THIS REASON BORMANN INSISTED CANARIS BE EXECUTED LATE SPRING 1945 WHEN EXECUTION MADE NO SENSE. AUTHOR CLAIMS RECEIVED TWO REPORTS AFTER 1960 CONFIRMING BORMANN'S PRESENCE IN SOVIET UNION.

*usual  
AND  
Book!*

B. GESTAPO HEINRICH MUELLER FLED TO SOVIET UNION 1945.

5. RECOGNIZE ALL ABOVE POSSIBLY WELL KNOWN HEADQUARTERS. STATION TAKING NO ACTION PENDING HQS COMMENTS/INSTRUCTIONS.

SECRET

EGNA-42565

XPAGE 3/

ATTACHMENT - IDENTITY LIST - U/S/C VIA 'TP'

DISTRIBUTION -

BY TELEPOUCH

3 A C/EUR W/ATT U/S/C

SECRET/RYBAT

EGNA-42565

XPAGE 3/

~~SECRET~~ TELEPOUCH U/S/C ATT TO EGNA 42565

TO - C/EUR  
FROM - COS/IC

26 Aug 1971

IDENTITY A - GENERAL GEHLEN'S MEMOIRS

IDENTITY B - HASE UND KOHLER VERLAG


65 MAINZ

POSTFACH 338

IDENTITY C - HERR VOLKER HANSEN

SON OF GENERAL HANSEN FORMER

TOP AIDE TO GENERAL GEHLEN



~~SECRET~~ TELEPOUCH U/S/C ATT TO EGNA 42565

CS COPY

EGNA-42565 AH

S/c Att \* 1 To EGNA-42565

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - EGNA-42574  
FILE NO - [ ] 32W-2-33/2  
DATE - 31 AUGUST 1971  
INDEXING - NONE  
MICROFILM - NONE  
TO - CHIEF, EUR  
INFO - COB, [ ] /EYES ONLY  
FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, [ ]  
SUBJECT - RYBAT [ ] /CALL/CATRIE  
ACTION - NONE, FOR YOUR INFORMATION  
REFS - [EGNA-42565, 26 AUGUST 1971]

DOC. MICRO. SER.

AUG 31 1971

MICROFILMED

VIA POUCH

1. WISH SUPPLEMENT REF WITH FOLLOWING FROM [ ] BASE [ ]

A. UTILITY CONTACTED [ ] 29 AUGUST CLAIMING THAT VP /NOT NAMED/ OF FIRM PUBLISHING HIS MEMOIRS HAS ASKED UTILITY ABOUT BONA FIDES [ ] WITH WHOM VP DEALING, WHO ALLEGEDLY CLAIMED BY JKLANCE REP FROM BERLIN AND WHO POSED TO VP QUESTIONS ABOUT UTILITY BOOK.

B. UTILITY STATED IF [ ] IMPOSTER, HE WOULD WANT WARN VP TO AVOID HIM. /BASE COMMENT - HIS PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE MORE LIKELY TO SEE WHETHER JKLANCE "PERSECUTING" HIM./

2. [ ] BASE [ ] LEARNED ABOVE BEFORE RECEIVING REF. HAVE CABLED [ ] INTRA MSG NAMING VP, POINTING OUT THAT VP IS [ ] PUBLISHER AND THAT IT MORE LIKELY UTILITY'S AGENT RATHER THAN VP WHO CHECKING [ ] BONA FIDES. HAVE ALSO ADVISED [ ] STATION DOUBTS [ ] WOULD CLAIM REPRESENT JKLANCE BECAUSE /A/ HE TOO SMART EXPECT NOT BE FOUND OUT BY JKLANCE IN THIS CONTEXT AND /B/ PROCLAMATION OF JKLANCE AFFILIATION DECIDEDLY AGAINST HIS OWN INTEREST.

3. HAVE INSTRUCTED [ ] HAVE [ ] ADVISE UTILITY THAT CHECK SHOWS [ ] CONNECTED JKLANCE IN ANY WAY BUT IS

SECRET/R Y B A T [EGNA-42575 /PAGE 1/

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 12/05/00

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

CS COPY

D 32W-2-33/2

EGNA-42574

REPUTABLE JOURNALIST WHO FOR MANY YEARS HAS BEEN EUROPEAN CORRESPONDENT FOR REPUTABLE AMERICAN MAGAZINES AND RADIO NETWORK.

4. [ ] BASE ADDS FOLLOWING BACKGROUND WHICH NOT REPORTED EARLIER BECAUSE SEEMED TOO FRAGMENTARY.

A. DURING VISIT MUNICH IN EARLY 1971 [ ] SAW UTILITY AND LATER ADVISED [ ] THAT UTILITY POLITELY DECLINED GIVE [ ] ADVANCE COPY HIS MANUSCRIPT, ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE SOME ARRANGEMENT WAS MADE TO SHOW [ ] PAGE PROOFS ONCE THEY MADE UP BY PRINTER. WE UNAWARE WHETHER THIS STAGE HAS BEEN REACHED, ALTHOUGH IT SEEMS DOUBTFUL. ONLY OTHER MENTION OF MEMOIRS KNOWN TO BASE WAS REPORTED BY [ ] A FEW WEEKS AGO, WHEN UTILITY ASKED [ ] THROUGH [ ] TO CHECK OUT WITH [ ] A DIAGRAM OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SET-UP WHICH UTILITY PLANNED TO USE IN HIS BOOK. DIAGRAM /WE HAVE RETAINED COPY/ WAS ESSENTIALLY ACCURATE, ALTHOUGH CONTAINING A FEW MINOR ERRORS, AND COMPLETELY OVERT, SO [ ] INSTRUCTED [ ] TO TELL UTILITY THAT, IF HE HEARD NOTHING FURTHER FROM US IN A WEEK, THERE APPEARED BE NO OBJECTION TO DIAGRAM /THUS AVOIDING GIVING ANYTHING DEFINITIVE OR IN WRITING TO UTILITY, OR OBLIGING HQS OR [ ] TO TAKE ANY POSITION ON MANUSCRIPT./

B. AT TIME UTILITY PASSED DIAGRAM TO [ ], HE PASSED THE FOLLOWING SCARCELY CREDIBLE COMMENT RE MEMOIRS - UTILITY CLAIMED HE HAD BEEN OFFERED "THROUGH GERMAN INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS" DM 6,000,000 /SIX MILLION MARKS/ NOT TO PUBLISH HIS BOOK. DESPITE [ ] JESTING COMMENT THAT OFFER WOULD APPEAR BE WELL WORTH TAKING UTILITY SAID HE HAD NO INTENTION DOING SO. UTILITY ALSO CLAIMED HE WAS NEGOTIATING WITH TIME-LIFE FOR SERIAL RIGHTS TO MEMOIRS.

DISTRIBUTION -

## German General's Memoirs Call Bormann a Spy for the Soviet

By HENRY RAYMONT

A manuscript described as the memoirs of Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, former head of the West German intelligence service, asserts that Martin Bormann, Hitler's top lieutenant, was a Soviet agent during World War II.

It also says that after the war Bormann became an advisor on German policy in the Soviet Union and that he died there less than three years ago.

These assertions about the Nazi leader who was last seen leaving Hitler's bunker in Berlin in 1945, are contained in a forthcoming book that General Gehlen is said to have written since his retirement in 1968.

The book is reported to be commanding offers approaching \$1-million for world publication rights, following at least six months of secret negotiations that in themselves resemble an episode of international intrigue.

The memoirs discount previous accounts of Bormann's fate, which presumed him either to have died outside Hitler's bunker in Berlin or to be hiding in South America.

In fact, the memoirs say, as the Russians closed in on the bunker, the Nazi leader crossed their lines and gained sanctuary in the Soviet Union. The information is attributed to a series of "unimpeachable" reports, presumably from General Gehlen's agents in the Soviet Union. The last report, which brought word of the death, came in 1969.

The account of Bormann's double role is one of many details of East-West intrigue in the reminiscences of General Gehlen, who was chief intelligence officer of the Wehrmacht on the Russian front and was recruited after the war by United States intelligence. He eventually became director of the Bundes-Nachrichten-Dienst, West Germany's secret service.

The existence of the memoirs—and negotiations for their sale by a small West German publishing house—became known here during the last few days as an outline and portions of the text were obtained from several publishing sources.

An announcement is expected this week that bids for the world rights to the manuscript outside Germany have been made by the World Publishing Company, a subsidiary of the Times Mirror Company of Los Angeles, and Avon Books, a paperback publisher owned by the Hearst Corporation. The publishing house of William Collins of London is also known to have offered \$100,000 for the

The announcement would be the first public acknowledgment of at least six months of secret negotiations for the publication of the books that in themselves resemble an episode

The announcement would be the first public acknowledgment of the existence of the Gehlen memoirs and the negotiations, which have included secret trips by United States and British publishers to Germany and an almost clandestine typesetting operation by the conservative Hamburg newspaper Die Welt, which plans to begin serializing the book on Sept. 10.



Reinhard Gehlen, former West German intelligence chief, in World War II.

According to information assembled from publishers here and in West Germany, the Gehlen memoirs were first offered for sale early this year by Volker Hansen, director of Hass & Kochler, a small, 182-year-old publishing house in Mainz known for books on military subjects. Mr. Hansen, whose father was a German intelligence officer during World War II, said he held power of attorney for General Gehlen.

Over the last three months several United States and British publishers went to Mainz, where they were allowed to see as many as three chapters of the 12-chapter manuscript. Requests to visit General Gehlen at his home in Bavaria were turned down on the ground that he wished to remain secluded during the negotiations. However, the publishers were told the general intended to make public appearances to promote the book after its publication.

Mr. Hansen's refusal to disclose the full text combined with the unavailability of its author led to some speculation about whether the memoirs had actually been written by General Gehlen.

But publishing sources, both here and in West Germany, assert that they have confirmed the reliability of the material through people close to the intelligence community of both countries.

Martin P. Levin, chairman of the board of World Publishing, said: "We are totally convinced that the memoirs are authentic. We are equally convinced that they will create an international sensation."

Mr. Levin said the authenticity of the manuscript had been verified by Peter Ritner, World's chief editor, with the help of Georg Bailey, an author formerly connected with United States military intelligence in Germany, when the two men visited Mainz late last month.

Two years ago, Mr. Ritner, then working for the Macmillan Company, was the editor of Albert Speer's "Inside the Third Reich," a best seller that is said to have contributed to General Gehlen's decision to issue his own memoirs.

The report that the general wrote a book was especially surprising because of his legendary record of anonymity. For years he shunned interviews and public statements, despite a reputation as the man who built West Germany's intelligence apparatus into the world's most effective anti-Communist espionage network.

General Gehlen, who made his reputation as an analyst of Soviet strategy on the Russian front, went underground as the war ended to surrender with his entire staff to Gen. George S. Patton's Third Army with an offer to cooperate with the victors.

In 1947, the newly created Central Intelligence Agency authorized him to establish a full-scale German intelligence organization, which he staffed largely with professionals from the disbanded S.S. security service and the Wehrmacht intelligence agencies.

People who say they are familiar with the 69-year-old general's thinking say fear of reprisals against his family and a distaste to have his views used in internal West German political controversies explain his continued reluctance to receive visitors.

If this has indeed been General Gehlen's attitude, information about the manuscript that became available in recent days indicates a drastic change. For in addition to describing wartime and later intelligence operations, it contains a detailed analysis of Soviet political and military goals for the next two decades as well as an urgent plea for a Western military buildup to contain Communist expansion.

The argument for a tougher policy of containment suggests that the publication of the memoirs is certain to be welcomed by the foes of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, his policy to improve relations with the Soviet bloc.

This is the reason given by German publishing sources why the German newspaper serial rights were acquired by Die Welt, whose owner, Axel Springer, is an influential critic of the Brandt government. Die Welt is reported to have paid \$250,000 for the serial rights.

Rüdiger Freiherr von Wechmar, Chancellor Brandt's spokesman, said in an interview from Bonn yesterday that the Government had not been aware of the impending serialization of the Gehlen memoirs. However, he said that high officials had known about the existence of "an alleged Gehlen manuscript" and were investigating whether there had been any violation of laws restraining former civil servants from revealing state secrets.

The plan to rush the manuscript into print coincided with the publication of a critical Gehlen biography written by Heinz Höhne, an editor of the Hamburg weekly news magazine Der Spiegel, which supports Chancellor Brandt. The Höhne book will be issued in Germany on Sept. 19, and an English translation is to be published here next year by Coward, McCann, Geoghegan.

In offering the book by Gehlen to prospective foreign publishers, Mr. Hansen is understood to have made the point that neither Mr. Höhne nor the author of another forthcoming Gehlen biography, E. H. Cookridge, have interviewed the former intelligence chief nor seen his memoirs.

A portion of the text of the memoirs, including the account of the Bormann case, was distributed by Mr. Hansen as evidence that General Gehlen's book would contain important and hitherto unpublished materials.

The memoirs say that the revelations about Bormann, the man Hitler named as his successor, "offer the key to one of the most enigmatic cases of our century."

The author says that he first heard suspicions voiced about Bormann in a private conversation in 1941 with Adm. Wilhelm Canaris, head of the Nazi counter-espionage service, who was executed for his role in the July, 1944, plot to assassinate Hitler.

According to the memoirs, although Bormann was believed to have ties to Die Rote Kapelle, a famous Soviet espionage cell in Nazi Germany, the Nazi leader was never placed under surveillance for fear that he would use his influence with Hitler to destroy the intelligence service.





WARTIME PHOTO is almost only one existing of Gen. Reinhard Gehlen.

## Gehlen Claims Bormann Was Soviet Agent

By HENRY RAYMONT

NEW YORK (NYT) — A manuscript described as the memoirs of Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, former head of the West German intelligence service, claims that Martin Bormann, Hitler's top lieutenant, was a Soviet agent during World War II. It also says that after the war Bormann became an adviser on German policy in the Soviet Union and that he died there less than three years ago.

These assertions about the Nazi leader, who was last seen leaving Hitler's bunker in April 1945, are contained in a forthcoming book which Gehlen is said to have written since his retirement in 1968. The book is reported to be commanding offers approaching \$1 million for world publication rights.

The memoirs discount previous accounts of Bormann's fate, which presumed him either to have died outside Hitler's bunker in Berlin or to be hiding in South America.

In fact, the memoirs say, as the Russians closed in on the bunker, the Nazi leader crossed their lines and gained sanctuary in the Soviet Union. The information is attributed to a series of "unimpeachable" reports, presumably from Gehlen's agents in Russia, the last of which, reporting the death, reaching him in 1969.

Bormann was tried and sentenced to death in absentia by the international war crimes tribunal in Nuernberg in 1946. He was officially listed as dead in 1954, but 14 years later the West German government posted a \$25,000 re-

ward for his capture.

The account of Bormann's double role is one of many details of East-West intrigue in the reminiscences of Gehlen, who, after being chief intelligence officer of the Wehrmacht on the Russian front, was recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency and eventually rose to director of the Bundes Nachrichten-Dienst, West Germany's secret service.

The existence of the memoirs — and negotiations for the manuscript's sale by a small West German publishing house — became known here during the past few days.

An announcement is expected this week that bids for the world rights to the manuscript outside Germany have been made by the World Publishing Co., a subsidiary of the Times-

Mirror Company of Los Angeles, and Avon Books, a paperback publisher owned by the Hearst Corporation. The publishing house of William Collins of London is also known to have offered \$100,000 for British rights.

According to information assembled from publishers here and in West Germany, the Gehlen memoirs were first offered for sale early this year by Volker Hansen, director of Hase & Koehler, a small publishing house in Mainz known for books on military subjects. Hansen, whose father was a German intelligence officer during World War II, said he held power of attorney for Gehlen.

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(Continued on Page 4)

# Gehlen Says Bormann Was Agent for Russia

(Continued from Page 1)

gone to Mainz, where they were shown up to three chapters of the 12-chapter manuscript. Requests to visit Gehlen at his home in Bavaria were turned down on the grounds that he wished to remain secluded during the negotiations but that he intended to make public appearances to promote the book after its publication.

Publishing sources, both here and in West Germany, assert they have confirmed the reliability of the material through persons close to the intelligence services of both countries.

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contains a detailed analysis of Soviet political and military goals for the next two decades, as well as an urgent plea for a Western military buildup to contain Communist expansion.

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Rudiger Freiherr von Wechmar, Brandt's spokesman, said in Bonn Saturday that the government had not been aware of the impending serialization of the Gehlen memoirs. He said, however, that high officials had known about the existence of "an alleged Gehlen manuscript" and were investigating whether there had been any violation of laws restraining former civil servants from revealing state secrets.

## Unpublished Materials

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According to the memoirs, although Bormann was believed to have ties to "Die Rote Kapelle," the famous Soviet espionage cell in Nazi Germany, the Nazi leader was never placed under surveillance for fear that he would use his influence with Hitler to destroy the intelligence service.

Gehlen is represented in his memoirs as saying: "My own investigation could begin only after 1946, when I was able to examine the mysterious circumstances of Bormann's flight from Hitler's bunker in Berlin, and his disappearance. My inquiry, which became immensely difficult, always ended at one point: Nobody had seen Bormann's corpse after the Reichsteiler (Bormann) was seen walking in the direction of the Soviet lines."

"When sensational press reports after the war sought to report various 'resurrections' (of Bormann), I did not break my silence. Nevertheless, I sought to trace all kinds of information. Two reports, which reached me personally, convinced me in the 1950s that Bormann was alive. He was, according to these reports, in the Soviet Union, working under an impenetrable cover.

"According to further information, which I viewed as highly reliable, the former Reichsteiler was acting as adviser to the Soviets on all questions concerning German policy. Only after my retirement from active duty did I establish from one source — which cannot be disclosed — that Bormann died some two years ago in the Soviet Union."

Gehlen, who made his reputation as an analyst of Soviet strategy on the Russian front, went underground as the war ended to surrender with his entire staff to Gen. George S. Patton's 3rd

Army with an offer to cooperate with the victors.

In 1947, the newly created CIA authorized him to establish a full-scale German intelligence organization, which he staffed largely with professionals from the disbanded SS security service and the Wehrmacht intelligence agencies.

The Gehlen memoirs reportedly assert that for 23 years he was paid \$6 million a year by the U.S. to conduct his espionage operation against the Russians.

Levin said that the authenticity of the manuscript had been verified by Peter Rittner, World's chief editor, with the help of George Bailey, an author formerly connected with U.S. military intelligence in Germany, when the two men visited Mainz late last month. Two years ago, Rittner, then working for the Macmillan Company, was the editor of Albert Speer's "Inside the Third Reich," a best-seller that is said to have contributed to Gehlen's decision to issue his own memoirs.



Martin Bormann

board of World Publishing, said: "We are totally convinced that the memoirs are authentic. We are equally convinced that they will create an international sensation."

The 69-year-old general's fear of reprisals against his family and reluctance to have his views used in internal West German political controversies are reasons given, by persons who claim to be familiar with his thinking, for Gehlen's continued reluctance to receive visitors.

If this has indeed been Gehlen's attitude, recent information about the manuscript indicates a drastic change. For, in addition to describing wartime and cold-war intelligence operations, it



AD — A girl holds a poster in Mainz, Germany, announcing the memoirs of Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, former head of the West German in-

telligence service. On the book's cover is the latest picture, taken in February, of the seldom-photographed Gehlen. —AP Photo

## 'Many Sweets' in Gehlen Memoirs

# 'This Book Will Change the Writing of History'

MAINZ, Germany (UPI) — The memoirs of West Germany's retired spymaster will "change the writing of history," publisher Volker Hansen predicted Monday.

Hansen said the claim that Adolf Hitler's top lieutenant, Martin Bormann, actually was a Russian agent "is only one of the many sweets" in the book by Gen. Reinhard Gehlen. Hansen said Hase and Koehler, the small, 182-year-old

publishing house in Mainz of which he is director, planned to publish the book at the end of this month.

Until his retirement about three years ago, Gehlen was head of the West German intelligence service. He has never given an interview, or previously written for publication.

Gehlen first went into business for the United States after the Nazi collapse, using as a nucleus a team he put together

during the war when he was the German army's chief of intelligence on the Russian front.

Hansen said the book will be titled, *Der Dienst* (The Service).

"It has a double meaning," Hansen said. "First, it indicates long years of service for the government, and second it was the nickname for the federal intelligence service which Gehlen directed."

"This book will change the writing of history," Hansen said. "Americans who have read it already are making that claim."

One of the pictures in the 500-page book will be the first published portrait of Gehlen since the end of World War II, Hansen said.

"It was taken by a member of the family in front of his house in Bavaria," the publisher said.

"I have known Gehlen for years," Hansen said. "He and my father got to know each other during the war, when my father worked for Adm. Wilhelm Canaris, head of the wartime counterespionage service."

Hansen said his publishing house produces about 60 titles a year, on political science, history, legal questions, computers, biographies and memoirs.

A larger publishing house

could not have maintained the security essential in producing such a bombshell book as Gehlen's," Hansen said. "I believe that is why he chose to let us have it."

Meanwhile, in Vienna, Simon Wiesenthal, head of the Jewish Documentation Center, rejected the reports that Bormann was a Soviet spy as "very unlikely."

Wiesenthal, in a first commentary to the Gehlen memoirs, said, "All logical reasons contradicted such an assumption."

Wiesenthal, whose organization concentrates in tracking down war criminals, said the Soviet Union, on purely political grounds, would never have kept Bormann's whereabouts secret, if he really were in the Soviet Union. "This would have been such an immense risk for them,"

In Frankfurt, West Germany, legal authorities continue their search for Bormann despite the claim by Gehlen.

A spokesman for the Frankfurt prosecution said Monday that Bormann is still being sought "right around the globe, and dead or alive."

He added that Gehlen's disclosure took the prosecution as much by surprise as it did the public.

### No Indication

The spokesman said the prosecution will pursue Gehlen's claim and will probably have the former Wehrmacht officer testify. He added that, up to now, the prosecution had no indication in the direction of Gehlen's claim.

The spokesman said he considers Gehlen's statement as unlikely, because he could think of no reason why the West German intelligence service should have withheld its knowledge, since Bormann was sentenced to death in absentia in the Nuernberg war crimes trials shortly after World War II.

Since then, the spokesman said, reports reached the prosecution time and again that Bormann was hiding in a South American country.

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1. PRESS COVERAGE HERE OF REF MATTER HAS BEEN RELATIVELY

HEAVY AND PROMINENTLY FEATURED, WITH CONSIDERABLE SKEPTICISM

AS TO VALIDITY SENSATIONAL ALLEGATIONS OF MARTIN BORMANN ROLE

AS SOVIET AGENT. NO SUBSTANTIAL REVFLATIONS NOTED HERE TO

DATE BEYOND THOSE CONTAINED IN NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE AND

LATER UPI RELEASE. WE MIGHT NOTE THAT SOURCE EGNA 42565 IS

DESCRIBED, WE GATHER ACCURATELY, AS FORMER U.S. MILITARY

INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. BONN MAY WISH SUPPLEMENT ABOVE WITH

CHARACTERIZATION NATIONAL PRESS COVERAGE.

2. [ ] <sup>SK</sup> ASKED CATRIBE [ALIAS BERNHARDT] FOR COMMENT

7 SEPTEMBER. HE CALLED IN ALIAS FLEMING FOR OUR MEETING OF

WHICH FOLL IS SUMMARY.

3. IN EFFECT, PRESS REVELATIONS OVER WEEKEND CAME TO CATRIBE

AS SAME SORT OF SURPRISE AS THEY HAD TO US (WE DID NOT DISABUSE

BERNHARDT OF THIS ASSERTION.) [ ] WAS AWARE THAT REF AUTHOR

PREPARING SOME SORT OF BOOK, BUT KNEW NEITHER TIMING OF ITS

PUBLICATION, IDENTITY OF PUBLISHER, OR CONTENT. [BERNHARDT] STATED

FLATLY THAT AUTHOR HAD NOT SOUGHT OFFICIAL WHBRUSH APPROVAL

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FOR HIS WORK, EITHER FROM CATRIBE OR ELSEWHERE. AUTHOR HAD ASKED [BERNHARDT] SOME TIME AGO TO GO OVER MANUSCRIPT AS "CENSOR", BUT [BERNHARDT] HAD DECLINED, FEELING THAT CATRIBE SHOULD NOT BE PLACED IN THIS POSITION, AND HE THEREFORE FELT, WITH ONE "EXCEPTION" (FRAU KUNZE, WHO ACTUALLY TYPED MANUSCRIPT), THAT NO CATRIBE PERSON HAD SEEN THE TEXT.

4. IN THIS SITUATION, [BERNHARDT] COULD ONLY SPECULATE AS TO CONTENTS. HIS PERSONAL, PERHAPS OPTIMISTIC, VIEW IS THAT IT WILL PARTAKE NOT SO MUCH OF THE NATURE OF MEMOIRS AS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AND OF POLITICAL COMMENTARY. THIS DESPITE THE BORMANN ASPECT, TO WHICH [BERNHARDT] COMMENTED THAT THE ONLY BASIS KNOWN TO HIM FOR THIS ALLEGATION LAY IN THE VAGUE REPORTING FROM [ ] IN 1961 TO THE EFFECT THAT, DURING THE WAR, SOVIET INTELLIGENCE WAS TARGETTED ON HIGH NSDAP OFFICIALS, AND THAT BORMANN'S NAME WAS MENTIONED VERY LOOSELY IN THIS CONTEXT. HE HAS NO IDEA WHETHER THE AUTHOR HAS RETAINED ANY "PRIVATE SOVIET SOURCE," BUT HE DEALT WITH THIS POSSIBILITY QUITE IRONICALLY.

5. [BERNHARDT] NOTED THAT THE AUTHOR HAD BEEN DRIVEN BY HIS SON TO A RETREAT IN THE ALLGAEU ON THE WEEKEND, BEFORE THE PUBLICITY BROKE, AND THAT HE INTENDED TO REMAIN SECLUDED

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PAGE 3 [ ] 16718 S E C R E T

THERE FOR AT LEAST TWO WEEKS, IN A LOCATION UNKNOWN TO CATRIBE  
OR, SO FAR AS [BERNHARDT] KNEW, ANYONE ELSE.

6. VIEW ABOVE, WE UNABLE MAKE ANY PRELIMINARY JUDGMENTS  
AS TO SECURITY ASPECTS REF PUBLICATION, AND WILL HAVE TO AWAIT  
BEGINNING SERIAL PUBLICATION IN DIE WELT ON 11 SEPTEMBER. IN  
THIS CONNECTION, [BERNHARDT] REPORTED THAT SPRINGER PRESS HAD  
ASSEMBLED TASK FORCE SOME MONTHS AGO, ALLEGEDLY TO WORK ON REBUTTAL  
TO SPIEGEL SERIES, BUT IT NOW APPEARS MORE LIKELY TO PREPARE  
THIS SERIAL; WHICH WILL CONTAIN NOT ONLY EXTRACTS FROM AUTHOR'S  
WORK BUT ADDITIONAL COMMENTARY PREPARED BY SPRINGER STAFF.  
FROM ALL APPEARANCES, WE CAN EXPECT A LIVELY FALL; THE  
"POLITICIZATION" OF CATRIBE IS APPARENTLY TO BE REVENGED INDIRECTLY  
ON THE SAME POLITICAL SCENE. GP-1.

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# Aussagegenehmigung für Gehlen

Bonn war vor Veröffentlichung vom „Fall Bormann“ nicht informiert

Bonn (ap) — Die Bundesregierung hat dem ehemaligen Chef des Bundesnachrichtendienstes, Gehlen, Aussagegenehmigung für den „Fall Bormann“ erteilt. Wie ein Regierungssprecher mitteilte, war ein entsprechendes Ersuchen des Untersuchungsrichters in Frankfurt/Main eingegangen, wo eine Voruntersuchung in Sachen des ehemaligen Reichsleiters und Vertrauten Hitlers, Bormann, laufe, dessen Verbleib seit Kriegsende unbekannt ist.

Der frühere General Gehlen hat in seinen jetzt fertiggestellten Memoiren behauptet, Bormann sei Spion der Sowjets gewesen. Beim Sturm der sowjetischen Truppen auf den Bunker der Reichskanzlei im April 1945 habe er sich hinter die sowjetischen Linien gerettet und sei erst vor knapp drei Jahren in der Sowjetunion gestorben. Ein Regierungssprecher erklärte dazu, die Bundesregierung könne

die von Gehlen aufgestellten Behauptungen nicht bestätigen. Im übrigen seien weder das Bundeskanzleramt noch der Bundesnachrichtendienst mit den Memoiren Gehlens befaßt worden.

Ein Sprecher der Frankfurter Staatsanwaltschaft, bei der die Ermittlungen geführt werden, erklärte, daß Bormann „tot oder lebendig“ gesucht werde und sich der Untersuchungsrichter mit dieser Angelegenheit befassen werde.

Page 4

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE,

## Latest Report on Bormann Is Treated With Skepticism

BONN, Sept. 6 (Reuters).—A report that Adolf Hitler's top aide, Martin Bormann, was a wartime Soviet agent who fled to Russia after the war was treated yesterday with skepticism among official and knowledgeable unofficial sources.

Simon Wiesenthal, the noted Nazi-hunter, who has been on Bormann's track since World War II, said he doubted that the most-wanted Nazi criminal had

spent the time since the war in Russia.

He said the report by The New York Times (in today's International Herald Tribune) of a new book by the former West German intelligence chief Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, indicated Gen. Gehlen knew about Bormann's whereabouts but never communicated this to the West German government.

"But there is no logic in this," Mr. Wiesenthal said in a tele-

phone interview from Vienna.

"It could have been a superb ploy for West Germany during the height of the cold war to demand of the Russians that Bormann be brought to trial."

"Instead they spent all their efforts getting South American governments to issue warrants for Bormann's arrest," he went on.

"Gen. Gehlen was a responsible German official. If he had known that then, surely he would have done something about it."

Mr. Wiesenthal said he was also suspicious of the allegation because none of the numerous Soviet intelligence officials who fled to the West since World War II have made any mention of the matter.

He said the last he heard about Bormann was 18 months ago when usually reliable sources reported Bormann, now 71, had undergone an operation by a German doctor in a hospital in southern Brazil. He said he understood that Bormann was often on the move between Paraguay, Chile and Brazil. "He never stays in the same place more than three months at a time," he said.

Mr. Wiesenthal said the state prosecutor in Frankfurt was still officially searching for Bormann and had made considerable searches in South America.

### Many Tips

In Frankfurt, the prosecutor who since 1963 has led the official investigation into Bormann's whereabouts said it was "improbable" that Bormann had spent the years since the war in the Soviet Union.

"We have had tips that Bormann was in nearly every country, and possibly Russia was among them. But until now most information has pointed to South America," Wilhelm Metzner said.

Mr. Metzner said Gen. Gehlen while in office provided almost no help in the investigations. "In 10 years of investigations I do not believe we ever received a single tip from Gen. Gehlen," he said.

### Denial by Spokesman's

West German government spokesman Ruediger von Weichmar denied he had told The New York Times the West German government is investigating the possibility that Gen. Gehlen had given away state secrets.

One of Bormann's sons, Gerhard, 34, said today he did not believe his father had ever lived in Russia. "This is completely out of the question," he said. The young Bormann works as a buyer in the Bavarian town of Freising.

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# Also General, wenn Sie die Absicht haben

Wie Gehlens Memoiren einen Verleger und weltweite Beachtung fanden

Von unserem Redaktionsmitglied Leo Sillner

München, 7. September

Die Sensation hat rasch der Skepsis und der Spekulation Platz gemacht: Martin Bormann — Leiter der NSDAP-Parteikanzlei und zuletzt Adolf Hitlers intimer Vertrauter, der bei der Flucht aus dem von sowjetischen Soldaten bedrängten Führerbunker am 1. Mai 1945 umgekommen, aber bis heute von der Bundesanwaltschaft gesucht — sei in Wahrheit schon 1945 von den Sowjets mit offener Armeen aufgenommen worden und habe bis zu seinem natürlichen Tod vor drei Jahren als Deutschlandberater gedient.

Es ist es am vergangenen Montag die ganze Welt den Zeitungen, und die Sensation war denn der dies vermeldete, war kein General, sondern als Reinhard Gehlen, bis 1968 Chef des Bundesnachrichtendienstes und im Augenblick der bestzitierte Memoirenschreiber. Angesichts der Wichtigkeit Gehlens wurden sogleich die Fragen auf den Plan gerufen. Wie hätte, so man allenthalben kritisch, der oberste Boß der Bundesregierung den Geheimdienstes diese neue Neuheit seinem Dienstherrn, dem Bundeskanzler, während all der Jahre verschwiegen vor aller Öffentlichkeit nach Bormann gefahndet wurde — vorenthalten können? Reinhard Hansen, der Geschäftsführer des Verlags Hase & Koehler in Mainz, der zur Buchveröffentlichung das Gehlensche Memoirenwerk im Umfang von etwa 460 Seiten zum Preise von 28 Mark auf den Markt bringen will, meint auf die Frage: „Ich könnte mir vorstellen, daß es ein altes Geheimnis war, das erst nach dem Krieg in der Öffentlichkeit bekannt wurde.“ Aber natürlich ist dann gar nichts unternommen

worden damals.“ Behauptungen, Bormann befände sich in der UdSSR, seien ja schon nach den Nürnberger Prozessen aufgestellt worden, und Gehlen habe diesbezüglich Informationen wohl schon zu einer Zeit erhalten, als seine Organisation noch gar nicht in den Bundesnachrichtendienst übernommen worden sei.

Als der ehemalige General Gehlen, der bis 1945 in der Wehrmacht das geheimdienstartige Ressort „Fremde Heere Ost“ leitete, 1968 seinen Dienst beim BND quittierte und sich in seine Pensionistenresidenz am Starnberger See zurückzog, gab es ein großes Rennen um die Memoiren jenes Mannes, der bis dahin wie kein anderer seine Person der Öffentlichkeit vorenthalten hatte. Wie kam es, daß schließlich v. Hase & Koehler, der sich selbst als „mittlerer Verlag“ bezeichnet, das Rennen um den todsicheren internationalen Bestseller (deutsche Startauflage 100 000 Stück) machte?

Hansen: „Ich hatte wie viele gedacht, warum soll man es nicht auch einmal versuchen, und nach Möglichkeit mit einem einleuchtenden Argument? So habe ich mich lange um einen Termin beim alten Herrn bemüht, und als es dann schließlich gelungen war, bin ich zu ihm gegangen und habe gesagt: „Also, Herr General, Sie haben sicherlich schon eine Vielzahl von internationalen Angeboten, und wenn Sie die Absicht haben, so würde ich vorschlagen, es einem mittleren Verlag zu geben, um auf diesem Wege die Frage der Geheimhaltung am besten zu wahren.“ Bei einem Großkonzern ist das nicht möglich, und das war es.“

Hansen, dessen Verlag sich vor allem auf die Gebiete der politischen Wissenschaften, der

Soziologie und der Rechtswissenschaften spezialisiert hat und zu dessen Autoren demnächst auch der ehemalige Bundeswehrgeneral Kielmannsegg mit einer militärpolitischen Studie über die Nahostsituation gehören wird, wendet sich empört gegen die Verdächtigung, ein „rechter“ Verlag zu sein, und er kann dies auch mit dem Hinweis, daß er bereits über ein Dutzend Bücher gegen den Rechtsradikalismus veröffentlicht hat, kontern.

Weiteres über den Inhalt des Gehlen-Buches will Hansen vor dem Erscheinen nicht ausplaudern: „Ich kann nur sagen, daß dieses Buch selbstverständlich keine Staatsgeheimnisse preisgibt und daß es einmal natürlich die vielen interessanten Aspekte in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland behandelt bis in die Gegenwart, aber auch insbesondere international angelegt ist.“ Ob große Enthüllungen zu erwarten seien? „Dieses Buch ist wirklich vor allen Dingen zwischen den Zeilen zu lesen; daß es ein Leckerbissen ist, ist gar keine Frage.“

Inzwischen hat ein amerikanischer Konzern die Weltrechte erworben. Ein ganzes Team hat sich an die Übersetzung gemacht.



Reinhard Gehlen

## Bonn erteilt Gehlen Genehmigung zur Aussage über Bormann

Die Bundesregierung hat dem ehemaligen Chef des Bundesnachrichtendienstes (BND), Reinhard Gehlen, Aussagegenehmigung im Fall Bormann erteilt. Wie ein Regierungssprecher in Bonn mitteilte, war ein entsprechendes Ersuchen des Untersuchungsrichters in Frankfurt eingegangen, wo eine Voruntersuchung in Sachen des ehemaligen Reichsleiters und Vertrauten Hitlers läuft. Martin Bormanns Verbleib am Kriegsende ist unbekannt.

Der frühere General Gehlen behauptet in seinen jetzt fertiggestellten Memoiren, Bormann sei sowjetischer Spion gewesen. Beim Sturm auf den Bunker der Reichskanzlei im April 1945 habe er sich hinter die sowjetischen Linien ge-

rettet und sei erst vor knapp drei Jahren in der Sowjetunion gestorben. Der Bonner Regierungssprecher erklärte, die Bundesregierung habe die Memoiren Gehlens aufgestellt. Die Behauptungen nicht bestätigen. Im übrigen sei weder das Bundeskanzleramt noch der Bundesnachrichtendienst mit den Memoiren Gehlens befaßt worden. Dieser habe die Regierung auch nicht darum gebeten, eine etwaige Verwendung amtlich erworbenen Wissens zu genehmigen.

Eine Vernehmung Gehlens durch den Untersuchungsrichter beim Oberlandesgericht, Frankfurt, Horst von Glasenapp, ist vorerst nicht möglich, da sich der frühere erste Mann des Bundesnachrichtendienstes nach Angabe der Frankfurter Behörde des Generalstaatsanwalts „derzeit außerhalb der Bundesrepublik“ hält. Wann Gehlen wieder in der Bundesrepublik sein werde, stehe nicht fest. (Vgl. Seite 8)

SÜDBEITSCH

8 SEPT 71

Bonn (AP) — Die Bundesregierung hat dem ehemaligen Chef des Bundesnachrichtendienstes (BND), Reinhard Gehlen, zu verhindern, daß er seine Memoiren, in denen er behauptet, der ehemalige Reichsleiter Martin Bormann sei ein sowjetischer Spion gewesen, veröffentlicht. Ein Regierungssprecher in Bonn sagte, die Bundesregierung habe keine Interesse an der Veröffentlichung der Memoiren. Gehlen, der in den Memoiren behauptet, Bormann sei ein sowjetischer Spion gewesen, habe sich bisher noch keine Äußerungen dazu lassen, aus denen hervorgeht, daß Gehlen die ihm während seiner Amtszeit zugänglich gewordenen Informationen über das endgültige Schicksal des ehemaligen Reichsleiters Martin Bormann an die Bundesregierung weitergegeben hat. Gleichzeitig betonte der Sprecher, daß Beamte auch nach ihrer Pensionierung verpflichtet seien, die ihnen während ihrer Amtszeit zugänglich gewordenen Informationen zu verschweigen. Gehlen, der die Memoiren dem Verleger der Gehlen-Memoiren, dem er „irrig Vorstellungen“ vom Beamtenrecht vorwarf, hat sich bisher noch keine Äußerungen dazu lassen, aus denen hervorgeht, daß Gehlen die ihm während seiner Amtszeit zugänglich gewordenen Informationen über das endgültige Schicksal des ehemaligen Reichsleiters Martin Bormann an die Bundesregierung weitergegeben hat. Gleichzeitig betonte der Sprecher, daß Beamte auch nach ihrer Pensionierung verpflichtet seien, die ihnen während ihrer Amtszeit zugänglich gewordenen Informationen zu verschweigen. Gehlen, der die Memoiren dem Verleger der Gehlen-Memoiren, dem er „irrig Vorstellungen“ vom Beamtenrecht vorwarf, hat sich bisher noch keine Äußerungen dazu lassen, aus denen hervorgeht, daß Gehlen die ihm während seiner Amtszeit zugänglich gewordenen Informationen über das endgültige Schicksal des ehemaligen Reichsleiters Martin Bormann an die Bundesregierung weitergegeben hat. Gleichzeitig betonte der Sprecher, daß Beamte auch nach ihrer Pensionierung verpflichtet seien, die ihnen während ihrer Amtszeit zugänglich gewordenen Informationen zu verschweigen.

## Moskau: Glatter Schwindel

Moskau (UP) — Die amtliche sowjetische Nachrichtenagentur TASS hat die in den Memoiren des früheren Leiters des Bundesnachrichtendienstes Reinhard Gehlen enthaltene Behauptung, der ehemalige Leiter Martin Bormann sei ein sowjetischer Agent, als „glatten Schwindel“ bezeichnet. In der häufigen schnellen sowjetischen Stellungnahme schreibt Juri Kornilow, Kommentator der Tagesfragen, antisowjetische Machwerke seien zwar nichts Neues und würden auch übersehen, doch verdienen die Gehlen-Memoiren, wenn sie beachtet zu werden. Die Organisation von Propaganda und die Erfindung antisowjetischer Machwerke seien für Gehlen „ein vertrautes Geschäft“.



# National Beitrag



BEIHEFT FREITAG  
10. SEPTEMBER 1971  
JAHRGANG 24 / NR. 12  
15 Pfennig

DAS BLATT DER NATIONAL-DEMOKRATISCHEN PARTEI DEUTSCHLANDS

## Gehlen-Memoiren als Fälschung

„Prawda“: Machwerk gegen die Entspannung

MOSKAU (adn/eb). Als bewußt antisowjetische Fälschung, die gerade nach dem Westberlin-Abkommen den reaktionären Kreisen der BRD bei ihren Manövern gegen die europäische Entspannung dient, weist gestern die „Prawda“ die in einem westdeutschen Verlag erschienenen und von Springers „Welt“ aufgekauften „Memoiren“ des Geheimdienstchefs Gehlen zurück.


Die „Prawda“ zitiert die „New York Times“, wonach die „Memoiren“ zweifellos von den Feinden der Ostpolitik BRD-Kanzlers

Brandt begrüßt werden. „Es heißt, daß die ‚Memoiren Gehlen‘ eine detaillierte Analyse der sowjetischen politischen und militärischen Ziele für die kommenden zwei Jahrzehnte und zugleich den Appell enthalten, das Militärpotential der westlichen Länder zu stärken“, schreibt die „Prawda“. „Schlecht stehen die Dinge um die heutigen Antikommunisten, wenn sie das Bewußtsein der Menschen mit derartigen Grillen trüben wollen, daß Hitlers Spießgeselle Bormann angeblich bei russischen Spionen Aufnahme fand.“

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vaten und beruflichen Spionage-Fans in Japan, Italien, Großbritannien, Schweden, Holland und den USA stillen.

Gleichzeitig mit der deutschen Veröffentlichung werden große Auflagen den Lesungen von pri- In den USA befinden sich die beiden deutschen Verlagshäuser in interessanter Gesellschaft: Aus-



**NUR WENIGE KILOMETER** von seiner alten Wirkungsstätte Pullach entfernt, schrieb Reinhard Gehlen seine Erinnerungen nieder.

gerechnet die ebenso mächtige wie rechtsorientierte „Hearst-Corporation“ beehrt sich, den Amerikanern die sicherlich spannende Lektüre nahebringen zu dürfen.

Peter Riltner, einer der Hearst-Gewaltigen, die über ein Imperium rechtsgewirkter Provinzblätter gebieten, sprach von den „Memoiren des Jahrhunderts“, die die Geschichtsschreibung verändern würden.

Jahrhundert-Autor Reinhard Gehlen — im 1000jährigen Reich Leiter Abteilung „Fremde Heere Ost“ — verdankt seine Nachkriegskarriere dem papieren Inhalt von 50 Stahlkoffern, die er vorsorglich in den bayerischen Alpen versteckt hatte, um sie den amerikanischen Siegern nach der Kapitulation für entsprechende Gegenleistung zu offerieren.

Auch jetzt hat Reinhard Gehlen wieder vorgesorgt: Niemand wird erfahren, welche Summe ihm sein Erinnerungsvermögen eingebracht hat. Dies soll nun wirklich sein Geheimnis bleiben.



◀ **PACKT AUS:** General a. D. Reinhard Gehlen, 22 Jahre lang Chef des Bundesnachrichtendienstes, hat heimlich seine Memoiren geschrieben. Jetzt wird der Spionage-Schmökler veröffentlicht.

▶ **VOR DREI JAHREN IN DER SOWJET-UNION GESTORBEN?** Hitlers Stellvertreter Martin Bormann soll laut Reinhard Gehlen für Stalin spioniert haben.



pg 2 of 2

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## First Installment of Memoirs Published

# Bormann a Russian Spy in 1941, Says Gehlen

HAMBURG (UPI) — Martin Bormann, Hitler's top deputy, was spying for the Russians as early as June 1941, when Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union.

That assertion was made by Reinhard Gehlen, former head of West German intelligence, in his memoirs, which began

appearing Saturday in excerpt form in the Hamburg daily Die Welt.

Die Welt reported in another story Friday that Soviet soldiers found Bormann alive in Berlin in June, 1945. The paper said that an unidentified female witness, the daughter of a former Wehrmacht general,

told the story to a West Berlin lawyer, who in turn took down the minutes.

The newspaper said the woman acted following press reports on Gehlen's book.

"As the most prominent informant and consultant of the Soviets, he was working for the opposition already at the be-

ginning of the Russian invasion," Gehlen wrote of Bormann.

The claim that Bormann was a Russian spy and died in the Soviet Union two years ago already has sparked controversy both here and abroad.

Earlier in the week a Bonn government spokesman said the retired spymaster and his publishers faced possible legal action if the book — due to come out at the end of the month — contains confidential information.

But the spokesman said the government would not block publication of the 500-page volume.

Several public figures, among them Simon Wiesenthal, whose Jewish Documentation Center in Vienna specializes in tracking down Nazis, also challenged the validity of Gehlen's claim.

Installed by Allies

Gehlen was chief of intelligence for the German armies that occupied the Soviet Union during World War II. Later the western allies installed him as head of the West German intelligence, a post he held until his retirement about three years ago.

In the brief excerpt published in Die Welt Saturday, Gehlen wrote that he and Wilhelm Canaris, over-all head of intelligence for the Nazi German armies, had decided that "the Soviets must have had a well-oriented source of information in the highest German leadership."

That source, according to Gehlen, was Bormann, who variously has been reported living in South America and killed in the final days of the war.

Radio Transmitter

"Independently from one another we (he and Canaris) discovered that Bormann had the only uncontrolled radio transmitter."

"But we also were agreed that surveillance of the strongest man next to Hitler in the National Socialist (Nazi) hierarchy was as good as impossible. Any improvidence would have meant the end of the inquiry and the end of us," Gehlen wrote.

Reports that Bormann was living in Paraguay and Argentina "can be dispensed with," according to Gehlen.

He said two trustworthy sources told him Bormann lived during the 1950s in the Soviet Union as a "perfectly shielded spy."

## Claim Bormann Was a Soviet Spy Is 'Two-Bit Fabrication,' Tass Says

MOSCOW (NYT) — Tass, the official Soviet press agency, has attacked allegations that Martin Bormann, Hitler's top lieutenant, was a Soviet agent during World War II as a "two-bit fabrication."

In a commentary, Tass said that this story, reportedly in-

cluded in the forthcoming memoirs of Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, a former Nazi and the retired chief of West German intelligence, was a "hoax" aimed at disrupting moves toward East-West detente in Europe.

The Tass commentary Wed-

nesday night stopped short of specifically denying the particular allegations made in Gehlen's manuscript, which is reportedly due for serialized publication soon in the West German newspaper, Die Welt, owned by Axel Springer, an influential critic of West German moves to improve relations with the Soviet Union.

"Now, when the tendency towards detente is obvious in Europe, certain circles in the West that are not interested in an improvement of the international climate — and the Springer concern belongs to them — would like to impede this process at all costs," Tass asserted.

"They think that all means are good for this: both outright lies and 'testimony' by Nazi criminals," the agency went on. "But the Western propaganda men have obviously overdone things with the 'memoirs' of the retired Nazi spy Gehlen. They have paid thousands for them, while the real price of the fabrication about Bormann is two bits."

The manuscript attributed by Western publishers to Gehlen asserts that Bormann became an adviser on German policy in the Soviet Union and that he died there less than three years ago.

Bormann was officially listed as dead in 1954. But a decade later the West German government posted a \$25,000 reward for his capture.

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# Bormann Was Russ Spy

Sept. 13, 1971

BONN (AP) — A claim that Hitler's top aide, Martin Bormann, was a wartime Soviet spy was supported Monday by a former Czechoslovak journalist.

Dr. Rudolf Stroebinger, a radio journalist who fled to West Germany after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, said Soviet leader Josef Stalin himself confirmed Bormann's spying activities in a private discussion a quarter of a century ago with former Czech President Edward Benes.

Stroebinger said the discussion was reported to him in 1968 by Gen. Josef Bartik, a close confidant of Benes who headed Czechoslovakia's wartime military counterespionage in London.

Bartik, who died in Prague in 1968, led Czechoslovakia's political intelligence service from 1944 until the fall of the Benes government in 1948.

"According to him, Benes's words to him in 1946 were, 'If Bormann is living today, he will never be hanged because he was an agent of the Soviet Union,'" Stroebinger said.

Stroebinger's statement followed a similar claim in memoirs written by former West German intelligence chief

Reinhard Gehlen. Serialization of the memoirs started in the newspaper "Die Welt" last weekend.

Gehlen said Bormann managed to escape to the Soviet Union after the collapse of Hitler's Third Reich and died there a few years ago.

However, Stroebinger said his informant could not confirm this.

According to Bartik, he said, Stalin told Benes that Bormann was captured by Soviet authorities some time during the 1920's as a German Free Corps insurgent in the Baltic area. Bormann won his release by promising to spy for Moscow.

Blackmail  
"The signed statement was completely forgotten until the Soviets rediscovered it in 1941," Stroebinger said. "Then they blackmailed him into spying for them."

Stroebinger, a deputy editor of Prague's "Lidova Demokracie" until the Soviet invasion, said Bartik gave him the information during an interview he did as part of a study into the history of the Czech intelligence service.

Bartik asked him not to publish the Bormann story because he intended including it in his own memoirs.

"Bartik died in June or July 1968," Stroebinger said. "No one would have believed me until Gehlen came with the same kind of information."

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## Gehlen Book

# Controversy Affects Publishing Negotiations

## Bonn Says Legal Status Not Clarified

By HENRY RAYMONT  
NEW YORK (NYT) — A sharp controversy in West Germany over the forthcoming memoirs of Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, Bonn's former chief of intelligence, is having a significant effect on negotiations here for the publication of the book outside Germany.

The possibility of prosecution of the author and his publishers was raised this week by Conrad Ahlers, the West German government's spokesman in Bonn, when he said that any disclosure in the memoirs of confidential information would be a violation of the law.

Earlier, Gehlen's claim that Martin Bormann, Hitler's deputy, had been a Soviet agent, was challenged by such widely differing figures as Adm. Karl Doenitz, the last wartime leader of Nazi Germany, and Dr. Simon Wiesenthal, head of the Jewish Documentation Center in Vienna, which specializes in tracking down Nazi war criminals.

As the debate unfolded, Christopher Shaw, publisher of the World Publishing Co., announced that an international publishing group headed by his company had obtained all book and serial rights to the Gehlen memoirs outside Germany.

The group, known to include the Book-of-the-Month Club and William Collins Sons and Co., Ltd., of London, was said by a publishing official to have offered "substantially over \$500,000."

But Shaw said that a number of French, Italian and Scandinavian publishers as well as U.S. paperback houses have been asked to suspend their bidding until the legal status of the manuscript has been clarified.

"We first want to await developments in Germany," Shaw said. "We also have decided that other publishers interested in the book should first see the English translation, which will contain material that cannot be published in the German edition."

Shaw hinted that an English-language translation, which could be used as the "master manuscript" for translation into other languages, might well provide a way to circumvent the West German laws.

In his statement, Ahlers said that under a law dating from the 1880s, any former civil servant writing about information he obtained while working for the government had to submit his manuscript for clearance before it was published

in Germany. Ahlers did not indicate how the law affected publication abroad.

The conservative newspaper Die Welt (The World) of Hamburg was scheduled to begin publishing excerpts from the Gehlen memoirs Friday and, as far as could be determined, had not shown them to the Bonn authorities.

Shaw said that Peter Ritner, World's chief editor, would work directly with Gehlen on the translation into English of the 150,000-word manuscript at Gehlen's home in Bavaria. Shaw said he expected the book would be ready for publication in the United States next spring.

"General Gehlen has advised us that he would be available, and indeed welcome, close questioning about the claims he makes in the book," Shaw said.

Gehlen's allegation that Bormann, a convicted Nazi war criminal, had found refuge in the Soviet Union and died there in 1969, drew sharp criticism from a variety of places. Only Albert Speer, former Nazi minister of armaments, has so far said publicly he shared Gehlen's assumption.

Doenitz, now 81, lived in retirement since his release from Allied war crimes charges in Spandau in Berlin last year, said, "The g Bormann is corn sense."

Wiesenthal, who is searching for ex-war criminals on Jewish victims of persecution, said in Vienna he still holds to the Bormann is in South

## Zu Gehlens Bericht über Bormann

„Ich sah  
ihn bei  
den Russen“

Gertrud von Heimerdinger, Tochter eines Generals und von 1921 bis 1945 Angestellte des Auswärtigen Amtes, hat am Wochenende vor einem Notar an Eides Statt erklärt, sie habe Reichsleiter Martin Bormann Mitte Juni 1945 in Berlin im Gebäude des heutigen Kriminalgerichts Moabit in sowjetischem Gewahrsam gesehen. Wenig später habe ihr ein sowjetischer Vernehmungsoffizier gesagt: „Den Bormann haben wir jetzt nach Rußland geschafft.“ Frau von Heimerdinger, die aktiv am Widerstand gegen Adolf Hitler beteiligt war, wurde seinerzeit selbst von den Sowjets in Moabit vernommen. Sie ist sich sicher,



Gertrud von Heimerdinger  
Foto: Manfred Beck

Bormann im Gang stehend und von Sowjetsoldaten umringt erkannt zu haben. Ihre vor einem Notar zu Protokoll gegebene Aussage lesen Sie auf Seite 2.

Jagd  
nach einem  
Totgesagten

Reinhard Gehlen berichtet in seinen Memoiren, Martin Bormann sei ein sowjetischer Agent gewesen und in der Sowjetunion gestorben. Die WELT nahm diese Aussage aus den Memoiren, aus denen wir weitere Teile veröffentlichten werden, zum Anlaß, den Fakten und Vermutungen über das Leben des engsten Vertrauten Adolf Hitlers nachzugehen. Dem ersten Bericht der dreiteiligen WELT-Folge über Karriere und Einfluß Bormanns folgt heute die Darstellung der widersprüchlichen Versionen über Bormanns Schicksal nach dem Sturm der Russen auf Berlin im April 1945.

Bormann und Stumpfegger. Aber beide waren tot. „Ihre Gesichter waren klar zu erkennen. Ich faßte Bormann an. Keine Reaktion. Ich beugte mich über ihn und vernahm keinen Atem. Wunden oder Blutspuren waren nicht zu erkennen. Ob sie Gift genommen hatten?“

So widersprüchlich schon diese wenigen Aussagen über das Bormannsche Ausbruchunternehmen in der Nacht zum 2. Mai sind, so verworren wird alles bleiben, was nach 1945 über Bormann gemeldet, vermutet und ermittelt wird. Die Historiographen der nationalsozialistischen Zeit lassen Bormanns Ende offen. Sie registrieren allenfalls mögliche Hypothesen; kein einziger ernsthafter Historiker entscheidet sich für eine, weil keine ihm gesichert genug erscheint.

Um so mehr nahm sich die Publizistik des Falles Bormann an. Die Meldungen und Berichte, seriös wie unseriös, wurden zur Legion. Von der ersten im Kleider Nachrichtenblatt der Militärregierung am 14. 6. 1945 publizierten Meldung, Bormann sei verhaftet, bis hin zu dem mit homerischem Gelächter quittierten Reinfall der Illustrierten „stern“, als sie versuchte, Bormann zu interviewen — ein Labyrinth, in dem es nicht an Spinnern und Filibustern fehlt.

Wo ist Martin Bormann nicht überall gesehen, geortet worden, als Landarbeiter in Tirol, als Mönch im römischen Franziskanerkloster, als Gaucho in der Pampa, als Kolonist am Parana, als Tourist in Schweden, als Elefantenspieler im Wanderzirkus, als reicher Mann in Santiago. Eine der gängigsten Thesen besagt, er lebe, wie der Auschwitz-Arzt Mengele, von Leibwächtern bewacht, im Dreiländercock Argentinien, Brasilien und Paraguay. Bormann, lebte er noch, wäre jetzt 71 Jahre alt.

Von BERND NELLESSEN und WERNER JOHE

Für den Ausbruchversuch Martin Bormanns aus dem Führerbunker in der Nacht zum 2. Mai 1945 gibt es viele Zeugen, doch ihre Aussagen widersprechen einander. Die zweite WELT-Folge berichtet über die Versionen, die dem Schicksal des Mannes galten, der verschwunden blieb, dessen Tod aber bezweifelt wird.

In einer der kleinen Gruppen, die am 1. Mai 1945 gegen 23 Uhr den Führerbunker, unter der Reichskanzlei verlassen, befindet sich ein unterkürter Mann in der Uniform eines SS-Obergruppenführers. Über dem feldgrauen Tuch trägt er einen Ledermantel; in den Taschen stecken das persönliche Testament Adolf Hitlers und ein privates Tagebuch. Es ist Martin Bormann.

Die Gruppe überquert hastig die Wilhelmstraße, verschwindet im U-Bahnhof Wilhelmplatz und marschiert dann, den Gleisen folgend, zum Bahnhof Friedrichstraße. Dort taucht sie wieder auf, wenige Meter von den an der Spree stehenden sowjetischen Soldaten entfernt. Die Gruppe will versuchen, unter dem Schutz von Panzern die Weidendammer Brücke zu überqueren. Beim Durchbruchversuch explodiert ein Panzer im sowjetischen Feuer. Die in seinem Schutz stürmenden Männer werden zu Boden geschleudert und bleiben minutenlang liegen.

Unter ihnen befinden sich der Chauffeur Adolf Hitlers, Erich Kempka, der Reichsjugendführer Artur Axmann, der Staatssekretär im Propagandaministerium Werner Naumann, der Pilot Hitlers, Hans Baur, Hitlers Leibarzt Ludwig Stumpfegger. Sie alle sind Zeugen für Bormanns Schicksal in dieser Nacht. Doch was sie bekunden, reimt sich nicht.

ums Leben gekommen. Im Nürnberger Prozeß wird Kempka später diese Aussage beschwören. In den Nachkriegsjahren melden sich viele, die — wenn auch in Details voneinander abweichend — gleichfalls bezeugen, daß Bormann sein Ende an der Weidendammer Brücke gefunden habe.

Sie alle müssen sich geirrt haben. Denn 1963 erklärte Werner Naumann in einer Vernehmung vor dem Staatsanwalt in Frankfurt: „In einem Trichter neben der Weidendammer Brücke traf ich einen kleinen Rest unserer Gruppe. Es mögen elf Mann gewesen sein. Zu ihnen gehörten Martin Bormann und Axmann. Ferner erinnere ich mich noch an einen Arzt Dr. Stumpfegger.“ Laut Naumann zog der Trupp auf den Bahngleisen weiter in Richtung Lehrter Bahnhof. Bei einem Zusammenstoß mit sowjetischen Soldaten trennten sie sich: „Ich weiß nicht mehr, wer mit Bormann zusammen ging. Ich weiß aber, daß Herr Bormann in diesem Augenblick noch gelebt hat.“

Dies bestätigte auch Artur Axmann. Er gab zu Protokoll, daß eine der abgesplitterten Gruppen aus Baur, Naumann, Stumpfegger und anderen bestanden habe. Erst nach Erreichen der Invalidenstraße hätten sich Bormann und Stumpfegger auf der Suche nach einem Schlupfloch von den anderen getrennt. Wenig später stieß Axmann wieder auf

### Viele Widersprüche

Als Kempka und Baur sich aus dem Gefahrenbereich retten, sind sie überzeugt, Bormann sei bei der Explosion

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## Viele Jäger

Einer der eifrigsten Verfechter der These, Bormann halte sich in Südamerika verborgen, ist Simon Wiesenthal, Leiter des jüdischen Dokumentationszentrums in Wien und erfolgreicher Verfolger untergetauchter Nazi-Funktionäre. Er glaubt zumindest nachweisen zu können, daß Bormann in Südamerika lebe. Erfolg aber hatte er in der Suche nach Bormann ebenso wenig wie der israelische Geheimdienst.

Nach Ansicht einiger Reporter schien die Südamerika-Spur erstmals 1964 heiß zu werden. Das Bilderblatt „stern“ schrieb Briefe an einen vermeintlichen Mittelsmann, der den „stern“-Reportern den leibhaftigen Bormann zum Stehdienein servieren wollte. Große Versprechungen über Vertraulichkeit und publizistische Aufmachung wurden schriftlich gegeben, als Beweis für standhafte Verschwiegenheit auf den Handel mit den Volkacher Madonnen-Dieben verwiesen. Um Bormanns persönlichen Urteil über die Vergangenheit und seine Meinung über die Gegenwart — die doch wahrlich unmaßgeblich sind — „verkaufen“ zu können und den alten Antisemiten geschmeichlich zu machen, scheute der „stern“ nicht davor zurück, sich in einem Brief an den Mittelsmann bereit zu erklären, „mit Nachdruck darzustellen, daß die Verfolgung bestimmter Personen durch einen Nahestaat, wie

Die Ermittlungsbeamten stießen auf eine Spur, die das Ende des Verfahrens zu bedeuten schien. Der pensionierte Berliner Postbeamte Albert Krummow gab zu Protokoll, er habe am 6. Mai 1945 zusammen mit drei Kollegen vom Postamt am Lehrter Bahnhof auf russischen Befehl hin zwei Leichen nahe der Invalidenstrasse begraben müssen. Es habe sich um einen großen und um einen kleineren, untersehten Mann gehandelt. Der größere der beiden trug Ausweise auf den Namen Dr. Stumpfegger bei sich, bei dem anderen wurden keine Papiere gefunden. Die Staatsanwälte erinnerten sich der Aussagen von Artur Axmann, der Bormann und Stumpfegger tot an der Invalidenstrasse gefunden haben wollte.

Um letzte Gewissheit über den nun nahezu sicheren Beweis für Bormanns Tod zu erzielen, wurde im Juli 1963 das ganze fragliche Terrain umgegraben, aber gefunden wurde nichts. Das Verfahren wurde deshalb nicht eingestellt; es läuft heute noch, „betrachtet mit einer Fülle von massiven bis vagen Gerüchten“, wie der Untersuchungsrichter Horst von Glasenapp der WELT in der vergangenen Woche erklärte. Die Bormann-Akten der Frankfurter Justiz füllen bereits mehr als 30 Ordner.

## Vier Versionen um den Mann nach Hitler

Immer man diesen Staat beurteilt, zweifellos einen Rechtsbruch darstellt. Selbst dieser Kotau zählte sich nicht aus. Das Ganze entpuppte sich als großer Schmarren.

Trotz aller Fehlschläge und Reinfälle aber verlor die Südamerika-Hypothese nicht an Attraktivität. Daß gerade Südamerika als Bormanns Zuflucht immer wieder genannt wird, hat viele Gründe. Unter das Kreuz des Südens zog es manchen alten Nazi. Dort wurde Eichmann, wurde Stangel aufgestöbert. Ausgedehnte deutsche Kolonialgebiete, in denen einige den Nationalsozialismus durch eine allzu beschlagene Brille betrachten, boten sich als Asyl an. Länder, in denen man durch Geld und gute Freunde bequemer als anderswo eine neue Identität erreichen und in der Weite der Landschaft die Spuren der Vergangenheit leichter verwischen kann, mußten den Flüchtigen wie eine rettende Insel erscheinen. Dennoch bleibt es merkwürdig, daß Bormann wie andere Gesuchte nicht in Japan, Indien oder Pakistan, sondern stets in Lateinamerika vermutet werden.

Diese Lokierung auf Südamerika hat auch ihre politischen Motive. Es ist kein Zufall, daß die Propaganda des Ostblocks den vermuteten Aufenthalt Bormanns in Übersee kontinuierlich dazu benutzt, eine ideologische Verbindung zwischen der „faschistischen“ Bundesrepublik und den entwickelten Nazi-Führer schützenden Oligarchien und Diktaturen herzustellen.

1965 erschien in Ost-Berlin das Buch des sowjetischen Historikers und Publizisten Lew Besymenski „Auf den Spuren von Martin Bormann“ — ein typisches Beispiel für die Behandlung des Falles Bormann in der Publizistik des Ostblocks. Es geht dem Verfasser nicht um die Suche nach Bormann, sondern um den Nachweis, daß Bormanns Erben und Beschützer die Bundesrepublik beherrschen.

Auch solche Vorwürfe veranlassen den Generalstaatsanwalt von Hessen, Fritz Bauer, ein Ermittlungsverfahren einzuleiten. Bauer war überzeugt davon, daß Bormann Berlin lebend verlassen habe. Er begann mit seinen Recherchen, wie schon so manche vor ihm, wieder in Berlin, ließ die am Ausbruchversuch Beteiligten vernehmen und setzte für „Hinweise zur Ergreifung des lebenden Bormann“ eine Belohnung von 100 000 DM aus. Sie wartet heute noch auf ihren Empfänger.

Diese drei Modelle verwarf McGovern. Ein viertes schien ihm wahrscheinlicher. Es ging von der Annahme aus, Bormann sei mit Stumpfegger bis zur Invalidenstrasse gekommen, habe dann aber Zyankali genommen, weil ihm alle Fluchtwege abgeschnitten schienen.

Dies ist nahezu identisch mit den Angaben, die Artur Axmann neun Jahre nach der CIA-Studie vor deutschen Untersuchungsrichtern machen wird.

McGoverns Vorgesetzter erweiterte diese vierte Version durch zusätzliche Informationen, die er aus „höchsten Kreisen der sowjetischen Regierung“ erhalten haben will. Danach wurde Bormann von russischen Offizieren identifiziert. Sie fanden sein Tagebuch in seiner Tasche. „Die roten Offiziere ließen die Leiche von Angestellten des Lehrter Postamtes begraben. Nachdem sie eine entsprechende Meldung nach Moskau geschickt und dann weitere Instruktionen erhalten hatten, kehrten die russischen Offiziere jedoch zu dem Grab zurück, gruben die Leiche Bormanns aus, brachten sie an einen abgeschiedenen Ort in Ostdeutschland und bestatteten sie erneut in einem nicht näher gekennzeichneten Grab.“

Erinnern wir uns der Aussage des Postbeamten Krummow und der erfolglosen Leichensuche 1963 an der Invalidenstrasse, so gewinnt diese Version an Wahrscheinlichkeit. Sie würde auch erklären, wie das Tagebuch Martin Bormanns in die Hände der Sowjets gefallen sein könnte. Daß sie es besitzen, hatte der CIA im Zuge dieser Ermittlungen von der „Organisation Gehlen“ erfahren. Befragt, ob sie auch etwas über Martin Bormann wisse, antwortete die „Organisation Gehlen“, er befände sich „weder in der DDR noch in der Sowjetunion“.

Das war 1963. Hat Gehlen damals seinen amerikanischen Auftraggebern Kenntnisse vorenthalten, oder kam er erst später in den Besitz von Informationen, die bestätigen, was er jetzt in seinen Memoiren schreibt?

Unabhängig von deutschen Stellen hatte sich 1953 der amerikanische Geheimdienst CIA mit Martin Bormann befaßt. Ihn veranlaßte dazu die Entdeckung einer aktiven Clique alter Nazis, die in die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik als „Vulkan-Affäre“ eingegangen ist. Um nachzuprüfen, ob Martin Bormann mit dieser Clique in Verbindung stand, setzte der CIA Agenten an. Wie deren Suche nach Bormann in anderen Ländern ohne Ergebnis blieb, so brachten auch die Nachforschungen in der Bundesrepublik und Berlin nicht mehr als einige Fallstudien ein. Der amerikanische Sachbearbeiter James McGovern veröffentlichte sie 1962 in seinem in den USA erschienenen Buch „Martin Bormann“. Vier Modelle als Anregung zum Nachdenken“ boten sich dem CIA-Mann an:

1. Die Rußland-Version  
„Bormann war ein Agent. Da er immer ein Opportunist gewesen war, stellte er sich dem sowjetischen Nachrichtendienst zur Verfügung, als es klar wurde, daß die Sache des Nationalsozialismus verloren war. Er übermittelte den Sowjets Informationen über die Absichten des Führers und die Strategie des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht und stellte dadurch den Sieg der Russen sicher. Als Belohnung für diese Dienste ermöglichten ihm die Russen nach der Besetzung Berlins, zur Invalidenbrücke zu flüchten und sich dort tot zu stellen. Dann wurde er von einer sowjetischen Patrouille abgeholt und nach Rußland gebracht, wo er als führender Sowjetexperte für deutsche Fragen ein komfortables Leben führte.“

Sobald sich die Gelegenheit böte, würde er nach Deutschland als sowjetischer Kommissar zurückkehren.“

2. Die England-Version  
Es sei Bormann gewesen, der Rudolf Heß zum England-Flug überredet und dann für den englischen Geheimdienst gearbeitet habe. Bormann sei es gelungen, sich nach Flügen durchzuschlagen, von wo ihn britische Agenten nach Großbritannien gebracht hätten. Dort habe er als Berater für deutsche Angelegenheiten gewirkt.

3. Die Südamerika-Version  
Bormann gelang es, mit einem U-Boot nach Argentinien zu flüchten. Dort habe er ehemalige Nazi-Funktionäre mit dem Ziel um sich geschart, „ein Viertes Reich mit Bormann als Führer zu gründen“.

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LOOKING FOR BORMANN IN 1953 INDEPENDENTLY OF GERMAN AGENCIES IN

ATTEMPT CHECK IF BORMANN HAD ANY CONNECTION TO "VULKAN AFFAIR".

ARTICLES CITES THE "AMERICAN SACHBEARBEITER JAMES MCGOVERN"

WHO PUBLISHED THE (INCONCLUSIVE) RESULTS OF C.I.A. INVESTIGATIONS

IN HIS 1968 BOOK "MARTIN BORMANN"; THEN QUOTES FOUR VERSION OF

BORMANN STORY THE C.I.A. MAN HAD TO CHOOSE FROM: THE SOVIET

UNION-, ENGLAND-, AND SOUTH AMERICAN-THESES. MCGOVERN FAVOURED A

FOURTH, NAMELY BORMANN DID DIE AND WAS BURIED WITH STUMPFEGGER

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

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18 SEP 1971

**SECRET**

3053

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AT THE INVALIDENSTRASSE, BUT THE SOVIETS RETURNED, DUG UP THE BODY -- THUS GETTING BORMANN'S DIARY -- AND RE-BURIED THE REMAINS SOMEWHERE IN EAST GERMANY. ARTICLE CONCLUDES BY SAYING C.I.A. HAD BEEN INFORMED BY "GEHLEN ORGANIZATION" THAT THE SOVIETS IN POSSESSION BORMANN DIARY, AND NOTES THAT WHEN AMERICANS QUERIED GEHLEN IN 1953 ABOUT BORMANN WHEREABOUTS THEY INFORMED "HE NOT IN DDR AND NOT IN SOVIET UNION". WELT WRITERS THEN RAISE QUESTION WHETHER GEHLEN RECEIVED INFORMATION HE CURRENTLY PUBLISHING LATER THAN 1953 OR WHETHER HE WITHHELD FROM HIS AMERICAN SPONSORS.

3. OTHER C.I.A. CONNECTED ASPECT IS SUDDEN UNEARTHING EYE WITNESS WHO CLAIMS SAW BORMANN IN SOVIET HANDS IN MOABIT IN MID-JUNE 1945: GERTRUDE VON HEIMERDINGER, WHO WORKED GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE 1921 - 1945, COLLABORATOR OF JOSEF (BEPPPO) ROEMER RESISTANCE GROUP. WHEN INTERROGATED BY SOVIETS IN MOABIT JUNE 1945, SHE SAW BORMANN (ALIVE) SURROUNDED BY SOVIET SOLDIERS ON/AROUND 13 JUNE 1945, AND LATER WAS TOLD BY HER INTERROGATOR MAJOR KIWRITZKY THAT "WE HAVE NOW TAKEN BORMANN TO THE SOVIET UNION". HEIMERDINGER STATES SOVIETS ASKED HER TO WORK FOR THEM, BUT SHE DECLINE.

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION		CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BY	
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PAGE 3 ( ) 13053 S E C R E T

AND WENT TO AMERICANS INSTEAD BECAUSE "ALLEN D U L L E S,  
AMERICAN CONTACT MAN OF THE GERMAN RESISTANCE IN SWITZERLAND  
KNEW THE "BRAVE WOMAN".

4. HEIMERDINGER PRESUMABLY IDEN WITH GERTRUD IDA  
HEIMERDINGER, ( ), DPOB 31 OCT 89, ULM.

5. FILE: [ ] X-FILE: [ ] GP-1.

S E C R E T

SECRET

14 SEP 1971

# INDUCEMENT TO SPYING

## Paper Says Russians Blackmailed Bormann

Exclusive to The Times from Reuters

MALMOE, Sweden — Martin Bormann, Adolf Hitler's right-hand man, became a Soviet agent in 1920, a Swedish newspaper reported Monday.

The information was attributed to former Czechoslovak President Eduard Benes' intelligence chief.

The report in the Social Democratic Arbetet by a Czechoslovak journalist, writing under the pseudonym of Pavel Havelka, said Soviet dictator Josef Stalin confided to President Benes that Bormann was a Russian agent.

The journalist said he was given the information by the president's intelligence chief, Josef Bartik, in February, 1968, but did not publish it until now because he doubted that anyone would believe him.

### Changed His Mind

He changed his mind when Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, the former West German intelligence chief, claimed in his memoirs that Bormann had spied for the Russians and had crossed to the Soviet Union after the war. Serialization of the memoirs has begun in a number of newspapers.

Bormann was not working for the Russians because of ideological conviction but because of Soviet blackmail, Havelka wrote. He was fighting in a Baltic legion against the Bolsheviks in 1920 when he was captured. To gain his freedom he signed a pledge to become a Russian agent.

When the Nazis attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, the Russians searched their files for potential German agents and found

Bormann's 21-year-old pledge. He was immediately presented with a copy and pressed into service, Havelka said.

Havelka quoted President Benes as telling Bartik in 1946, when the death sentences imposed at the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal had been carried out: "If Bormann is still alive, at least he will not be executed as he is Stalin's agent."

Havelka, who has written for Arbetet several times in the past, said President Benes was flattered that Stalin had confided in him. He believed that he was the only non-Communist leader to have been told the truth about Bormann.

DISP NO - EGNA-42638  
FILE NO - ( )  
DATE - 14 SEPTEMBER 1971  
INDEXING - NONE  
MICROFILM - NONE  
TO - CHIEF, EUR  
INFO - COB, ( ) VIA POUCH/  
FROM - COS, ( )  
SUBJECT - ( ) CATRIBE UTILITY

DISCUSSION WITH ( ) CONCERNING UTILITY  
MEMOIRS. PROCUREMENT OF COPY OF MEMOIRS. UTILITY  
MESSAGE TO JKLANCE RE MEMOIRS.

ACTION - NONE, FYI

REFS - NONE

1. THIS MSG RELATES CONTENT OF ( ), ( ) TALK WITH  
( ) CONCERNING UTILITY'S MEMOIRS /HENCEFORTH REFERRED TO  
AS 'UM' /, MANNER IN WHICH STATION PROCURED COPY OF UM, AND  
UTILITY MSG TO JKLANCE RE UM. EVENTS ARE RELATED CHRONOLOGI-  
CALLY.

2. IT WAS ARRANGED WITH ( ) AT ( ) AND ( )  
WOULD LUNCH WITH ( ) /ALIAS BRITZ WAS ALSO PRESENT / AT  
PULLACH ON 17 SEPTEMBER. ON MORNING 16 SEPTEMBER ( ) NOTI-  
FIED ( ) BY INTRA MSG THAT HE HAD LEARNED FROM ( ) THEN  
VISITING HAMBURG, THAT LATTER HAD COPY OF UM /FOR DISGUISE PUR-  
POSES ENTITLED 'LEHMANN'S ERINNERUNGEN' / IN OFFICE IN BERLIN  
AND WOULD BE WILLING TO ALLOW ( ) AND ( ) ONLY TO PERUSE  
COPY. ( ) DIRECTED ( ) TO SEE IF ( ) WOULD ALLOW  
( ) TO ACCOMPANY ( ) TO BERLIN THAT AFTERNOON, BORROW  
UM COPY, MAKE COPY OF IT AND SHOW COPY TO ( ). ( )  
AGREED TO THIS PROCEDURE, STRESSING HOWEVER THAT HE DID NOT WISH

SECRET EGNA-42638 /PAGE 1/

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ANYONE ELSE, INCLUDING HIS C J BASE CONTACTS, TO BECOME AWARE OF HIS ACTION.

3. E J AND E J FLEW TO BERLIN AFTERNOON 16

SEPT, UM COPY WAS BORROWED AND TAKEN TO C J BASE, C J HAD ALERTED C J VIA INTRA MSG/, WHERE TWO COPIES WERE MADE.

PROCESS CONSUMED ALMOST FOUR HOURS SINCE 436 PAGES INVOLVED.

MORNING 17 SEPT C J FLEW TO MUNICH AND GAVE UM COPIES TO

C J AND E J TIMING WAS SUCH THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO

SCAN UM BEFORE LUNCH WITH E J THIS QUICK PERUSAL RE-

VEALED THAT THERE WAS NOTHING IN UM WHICH APPEARED ENDANGER ANY

SECURITY, OPS, OR LIAISON INTERESTS OF UKLANE, OR WHICH MIGHT

BE EMBARRASSING TO UKLANE, OR FOR THAT MATTER TO ENLITE AS

WHOLE. SCREENERS OVERALL IMPRESSION OF UM WAS ONE OF CONSIDER-

ABLE DULNESS /FEAR LESS INTERESTING THAN DER SPIEGEL ACCOUNT,

WHICH ITSELF WAS NOT VERY SEXY/, WITH UTILITY IN Ponderous

GENERAL STABSOFFIZIER STYLE TRYING TO JUSTIFY HIS PAST PERFOR-

MANCE, PRESENT HIS PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE, POLITICS AND INTELLIGENCE

WORK, AND POINT OUT TERRIBLE DANGERS OF COMMUNISM. ONE WOULD

NOT HAVE BELIEVED THAT EVEN UTILITY COULD RENDER SO UNEXCITING

SOME OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN WHICH CATRIBE HAS BEEN IN-

INVOLVED.

4. AT LUNCH E J INDICATED THAT ONE OF TOPICS HE HAD

WISHED DISCUSS WITH C J DURING THIS TOUR D. HORIZON SESSION

WAS UM, ADDING THAT INTEREST AND CONCERN OF STATION REPS WAS

ALONG FOLLOWING LINES - DID UM CONTAIN ANY INFO WHICH WOULD HAVE

DAMAGING EFFECT UPON UKLANE OPERATIONAL OR LIAISON ACTIVITIES,

INCLUDING THOSE WITH CATRIBE. DID UM CONTAIN ANY INFO WHICH

MIGHT GENERATE EMBARRASSMENT FOR ANY ELEMENT OF ENLITE, IN-

CLUDING UKLANE, ENLITE MILITARY, OR OTHER ENLITE ELEMENTS.

DID E J ANTICIPATE THAT PUBLICATION OF UM WOULD HAVE ANY

ADVERSE EFFECTS UPON LNUITE INTEL ACTIVITY IN FRS IN GENERAL.

5. WITH RATHER SAD SHAKE OF HEAD, ( ) REPLIED THAT HE COULD NOT ANSWER ANY OF ( )'S QUESTIONS, BECAUSE UTILITY HAD NOT SEEN FIT TO CONFER WITH CATRIBE BEFORE PUBLICATION OF BOOK AND "NO ONE" AT CATRIBE HAD SEEN COPY OF PROOF OF BOOK. CLEARLY WITH PRESENCE OF BRITZ IN MIND, ( ) COMMENTED THAT HE COULD ONLY REPEAT TO ( ) WHAT HE HAD PREVIOUSLY SAID /DECEMBER 70 MEETING AT WHICH BRITZ ALSO PRESENT / ABOUT DETERIORATION OF BOTH HIS PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH UTILITY AND THOSE OF CATRIBE AS WHOLE.

6. ( ) ADDED THAT HE WOULD COMMENT, HOWEVER, THAT, KNOWING UTILITY VERY WELL, HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT UTILITY WOULD CITE IN UM ANY MATTER WHICH HE BELIEVED MIGHT BE HARMFUL TO JKLANCE. UTILITY VALUED SUPPORT WHICH CATRIBE HAD RECEIVED FROM JKLANCE AND CHERISHED HIS PERSONAL CONTACTS WITH JKLANCE OFFICERS, THUS IT WAS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT HE WOULD TAKE ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT DAMAGE THESE RELATIONSHIPS.

7. EVENING OF 17 SEPT ( ) RECEIVED FROM ( ) ( ) MEMO WHICH DESCRIBED MEETING HELD WITH UTILITY AT 1230 HRS 17 SEPT /AMUSINGLY ENOUGH AT VERY TIME JKLANCE REPS WERE PERUSING COPY OF UM/. UTILITY, WITH PROOF COPY OF UM AT HAND, ASKED THAT ( ) CONVEY FOLLOWING INFO TO ( ) AND ( ) BUT NOT TO CATRIBE -

A. HIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH VARIOUS U.S. PUBLISHERS HAD "GOTTEN OUT OF HAND" AND HAD LED TO "ALL THE PUBLICITY" RE BORMANN. INITIALLY HE HAD NEGOTIATED THRU /GENERAL / JULIUS KLEIN BUT WHEN LATTER DEMANDED FIFTY PERCENT OF PROFITS UTILITY TURNED ELSEWHERE. HE ADDED THAT KLEIN WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR RELEASE OF BORMANN EXPOSE /COMMENT - THIS SEEMS UNLIKELY/.

B. INFO ON WHICH HE BASED HIS CLAIM THAT BORMANN WAS

SOV AGENT WAS ACQUIRED WHILE CATRIBE WAS WORKING UNDER JKLANCE SPONSORSHIP AND HAD BEEN PASSED TO JKLANCE. HE ADDED THAT TWO DIFFERENT SOURCES HAD CLAIMED TO RECOGNIZE BORMANN IN EAST GERMANY AND THAT A FILM WHICH SHOWED BORMANN IN COMPANY OF HIGH SOV OFFICIALS HAD BEEN SEEN BY CLOSE ACQUAINTANCE OF BORMANN.

C. HE SAID THAT WHEN HE HAD AGREED TO WRITE HISTORY OF CATRIBE HE HAD MADE SEPARATE AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH HE WAS NOT RESTRICTED FROM PUBLISHING HIS PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS. FRG GOVT IS TRYING TO FIND LEGAL BASIS TO SUPPRESS HIS BOOK BUT SINCE IT IS BASED ESSENTIALLY ON OVERT OR UNCLASSIFIED INFO, NO SUCH BASIS EXISTS.

D. HE HAD NOT FURNISHED COPY TO ( ) BECAUSE ANYTHING PASSED TO ( ) WOULD "END ON ( )'S DESK". HE ADDED THAT DURING A QUERY FROM ( ) RE DER SPIEGEL ARTICLES HE HAD TOLD ( ) THAT HE WAS WRITING HIS MEMOIRS.

E. HE HAS NOT ATTACKED ANYONE PERSONALLY IN BOOK. HE RUSHED IT INTO PRINT TO TRY OFFSET SOME OF UNFAVORABLE PUBLICITY GENERATED BY DER SPIEGEL ARTICLES. HE HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH CONTENT OF DIE WELT ARTICLES AND DOES NOT CARE WHAT DIE WELT PUBLISHES.

F. LAST THREE CHAPTERS OF BOOK DEAL WITH WORLD COMMUNISM, ACHIEVEMENTS DURING 1960S, 1970S, FORECAST OF THINGS TO EXPECT IN 1980S.

G. HE STILL CONSIDERS THAT WEHNER, BAUER, AND BAHR ARE "WORKING FOR EASTERN BLOC OBJECTIVES".

8. ( ) COMMENTED THAT UTILITY APPEARED IN GOOD HEALTH AND SPIRITS, OBVIOUSLY PLEASED AT PROSPECT OF MAKING SIZEABLE AMOUNT OF MONEY FROM HIS BOOK. HE DID NOT OFFER A COPY OF BOOK PROOF FOR ( ) AS HE PREVIOUSLY HAD PROMISED.

9. POUCHING COPY OF "LEHMANN'S ERINNERUNGEN".

DISTRIBUTION -

BY TELEPOUCH

3 - C/EUR W/ATT USC

*s/c att'd by IP/AN  
05 Oct 71*

ATTACHMENT - AS STATED - U/S/C

S E C R E T

EGNA-42638

/PAGE 5/

SECRET

BM  
Topic: UTILITY  
(will be updated for  
17 Sept 71 (C-7 COS) given  
Lower copy to hand  
copy 20 Sep 71)  
BM

Memo for ( )

SUBJECT: Discussions with CDR SCHNEIDER

During discussion with CDR S at 1030 this morning, he passed on the following information which he wished conveyed to ( ) and yourself, but not to the BND. (CDR S stated he was not officially in Starnberg and desired to keep his current whereabouts restricted for the time being). He had a proof copy of his book, not bound, which was entitled "Lehmann's Erinnerungen" which it is assumed would be changed to G's when published.

1. He stated his negotiations with various publishers in the U.S. got out of hand and resulted in all the publicity re Bormann. At first he was negotiating with Gen(sic) Julius Klein but when Klein demanded 50% of any profits, DR S turned elsewhere. He claims Klein was responsible for the release of the Bormann exposee. (No mention made of Hansen or the New York Times)

2. Dr S states that information on which he based his Bormann account was acquired while he was working under American sponsorship and was passed on to them. He claimed two different sources had claimed to recognize Bormann in East Germany and that a film had been seen but a close acquaintance of Bormann which showed him(Bormann) in company with high Soviet officials.

3. Dr S claimed that when he agreed to write the history of the BND, he had a separate provision which would not restrict his publication of personal recollections. He claims the Federal Govt is trying to dig up some legal basis to suppress the book, but have no leg to stand on since his book is based on overt information appearing or available to the public.

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DATE 2005



SECRET

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4. Dr S stated that he had not furnished a copy of his book to Wessel since anything so passed on would end up on Emke's desk. During a query re the recent Spiegel articles, Dr. S claimed that he had informed Emke that he was writing his memoirs. Since he had nothing to do with the Die Welt series, he could care less what they publish in their series.

5. Dr S has not attacked anyone personally in his book but rushed it into print to off-set some of the unfavorable publicity created by Die Spiegel articles. The last three chapters of his book deal with Soviet World Communism, achievements during the 60's and 70's and a forecast of things to expect during the 80's. He still feels Wehner, Bauer and Bahr are working for Ostbloc objectives.

6. The book should appear for sale during late September or early October 71.

PS DR S appeared in excellent health, good spirits and is obviously looking forward to getting his hands on a chunk of dough. He did not offer a copy of the proof for ( ) as previously promised.

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BOOK, NOR ITS TIMING. AS PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED TO US, HE WAS AWARE  
 UTILITY WORKING ON HIS REMINISCENCES, BUT UTILITY HAD NOT CHOSEN  
 TO DISCUSS THEIR CONTENT WITH HIM. HE THEREFORE UNABLE TO REPLY  
 EFFECTIVELY TO ( )S QUESTION AS TO WHETHER JKLANCE INTERESTS  
 WOULD BE AFFECTED BY UTILITY'S BOOK. AFTER COMMENTING ON SUBJECT,  
 MORE IN SORROW THAN ANGER, ( ) ENDED BY GIVING THE OLD MAN THE  
 BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT, NOTING THAT WE HAD SEEN VERY LITTLE TO DATE  
 FROM UTILITY HIMSELF (OTHER THAN THE BORMANN MATERIAL, WHICH HE  
 DISMISSED AS ANCIENT AND UNSUBSTANTIATED RUMOR), CHARACTERIZING  
 PUBLICITY TO DATE AS MOSTLY PRESS AGENCY, AND BY STATING HIS  
 OPINION THAT UTILITY WOULD BE MOST UNLIKELY TO PUBLISH ANYTHING  
 WHICH WOULD EMBARRASS JKLANCE OR PLACE IT IN A BAD LIGHT.

4. ALIAS BRITZ, QUITE SILENT DURING ABOVE CONVERSATION,  
 BROUGHT UP A POINT REGARDING A SENSITIVE PROJECT WHICH IS BEING  
 REPORTED THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS. BRITZ NOTED WITH PLEASURE COMING  
 VISIT OF ( ) CONFIRMING THERE WILL BE HIGH-LEVEL TURNOUT AND  
 EXPRESSING GRATIFICATION THAT HQS HAD FOLLOWED UP THIS TOPIC FROM  
 HIS OWN HQS VISIT.

5. WE ALSO TOOK ADVANTAGE SESSION TO MENTION SEVERAL

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OTHER COMING HQS VISITORS, INCLUDING ( ) REP, OF WHICH ( )  
 NOT PREVIOUSLY AWARE. WE INDICATED OUR DESIRE BE HELPFUL TO ALIAS  
 KRASSMAN IN THIS GENERAL FIELD, BUT CAUTIONED RE GREAT EXPENSE  
 INVOLVED AND, AT LEAST IN OUR SYSTEM, FACT SUCH COVERAGE CAN IN  
 LARGE PART BE CARRIED OUT BY NON-INTEL COLLECTORS.

6. DURING COURSE OF LUNCH ( ), RATHER CLEARLY FOR  
 BRITZ BENEFIT, MADE POINT OF MILDLY PRAISING REGIME'S OSTPOLITIK.  
 HE REMARKED THAT AT A MINIMUM OSTPOLITIK HAD BOKEN LOG JAM RE  
 BERLIN AND WAS LEADING TO "NEW GAME" IN EASTERN EUROPE AS WHOLE.

7. ( ) INQUIRED AS TO WHAT VISITORS HAD HEARD RE HOW  
 ALIAS HARTWIG WAS DOING IN WASHINGTON, ADDING THAT HE UNDERSTOOD  
 THAT MATTERS WERE GOING WELL. VISITORS INDICATED THAT ALL INFO  
 FROM HQS INDICATED THAT HARTWIG HAD SMOOTHLY ADJUSTED TO WASHINGTON  
 AND THAT COOPERATION BETWEEN TWO SERVICES THERE ALSO WAS FRIENDLY  
 AND EFFECTIVE.

8. ALIAS BRITZ ESCORTED VISITORS TO CAR. IN FIFTEEN MINUTE  
 CHAT/QUESTION OF EXPANDED COOPERATION BETWEEN SERVICES RE ( )  
 TARGET WAS DISCUSSED. (BRITZ) INDICATED THAT ALTHOUGH ALIAS MANTHEY )  
 "OF COURSE" WOULD HANDLE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF SPECIFIC

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OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES, BRITZ INTENDED TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONAL POLICIES INCLUDING THOSE RE OPERATIONS AGAINST ☐ TARGET. REFERRING TO PAST BRITZ AND MANTHEY DISCUSSIONS DURING THEIR VISIT TO HQS AND WITH STATION REPS IN FIELD, AND AGAIN (TOPIC WAS BROACHED AT LUNCH) CITING PLACEMENT OF ALIAS CASTROP IN NEW YORK TO WORK AGAINST ☐ TARGET, ☐ IN GENERAL TERMS SKETCHED "OUR PRELIMINARY IDEAS" RE ☐ ADDING THAT DETAILS WOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH MANTHEY AS SOON AS LATTER WAS AVAILABLE (TO DATE IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE A MUTUALLY CONVENIENT MEETING WITH MANTHEY RE ☐). BRITZ SAID HE WAS PLEASED THAT STATION REPS HAD BRIEFED HIM RE JKLANCE THOUGHTS REGARDING ☐ AND THEY COULD BE ASSURED THAT HE WOULD REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH MANTHEY CONCERNING THE MATTER.

9. CONTINUING RE ☐ TARGET, BRITZ COMMENTED THAT IT MADE GOOD SENSE TO THINK ABOUT ATTACKING THIS TARGET IN THIRD COUNTRIES. HE ADDED THAT JUST OVER A YEAR AGO "EVERYBODY" WAS SAYING THAT CATRIBE WAS UNABLE TO RECRUIT HUMAN SOURCES IN EASTERN EUROPE. THIS INACCURATE STATEMENT HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY REBUTTED; CATRIBE HAD SHOWN THAT IT COULD PERSUADE EASTERN EUROPEANS, INCLUDING ☐ OFFICIALS<sup>LS</sup> ABROAD, TO COOPERATE WITH CATRIBE. WITH RESPECT TO ☐ THE IDEO-

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LOGICAL QUESTION HAD DECREASED IN IMPORTANCE AND WITH FURTHER DEVELOP-

MENT OF FRG OSTPOLITIK WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. ( ) OFFICIALS HAD SHOWN THEMSELVES AS HAVING STRONG INTEREST IN MONEY "AND THE GOOD THINGS OF LIFE" AND INCREASINGLY WERE BECOMING "WESTERNIZED" IN THEIR OUTLOOK. THIS SITUATION OFFERED GOOD CHANCE FOR OPERATIONAL EXPLOITATION, ESPECIALLY IN THIRD COUNTRIES.

10. (BRITZ), WITH AIR OF CONFIDENCE, ADDED THAT "DER SPIEGEL" SERIES ACTUALLY HAD BEEN A BLESSING RATHER THAN A PROBLEM.. FRG AUTHORITIES WHO NEEDED TO KNOW WERE AWARE THAT CATRIBE WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE OUTFIT ITS ENEMIES HAD CLAIMED IT, IN EXAGGERATED FASHION, TO BE, AND IT WAS "GOOD COVER" VIS-A-VIS COMMUNIST COUNTRIES TO LET PRESS RANT AND RAVE AND FOR THESE COUNTRIES TO UNDERESTIMATE CATRIBE CURRENT CAPABILITIES.

11. COMMENT: NO PROBLEMS EMERGED FROM CATRIBE SIDE AT THIS SESSION. ( ) USUAL CORDIAL SELF, BUT REMAINS BASICALLY UN-INVOLVED IN OPS AREAS OF PRINCIPAL INTEREST TO US AND PERHAPS SOMEWHAT PREOCCUPIED BY PERSONAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS UTILITY BOOK. ALIAS BRITZ IMAGE IS THAT OF POLITE SUBORDINATE IN PRESENCE; AFTER MEET, IN SHORT CHAT REPORTED IN PARAS 8-10, HE BECAME THE INCREASINGLY CONFIDENT "OPS MANAGER." GP-1

SECRET

SECRET

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ACTION NO. 961		24 SEP IN 430821 ( ) CATRIBE UTILITY REF ( ) 13053 (NOT NEEDED ( ) (IN 421946)			

SECRET 241420Z SEP 71 CITE ( ) 13207

DIRECTOR INFO ( ) ( )

( ) CATRIBE UTILITY

REF ( ) 13053 (NOT NEEDED ( ) (IN 421946)

ABSTRACT	INDEX
DEST	E/G

1. ACCORDING VARIOUS WEST GERMAN PUBLICATIONS DATED 24 SEPT, GEHLEN REAFFIRMED HIS STATEMENTS THAT BORMANN WAS SOVIET AGENT IN HEARING BEFORE HORST VON GLASENAPP, UNTERSUCHUNGSRICHTER OF FRANKFURT LANDGERICHT, THIS PAST WEDNESDAY (22 SEPT) IN PLACE "KEPT HIGHLY SECRET" IN SOUTHERN GERMANY.

2. "DIE WELT" AND "FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE", QUOTING FROM VON GLASENAPP INTERVIEW WITH WEST GERMAN RADIO KOELN, STRESS GEHLEN BASED HIMSELF ON "TWO ABSOLUTELY RELIABLE SOURCES", DISREGARDING LESS RELIABLE SOURCES. ALSO INDICATE THAT SINCE GEHLEN REVELATIONS VARIOUS WITNESSES, "WHO CAN NOT BE SIMPLY DISREGARDED", HAVE COME FORWARD.

3. "BONNER RUNDSCHAU" STATES GEHLEN ASSERTATION RE BORMANN CONNECTION TO "ROTE KAPELLE" BASED ON "INFORMATION FROM AMERICAN SOURCE" NOT HIS OWN. FURTHER NOTES THAT FEVERISH SEARCH GOING ON FOR ADMIRAL CANARIS DIARIES, WHICH "ACCORDING UNCONFIRMED REPORTS ARE IN UNITED STATES, AND WHICH CONTAIN CONCRETE INDICATIONS POINTING TO BORMANN".

4. FILE: L

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SOURCES METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

24 Sept 71

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DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING ACTION
		SECRET	
TO	Chief/EUR	XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.	Chief of Station, C 3		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief of Base, C 3		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	C 3 CATRIBE C 3 Views and Comments on CATRIBE Reorganization		MICROFILM
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			
<p>1. As reported previously, Alias WINTERSTEIN tends to see the further evolution of CATRIBE through jaundiced eyes and his comments and assessments must be weighed with this in mind. There are, however, indicators independently gained which tend to corroborate some of his less-sweeping statements. The following is an account of a recent meeting with @WINTERSTEIN.</p> <p>2. On the Gehlen memoirs, @WINTERSTEIN appears knowledgeable by virtue of his long association with General Gehlen and his connections in the press and publishing field. According to @WINTERSTEIN, Volker HANSEN is the proprietor of the Hase und Koehler publishing house in Mainz. His father, General HANSEN is the former Bundeswehr Chief of Personnel and a friend of General Gehlen. According to @WINTERSTEIN, neither HANSEN was a member of CATRIBE although willingly collaborated because of the senior HANSEN's friendship with General Gehlen. Volker HANSEN is the agent for General Gehlen's memoirs. He had been negotiating with the NY Times on the publication of the memoirs. In his dealings with the NY Times, Hansen mentioned the Bormann story as one of several dramatic items in the memoirs. When General Gehlen learned that Hansen had been dealing with the NY Times, he became irate and stated he refused to have anything to do with a newspaper that had compromised national secrets by publishing the Pentagon Papers. The NY Times then, without recourse to either Hansen or Gehlen, published the Bormann story on 5 September which made General Gehlen furious and appears to have forced Springer's hand resulting in the 11 September article in Die Welt.</p> <p>3. @WINTERSTEIN needs no prompting when it comes to his favorite topic, namely the parlous state of CATRIBE under the present management. According to @WINTERSTEIN, there is a polarization of the service into two major camps. On the one side are the intruders, @BRITZ, @HEINE</p> <p>Distribution:</p> <p>4 - Chief/EUR 2 - COS/C 3</p> <p style="text-align: right;">UTILITY</p>			
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE	
C 3	EGMA-75506	28 SEP 1971	
	CLASSIFICATION	24 September 71	
	SECRET	NOS FILE NUMBER	
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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION  S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER  EGMA-75506
<p>           @MANTHEY, and @ZINNEBERG, who are ensuring that their kind of people get the leading positions in Beschaffung and elsewhere. In @WINTERSTEIN's view, one of the villains is @ACKERMANN, whom he termed as a ruthless and unscrupulous operator. It was during these fulminations that @WINTERSTEIN mentioned that @STURM was no longer deputy to @MANTHEY. @ACKERMANN had succeeded in turning @MANTHEY against his deputy. @STURM now heads up the so-called Gesamtlage in the Auswertung (IIia).         </p> <p>           4. Alias WINTERSTEIN was less precise as to the make-up of the wing opposing the "intruders". It would appear that he himself and the generation of CATRIBE officers who hold military rank probably make up part of the opposition. In addition, officers returning from overseas assignments who have not found CATRIBE Headquarters the same as when they left also belong to the opposition. Recent conversations with the two officers in this category, Alias KLAUSNER and Alias HELLBRANDT, has substantiated this. Alias WINTERSTEIN also mentioned a group of opportunists which is levitating between the two factions.         </p> <p>           5. In the course of further conversation, Alias WINTERSTEIN offered an interesting explanation for Alias TISCHNER's recent promotion to BG. Alias TISCHNER was promoted over the heads of several senior candidates for the rank. According to @WINTERSTEIN this is one piece of evidence supporting his polarization thesis - in the Auswertung Alias ZINNEBERG is pitted against Alias PILSEN and the promotion of @TISCHNER strengthens the @ZINNEBERG faction.         </p> <p>           6. An officer who fits the civilian - military officers mold referred to in para 4 above is Alias KALLERT who has been succeeded by @FLEMING. @KALLERT ostensibly was to head up a Referat in the CALLIKAK complex but a decision has not been made as yet. In a recent meeting @KALLERT understandably took a rather dim view of the reorganization of Beschaffung. According to him the reorganization along geographic lines started by <input type="checkbox"/> made sense and, in theory, so does the current Beschaffung reorganization. The reality, however, indicates that an inflexible functional compartmentation is taking over. @KALLERT claims that as a result a caste system is coming into being. Previously there was coordination and cooperation despite hierarchical restrictions. Now rigidity is setting in because of organizational stratification.         </p> <p>           7. As CATRIBE evolves in response to new MMBRUSH priorities we shall obtain a variety of partisan views on internal CATRIBE roilings and shall continue to report them as background for Headquarters desk officers.         </p>		
FORM 8-64 53a (40)	CLASSIFICATION  S E C R E T	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center;"> <div> <input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED         </div> <div>           PAGE NO.  2         </div> </div>

Sep 24  
1971

Despite his penchant for secrecy, aliases and bulletproof cars, and his aversion to photographers and public appearances, his notoriety as a superspy has always made General Reinhard Gehlen a controversial figure. As head of German military intelligence on the Eastern Front during World War II, Gehlen so infuriated Hitler with his precise predictions of Soviet victories that *der Führer* ordered him sent to an insane asylum. Instead, he fled to the Bavarian Alps, and later made a deal with the invading Americans: 50 cases of secret data on the Red Army in return for U.S. financial and political backing for what became Bonn's post-war espionage organization, the BND (*Bundesnachrichtendienst*). An obsessive anti-Communist, Gehlen helped plot some of the crucial undercover moves of the cold war. But the shadowy chief of German intelligence was forced into retirement at the age of 66 in 1968, partly because two of his aides were found to be Soviet double agents. Now Gehlen has again stirred up a controversy—this time with his forthcoming memoirs, *Der Dienst* (The Service).

**Hated and Feared.** The book is said to have brought \$175,000 for its serialization, starting last week in the West German newspaper *Die Welt*, and over \$500,000 has reportedly been bid by a group of book publishers led by the World Publishing Co. in New York. Gehlen claims to have known about the Berlin Wall before it went up, to have been aware of plans for the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia before it occurred, and to have correctly predicted the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. Perhaps his most startling assertion is that missing Nazi War Criminal Martin Bormann was really a Soviet agent who died in the Soviet Union less than three years ago.

A more shadowy figure than Gehlen himself, *Reichsleiter* (National Leader) Bormann rose from an obscure fund raiser for the Nazi Party to become the second most powerful official of the Third Reich. The short, stocky Bormann was Secretary to the Führer, Director of the Party Chancellery, and one of the most hated and feared men in Hitler's Germany.

After he replaced Deputy Führer Rudolf Hess in 1941, he exercised virtual control over everyone Hitler saw and everything Hitler read. As executor of Hitler's estate, he was the first to enter the room in the *Führerbunker* after Hitler's suicide. Turning the government over to Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz, Bormann fled the bunker on the night of May 1, 1945, in an attempt to slip through the tightening Soviet ring of tanks and troops only 300 yards away. Somewhere between the bunker and Friedrichstrasse Station, Martin Bormann vanished.

... mystery surrounding Bormann began. At the 1945-46 Nuremberg trials, when Bormann was sentenced to death *in absentia* for his war crimes, two men claimed that he died on the night of May 1 before reaching the Friedrichstrasse Station. But his corpse was never found, and four weeks later his voice was reportedly heard over a secret radio station in Stockholm, triggering rumors that have not yet ceased.

Since January 1946, there have been reports of sightings of Bormann from a dozen or more countries. In 1954 he was officially declared dead by a West German court, but in 1964 the War Crimes Office in Frankfurt, obviously convinced he was still alive, posted a \$28,000 reward for Bormann's capture. Meanwhile, Nazi Hunter Simon Wiesenthal claimed in *The Murderers Among Us* that Hitler's deputy had been smuggled out of Germany to South America by the Nazi underground escape organization. Wiesenthal said that on several occasions Bormann was seen nightclubbing with "the Mad Doctor of Auschwitz," Josef Mengele, who is now hiding in the jungles of Paraguay. Later, according to Wiesenthal, Bormann set up a colony of ex-Nazis in Argentina near the mountain town of Bariloche, where he remains today at the age of 71, well protected by thugs and armed guards.

**High-Level Leak.** What, then, of Gehlen's allegations in *Die Welt* that Hitler's alter ego was a Soviet agent, rescued that fateful night in 1945 by Red Army soldiers and whisked off to the U.S.S.R. to continue his anti-German work? It is an established fact that there was a high-level leak of Nazi secrets to the Soviets. According to the first installment of Gehlen's memoirs, both he and his *Abwehr* (Army counter-intelligence) superior, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, "came to the conviction that the Soviets must have at their disposal a well-informed intelligence source at the top of the German leadership," and that this source was Bormann. Gehlen says that he received two dependable reports in the 1950s that "Martin Bormann lived perfectly covered and protected in the Soviet Union" after the war and later information that he had died there. But Gehlen's first installment provides sparse proof for his allegations.

Hitler's successor, Admiral Dönitz, now 80, called the Gehlen theory "complete nonsense." Tass described it as a

tempt for an East-West *détente* in Europe. Certainly the manuscript, which contains a detailed analysis of Soviet political and military goals for the next two decades and calls for a parallel build-up of Western military strength, can only be welcomed by foes of Chancellor Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. That would include *Die Welt* Owner Axel Springer, whose criticism of the Brandt government borders on frenzy. Gehlen's memoirs could also be an over-dramatized effort at self-justification.

For all that, there is at least some support for Gehlen's astonishing thesis. A 1947 book called *Who Killed Hitler?* states: "Russian intelligence reported Bormann under arrest, a prisoner of the Red Army in the Berlin area in early July 1945—two months after Berlin's capture!" An International News Service story in 1950 quotes Wilhelm Hoettl, a Nazi secret service expert, as saying that Bormann and other former German officials were running a bureau in the U.S.S.R. to "reorganize Germany, East and West, along the lines of a people's democracy."

Cornelius Ryan, author of *The Last Battle*, said in a 1966 interview that a German general "told me he once had a secret meeting with Hitler, with Bormann the only other man present. Hitler gave orders about a change in command on the Eastern Front. Within two hours the Russian radio broadcast the names of the generals who would be replaced, who would take over, and specific details on new strategy."

**Skeptics and Questioners.** Top Allied intelligence sources in Germany are skeptical. They wonder why Gehlen did not turn over the information he had to the West German government, if he indeed had real evidence Bormann was a Soviet spy. The War Crimes Office in Frankfurt has announced that once the book is published, it will call Gehlen in for questioning, particularly since his intelligence agency was never able to unearth any clues to Bormann's whereabouts. Bonn officials are also studying the possibility that Gehlen may have broken the law by not making evidence in his possession available to the government.

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MARTIN BORMANN

REINHARD GEHLEN

25 SEP 1971

## World Gets Rights to Memoirs By Gehlen and Loses an Editor

By HENRY RAYMONT

The World Publishing Company signed this week a contract for the controversial memoirs of Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, West Germany's former intelligence chief—and lost a top editor who had played a key role in obtaining them.

Completion of the negotiations that give the company world rights to the memoirs outside Germany for a reported \$500,000 became known yesterday along with conflicting versions of the resignation of James C. Wade, editor in chief of World's adult trade division. Mr. Wade first alerted the company to the existence of the memoirs early last summer.

According to publishing sources, Mr. Wade resigned after being excluded from the final meeting last Tuesday with General Gehlen's representative, Volker Hansen, by Christopher Shaw, World's president. In separate interviews, neither Mr. Wade nor Mr. Shaw would discuss any differences.

### 'Left Very Amicably'

"I left very amicably and very happily," Mr. Wade said, interrupting a visit to another publishing house where he was inquiring about a job. "Once the Gehlen book was taken care of, I simply wanted to change."

Mr. Shaw, reached at his summer home in East Hampton, L. I., confirmed that Mr. Wade had not been present at the Tuesday luncheon, but explained that this was because he had resigned the night before.

"He left very suddenly and I haven't talked to him," the company president said.

Other sources, who asked not to be identified, indicated that one reason for Mr. Wade's sudden departure was precisely that he had not been invited to participate in the conclusion of the deal after having spent some four months working on it. Some said the incident reflected a tendency by Mr. Shaw to place protocol ahead of the sensitivities of his editorial staff.

In addition, associates of Mr. Wade said that the 31-year-old editorial executive had become increasingly disenchanted with

Mr. Shaw's emphasis on backlist and reference books, whereas he preferred to work on new books of fiction and non-fiction. Among the books Mr. Wade edited are Herman Kahn's "The Year 2000," Dr. Bruno Bettelheim's "The Empty Fortress" and Malcolm Lowry's posthumous novel, "October Ferry to Gabriola."

Peter Ritner, vice president and director general of World's publishing division, who brought Mr. Wade to the company when the two men resigned from Macmillan two years ago, described the resignation as "a terrible personal loss for me and a great professional loss for World."

Mr. Wade's departure was also deplored by Martin P. Levin, chairman of World, who attributed the move to "our switching away from highly visible trade books to encyclopedias and general reference books."

### A Working Luncheon

Discussing the agreement on the Gehlen memoirs, Mr. Levin said it was concluded Tuesday "when we exchanged a check for the complete manuscript." He said the transaction took place at a working luncheon that was also attended by the company's lawyers, several executives and George Bailey, an expert in German intelligence operations who has been acting as a consultant for World in the negotiations. Mr. Bailey, who was a European correspondent for the defunct The Reporter magazine, is completing a book for World titled "The Germans."

Mr. Levin said he expected the Gehlen book to be ready for publication in the United States next spring.

The Gehlen memoirs—particularly his contention that Hitler's deputy, Martin Bormann, was a Soviet agent during World War II—have generated sharp controversy in West Germany. Moreover, the Government in Bonn has warned that any disclosure of confidential information in the memoirs could lead to prosecution of the author and his publisher.

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WASHINGTON STAR  
26 SEP 1971

## Spy Memoirs Pact Signed, Editor Quits

New York Times News Service

NEW YORK — The World Publishing Co., has signed a contract for the controversial memoirs of Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, West Germany's former intelligence chief—and lost a top editor who played a key role in obtaining them.

Completion of the negotiations that give the company world rights to the memoirs outside Germany for a reported \$500,000 became known Friday, together with conflicting versions of the resignation of James C. Wade, editor-in-chief of the company's adult trade division.

According to publishing sources, Wade resigned after being excluded from the final meeting Tuesday with Gehlen's representative, Volker Hansen. Wade was the first to alert the company to the existence of the memoirs last summer.

In separate interviews, neither Wade nor World's president, Christopher Shaw, would discuss any differences.

But sources at World who asked not to be identified indicated that one reason for Wade's sudden departure was his exclusion from the conclusion of the deal after he had spent four months working on it.

Martin P. Levin, chairman of World, said the deal was concluded Tuesday "when we exchanged a check for the complete manuscript." Levin said he expected the Gehlen book to be ready for publication in the United States next spring.

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and other international agencies; development organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental.

## World Gets Rights To German Spymaster's Memoirs

World Publishing Company has acquired world rights, including all book and serial rights and excluding only German-language rights, to the memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen, German chief of Wehrmacht intelligence on the Eastern Front during World War II and then head of the clandestine Buro Gehlen which operated in West Germany, secretly financed by the Central Intelligence Agency from the war's end until 1956 (*PIF* Currents, September 20). World plans publication in May of 1972. From 1956 until his retirement in May, 1968, General Gehlen was chief of the official West German intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst. He was one of the most influential, feared, brilliant, mysterious and successful figures in the history of espionage.

The publication of General Gehlen's memoirs will release a vast amount of information previously unavailable about World War II and the cold war period that followed it. The publishers believe, on the basis of their current knowledge of the manuscript's contents, that the whole historiography of World War II will have to be substantially revised after its publication. Gehlen's revelation that Reichsleiter Martin Bormann was a Soviet spy during World War II, a disclosure which has aroused intense interest in the world press, is only an example of the extraordinary nature of the material the book will offer.

World's purchase of the rights to General Gehlen's memoirs culminates several years of interest and pursuit by James O. Wade, editor-in-chief of the adult department of World Publishing and formerly senior editor of the Macmillan Company, where he commissioned a still unpublished biography of the general. Last month, Mr. Wade learned that previous arrangements for publication of the memoirs, understood to have been final, had been cancelled. Mr. Wade immediately reported this news to Peter V. Ritner, vice-president and director of World's general publishing division. Mr. Ritner, publisher of "Inside the Third Reich" (Macmillan) by Gehlen's wartime colleague, Albert Speer, went to Germany to look into the situation personally. He spent a day in Mainz in the company of George Bailey—an old friend, ABC correspondent and former American intelligence officer—reviewing parts of the manuscript and assuring himself that it was both authentic and sensational.

From Volker Hansen, head of Hase und Kohler Verlag, the German pub-

lisher acting as general agent for the property, Mr. Ritner obtained a two-week option. Approaches were made to other publishers and media, with the result that by September 7, an offer well in excess of \$400,000 had been made to the German publisher.

In West Germany, Conrad Ahlers, a government spokesman in Bonn, told newsmen that any disclosure of confidential information in the memoirs would violate West German law. As a result, a great deal of material falling into this category has had to be deleted from the Hase und Kohler Verlag text and from all other forms of publication in the German language, including serialization in the newspaper *Die Welt*, which, having paid a record equivalent of \$250,000 for serialization rights, published the first installment of the memoirs on September 10.

West German law cannot, however, control what is published in other languages outside of the country. General Gehlen has consequently insisted on many additions to the English-language version over what can be published in Germany and has further insisted, as a point of his contract with World, that all translations into other languages be made from the full and definitive text that will comprise World's English-language version.

While General Gehlen's knowledge and authority may go unquestioned, recent articles that picked up the Bormann story have suggested that he may have mixed motives in releasing his book for publication, even though they have failed to suggest any substantial motive that might distort his telling of the myriad facts uniquely at his disposal. It has been known for some time, for example, that Gehlen's organization operated illegally in West Germany after the war, with secret financing from the American Government through the CIA, and it has been surmised that Washington kept the arrangement secret out of embarrassment over the need to employ the 4000 men with whom Gehlen staffed his *Buro*, most of whom were former Nazis who worked under the SS or Gestapo, but who were nonetheless the only men qualified to conduct espionage and security operations in this area of the cold war. Hitherto, the matter has been taken lightly by the press, possibly because sufficient evidence was publicly unavailable. General Gehlen's memoirs now provide that evidence.

The book also shows how the American government knew the Bay of Pigs

invasion would fail; how Gehlen, a close personal friend of General Moshe Dayan, helped build the Israeli intelligence organization Sherout Yediot (SHAI); how the CIA was restrained from interfering with the anti-Communist coup in Indonesia that ended in the slaughter of 600,000 Indonesian "Communists"; why former West German intelligence chief Otto John may have "defected" to the East; how Bonn had five days advance warning of Israel's "surprise" attack on the Arabs in the Six Day War of June, 1967, (three weeks advance notice of the building of the Berlin Wall, and six weeks advance notice of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia).

The German publisher, Volker Hansen, is the son of a World War II officer who was a close associate of Gehlen's in the Wehrmacht. (Gehlen's uncle ran a publishing house in Germany before the war, and Gehlen's father ran its Breslau branch). Gehlen and Hansen's father were both in communication with Canaris, Stauffenberg and the other officers who were planning to assassinate Hitler, and Gehlen warned Stauffenberg that the plot would fail. (What really happened during the plot of July 20 is also covered in the memoirs.)

After the war, Hansen's father spent 11 years in a Russian prison camp. When he returned to Germany he picked up the threads of his life, and one of the old friends he looked up was Gehlen. Hansen senior and Hansen junior spent years convincing Gehlen to write the story of his career.

General Gehlen has also expressed his intention to make himself available for promotional appearances and interviews in the United States upon the book's publication. World plans publication in May of 1972.

## ABA Starts New Book & Author Series

The American Booksellers Association, in cooperation with *Book World* and the National Book Committee, will inaugurate the 35th season of book-and-author luncheons in New York City on October 4 at 12:30 P.M. in the Grand Ballroom of the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel.

Speakers for the first program will be John Kenneth Galbraith ("Economics, Peace and Laughter"), Melina Mercouri ("I Was Born Greek") and Don Oberdorfer ("Tet").

Belle Rosenbaum, associate editor of *Book World*, has arranged the program. Once again, Maurice Dolbier, book review editor of the *Providence Journal*, will be master of ceremonies.

Dates of the remaining luncheons in the 1971-72 book-and-author series are November 1, January 17, February 14 and March 20.

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1. AT ( ) REQUEST, [ ] MET WITH ( ) AND

( ) (FOR ( ): HEADS OF IDEN PUBLISHING COMPANY) ON 27

SEPT. [ ] SAID THEY ARE CURRENTLY NEGOTIATING WITH PUBLISHER

VOLKER HANSEN OF HASE AND KOEHLER (MAINZ) FOR RIGHTS TO GENERAL

GEHLEN'S MEMOIRS, EXCERPTS OF WHICH NOW APPEARING IN DIE WELT AND

OTHER FRG PUBS.

2. ( ) SAYS MEMOIRS AS NOW WRITTEN ARE UNMARKETABLE ON ANY WORTHWHILE SCALE, BUT THAT IDEN ANXIOUS PURCHASE ALL FOREIGN RIGHTS ON CONDITION THAT GEHLEN WILL DEVOTE TIME AND EFFORT TO MAKING MEMOIRS MORE DRAMATIC (DO NOT READ SENSATIONAL). IDEN WOULD PROVIDE WRITER TO RUN GEHLEN THROUGH RECORDING SESSIONS AND MAKE NECESSARY REVISIONS. OBJECT WOULD BE LARGE-SCALE PRODUCTION IN WEST EUROPE AND U.S. IN BOTH BOOK AND SERIALIZED ARTICLES IN PRESS.

3. HANSEN SAYS GEHLEN (WHO STILL OWNS ALL RIGHTS) IN BASIC AGREEMENT WITH IDEN PROPOSAL BUT THAT WATER BEING MUDDIED BY U.S. PUBLISHERS TALKING IN BIG TERMS (MILLION DOLLARS IN ONE CASE) WITH-

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OUT EVEN HAVING SEEN MANUSCRIPT.

4. REASON FOR ( ) CALLING ( ) IS THAT HANSEN TOLD ( ) THAT GEHLEN QUERIED JKLANCE ON PROPRIETY OF PUBLISHING MEMOIRS AND THAT JKLANCE ASKED TO REVIEW SEVERAL CHAPTERS OR EPISODES, AMONG WHICH WAS BYRMANN STORY. HANSEN, WHO IS IN FREQUENT TELEPHONE CONTACT WITH ( ) AND WHO SEEMS ANXIOUS DO BUSINESS WITH IDZN, SAID ON 25 SEPT THAT WHOLE AFFAIR BEING HELD UP PENDING JKLANCE REACTION TO GEHLEN MATERIAL SUBMITTED. ( ), WHO WANTS MOVE AHEAD QUICKLY OBVIOUSLY WANTED JKLANCE TO KNOW THAT REPUTABLE AND COOPERATIVE PCO-WEST PUBLISHING HOUSE VYING FOR RIGHTS AND THAT IT WOULD BE WILLING WORK WITH JKLANCE ON ANY PARTICULARLY KNOTTY ASPECTS OF TEXT. HE ALSO STATED HE WOULD "CLEAR" TEXT WITH FRG BEFORE PUBLICATION. HE DID NOT IMPLY, HOWEVER, THAT JKLANCE OR FRG WOULD HAVE VETO POWER OVER PUBLICATION ONCE INVESTMENT MADE.

5. FROM THIS VANTAGE POINT IT WOULD SEEM THAT, SINCE BOOK BOUND TO APPEAR ANYWAY, IT MIGHT BE IN OUR INTEREST TO SEE IT IN HANDS OF COOPERATIVE IF UNCONTROLLED PUBLISHER. IT IN STATION'S PAROCHIAL INTEREST TO APPEAR HELPFUL TO ( ) SINCE RELATION-

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PAGE 3 ( ) 21237 S E C R E T

SHIP STILL DEVELOPMENTAL, AND IF OVERALL JKLANCE INTERESTS PERMIT, PERHAPS WE CAN GET SOME CREDIT EVEN WHERE IT NOT DUE AND ULTIMATELY BE IN POSITION OFFER ADVICE ON MANUSCRIPT.

6 AS IDEN/HANSEN NEGOTIATIONS SEEM RATHER ACTIVE, AN EARLY REPLY WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

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ACTION UNIT

FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

SECRET 271523Z SEP 71 CITE ( ) 21238

DIRECTOR INFO: ( ), ( ), ( )

( ) IC ( )

REF: ( ) S 21237 (N 432514)

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ORIG: E  
UNIT: E/F/INT-CA  
EXT: 9029  
DATE: 28 Sept 71

MESSAGE FORM  
TOTAL COPIES: 18-26

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ (9)

CONF: C/EUR-5 INFO FILE VR. C/CA-3 C/FI-2 C/IP/AN CSDO  
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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

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PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR

TO [ HAVE NO OBJECTIONS IF ( ) WISHES PROCEED ON OWN PUBLISH / 857327  
MEMOIRS, BUT ARTICLE 25 SEPT NEW YORK TIMES REPORTS WORLD  
PUBLISHING COMPANY SIGNED CONTRACT WITH VOLKER HANSEN THIS WEEK  
FOR RIGHTS PUBLISH MEMOIRS OUTSIDE GERMANY, FOR REPORTED  
\$500,000.

4. FILE: 200-124-178/3; [ ]

END OF MESSAGE

C/E/G/CIL ( )

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TO	COB, [ ]			XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.	COS, [ ]				NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	Chief, EUR				ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	Gehlen's Memoirs				MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Transmitted herewith are recent newspaper articles describing publication arrangements for the U.S. rights for Gehlen's book.

Attachment:  
Newspaper articles, h/w

Distribution:  
2 - COB, [ ] w/att h/w  
1 - COS, [ ] w/att h/w


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DATE 2005

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	EGMS-9478	5 October 1971
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
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Distribution: 1 - E/G/CIL 1 - IP/EN 1 - E/G/IS	ORIGINATING	
	OFFICE	OFFICER
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OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	
C/E/G/CIL	12 Oct	
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE		

**DISPATCH**

EGMS-9478

DISP NO - EGNA-42666  
 FILE NO - [ ]  
 DATE - 7 OCTOBER 1971  
 INDEXING - NONE  
 MICROFILM - NONE  
 TO - CHIEF, EUR  
 INFO - CHIEF OF BASE, [ ]  
 FROM - CHIEF (OF STATION, [ ]  
 SUBJECT - OCATRIBE( )-- GEHLEN MEMOIRS - EHMKE UNDER FIRE  
 ACTION - FYI  
 REFS - BONN 13053




1. FOLLOWING HAS BEEN ABSTRACTED FROM MOST RECENT INSTALLMENTS OF GENERAL G E H L E N'S MEMOIRS SERIALIZED IN "DIE WELT" XW AND 4 OCTOBER/, AS BEING OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO ADDRESSEES. AS IN PAST, GEHLEN'S CONTRIBUTIONS ARE RATHER WEAK AND LACK "SPICE" INHERENT IN MATERIAL, HOWEVER, "DIE WELT" JOURNALIST RUDOLF S T R A U C H HAS ADDED COMMENTS "EXPLAINING" MORE EXPLICITLY THAN THE GENERAL WAS ABLE WHAT GEHLEN REALLY MEANT TO SAY.

2. UNDER HEADLINES "CIA IS BETTER OFF THAN THE BND", AND "EHMKE RULES WITHOUT PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL", STRAUCH ENLARGES GEHLEN'S ATTACK ON CURRENT PUBLIC RELATIONS BINGE AND TREND TOWARDS "IMAGE CULTIVATION" /IMAGEPFLEGE/ AND "TRANSPARENTIZATION" OF BND. STRAUCH QUOTES GEHLEN AS STATING THAT TOO MUCH EXPLAINING AND DESCRIBING OF ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS ONLY TEND TO AID ENEMY AND ARE DISSERVICE TO ANY INTELLIGENCE SECURITY ORGANIZATION. THE VERTRAUENSMAENNERGREMIIUM /PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL COMMITTEE/ ONLY PLAYS A PASSIVE, INFORMATION-RECEIVING ROLE. MORE ACTIVE COORDINATING ROLE IS PLAYED BY "STAATISSEKRETAERSAUSSCHUSS" /X/ TO WHICH STATE SECRETARIES FROM

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EGMA-42666

07 OCT 71

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MINISTRIES OF INTERIOR AND DEFENSE AS WELL AS EHMKE BELONG/. STRAUCH QUOTES MEMBERS OF ALL PARTIES DEMANDING REFORM AND NONPOLITICAL CONTROL OF BND, WITH SUCH CONTROL BEING FIRMLY IN HANDS OF PARLIAMENTARIANS. IT IS POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT IN ANY ATTEMPTS TO WORK OUT A MORE "PARTY-LESS" CONTROL MECHANISM FOR BND, STRONG RESISTANCE FROM FEDERAL CHANCELLERY IS TO BE EXPECTED. EVEN FDP IS "CAREFULLY CRITICAL" OF POLITICAL CHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN PULLACH. IN CONTRAST TO ANGLO-SAXONS /MEANING BRITISH AND AMERICANS/, WHO LONG AGO RECOGNIZED THAT A HIGHER GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL -- BE HE EVER SO BRILLIANT AND COMPETENT -- SIMPLY CANNOT STEP INTO A MIDDLE OR HIGHER LEVEL POSITION IN AN INTELLIGENCE/SECURITY SERVICE WITHOUT HAVING HAD SOME EXPERIENCE IN THAT FIELD, GERMANS HAVE YET TO RECOGNIZE THIS FACT OF LIFE.

3. ONE OF MAIN TARGETS IN THIS DISCUSSION IS MINISTER EHMKE. "DIE WELT", JJTO ALLOW MINISTER IN ALL FAIRNESS TO ANSWER ANY ATTACKS" AND "FOR SAKE OF COMPLETE INFORMATION", OFFERED TO INTERVIEW HIM, BUT HE REFUSED. THEY ALSO PRESENTED CERTAIN QUESTIONS IN WRITING, ONLY TO RECEIVE LETTER FROM FEDERAL CHANCELLERY DECLINING ANY ANSWERS ON THE GROUNDS. QUESTIONS WERE "RENEWED ATTACK ON BND AND ITS WORK". ONE PERSON MUCH QUOTED BY STRAUCH IS CDU VERTRAUENSMAENNERGREMIIUM MEMBER FRITZ B A I E R, WHO BLASTS EHMKE FOR THE CURRENT POLITIZATION OF BND. TRIUMVIRATE OF WEHNER-BAHR-NOLLAU RULES BND, AND EHMKE IS MANAGER" SAYS BAIER. HE ALSO STATES THAT "GEHLEN WOULD NEVER HAVE STOOD STILL FOR WHAT W E S S E L HAS", AND RENEWS, ALLEGEDLY ON BEHALF OF COLLEAGUES FROM ALL PARTIES, CALL FOR A REFORM OF CONTROL MECHANISM FOR BND.

4. SPRINKLED THROUGHOUT GEHLEN ARTICLES AND "DIE WELT" GLOSSES ARE FAVORABLE COMMENTS RE U.S. CIA AS BEING EXAMPLE OF

HOW AN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CAN BE ORGANIZED SO AS TO FUNCTION  
EFFECTIVELY WITHOUT BEING HAMPERED BY POLITICAL PARTY INFLUENCES  
WITHIN AGENCY OR BY CHANGES OF PERSONNEL BROUGHT ABOUT FOR  
POLITICAL REASONS.

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2 A COB/ [ ] 1/VIA REGULAR POUCH/

# Gehlen's Book Is Runaway

## Best Seller

FRANKFURT (AP) — A book written by an ex-German general, Reinhard Gehlen, which claims that Martin Bormann was a Soviet spy is becoming a runaway best seller in West Germany, its publisher reported Friday.

Walter Hansen, head of the Ullstein Hase und Kochler publishing house of Mainz, said at the Frankfurt international book fair that the entire first German edition of 100,000 copies had been sold out and orders already had been received for 37,000 of the planned 50,000 second edition. Paper for the third edition is on order.

The book, by Gehlen, who is West Germany's former intelligence chief, has shot up to the No. 2 spot on the best seller list to be published Monday in the news magazine Der Spiegel.

**Spied for Russians**  
Hansen attributed the success of the book, entitled "Der Dienst" (The Service), partly to the publicity given to its content that Bormann, Hitler's top aide, spied for the Russians and died in the Soviet Union several years ago. The publisher dismissed as hearsay reports circulating that the German general had been in the direction of the West German government.

THE STARS AND STRIPES

Sunday, October 17, 1951

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# Reinhard Gehlen – enttarnt

VON CLAUD HEINRICH MEYER

Die angebliche Sensation („Bormann war ein Agent Moskaus“) war rasch verweht; es kamen in der Welt noch 16 Folgen mit Auszügen aus den so bezeichneten Memoiren des ehemaligen Bundesnachrichtenchefs Reinhard Gehlen. Die Sache und die Scheinautorität, die hier über das Forum einer großen Zeitung bis zum Mittwoch dieser Woche ausbreitet wurde, erzwingt einige Schlussfolgerungen.

So ist es tatsächlich kein Zufall gewesen, daß die Welt und Gehlen zueinander fanden, wenn Gehlen in dem Titel seines Buches vorab, über den „Dienst“ zu schreiben, über den Bundesnachrichtendienst also, dann sind es in Wahrheit mühsam zu lesende Anmerkungen zur gegenwärtigen Politik, hervorgehoben offenbar durch die Spiegel-Serie „Pulver im Innern“, auf die ein Mann zu antworten versucht, der sich bisher – fast schon um den Preis der Lächerlichkeit – im Verborgenen gehalten hatte. In seinem Schriftsatz kröpft Gehlen vor allem einen militanten Antikommunismus aus, der einer Feind-hört-mit-Mentalität entsprungen zu sein scheint: Es ist das alte Lied von der permanenten Unterwanderung durch sowjetische Spione allerorts, verbunden mit einer seltsamen Klage, die nur dem Komplex entsprungen kann, nicht genügend Anerkennung erfahren zu haben: daß nämlich der „Dienst“ schlecht funktioniert, schlecht beschrieben und nicht genügend eingesetzt worden sei.

Beispiel eins: Gehlen fordert allen Ernstes, der Bundesnachrichtendienst möge zur diplomatischen Vorkundung eingesetzt werden: „In anderen Staaten, außer Deutschland, verwenden ihre Nachrichtendienste zur Ergänzung ihrer Arbeit die Auswärtigen Dienste... Die größeren Staaten benutzen diese heiklen Aufgaben, die später auf diplomatischer Ebene verhandelt werden sollen, um sie zu einem einmal durch den Nachrichtendienst erledigen zu lassen.“ Gehlen fährt fort: „In anderen Staaten wäre wahrscheinlich der Mission des Staatssekretärs Bahr in ihren ersten Jahren eine Vorklärung durch eine geeignete von der Regierung besonders ausgezeichnete Persönlichkeit des Nachrichtendienstes vorausgegangen. Indiskretionen in der gleichen Weise wären dann sicher nicht möglich gewesen.“ Diesem grotesken Gedanken läßt Gehlen allerdings die Einschränkung folgen: „... daß der Nachrichtendienst seinen ihm zukommenden Platz im Staate besitzt.“

Beispiel zwei: Gehlen unterstellt – und diese Passage liest sich wie ein Stück aus dem Rotbuch jenes unseligen Vereins Rettet die Freiheit der In den fünfziger Jahren in allen Ländern Europas und anderswo kommunistischer Brandstifter feststellen wollte – daß neben der gewissenhaften, offiziellen sowjetischen Spionagetätigkeit ein Heer von unbewußt gewor-

benen „Beeinflussungsagenten“ für den Kommunismus tätig sei: „Diesen Persönlichkeiten ist oft nicht bewußt, daß sie das Spiel des sowjetischen KGB betreiben; sie würden diese Unterstellung entrüstet bestreiten.“ Auch Minister Eaton, der ehrenwerte, gutgläubige und philanthropische Begründer der Pugwash-Konferenzen, wird wohl zusammen mit seinen Freunden von den Sowjets in die Reihe der Beeinflussungsagenten eingereiht sein, ohne daß ihm dies bewußt ist. Es handelt sich, was ich verdeutlichen möchte, bei der Arbeit der Beeinflussungsagenten um eine Tätigkeit, die in vielen Fällen nicht einmal straffällig ist. Gerade diese Tatsache und die oft erwiesene Ahnungslosigkeit der Beeinflussungsagenten haben zur Folge, daß ihre Zahl auch nicht annähernd



Reinhard Gehlen im Jahr 1970

geschätzt, geschweige denn die Mehrzahl derartig bewußter und unbewußter Helfer erfaßt und ausgeschaltet werden kann. Auch in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland sind bis in die jüngste Zeit nur vereinzelt Fälle bekannt geworden, in denen Beeinflussungsagenten unschädlich gemacht werden konnten.

Nach dieser Vorbereitung sagt Gehlen dann genauer, was er meint: Er sieht Arglosigkeit, Unvorsichtigkeit und Fahrlässigkeit bei jenen „im Rahmen der gegenwärtigen Ostpolitik handelnden Persönlichkeiten“, und natürlich auch bei Industriellen, Wirtschaftswissenschaftlern und Journalisten, wenn sie Kontakte mit kommunistischen Auslandsvertretern aufnehmen. Aber das ist noch nicht das Schlimmste. Wörtlich heißt es dann bei Gehlen: „Während ihre Gesprächspartner, die Ostfunktionäre in allen Sicherheitsfragen über eine langjährige Schulung verfügen, ist es natürlich, daß ihre in der Masse unge-

schulden deutschen Partner die Sicherheitsnotwendigkeiten nicht kennen und sie im Gespräch vernachlässigen, sowie auf eine provokatorische oder scheinbar entgegenkommende Gesprächsführung hereinfallen.“

Beispiel drei: Daß Gehlen von Koexistenz und Entspannung nichts hält, versteht sich fast von selbst. Darüber hinaus bekümmert er aber, daß die eigenen „Wertvorstellungen“ nicht deutlich genug der immerwährende Wühlarbeit des Gegners entgegengesetzt werden. Woran Gehlen dabei denkt? Er fragt es wie immer unmißverständlich (mit Ausnahme jener dunklen Stellen, deren Bedeutungen er mit dem Satz abdeckt: „Aus Gründen, die hier nicht erörtert werden können...“). Er sagt also hier: „Es ist in diesem Zusammenhang unverständlich, daß nicht einmal die kostspieligen Einrichtungen des Deutschlandfunks, der Deutschen Welle und die im Ausland hochgeschätzten Goethe-Häuser dazu benutzt werden, die eigenen Anliegen im Ausland mit dem gebotenen Nachdruck und mit einer Eindeutigkeit zu vertreten, die sich von bewußt behutsamer, von den Sowjets als schwächlich ausgelegter Stellungnahme unterscheiden.“

Gehlen's Erinnerungen sind ein schreckliches Dokument. Theo Sommer schrieb in der Zeit: „Es ist immer ein peinlicher Anblick, wenn ein Denkmal vom Sockel stürzt.“ Noch schmerzlicher ist, wenn eine Figur vom Format und Verdienst sich selber vom Boden sprengt.“

Der Text der Erinnerungen und, wie wir glauben, auch schon die hier ausgewählten Zitate, belegen doch wohl nichts anderes, als daß wir es hier mit einem technokratischen Verstand zu tun haben, der, eingehüllt in das mystische Gewand eines ehemaligen Geheimdienstchefs, höchst begrenzte Einsichten vor uns ausbreitet und Veränderungen in der Welt nicht erkennen kann und von ihnen auch nichts wissen will. Kenner der Geschichte des Bundesnachrichtendienstes glauben darum auch, daß diese natürliche Begrenzung, das Unvermögen zu einem wirklich analytischen Auswerten von Informationen, der schwerste Vorwurf ist, den man gegen die Gehlen-Ära im Bundesnachrichtendienst erheben muß. Der Typus des verdienstvollen Generalstäblers, den man innerhalb des Dienstes nicht gar so selten antreffen konnte, war den Komplizierungen der politischen Verhältnisse, weil schlecht gerüstet, nicht gewachsen. Und Gehlen, das zeigen seine Erinnerungen, war ganz bestimmt nicht der Mann, der dies ändern wollte.

Der wahre Zugewinn der Öffentlichkeit an Information durch diese Erinnerungen besteht darin, daß wir jetzt genau wissen, wie Gehlen dachte.

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INFO DIRECTOR

27 OCT IN 455106

CATRIBE LIAISON

1. ACCORDING [ ] OCTOBER, [ ] RECENTLY INFORMED HIM THAT SPIEGEL HAD APPROACHED HIM WITH REQUEST DO CRITICAL REVIEW OF GEHLEN BOOK. [ ] SAID HE SUBMITTED REQUEST TO MINISTER GENTISCHER WHO APPROVED IT. [ ] NOW WORKING ON REVIEW WHICH SCHEDULED APPEAR IN SPIEGEL 1 NOVEMBER.

2. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH SPIEGEL BUSINESS MANAGER HANS DETLEV BECKER, LATTER LAUGHED WHEN [ ] INQUIRED ABOUT REVIEW AND SHOWED [ ] UNSOLICITED LETTER WHICH [ ] WROTE 27 OCT 1971 TO SPIEGEL OFFERING TO WRITE CRITICAL REVIEW. SPIEGEL THEN ACCEPTED [ ] OFFER.

3. [ ] COMMENTED THAT BAD AS GEHLEN BOOK IS, HE CONSIDERS IT INAPPROPRIATE FOR [ ] WHO AT VARIOUS TIMES CONSIDERED FOR AND WILLING ACCEPT LEADING POSITION IN CATRIBE, TO PUBLISH CRITICAL REVIEW OF BOOK.

4. FILE: [ ]

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SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3828  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

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GEHLEN

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10 Nov IN 466540

DIRECTOR, C

C 7 CATRIBE UTILITY

*Very garbled*

1. USAREUR DCSI LIAISON OFFICER BONN HAD FURTHER CONVERSATION WITH RUDOLF ROTHE [ ] 9 NOVEMBER. ACCORDING ROTHE, DAVID IRWIN, REPRESENTING MCGRAW-HILL, NEGOTIATED IN MUNICH OVER WEEKEND (PRESUMABLY 6/7 NOV) WITH (VOLKER) HANSEN, REPRESENTING GEHLEN, CONCERNING COPYRIGHT, PUBLISHING, AND DISTRIBUTION ASPECTS<sup>0</sup> GEHLEN MEMOIRS. ALLEGEDLY MCGRAW-HILL CONTRACTED FOR TRANSLATION AND DISTRIBUTION BOOK IN U.S. WITHOUT READING MANUSCRIPT. IRWIN NOW REPORTEDLY CONCERNED POOR CONTENTS BOOK WHICH VARIOUSLY DESCRIBED "TRASH", AND POSSIBLY RESULTANT FINANCIAL FIASCO. SPECIFIC PURPOSE AND OUTCOME MEETING UNKNOWN.

2. ROTHE ALSO MENTIONED GEHLEN OR "GHOST-WRITER WILFRIED HERTZ - EICHENRODE" (OF DIE WELT) ALLEGEDLY DRAFTING TWO OTHER BOOKS, ENTITLED "MEIN LEBEN" AND "FREMDE HEERE OST". ACCORDING ROTHE, [ ] AS YET NOT AWARE LOW EVALUATION GEHLEN'S BOOKS BY U.S. PUBLISHER OR THAT NEW BOOKS UNDER CONSIDERATION/ PREPARATION BY GEHLEN, BUT [ ] WOULD BE ADVISED SOONEST. WE INFER ROTHE MAKING IT HIS BUSINESS [ ] INFORMED

*these matters.*

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10 Nov 71

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71-5408

71-5696

11 NOV 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
VIA : Deputy Director for Plans  
SUBJECT : Letter to Mr. Kissinger for Signature

Attached for the signature of the Director is a letter to Mr. Kissinger transmitting an inscribed copy of General Gehlen's memoirs.

Chief,  
European Division

1 Attachment, A/S

cc: DDCI

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TO	CHIEF OF STATION, ( )			MARKED FOR INDEXING	
INFO.				NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
FROM	CHIEF, EUROPEAN DIVISION			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
SUBJECT	Book for ( )			MICROFILM	
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES					

UTILITY has produced his memoirs, and has inscribed a number of copies as gifts for old friends and associates. A copy for ( ) is being forwarded under separate cover, true name pouch, and we would appreciate your delivering it to ( ) at your convenience.

( )

ATTACHMENT: U/S/C (TRUE NAME POUCH)  
Book (as stated)

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	OELS-12885	11 November 1971
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		OFFICER'S NAME

OELS-12885

THE STARS AND STRIPES

Saturday, November 13, 1971

### ● Gehlen Wins Fight Against TV

MUNICH (AP) — Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, camera-shy former chief of the West German intelligence service, has won a temporary injunction against a television news team he said secretly took films of him.

Gehlen is author of a best-selling book entitled "The Service," which contends that Martin Bormann, top aide to Adolf Hitler, had been a Soviet spy.

Gehlen's lawyer, Georg Romatka, told a newsman that the television news documentary program "Panorama" has been enjoined from showing the films of Gehlen.

Romatka said that after Gehlen had refused a Panorama request for an interview, a member of the program's news teams

secretly filmed him. The films, which were taken in 1965, show Gehlen in his home and in his office. They also show him in a car and in a plane. The films were taken by a member of the news team who was disguised as a tourist.

Only the only published picture of Gehlen was a 1965 photo of him in a military uniform. The photo was taken by a member of the news team who was disguised as a tourist.

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
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 18, 1971

Dear Dick:

Many thanks for sending "Der Dienst"  
along to me. Gehlen was most thought-  
ful to remember me, and you to help him  
in this way.

Warm regards,

  
Henry A. Kissinger

Honorable Richard Helms  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20505

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THE MEMOIRS OF GENERAL REINHARD GEHLEN

[Article by Ivan Drenski; Sofia, Anteni, Bulgarian, 19 November  
ber 1971, pp 10-11]

"Germans, attention! Some 15,000 intelligence agents from the socialist nations are working in your nation!" -- this by itself is sufficient in order to figure out the purposes. If we add to these discoveries Gehlen's assertion that he knew that Hitler's deputy Martin Bormann was a trusted agent of Soviet intelligence and of persons uninitiated in politics and intelligence, it becomes clear that all of this has been pieced together to fan the espionage mania in the West, and to prevent an improvement of the situation in Europe and the world.

For almost 30 years, General Reinhard Gehlen was engaged in espionage against the Soviet Union and the socialist nations. The key points in his espionage activities were: at the beginning of 1942, he was appointed as the chief of the "Foreign Armies East" department in the headquarters of the ground forces of the Wehrmacht. After the capitulation of Nazi Germany in 1945, he offered his services to the

American Command, and from them he received enormous amounts of money to collect the still living Nazi spies, saboteurs and murderers into the "Gehlen Intelligence Organization." Under his leadership, this rabble became one of the main bodies of the Cold War in Berlin and generally in Germany. In 1955, the "Gehlen Organization" changed its name to the "Secret Information Service of the German Federal Republic." In 1969, Gehlen retired on pension.

As can be seen, Gehlen began his work in the mire of German espionage under Hitler, he changed allegiance to the CIA, and achieved his "flourishing" under Chancellors Adenauer, Erhard and Kiesinger! The service of many lords under the tattered banner of anticommunism!

For many years, the reactionary press in West Germany has created the aura of an incomparable intelligence agent around the personality of General Gehlen. For himself, Gehlen did everything in order to maintain the illusion in the West German government that he alone possessed a secret information monopoly.

And in his memoirs, at present he has achieved this. In seeing in the person of the Nazi Admiral Canaris an individual who overshadowed him, Gahlen consciously and disdainfully passes over him in order to emphasize his own importance. This has evoked dissatisfaction from the still living associates of Canaris, and they were quick to bring up some of Gehlen's defeats.

Gehlen himself does not write anything about this, but it must be remembered that they were known not only to the former associates of Canaris. They were also known in the socialist nations where a number of Gehlen's spies had been discovered and condemned. In parallel with this, several of his closest assistants long ago abandoned him, and sought political asylum in other nations.

It sounds humorous, very humorous, when an individual such as General Gehlen asserts that he was an enemy of Hitler's, and that he did not have time to participate in the work of the organizations of the opposition officers. After the attempt on Hitler's life on 20 July 1944, when many officers and generals were executed without trial and investigation, the Gestapo did not think about Gehlen, as at that time he was in sick bay. "I was in sick bay and simply forgotten," he wrote. If one wishes, one can believe that the Gestapo forgot their enemies so easily.

But in order to raise his value, the spy Gehlen asserts that the East German intelligence service had put a price of 1 million marks on his head. Scarcely anyone in East Germany would have any use for Gehlen's head. It is more probable that Gehlen himself truly has cause to malign East Germany, because precisely there his efforts to cause harm and spy failed, without mentioning the protective measures which were carried out there on 13 August 1961 and which dealt him

a stunning blow. Gehlen intentionally does not mention anything of the causes for the suicide of several of his associates in October 1968. Among them were Admiral Hermann Luedke, Maj Gen Horst Wendland, director Hans-Heinrich Schenk, Lt Col Johannes Grimm, the secretary Gerhard Boehm, and others. These suicides occurred in a short period of time, but at a time when he [Gehlen] was turning over his job to Gen Gerhard Wessel.

The reader of the memoirs of Reinhard Gehlen understands that the author becomes particularly loquacious in describing the activities of "foreign" intelligence agents discovered in West Germany. The purpose is quite clear. He is trying to frighten the reader that there are no corners in the nation where one would not be observed by the organs of foreign intelligence. In the chapter entitled "What Dangers Are Involved in the Eastern Policy of Willy Brandt," the author feels that the rapprochement with Moscow will bring new intelligence agents into the nation, and the struggle against them will become even more difficult. In essence, precisely due to these warnings by Gehlen about the dangers which are involved in contacts between West Germany and the Soviet Union and the other socialist nations, the reactionary forces are making such a great to-do about his memoirs.

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<p><b>Remarks:</b> Gehlen included inscribed copies of his <del>XXXXXX</del> memoirs for Generals Sibert &amp; Dean. E/G has no way of sensibly sending the books to these gentlemen. Since Mr. Critchfield and Mr. [ ] have met and corresponded with them both, it would be much appreciated if the office of DDF/SSA could arrange to mail the books, with appropriate notes, return addresses, etc. The following are last known addresses, per CIA Library reference works:</p> <p>Winter BG Edwin L. Sibert summer          Yeomans Hall Club RTD Vincyard Haven          Charleston, SC 29401 Mass 02568          (over)</p>					
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Dec 1971



Otto John, Martin Bormann, Adolf Hitler, Wilhelm Canaris, Richard Gehlen

## A 'Traitor' Speaks

By OTTO JOHN

KATZENELNBOKEN, West Germany —As a "traitor" who was once "unmasked" by Herr Richard Gehlen, the retired German intelligence chief, I would like to say something about Herr Gehlen's memoirs, already published in West Germany and soon to be published in "unexpurgated" form in the United States.

I was the head of West German counterespionage in July, 1954, when I was abducted from West Berlin by the Soviet K.G.B. That action by the Soviet intelligence service cleared the way for Herr Gehlen's rise to the top of Dr. Konrad Adenauer's secret service.

At that time Herr Gehlen called me a "traitor." Now, I want to ask the question: Is it not treason to publish in the United States top-secret material banned from publication in West Germany?

What is treason? It depends from which side you look. "Once a traitor, always a traitor," said Gehlen to my superiors in the Bonn Ministry of Interior after I disappeared and surfaced in East Berlin.

Queried as to what he meant, Geh-

len answered that John had committed treason in making contacts with the enemy during the war (which I had done, in fact, on behalf of the resistance against Hitler) and that I, therefore, would commit treason again and again.

I dare to say that I have always remained true to myself. I was a radical opponent of Hitler and fought him, right from the beginning, until I escaped from Berlin to London after the failure of our revolt against Hitler on July 20, 1944. I did not owe any loyalty to Hitler. What about Gehlen?

By the time the Wehrmacht was doomed to unconditional surrender Gehlen had become the most trusted top adviser to Hitler on all intelligence matters concerning Russia. He owed loyalty to Hitler because as an ardent believer he had sworn loyalty to him. He had shared and enjoyed Hitler's political success and military victories. In the midst of defeat, however, he deserted his Führer, as did Göring, Himmler and many others. He defected, taking Hitler's secret intelligence archives to the victorious American Army. If any one was a traitor

according to moral standards of the Wehrmacht, Gehlen was!

Gehlen's memoirs are boosted as bestseller by means of a feeble-minded, fantastic and false statement contending that Martin Bormann, Hitler's deputy, was a Soviet spy.

"Two reliable informations assured me in the fifties," writes Gehlen, "that Martin Bormann was alive in the Soviet Union under perfect cover. The former head of Hitler's Chancery defected to the Soviets whilst the Red Army occupied Berlin. He then lived as adviser to the Soviet Government in Russia where he has died in the meantime."

No competent intelligence researcher has been able to trace these two mysterious sources. I happen to know them. They are former Cavalry Capt. Dietrich von Kuenheim and the writer Guido Röder. They "revealed" the details in a pamphlet, "Soviet Agents Everywhere," called a "Report of the Intelligence of the Russian Emigration," i.e., the White Russian emigration from Czarist Russia, published in 1955. The pamphlet is based on the ideology of the notorious "Protocols of Zion." For such obscure nonsense Gehlen was easy prey.

Gehlen has the face to add much color to what he calls in his memoirs "the revelation of his long-kept secret that conceals the key to the most mysterious case of our century." He pretends that Adm. Wilhelm Canaris, head of Wehrmacht intelligence at the beginning of the Russian campaign, found out that Bormann was a Soviet spy; that Bormann had at his disposal one nonsuspect wireless station by which he communicated to the Soviets the most important secrets of the German Supreme Command. There was never such a wireless station.

I was close to Admiral Canaris in the resistance against Hitler beginning in 1939 and a confidant of his closest advisers. Colonel, later Gen. Hans Oster, his Chief of Staff, and Hans von Dohnanyi, a High Court judge. There was never a hint at Bormann's spy activity for the Soviets.

Dr. Otto John, former chief of counterespionage in West Germany, has spent the years since his release from prison trying to clear his name of treason charges.

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**DISPATCH**

EGMW-17208

A Publishing Controversy:

# The Espionage Career of General Gehlen

One of the most complicated and controversial publishing stories of the moment centers on three books dealing with the espionage career of General Reinhardt Gehlen of Germany, Hitler's wartime chief of intelligence against Russia, who surrendered to the Americans in 1945, moving over with his archives and his agents, including ex-Gestapo and SS men, to become a top CIA strategist in the Cold War, and then, in 1956, head of the BND, West Germany's Intelligence Service, until his retirement in 1968. He lives today in Bavaria.

The books that are coming this spring involve a host of publishing houses around the world, but in the interest of simplifying matters mention will be made here largely of the American, British and German publishers.

### The Three Gehlen Books

World Publishing Company, in August, for a well-publicized \$400,000, bought world rights to the official Gehlen memoirs apart from the German-language edition. It is important to emphasize, however, that the edition of the Gehlen memoirs which will be published in America by World, in England by Collins (rights went for \$96,000) and throughout the world by such houses as Mondadori in Italy (rights, \$56,000) and Presses de la Cité in France is *not* the same edition of the memoirs as was published in Germany this past October by Von Hase und Kochler Verlag. It is a considerably expanded version with additional material. World's "The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhardt Gehlen," translated by David Irving, is now scheduled for publication in May, if 90% of the translation can be completed by mid-January.

In March Coward, McCann & Geoghegan will publish "The General Was a Spy: The Truth About General Gehlen and his Spy Ring" by the two *Der Spiegel* reporters, Heinz Hohné and Hermann Zölling, whose critical articles about Gehlen in that influential German publication are widely credited with having prompted the General to decide to tell his side of the story, although at one

time he had declared that if he ever wrote his memoirs they would not be published until 25 years after his death. This book is being published in England by Secker & Warburg and in Germany by Hoffmann und Campe. It has an introduction by Sir Hugh Trevor-Roper and the American edition will have a preface by Andrew Tully as well.

Also scheduled for March in the United States, from Random House, is "Gehlen: Spy of the Century" by the British author E.H. Cookridge, which has just been published in Britain by Hodder and Stoughton to an excellent press. The German publisher for the work is Scherzerlag. It is the Cookridge book which has been under contract as a book for the longest time, since 1967.

The fantastic power that Reinhardt Gehlen has apparently wielded in espionage around the world has long been known to experts, but to the average reader outside of Germany his name meant very little until a news story broke in the New York *Times* of September 5, reporting that Gehlen had de-

cided to tell all, that American and British publishers were being invited to Mainz to see a few chapters of his memoirs, and listing among the sensational disclosures they were to contain, the news that Martin Bormann, the Nazi leader, far from having died in the bunker with Hitler in Berlin, or being alive in South America, had long been a secret spy for the Russians inside Nazi Germany. According to Gehlen's story, as released last fall, Bormann had escaped to Russia and lived there until his death a few years ago.

### Gehlen on Bormann

Ironically, it was the Martin Bormann story, which first drew attention to the Gehlen memoirs, that has caused a certain number of people to discount their credibility. According to Herbert Nagourney, head of the New York office of the book publishing division of the New York *Times*, Quadrangle Books, the *Times* had been offered the Martin Bormann chapter in German and Sidney Gruson, vice-president of the *Times*, had gone to Mainz, Germany, to see what he could of the rest of the manuscript. This was in summer, 1971. The *Times* kept pressing to see more of the manuscript and being refused (as were all the other publishers who went to Mainz). On the basis of opinions rendered by three experts at the New York *Times*, the paper reached the conclusion that the Bormann story was highly dubious. "We told them no deal, unless we see the rest of the manuscript," Mr. Nagourney told *PIW*. The *Times* had reached a decision not to bid for the Gehlen memoirs when a letter arrived from Gehlen saying that he did not want his memoirs to be published in the New York *Times*.

Peter V. Riitner, vice-president of the general publishing division of World, takes up the story next. James Wade, at that time editor-in-chief at World, had been following the Gehlen story for years. In August he got wind of the fact that the deal with the *Times* had fallen through and I went to Mainz, personally," Mr. Riitner told *PIW*, "taking with me an old friend, George Bailey, a



Wide World Photos

former American intelligence officer who can read German."

Although he saw only chapters on Martin Bormann and on Gehlen's later relations with the American CIA, Mr. Ritner says he was "satisfied there was such a thing as the Gehlen memoirs" and the \$400,000 world rights deal went through. No American paperback rights have yet been sold, although a deal with the Book-of-the-Month Club for the official Gehlen memoirs has been made. The book may not necessarily be a full selection, however. Mr. Ritner considers that World has almost made back the \$400,000 it paid out in terms of the sale of rights which have been picked up in Israel, Greece, Finland, the Netherlands, Spain, Denmark, Brazil, Sweden, Norway, Italy, France.

#### Loose Ends, Unanswered Questions

While all of this was being negotiated, the German edition of the Gehlen memoirs were being serialized in *Die Welt*. "We had a number of readings of them and it was clear there were loose ends and unanswered questions," Mr. Ritner told *PIW*. "We were not ready to proceed without access to the General. It turned out that the General was extremely anxious to say more in editions other than the German-language edition."

Questions were thereupon fielded to Gehlen in Bavaria from the publishers in all parts of the world who had purchased his memoirs and from intelligence sources in the United States and in Europe. It is whatever Reinhardt Gehlen is responding to these questions that will lengthen his manuscript and in Mr. Ritner's eyes make it "much fuller, longer and more controversial" than the original German-language edition.

"Gehlen," Mr. Ritner says, "is a man of deeply held beliefs. He is an unreconstructed Cold Warrior; a dedicated anti-Communist. He thinks of himself as an honest man with a need to protect Western civilization. He thinks the West has become lazy, self-indulgent, self-pitying."

The Gehlen memoirs, Mr. Ritner says, will go into detail about the predictions he made in the past that did come true, including the Bay of Pigs, which he

claims was set up so that it would fail and discredit President Kennedy. They will also contain his predictions for what lies ahead for the next 50 years or so. "He is profoundly pessimistic." As for the material on Martin Bormann, Mr. Ritner says, "there is no way for an outsider to decide one way or another."

"The General Was a Spy" by the *Der Spiegel* reporters, Heinz Hohne and Hermann Zolling (Coward, and Secker & Warburg), is a detailed, specific account of how the authors believe the Gehlen organization operated, with particular emphasis on what they consider its failures in later years. The General, according to Hohne and Zolling, was not always the mastermind he claimed to be and they comment critically on statements he made in the German edition of his memoirs. "We believe in the credentials and soundness of these investigative reporters," Jack Geoghegan of Coward, McCann & Geoghegan told *PIW*. "Hohne's book on the SS, published by us, was widely acclaimed as definitive. We do not think Gehlen can provide that kind of objectivity about himself. One wants to be sure books are analyzed in terms of their credibility and not because of some fancy price announced for rights in the press. We have seen too many examples of books for which large sums were paid not delivering the goods."

In his introduction to "The General Was a Spy," while paying full credit to Gehlen's remarkable talents, Sir Hugh Trevor-Roper writes, "In its early days the Gehlen organization certainly enjoyed some successes, which are here recorded; but from 1958 the decline in its efficiency is clear. There was a series of small failures. Then, in 1962-63 came the great failures. . . . He was allowed to serve out his time, but the legend has been destroyed and, after he had gone in 1968, a government enquiry revealed the nepotism, the scandal and the ineptitude that had thrived in a privileged private empire sustained and protected from criticism by the political conjunctions of the Cold War."

"Gehlen: Spy of the Century" by E.H. Cookridge (*Random House* and *Hodder and Stoughton*) is the product of four years of solid research, much of it based on material in the National Archives in Washington, some of which was

"privileged." Rights have also been sold in Germany, Norway, Netherlands, Italy, Spain. Mr. Cookridge, whose previous books include "Soviet Spy Net, Inside SOE" and "The Third Man" (the story of Kim Philby), also interviewed former members of the Gehlen Organization and received documentation from them.

He challenges Gehlen in a statement released in England in November, 1971, on publication of the British edition of the Cookridge book, to say whether or not he lied to CIA officials about Bormann in 1953 and 1965 or whether his entirely different claim about him made in 1971 is untrue. Mr. Cookridge ends his book, however, with the statement, "Whether we like it or not, Western democracy must be prepared in times of danger to accept such strange allies as Reinhardt Gehlen in its defense against totalitarianism."

Peter Ritner of World, summing up his own personal reaction to the power wielded by Gehlen and the CIA, puts it this way: "Who appointed Gehlen or our CIA to decide, on the basis of their philosophical background, who was going to be deported, shot, kidnapped? This kind of thing is state-subsidized thuggery and I hate it. We're lucky to know about it 20 years afterwards, but it's a bad scene."

The still unanswered question about Gehlen's own memoirs would seem to be how much he is able to reveal by West German law about his secret activities. As reported in "The General Was a Spy," after the September 5 New York *Times* story about the Gehlen memoirs broke, "Professor Horst Ehmke, Minister in the Federal Chancellery with overall authority over the BND, sent Gehlen a personal letter reminding him that even a retired head of the BND was still bound by the security regulations governing state or official secrets. In reply, Gehlen assured him that he would not violate this official ban—nor did he" (in the German-language edition of his book,—brackets *PIW*'s). A source who was at one time close to negotiations for Gehlen's memoirs told *PIW*, "We always had the feeling the CIA would read anything he wrote." Peter Ritner, on the other hand, says, "once a man like this starts talking, he cannot stop."

Barbara A. Bannon

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SECRET 281024Z JAN 72 CITE E 15210

DIRECTOR INFO E

RYBAT E UTILITY

28 JAN 1972 524120

ANY	FI	E/G/CIL
PS	DEST	
ARREST		

1. UTILITY HAS INFORMED E, WHO IN TURN INFORMED

E, AS FOLLOWS:

A. HE HAS AT HOME CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF "CLASSIFIED" MATERIAL WHICH HE WOULD LIKE TO DISPOSE OF; HOWEVER HE DOES NOT WISH TO TURN IT OVER TO CATRIBE, AND BECAUSE OF ITS NATURE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE IT "AVAILABLE FOR REFERENCE PURPOSES".

B. OF PARTICULAR SENSITIVITY ARE "RECORDS" RE E AND E AND "OTHER POLITICAL FIGURES".

C. HE BELIEVES THAT CATRIBE MIGHT "MISCONSTRUE" HIS POSSESSION OF THESE FILES.

D. HE IS CONCERNED THAT SOME OF THESE DOCUMENTS MIGHT "FALL INTO UNAUTHORIZED HANDS" (EVIDENTLY HE FEARS BURGLARY) AND BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE EASIER TO SAFEGUARD MATERIAL IF IT COULD BE REDUCED TO MICROFILM.

E. HE ASKED IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO "BORROW" RECORDAK CAMERA TO MICROFILM HIS FILES. HE WOULD THEN FILM FILES AND PASS UNDEVELOPED FILM TO "YOU" (JKLANCE) FOR DEVELOPMENT, AND FOR RETURN TO HIM OF "A COPY" FOR HIS USE. E COMMENT:

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PAGE 2 [ ] 15210 S E C R E T

PERHAPS HE WISHES TO INSURE THAT JKLANCE OBTAINS A COPY OF THIS MATERIAL WITHOUT HIM FORMALLY DELIVERING MATERIAL TO JKLANCE).

2. UTILITY ADDED THAT HE IS QUITE CONCERNED ABOUT CURRENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN GERMANY AND STATED, FOR JKLANCE INFO ONLY, HE IS PLANNING BUY BUILDING SITE IN SOUTH PORTUGAL AND PROBABLY WILL MOVE THERE IN YEAR OR SO. HE SAID THAT HE HAS LEARNED THAT CATRIBE NO LONGER IS MAKING ANY PROVISION FOR EVACUATION OF DEPENDENTS IN EVENT OF EMERGENCY (AN ATTITUDE WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS "CRIMINAL") AND THUS HE IS MAKING HIS OWN PRIVATE PLANS FOR EMERGENCY. COMMENT: IT WOULD APPEAR THAT HIS VIEWS RE MICROFILMING HIS FILES PROBABLY WERE CONDITIONED TO SOME EXTENT BY ABOVE MATTER.

3. STATION VIEWS:

A. DESPITE OBVIOUS PROBLEMS WITH RESPECT TO OUR RELATIONS WITH CATRIBE WHICH FILMING AND REPRODUCTION OF UTILITY FILES WOULD PRESENT, BELIEVE THAT HIS OFFER IS ONE WE CAN NOT AFFORD TO REFUSE, AND THUS FAVOR POSITIVE RESPONSE.

B. CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL THAT STATION HAND IN THIS MATTER

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NEVER SHOW. BELIEVE THAT UTILITY-( ) CONTACT OFFERS WAY TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS AND ACCOMPLISH FILMING WHICH WOULD SEEM NATURAL TO UTILITY, AND WHICH CAN BE USED TO GIVE TO HIM APPEARANCE THAT STATION IS NOT INVOLVED AND POSSIBLY DOES NOT EVEN KNOW OF HIS OFFER. IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATION INSTRUCTIONS, ( ) DOES NOT TELL UTILITY THAT ANY PARTICULAR REQUEST BY LATTER IS PASSED THRU ( ) UNLESS OF COURSE UTILITY SPECIFICALLY REQUESTS SUCH HANDLING; THUS UTILITY MAY BELIEVE THAT IN CERTAIN INSTANCES, SUBJECT MATTER BEING ONE OF THEM, THAT ( ) COMMUNICATES DIRECTLY AND PRIVATELY WITH ( ).

C. GIVEN FACTORS CITED IN "B" ABOVE, PROPOSE THAT ( ) PLAY SUBJECT MATTER AS THOUGH HE HAS NOT REPORTED IT TO ( ) BUT ONLY PRIVATELY TO ( ) . FIRST STEP WOULD BE FOR ( ) TO INFORM UTILITY THAT HE HAS "CONTACTED ( )" CONCERNING MATTER, THAT [ ] HAS "INDICATED INTEREST" AND IS MAKING ARRANGEMENTS TO ACHIEVE FILMING AND COPYING DESIRED BY UTILITY. ( ) WILL INFORM UTILITY ABOUT THESE ARRANGEMENTS VIA ( ) IN ORDER TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS ( ) WILL REQUIRE CERTAIN INFO FROM UTILITY. LATTER SHOULD PASS REPLIES

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10 QUESTIONS VIA C 1

4. QUESTIONS WHICH WE CONSIDER SHOULD BE POSED TO UTILITY, OSTENSIBLY FROM C 1, BY C 1 ARE FOLLOWING:

- A. APPROXIMATELY HOW MANY PAGES ARE TO BE PHOTOGRAPHED?
- B. WHAT SIZE ARE MOST OF ITEMS? ARE MAPS, DIAGRAMS, ETC INCLUDED? IF SO, WHAT IS MAXIMUM SIZE?
- C. WHAT AMOUNT IS BLACK AND WHITE? WHAT AMOUNT REQUIRES COLOR PHOTOGRAPHY?
- D. WHEN UTILITY SPEAKS OF "RECORDAK" IS HE USING GENERIC TERM FOR SPECIAL REASON, OR WOULD ANY UNIT CONSIDER APPROPRIATE BY C 1 BE ACCEPTABLE?
- E. WOULD UTILITY PLAN DO ALL OF FILMING HIMSELF, OR WOULD HE WISH ASSISTANCE, POSSIBLY FROM C 1 OR FROM A TECHNICIAN? (COMMENT: CONCEIVABLY IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE TO HAVE TECHNICIAN, NOT FROM C 1 STATION, ASSIST UTILITY. TECHNICIAN MIGHT LIVE QUIETLY IN HOTEL IN VICINITY OF UTILITY RESIDENCE.)

5. POSSIBLY HQS HAS OTHER QUESTIONS RE TECHNICAL ASPECT WHICH CONSIDER WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO HAVE C 1 POSE. PLS ADVISE.

6. FILE C 1  
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EXTRACT AND CROSS REFERENCE

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DOC. SUBJECT

SOURCE INFORMATION

SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION

TEXT OF EXTRACT (Also cite doc. distribution, Dissem. No., etc. - if applicable)

GEHLEN. REINHARD  
SEX M DOB ?

32W-002-065  
EGNA-42909A01  
31 JAN 72  
P4

CIT ?  
OCC ?  
GER DIENST EX-PRES FEDERAL INTELL SERV  
REPORTS EXPERIENCE HE GAINED IN 26YRS OF INTEL  
WCRK DESCRIBES COMMUNIST OBJECTIVE, ACTIONS  
AND THEIR EFFECTS IN CAPITALIST CCOUNTRIES  
BORMANN CASE

R 7202180009

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(7-46)

## Die Welt 1 Feb 71 Verfahren wegen „Pullach Intern“ eingestellt

Sel./St. Karlsruhe/Bonn, 31. Januar  
Generalbundesanwalt Ludwig Martin hat, wie am Montag in Karlsruhe bekanntgegeben wurde, das Ermittlungsverfahren gegen das Nachrichtenmagazin „Der Spiegel“ wegen der im Frühjahr 1971 veröffentlichten Artikelserie über den Bundesnachrichtendienst „Pullach Intern“ eingestellt, weil nach dem Ergebnis der von der obersten Anklagebehörde angestellten Untersuchungen eine Preisgabe von Staatsgeheimnissen nicht nachweisbar ist. Bei einer Strafverfolgung wäre der Paragraph 95 StGB („Offenbaren von Staatsgeheimnissen“) zur Geltung gekommen.

Ein Teil des Inhalts der Artikelserie, so heißt es in der Begründung, sei durch frühere Veröffentlichungen in der westlichen und östlichen Presse sowie in Rundfunk, Fernsehen und anderen Publikationsorganen bekannt gewesen. Andere Angaben des „Spiegels“ über den Bundesnachrichtendienst seien fingiert oder so allgemein und unbestimmt gehalten worden, daß ihre Offenbarung keine schwerwiegende Gefahr für die äußere Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik dargestellt habe.

Nicht eingestellt ist hingegen das Ermittlungsverfahren gegen Journalisten von Tages- und Wochenzeitungen, einer Illustrierten und eines Fernseh-Magazins wegen Veröffentlichungen aus geheimen Telegrammen der Deutschen Botschaft in Washington an das Auswärtige Amt in Bonn. Diese Pauls-Telegramme von April 1971 befaßten sich mit den Viermächteverhandlungen über eine Berlin-Regelung. Conrad Ahlers und Rüdiger von Wechmar hatten im vergangenen Jahr grundsätzliche Bedenken gegen das Ermittlungsverfahren in Sachen Pauls-Telegramme vergeblich innerhalb des Kabinetts angemeldet.

ORIG: E 3/dk  
JNIT: E/G  
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3 FEB 72 15 20Z

CITE DIRECTOR

228273

INFO: E 3

RYBAT E 3 UTILITY

REF: E 3-15210 (IN-524120)

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1. RECEIPT OF MICROFILM COPY OF UTILITY'S CLASSIFIED FILES OFFERS ENTICING OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN INFORMATION OF BOTH HISTORICAL AND CURRENT VALUE, AS WELL AS ASSESSING DEGREE TO WHICH UTILITY HAS WITHHELD DATA FROM SUCCESSOR. AGREE, HOWEVER, THAT WE SHOULD EXERCISE CAUTION IN DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF STATION PERSONNEL.

2. PROPOSE THAT BEST METHOD IS TO EXPLOIT E 3 PRESENCE DURING NEXT TDY TO EUROPE TO CONTACT UTILITY AND DISCUSS HIS PROPOSAL AND BEST METHOD HANDLING REQUEST.

3. CONCUR IN SUGGESTION IN PARA 3 C REF THAT E 3 CONTACT UTILITY AND ADVISE HIM THAT HE HAS PASSED MESSAGE RE FILE TO E 3 WHO WILL BE IN CONTACT WITH UTILITY VIA E 3. E 3 SHOULD ALSO TRY TO OBTAIN TECHNICAL DATA OUTLINED PARA 4 REF.

END OF MESSAGE

03 FEB 1972

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RYBAT ☐ UTILITY

REF DIRECTOR 228273

1. CONCUR REF PARA 2 PROPOSAL. ☐ WILL TAKE ACTION  
 PARA 3.

2. FILE ☐ 3. GP-1

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## **WORLD PUBLISHING**

**TIMES MIRROR**

February 3, 1972

General Reinhard Gehlen  
c/o Mr. Volker Hansen  
Hase und Kohler Verlag  
65 Mainz  
Postfach 338, West Germany

Dear General Gehlen:

Now that we're in the last stages of the preparation of the English-language edition of your memoirs it seems right that I should get directly in touch with you.

To begin with, I want to thank you for the time and generous assistance you've given David Irving. The machinery for readying a book for the press can be very trying indeed--especially when you're concerned with a rather complex work which everyone is determined must achieve a great success. I am pleased with the results I have seen so far. I can promise you that we shall put every effort into trying to make the book one of the two or three biggest books of the year in English and the other languages which will translate from the English.


We come now to the details of the book's publication in America--and there is one step I should like you to consider, particularly because I think you'll enjoy it. And that is a trip to the United States around the official Publication Date. The interest in your ideas and your career is very intense here. It will be no problem to set up a number of serious, significant television and newspaper interviews. I am not thinking of the kind of "tour" some of our authors take--with dozens of engagements all over the country. I should suppose that four or five depth-interviews will be all you'll need or care to undertake. But we can arrange these so that they'll reach tens of millions of people. The impact of such appearances on the distribution and ultimately sales of your book will be tremendous.

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**WORLD PUBLISHING**  
TIMES MIRROR

- 2 -

I can of course assure you that World will take care of the physical arrangements so as to eliminate any question of confusion or fatigue. As a matter of fact, to repeat myself, the whole experience should be great fun. But I'll understand if you simply don't feel up to such a foray. Do let me know what you think of it, however. This trip is the way really to launch your book, and to ensure that your views reach the maximum number of people.

  
Peter V. Ritner  
Vice President

PVR:cw  
cc: Mr. Hansen



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493

SECRET 071445Z MAR 72 CITE 15905

DIRECTOR INFO ( )

RYBAT ( ) (OASCOPE) UTILITY

REF A. (EGMS) 9478

B. ( ) -14 129 ( ) 45632

C. ( ) 13976 ( ) 466540

1. VIA ( ) UTILITY HAS INFORMED ( ) BASE AS

FOLLOWS:

A. HE HAS RECEIVED LETTER DATED 3 FEB 72 FROM PETER V. RITNER, VICE PRES WORLD PUBLISHING CO, STATING ENGLISH LANGUAGE EDITION UTILITY MEMOIRS NOW APPROACHING COMPLETION, EXPRESSING THANKS FOR UTILITY AID TO DAVID IRVING IN PREPARING BOOK, PROMISING TO TRY MAKE BOOK ONE OF TWO OR THREE BIGGEST SUCCESSES OF YEAR IN ENGLISH AND OTHER LANGUAGES INTO WHICH WILL TRANSLATE FROM ENGLISH. RITNER ASKS UTILITY TO CONSIDER TRIP TO STATES AROUND MAY 72 PUBLICATION DATE, ADDING THAT HE WOULD PLAN TRY SET UP NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT TV AND PRESS INTERVIEWS (IN LIEU OF LARGE SPEAKING TOUR) WHICH SHOULD ENABLE UTILITY TO "REACH TENS OF MILLIONS OF PEOPLE".

B. UTILITY WOULD LIKE MAKE VISIT, ACCOMPANIED BY GERMAN PUBLISHER VOLKER HANSEN. HOWEVER HE WOULD NOT DO SO

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PAGE 2 ~~E~~ 115905 S E C R E T

IF BKTRUST WOULD JUDGE IT EMBARRASSING TO HAVE HIM IN STATES. PERSONALLY HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THERE IS DANGER OF "COMPROMISE" BUT WISHES TO HAVE BKTRUST REACTION BEFORE MAKING FINAL DECISION.

2. ( ) BASE/STATION VIEWS <sup>AS</sup> FOLLOWS:

A. WE SEE NO HARM ACCRUING TO (BKTRUST) AS LONG AS IT CLEAR TO BOTH GERMAN AND AMERICAN OFFICIALDOM AND PUBLIC, AS IT SHOULD <sup>P</sup> BE, THAT TRIP IS SPONSORED BY WORLD PUBLISHING CO AND HAS AS ONLY AIM PUBLICITY FOR UTILITY BOOK, AND AS LONG AS UTILITY AND ( ) ARE NOT IN STATES AT SAME TIME.

B. AS SOON AS DATE FOR ( ) VISIT IS FIRM, SUGGEST THAT ( ) BASE VIA ( ) INFORM UTILITY THAT (BKTRUST) PERCEIVES NO OBJECTION TO HIS TRAVEL TO STATES, BUT WOULD "PREFER" IT TAKE PLACE DURING SECOND HALF RATHER THAN FIRST HALF OF MAY. IF UTILITY SHOULD INQUIRE AS TO WHY (BKTRUST) HAS THIS PREFERENCE, THEN WOULD HAVE ( ) TELL HIM THAT OFFICIAL VISIT BY ( ) IS SCHEDULE FOR FIRST HALF OF MAY AND POSSIBILITY OF ANY EMBARRASSMENT TO ANY PARTY WOULD BE ELIMINATED IF BOTH MEN NOT IN STATES AT SAME TIME.

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PAGE 3 [ ] 15905 SECRET

C. PRESUMABLY BY TIME COS INTRODUCES CHIEF EUR  
TO [ ] ON 10 APRIL AT CASCOPE HQS, SITUATION WITH  
RESPECT TO TIMING OF BOTH [ ] AND UTILITY TRIP WILL  
BE CLEAR. (COS,) IN LINE WITH POLICY OF OPEN DEALING WITH  
[ ] WOULD INFORM LATTER THAT HE UNDERSTANDS "FROM  
PUBLISHING CONTACTS IN STATES" THAT UTILITY PLANS TRAVEL TO  
STATES IN LATE MAY TO PARTICIPATE IN PUBLICITY ATTENDANT  
UPON PUBLICATION OF HIS BOOK. COS) BROACHING OF TOPIC SHOULD  
NOT COME AS SURPRISE TO [ ] BECAUSE BOOK HAS BEEN  
SUBJECT OF CONVERSATION PREVIOUSLY.

3. REQUEST HQS VIEWS.

4. FILE: [ ] GP-1.

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INDEX

1. BKTRUST INTERPOSES NO OBJECTION GEHLEN TRIP. BELIEVE THIS SHOULD BE EXTENT ( ) REPLY TO GEHLEN, EXCEPT TO INFORM HIM ALSO THAT [ ] PLANNING TRIP EARLY MAY. SUGGEST NO STATEMENT BKTRUST PREFERENCE OR ADVICE. AT SAME TIME, BELIEVE WE OBLIGED INSURE [ ] AWARE GEHLEN TRAVEL PLANS, AND SUGGEST [ ] BE ADVISED NOW RATHER THAN LATER ALONG LINES SUGGESTED PARA 2-C REF.

2. THIS CONNECTION, HQS HAS COMPLETED QUICK REVIEW MANU-  
SCRIPT ENGLISH LANGUAGE VERSION GEHLEN BOOK WHICH OBTAINED  
UNOFFICIALLY AND WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE PUBLISHER. IT APPROX 5%  
LONGER THAN GERMAN VERSION AND CONTAINS SEVERAL ITEMS WHICH  
LIKELY CAUSE CONSTERNATION IN GERMANY. THIS INFO FOR BKTRUST

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PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR

242491

A. NO REFERENCES TO BKTRUST) OR LNLUTE TO CAUSE  
ALARM.

B. MORE DETAILS ON BORMANN CASE, BUT NOTHING  
SENSATIONAL.

C. REGRET THAT JOB OF VICE PRESIDENT GIVEN TO  
OUTSIDER, BLOETZ, WHO DISTINGUISHED HIMSELF AS MANAGER  
HAMBURG SPD OFFICE. OBVIOUS MISGIVINGS OVER SUCH AN  
APPOINTMENT HAVE UNHAPPILY BEEN BORNE OUT.

D. INNUENDO COMMENTS ON ECON BAHR AND LEO BAUER  
WHICH MIGHT BE OFFENSIVE TO THEM. HE DESCRIBES BAHR VISIT  
TO PULLACH IN 1968. "AFTER HE LEFT, I ORDERED HIM DISCREETLY  
FOLLOWED. THE SURVEILLANTS REPORTED THAT BAHR HAD KEPT SECRET  
TRYST WITH SENIOR ITALIAN COMMUNIST OFFICIAL."

E. DESCRIPTION OF EFFORTS BY GUSTAV HEINEMANN TO  
EXCHANGE HEINZ FELFE. "HE MOVED HEAVEN AND EARTH TO ARRANGE  
AN EARLY RELEASE FOR FELFE FOR HUMANE REASONS". ALSO DE-  
ROGATORY COMMENTS ABOUT HEINEMANN 1953 ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION

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PAGE THREE

CITE DIRECTOR

24249/

"PRO-SOVIET" GESAMTDEUTSCHE VOLKSPARTEI.

F. INDIRECT ATTACK ON EHMKE, SAYING HE PROHIBITED PUBLICATION OF PROPOSED BND BOOK "MOSCOW CALLING HEINZ FELFE" WHICH INTENDED COUNTER ANTICIPATED BOOK BY FELFE. GOVERNMENT PAID OFF THE PUBLISHER TO PREVENT ITS PUBLICATION, IMPLICITLY AT EHMKE BEHEST.

G. ACCUSATION THAT APPROX 1963-64, MINISTERIALRAT BACHMANN OF CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE WAS SPREADING DEROGATORY RUMORS ABOUT GEHLEN. BACHMANN PREVIOUSLY WORKED FOR BND WHERE HE DEMONSTRATED ONLY MEDIOCRE TALENTS. COMPLAINTS AGAINST VON KOESTER, BACHMANN'S REPLACEMENT IN CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE BECAUSE OF HIS ANTI-BND MACHINATIONS.

H. EXPRESSIONS OF DISPLEASURE ABOUT HOW BND RUN AFTER GEHLEN DEPARTURE. GEHLEN WOULD HAVE PREFERRED WENDLAND AS HIS SUCCESSOR OVER WESSEL, AS THERE NO DOUBT IN HIS MIND THAT WENDLAND WAS BEST AND MOST RELIABLE SENIOR COLLEAGUE. RE WENDLAND'S SUICIDE WHICH ASCRIBED TO OVERWORK AND DISAPPOINTMENTS,

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PAGE FOUR

CITE DIRECTOR

242491

GEHLEN SAYS HE LATER LEARNED THAT WENDLAND HAD BEEN  
HURT BY TACTLESS REMARK BY HIS SUCCESSOR (WESSEL).

I. STRONG STATEMENTS ON PRO-COMMUNIST ATTITUDES OF  
NOLLAU AND WEHNER. WEHNER RECOMMENDED HIS PROTEGE NOLLAU FOR  
VICE PRESIDENT JOB. GEHLEN INFORMED CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE  
THAT NOLLAU'S SECURITY CLEARANCE WAS NOT UP TO STANDARD  
NORMALLY REQUIRED FOR THE JOB. GEHLEN MAKES PARENTHETICAL  
REFERENCE TO WEHNER'S CURIOUS SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES.

J. RE OSTPOLITIK AND GROWING MISTRUST OF GERMANY, "I  
UNDERSTAND THAT WESTERN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES WITH WHOM I  
ALWAYS ENJOYED UTMOST COOPERATION ARE NOW RELUCTANT TO EXCHANGE  
THEIR MORE SECRET INFORMATION WITH THE PRESENT BND."

3. FILE: [ ]

END OF MESSAGE

SAC  
SA/DDP ( ) In Draft

E/G/R ( ) In Draft

/C/EUR

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		SECRET		
TO	Chief of Station, [ ]		MARKED FOR INDEXING	
INFO.	Chiefs of Bases, [ ]		NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
FROM	Chief, EUR		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
SUBJECT	INTEL CALL Unique Published Reference to Molotov - Ribbentrop Meeting in 1943.			
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES				
<p>1. The recent published work of the late Basil Henry Liddell Hart, <u>History of the Second World War</u> (G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1971), contains a unique account of a diplomatic encounter between Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and the late Joachim von Ribbentrop which has aroused interest. It is generally accepted that these gentlemen last met in November 1940. Liddell Hart states that there was a meeting behind German lines in Russia during June 1943.</p> <p>2. The citation is on page 488. It is the period before the great battle of Kursk salient, which General Gehlen's book describes as the last strategic effort of the German armed forces in Russia. According to the British author, "In June, Molotov met Ribbentrop at Kirovograd, which was then within the German lines, for a discussion about the possibilities of ending the war. According to German officers who attended as technical advisers, Ribbentrop proposed as a condition of peace that Russia's future frontier should run along the Dnieper, while Molotov would not consider anything less than the restoration of her original frontier; the discussion became hung up on the difficulty of bridging such a gap, and was broken off after a report that it had leaked out to the Western Powers."</p> <p>3. We have learned that Liddell Hart's publisher claims to have raised this point in a conversation about the manuscript several weeks before the author's death. Liddell Hart reportedly said he expected the story of the Molotov-Ribbentrop</p>				
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meeting to be questioned, but that he had data to support it which he would, when the occasion arose, show to the publisher. The publisher claims to have sought the data among the deceased historian's records, but without avail. The publisher, nevertheless, considers the story to be authentic.

4. It is apparent that Liddell Hart's account is based on the statements of German officers. The British historian did interview many German officers of all ranks after World War II. Reasons of state would make the disclosure of information about this reported event politically undesirable for the countries directly involved in the reported meeting, and perhaps for other countries as well.

5. ( ) who has professional access to General Gehlen, intends to raise the Liddell Hart report informally with the General. Although we think the likelihood of a confirmation is not strong, it is probably better to approach Gehlen this way than through official channels.

6. This story about the previously unknown diplomatic meeting is mainly of historical interest, but it is a useful conversation piece, we believe, for intelligence officers with German official contacts. This would be true in Munich and Bonn, at least, and we are sure the story will interest ( ) There may be among the German contacts of the Station persons who have some knowledge of the event reported by the British historian. If so, we would be very interested to learn of it.

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CLK2

SECRET 220908Z MAR 72 CITE 18883

DIRECTOR INFO 1

RYBAT 1 UTILITY

REF: DIRECTOR 242491

AMC	FI
PS	DEPT
ABSTRACT	INDEX

EG/CL4

566650

1. ( ) ADVISED UTILITY PER PARA 1 REF ON 20 MARCH.  
UTILITY THANKED HIM FOR MESSAGE, SAID HIS PLANS TILL  
INDEFINITE, BUT WILL LET US KNOW IN ADVANCE IF AND WHEN HE  
MAKES TRIP. ( ) HAS IMPRESSION UTILITY WILL TRAVEL.)

2. FILE ( ) GP-1.

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SECRET 220848Z MAR 72 CITE L

18882

DIRECTOR INFO ☐

640  
566640

RYBAT ( ) CASCOPE UTILITY

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 228273

B. ( ) 15341 (IN 529733)

C. ( ) 15210 (IN 524120)

ANALYST	PS	DEPT	E/G/CIL
ABSTRACT	INDEX		

1. PER REFS A AND B, ☐ 1 CONTACTED UTILITY IN NAME

☐ 1, AND OBTAINED FOLL DATA, KEYED TO PARA 4 REF C:

A. MATERIAL CONSISTS OF ABOUT TEN METERS

(THIRTY-FIVE FEET) OF LETTER- AND LEGAL-SIZE PAPER IN FOLDERS,  
SOME FASTENEED OR STAPLED.

B. PAGE SIZE ALMOST ENTIRELY 8 ONE-HALF BY  
ELEVEN AND 8 ONE-HALF BY 13 INCHES.

C. BLACK AND WHITE ONLY.

D. NO SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR COPYING CAMERA;  
REKORDAK OR SIMILAR (IN SIZE) CAMERA WOULD BE APPROPRIATE.

E. UTILITY'S CONCEPT IS THAT HE AND HIS  
"DAUGHTER" (PRESUMABLY DAUGHTER-IN-LAW) WOULD DO WORK THEMSELVES  
IN EVENINGS, <sup>0</sup>VER ONE OR TWO WEEK PERIOD, IN TWO BASEMENT ROOMS  
HIS HOME. MATERIAL IS STORED IN VAULT AREA ADJOINING ONE OF  
THESE ROOMS.

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PAGE 2 ☒ 18882 S E C R E T

2. COMMENT: IF ABOVE SYSTEM USED, IT STILL MIGHT BE  
 USEFUL FOR TECHNICIAN TO VISIT FOR A FEW DAYS FOR ORIENTATION  
 ON CAMERA. DEPENDING ON UTILITY'S TRAVEL PLANS (SEE SEPARATE  
 MESSAGE), FURTHER ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE WITH ☒ IN  
 U.S. WILL ADVISE WHEN THESE PLANS MORE DEFINITE.

3. FILE ☒ GP-1.

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ACTION NO.

FILE, VRC

ONE (Mr. Cretchfield) SACBOP

**ACTION**

SECRET 241521Z MAR 72 CITE 1 718936

569729

DIRECTOR INFO ☐

TYBAT ☐ CASCOPE UTILITY

REF: DIRECTOR 247052

1. UTILITY WELCOMES CALL ON MORNING OF 3 APRIL,  
AND WOULD ALSO BE GLAD SEE ☐ PER PARA 2 REF ON EVENING  
2 APRIL. 4 APRIL NOT CONVENIENT.

2. ( ) WILL BE ON LEAVE ALL OF EASTER WEEK  
EXCEPT FOR 7 APRIL AND HAS VERY BUSY SCHEDULE THAT DAY (DEPARTS  
AGAIN ON SATURDAY FOR MORE LEAVE). REGRET CALL THAT WEEK  
APPEARS IMPOSSIBLE.

3. (ALIAS BERNHARDT) AVAILABLE AFTER 1400 ON 3 APRIL  
AND ANYTIME ON 4 APRIL. TIME CAN BE FIXED AFTER ( )  
ARRIVAL. BERNHARDT MENTIONED HE WILL BE ATTENDING BIRTHDAY  
RECEPTION AT UTILITY HOME BETWEEN 1100 AND 1300 3 APRIL.

4. SINGLE ( ) CONFIRMED AT HAUSTEIN 2-5 APRIL.

5. ( ) WILL BE (ACTING) DURING VISIT ☐ ☐  
WILL BE AT HQS) AND MAY BE CONTACTED FOR ANY SUPPORT.

6. FILE 32W-228/1. G-1.

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XT: 23 March 1972

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SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR  
247052

INFO 2 MAR 72 03 00Z

RYBAT CASCOPE UTILITY

REF: 18882 (IN 566640)

1. REQUEST ADVISE UTILITY PLANS ARRIVE MUNICH 2 APRIL AND WOULD APPRECIATE OPPORTUNITY MAKE BRIEF AND PURELY SOCIAL CALL ON UTILITY ANY TIME 3 APRIL TO PAY RESPECTS ON 70TH BIRTHDAY.
2. CAN MEET WITH UTILITY FOR TALKS RE REF EITHER EVENING 2 APRIL OR ANYTIME 4 APRIL. FYI WE ARE MAKING NO DECISIONS ON PHOTOGRAPHY PROPOSAL UNTIL AFTER THIS SESSION WITH UTILITY.
3. TENTATIVELY PLANS LEAVE MUNICH 5 APRIL FOR BUT WOULD DELAY A DAY IF NECESSARY.
4. IN ADDITION MTG WITH UTILITY WOULD LIKE TO CALL ON AND HAVE BRIEF SESSION WITH ALIAS BERNHARDT.
5. PLEASE RESERVE SINGLE HAUTEEN SOLLN OR SCHLOSS IM GRUENWALD FOR 2-5 APRIL.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

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PAGE TWO

CITE DIRECTOR

to [ 6. IF IT WOULD BE MORE CONVENIENT IF [ ] 72470527  
POSTPONED HIS TRIP DAY OR TWO, HE CAN DO SO, BUT ADVISE  
SOONEST.

7. FILE: 32W-228/1.

END OF MESSAGE

C/EUR

(On draft)  
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097 C/NE (MR CRITCHFIELD SAC/DDP)

SECRET 270803Z MAR 72 CITE E, 189A7

DIRECTOR INFO [ ]

RYBAT ( ) UTILITY

REF: ( ) 18936 (IN 569729)

AN	SI	E/G/CIL
PS	POST	
ABSTRACT		INDEX

1. UTILITY INVITES ( ) TO DINNER AT 1800 3 APRIL  
AT STRAND HOTEL IN HIS VILLAGE. ONLY FIRENDS AND RELATIVES  
WILL BE PRESENT, NO ONE FROM CASCOPE. HE SUGGESTS THIS IN  
LIEU OF MORNING CALL, BUT GLAD MEET TWICE THAT DAY IF [ ]  
DESIRES. WOULD APPRECIATE REPLY.

2. NO FILE. GP-1.

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CITE DIRECTOR

TO [ ] [ ]

RYBAT 5 UTILITY

REF: 18943 (IN 570237)

( ) HONORED TO ATTEND DINNER 3 APRIL. SINCE UTILITY  
UNAVAILABLE 4 APRIL ( ) WILL PLAN CONTACT 2 APRIL ~~PM~~ FOR AFTER  
DINNER CONVERSATION.

END OF MESSAGE

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CEC12/Germans

C/EUR

JAMES H. CRITCHFIELD  
SAC/DDP

28 MAR 1972

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8 APR 1972

# Super Spy, Strange Ally

## Books

GEHLEN: *Spy of the Century*. By E. H. Cookridge.

(Random House, 402 pp., illustrated, \$10.00)

**THE GENERAL WAS A SPY: The Truth About General Gehlen and His Spy Ring.** By Heinz Hohne & Hermann Zölling. Introduction by Hugh Trevor-Roper and Preface to the American Edition by Andrew Tully.

Reinhard Gehlen was a Nazi general with an obsessive hatred of communism who may have had more influence on the course of the Cold War than any other man. Soviet articles refer to him as a fascist warmonger who was the biggest single factor in the prevention of an East-West detente. These two books tell his extraordinary story.

From late 1941 to the end of the war Gehlen was Hitler's chief of intelligence for the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. Then, having arranged to be captured by the Americans, he soon emerged as the principal source of CIA intelligence from the communist world until 1955, when he became Chancellor Adenauer's chief of intelligence for the West German Republic.

Gehlen was one of the planners of "Operation Barbarossa," the 1941 German attack on the Soviet Union, which sent Nazi divisions six hundred miles into the U.S.S.R. in seven weeks, placing 50 million Russians under Hitler's rule. When Gehlen became chief of intelligence for the Eastern Front, he immediately began organizing a Russian Army of Liberation among anti-Communist prisoners of war and partisans. By the spring of 1943 he had organized this army under Soviet Gen. Andrei Vlasov, who had been captured by the Germans and turned against Stalin. Vlasov and Gehlen estimated that there were hundreds of thousands of anti-Communist Russians prepared to join with the Germans in the overthrow of Stalin.

But Gehlen's plans ran head-on against Hitler's view that the Slavs were sub-human beings who should be controlled by terror and mass execution. At

first Vlasov's propaganda leaflets promising good treatment to deserters and employment in the Vlasov movement produced massive defections, but soon Hitler's ruthless treatment of the Russians brought an end to that. Had Hitler not been a maniac, it is conceivable that Gehlen's plans would have provided the basis for a German victory in the East, certainly a substantial prolongation of the war.

Gehlen remained loyal to Hitler, but seeing how the war would end he made plans for his future. He arranged to have all his intelligence files on the Soviet Union packed in 50 steel cases and hidden away until he could be captured by the U.S. Army. As Stalin's aggressive program in Eastern Europe, the Balkans and Iran began to unfold, it was apparent to the Americans that they were totally unprepared, without intelligence about the Soviets. But Gehlen was prepared and had soon negotiated a remarkable deal in Washington giving him authority to establish an all-German intelligence apparatus with complete control over its personnel.

In the little village of Pullach outside of Munich in a large housing development formerly for SS officers, Gen. Gehlen built a walled-in headquarters for what was soon to become the spy base of the Cold War, providing the CIA with 70 per cent of its intelligence on the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. Thus, in a matter of months Hitler's chief anti-Soviet spy had become the Soviet expert for the United States.

There can be little doubt that the Soviets, fearing the Germans more than any peoples, were greatly influenced in their assessment of

The reviewer, a former Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and a specialist on international communism, is a consultant, writer and lecturer on foreign affairs.

U.S. policy by the fact that Gehlen was selected for this role. But there can be little doubt too that given Stalin's aggressive moves the U.S. would use the only available source of intelligence. Probably the revisionist historians of the Cold War will be debating for years the essence of the conclusion E. H. Cookridge reaches in his book: "Whether we like it or not, Western democracy must be prepared in times of danger to accept such strange allies as Reinhard Gehlen in defense against totalitarianism."

According to Cookridge, who is a British author of many fine books on espionage, the CIA pumped over \$200 million into the Gehlen organization. But the results more than paid off. Among its sensational exploits were the accurate forecasts of the East German uprisings in 1953, the Hungarian revolt in 1956, and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Gehlen secured the text of Khrushchev's secret speech denouncing Stalin, and gave it to Allen Dulles. His intelligence operations exposed some of the most successful Soviet secret agents. His plans led to the 600-yard tunnel the CIA dug into East Berlin, where the main telephone trunk lines leading to Moscow and other capitals in Eastern Europe were tapped for nine months until this incredibly successful operation was discovered. In June, 1967, CIA Director Richard Helms was able to make high marks from President Johnson by prediction the exact date of the six-day Israeli attack in the Middle East. His source: Gen. Gehlen.

It wasn't until he became head of German intelligence that Gehlen began to have defeats mixed with his successes. The Communists be-

came more effective in penetrating his organization and planting fake information. But the greatest blow to Gehlen was the discovery in 1962 that his chief of counter-intelligence, Heinz Felfen, was a Soviet double agent. The Felfe Affair, combined with changes in German political leadership and the new technology of spy planes and satellites all contributed to the fading impact of Gehlen. He retired in 1968 at 65.

Gehlen probably was the "spy of the century," but his rightist proclivities and rigid anti-communism probably contributed to prolonging the most dangerous period of the Cold War and may have slowed the evolutionary political process in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. A proponent of revolution not evolution, he believed that all communism was bad and dreamed of war between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. He had no sympathy for national communism, Titoism, and revisionism. He didn't seem to believe that the political process in Moscow and Eastern Europe would allow for a struggle for power between the rightist Stalinists and the anti-Stalinist revisionists. Even after the advent of Khrushchev his operations continued to give weight to the arguments of those Communist leaders who most feared the Germans and who were most opposed to relaxing the Stalinist tactics of tyranny and terror.

Both of these books are lively reading, well documented and cover essentially the same events. The Cookridge book is better organized and better written, but spy buffs may enjoy the operational detail of "The General Was A Spy" by Hohne and Zölling, two German newsmen who write for *Der Spiegel*.

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SECRET 051539Z APR 72 CITE: 19048 (ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO ☐

RYBAT ☐ CASCOPE UTILITY


1. ☐ MET WITH UTILITY FOR ONE HOUR CONVERSATION  
MORNING 3 APRIL, PRESENTED ☐ LETTER, GIFT  
AND CONGRATULATIONS. ALSO ATTENDED DINNER WHICH ENTIRELY  
A FAMILY AFFAIR WITH APPROX. 30 MEMBERS HIS FAMILY GATHERED  
FROM VARIOUS AREAS. UTILITY WAS OBVIOUSLY IMPRESSED AND PLEASED  
WITH OUR GESTURE.

2. UTILITY CONFIRMED PUBLISHER WISHES HIM TO COME TO  
NYC TO ASSIST PROMOTION OF BOOK. IT ☐ IMPRESSION AT  
END OF CONVERSATION THAT UTILITY WILL PROBABLY DECLINE.

3. BELIEVE WE EVOLVED A FAIRLY PAINLESS SOLUTION TO ASSIST  
UTILITY WITH HIS FILE PROBLEM. HAVE DISCUSSED WITH ACOB WHO  
CONCURS. NO ACTION REQUIRED UNTIL ☐ RETURN. BASICALLY  
WE WILL ASSIST IN LOCATING ☐ FROM NYC WHO TO  
ASSIST IN MAKING COPIES OF "HISTORICAL DOCS RELATED TO UTILITY  
BOOK AND POSSIBILITY OF USE IN PREPARING FILM SCENARIO AT LATER  
DATE.."

4. FOUND UTILITY IN EXCELLENT PHYSICAL AND MENTAL STATE,

6 APR 1972 578561



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PAGE 2 [ ] 1048 S E C R E T

LOOKING FIVE YEARS YOUNGER THAN EIGHTEEN MONTHS AGO.


5. PAID COURTESY CALL ON ALIAS BRITZ AND HAD EXCHANGE WITH ALIAS BERNHARDT. FORMER DEMONSTRATED INTEREST IN M.E. WHERE FED REP CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN REESTABLISHING TIES. ALSO CALLED ON ALIAS DESSAU WHO CONTINUING TRANSCRIBE HIS TAGEBUCH AND HAS GIVEN UTILITY SOME HELP WITH CONTINUING PUBLISHING ACTIVITIES. ALIAS DESSAU IS SKEPTICAL THAT LONDON AND N.Y. VERSIONS WILL COME OUT ON SCHEDULE; HAS HAD SOME CONTACT WITH IRVING, THE PRINCIPAL U.K. EDITOR AND TRANSLATOR.

6. FILE: [ ]

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officer-comrade, Col. Gen. Franz Halder, former Wehrmacht chief of staff. Gehlen, now retired, headed the West German intelligence agency, for two decades. —UPI Photo

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Apr 16, 1972

*One thing, Chief, the authors wouldn't last a week in our outfit*

## The General Was a Spy

The Truth About General Gehlen and His Spy Ring.

By Heinz Höhne and Hermann Zölling.

Translated by Richard Barry from the German "Putsch Intern."

With an Introduction by Hugh Trevor-Roper and a Preface

to the American Edition by Andrew Tully.

Illustrated. 347 pp. New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan. \$10.

## Gehlen

Spy of the Century

By E. H. Cookridge.

Illustrated. 402 pp. New York: Random House. \$10.



General Gehlen in Hanover, 1958.

NEW YORK TIMES

16 APR 1972

# The General Was a Spy

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By CHRISTOPHER FELIX

The Chief, Foreign Output Evaluation, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. (By safe hand to Langley.)

Dear Chief:

Lest it be supposed that my report violates the Agency's charter by engaging in operations within the United States, let me hasten to point out that, except for Andrew Tully's Preface to the Höhne and Zolling book (and for our reputation, of course), the paper, print, and bindings are the only things American involved here. E. H. Cookridge is a British subject: his book was first published in England. Heinz Höhne and Hermann Zolling are Germans: Their book is an elaboration of 15 articles published in West Germany's *Der Spiegel* magazine in the spring of 1971, which were highly critical of Gen. Reinhard Gehlen's direction of the Federal Intelligence Service.

Both books tell the same story: General Gehlen, a German officer since 1920, wartime head of F.H.O. (*Fremde Heere Ost*—Foreign Armies East), the intelligence section of the German General Staff concerned with Eastern Europe, surrendered at war's end to the Americans with the offer to put himself, his files, staff and networks at their disposal. After some fencing, the offer was accepted, and the Gehlen organization was ultimately installed in a compound at Pullach, near Munich. In 1949 American support and supervision was transferred from the United States Army to the recently formed C.I.A.

In 1956 the Gehlen organization became the B.N.D. (*Bundesnachrichtendienst*), the West German Federal intelligence service, and Gehlen its "President." Long a favorite of Chancellor Adenauer, who referred to him as "My dear General Gehlen," the

General and his B.N.D. suffered setbacks in the 1960's, notably the revelation that one of Gehlen's trusted deputies, a former S.S. officer, was a

Christopher Felix is the pseudonym of a former American diplomat and intelligence officer. He is the author of "A Short Course in the Secret War," "Three Cornered Cover" by Mr. Felix (with George Marton) will be published this fall.

longtime Soviet agent, and the B.N.D.'s involvement in the famous November, 1962, *Der Spiegel* affair. The latter added the enmity of Franz-Josef Strauss, the West German Defense Minister whose Bavarian C.S.U. (Christian Socialist party) was an essential prop of Christian Democratic rule, to the existing hostility of many Social Democrats.

In 1968 Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger, reportedly under some pressure from his Socialist partners in the "grand coalition," did not extend Gehlen's exemption from mandatory retirement. Gehlen's place, as president of the B.N.D., was taken by Gen. Gerhard Wessel, a former associate of Gehlen, but no longer his friend. In 1970, under the Brandt Government, a Social Democratic party official was installed in the B.N.D. as Vice President, former S.S. and Gestapo personnel were removed, and B.N.D. department heads were replaced, several by Social Democrats.

Although the story is the same in both books — down to a striking identity (and abundance) of detail — their approach differs. Cookridge, whose 13th book on secret operations this is, writes as the "expert." Nevertheless, he cannot avoid signs of regret at the apparent decline in later years of Gehlen's organization; the General is, after all, the hero of his book. In fact, at his hands Gehlen takes on the proportions of a superman.

Höhne (author of "The Order of the Death's Head," 1970, and "Codeword: Direktor," reviewed on P. 40 in this issue) and Zolling, on the other hand, while recognizing Gehlen's accomplishments (and even defending him on occasion — not without flashes of national pride) are partisan. The B.N.D. under Gehlen, they plainly feel, let Germany down. "The Federal Republic," they write at the outset, "requires an efficient secret service if it is not to be exposed to unnecessary external dangers"; and their major charge against Gehlen is that from 1958 on, he and the B.N.D. were no longer efficient. Their opinion of the Gehlen organization for most of the years before that seems revealed in their frequent use of the phrase, "the Americans and their German minions at Pullach." This attitude, if understandable in the middle 1950's, carries a different weight nearly two decades later.

The German authors are severe about Gehlen's use of former Nazis and about his organization's "inordinate influence on government decisions with no controlling authority" to restrain it — given postwar West German history, that is a slap at Adenauer in particular and German Christian Democratic Governments in general.

The decline of the B.N.D. ("that secret service which was once regarded as the best in Europe," they add nostalgically but inconsistently, since they place its apogee in the period when Adenauer dominated and Gehlen & Co. were still "minions" of the Americans) they attribute variously to Gehlen's misconceptions and uncurbed powers, to the German tradition of regarding intelligence as falling almost exclusively in the domain of the military (they do have a good short essay on the historical development of the German intelligence services), and, among

continued

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other things, to "[snooping] in West German internal politics." The latter may or may not be so. I wouldn't know, Chief. But it seems to me that if it is so, the answer to excessive partisanship of a West German intelligence service when the Christian Democrats were in power is not necessarily to pack it with the opposition party when they come to power.

If the approaches of the two books are different, the books themselves nonetheless contain some remarkable similarities. One is that the authors would not last a week in any intelligence service. They are quite unaware of the essential human element in secret operations; to them it is all moving so many pawns around a vast board. As you once remarked, Chief, "perhaps only fiction can convey the reality of our work." Also, failing to understand the role of intelligence in larger policy, they greatly overestimate it. "Under the influence of [Gehlen's] daily situation reports on the East which painted Moscow's policy . . . in the blackest of colors," write Höhne and Zolling of the period around 1950, "... The U.S. secret service officers inevitably [sic] came to accept the political views [sic] of their German partners. Senior U.S. secret service officers were soon pleading for an end to the Occupation regime on this side of the Elbe and the incorporation of West Germany into the political, military, and economic alliance of the West."

The role of "secret service officers" is not to (

plead major policies; and when they do, they often have a reverse effect. The authors really should read the memoirs of those men, such as Dirk Stikker of the Netherlands, Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium, and Dean Acheson, who, with the British and French, made and directed Western policy in those years. Cookridge, speaking of the East German Ministry of State Security, says flatly, "It was the extremely hostile intelligence produced by its Czechoslovakia section against the Dubcek Government which prompted Moscow into armed intervention there in 1968." Moscow is quite capable of identifying the self-interest in East German intelligence reports, and, however suspicious the Russians may be, they do not make major decisions in the fashion Cookridge suggests.

Too, all three authors are given to the kind of inaccuracies, large and small, and to the sweeping generalizations that would spell quick failure for a secret intelligence service. Cookridge's chapter on "War of

the Radio Waves" is laughable. A better writer than the two Germans (who may be suffering in translation), Cookridge also succumbs to embroidery. On the Berlin telephone tunnel and the C.I.A. he says, "[Frank G.] Wisner was all for it, but he was at that time preoccupied with C.I.A. operations in Guatemala." Anyone who thinks Frank Wisner couldn't keep an eye on two things at once doesn't know how affairs are conducted in a large organization — and obviously didn't know Wisner.

Cookridge has one item that really intrigued me. He quotes, with evident admiration, and as proof of the effectiveness of Gehlen's penetrations into wartime Russia, a radio message from an agent named "Minishkiy" stationed in "Stalin's Supreme Headquarters," dated July 14, 1942: "The war council in Moscow concluded its session during the night of July 13. Amongst those present were Shaposhnikov, Voroshilov, Mol-


otov and the heads of the British, American and Chinese military missions . . . the British representative demanded Soviet assistance in Egypt . . . offensive operations in two sectors of the front were decided upon." As you know, Chief, I was in Moscow in July, 1942. Foreigners never participated in Soviet "war councils." Soviet operations were never planned or discussed in the presence of foreigners. The Admiral commanding the British military mission was not at a level to "demand" anything of the Russians. (Rather than seeking Russian help in the Middle East, the British and Americans in July, 1942, were in fact planning the North African invasion, in part as a means of helping the Russians.) Finally, there was no Chinese military mission in Moscow. I guess it's a little late to follow this up, Chief.

Messrs. Höhne and Zolling are similarly carried away. On Gehlen's operations in Africa

they write: "The B.N.D.'s new African friends gave it, almost for the asking, what the ex-colonial powers such as Britain, France and Belgium had had to employ a comprehensive net-

work of agents to obtain — pictures of the situation in the politically emergent continent of Africa." Come, come. Our German friends have apparently never heard of the French "Communauté" (nor of Monsieur Foccart). Nor of the Kenyan request to Britain for troops to put down local rebellion.

There is also their sweeping statement concerning the late 1940's: "The Americans also urged Gehlen to do business with the French. The U.S. secret service had barely any contact with the S.D.E.C.E. [Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionage — French postwar secret service] but was most anxious to gain some insight into the policies of Paris." You will remember, Chief, that this was



General Gehlen in Hanover, 1958.



just the moment when you and I, greeted as old friends, were in and out of the Paris "piscine" seeing the head of the S.D.E.C.E., that ours was but a small part of a relationship that flourished until the advent —perhaps I should say the onslaught—of de Gaulle 10 years later, and above all that it was neither an American need nor practice at that time on any level "to gain . . . insight into the policies of Paris" via the Germans.

I know these two books are the first the public has on the subject of the Federal intelligence service, Chief. This fact, together with the frequent direct and indirect allusions in the text and notes of both books to the B.N.D. sources, suggests the possibility that the B.N.D. — who were certainly aware of the authors' researches — decided to get into the act for themselves, and to provide a certain amount of information for their own purposes. An easy operation.

You'll have to get someone better versed in German politics today to tell you whether this is an effort by the present heads of the B.N.D. to distance the organization from Gehlen, and thus from public criticism in Germany of the former "president," and perhaps to gain favor with the ruling Social-Democrats, or an effort to show that the Social-Democratic changes since 1970 in the B.N.D. have not produced the necessary or desired reforms, or some other, more arcane, purpose. But you might want to pass this much along.

You might also want to pass along one last item, Chief. I learn from these books that General Gehlen has a son. Höhne and Zolling say he is named "Felix-Christoph." Cookridge says he is named "Christopher Felix." I swear to you, Chief, I never met Gehlen in my life. You know it. It's no more than a damnable coincidence.

Yours,

Chris. ■

REINHARD GEHLEN

8131 BERG AKI STARNBERG, DEN 16.4.1972  
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Sehr geehrter Mr. Helms!

In den Tagen meines 70. Geburtstages wurde mir eine große Überraschung durch Jim's Besuch zuteil, und es war mir eine große Freude, daß er an dem Abendessen mit meiner Familie teilnehmen konnte.

Eine besondere Überraschung war das wirklich hübsche und sinnige Geschenk, das ich von Ihnen als Leiter der mir so lange und weiter verbundenen CIA durch Jim's Hand zugleich mit einer Ablichtung von Paul Revere's Ride erhielt. Es war mir wirklich eine große Freude, an diesem Tage einen der alten Freunde bei mir zu sehen.

Mit dem Dank für Ihre Wünsche möchte ich meinen Wunsch verbinden, daß Ihre so wichtige Aufgabe weiterhin unter einem guten Stern stehen und noch viele Jahre so weiter laufen möge, wie sie jetzt läuft.

Hier in Deutschland haben wir viele Probleme, und ich bin etwas besorgt um die ganze Entwicklung. Jim wird Ihnen ja davon erzählt haben.

Ihnen und Ihrer verehrten Frau Gemanlin nochmals alles Gute. Mit besten Grüßen bin ich in Verbundenheit

Ihr

*Reinhard Gehlen*

ArL

( )  
April 18, 1972

4. Van.

I would like to draw your attention on the New York Times Book Review of April 16, where a "former American Intelligence Officer" with the pseudonym Christopher Felix wrote quite a remarkable comment on two books which were recently published:

"The General was a Spy" by Heinz Hoehne and  
Hermann Zölling

"Gehlen - Spy of the Century" by E.H. Cookridge

In case you know this man I think he should be encouraged to do more comments in similar cases!

There is - unfortunately - only one recurrent allegation concerning the "many SS and Gestapo personal in the BND". This is absolutely untrue, since the spy Felke was the only one in the rather big Headquarter, and several others were outside in the field engaged with intelligence via their own channels against their own former people in Eastern Germany.

In the early 60s the BND discharged these people on a mostly voluntary mutual basis with some unimportant exceptions. As you probably know as an "alter Kenner", there were even among them people who tried to serve their country well, and had no "Dreck am Stecken".

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- 2 -

I understand that [redacted] is still busy with the history of our longstanding cooperation. So I would appreciate if you could forward this very informal note to him!

I really enjoyed seeing you in your spacious office.

Very cordially

yours,

PS: I think both books are basically poor products, full of sensations and half truth. But the truth is either too complicated or too dull to fascinate the average consumer.

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RYBAT L 1 UTILITY

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1. IN REF L 1 DISCUSSION WITH UTILITY PROBLEM OF PHOTOGRAPHING FILES  
WAS DIVIDED INTO THREE PARTS:

- A. AVAILABILITY OF EQUIPMENT.
- B. PHOTOGRAPHING FILES.
- C. PROCESSING FILM.

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2. L 1 AND UTILITY EVOLVED FOLLOWING CONCEPT:

A. COVER STORY FOR CONTINGENCY USE WOULD BE THAT UTILITY, AT  
REQUEST HIS NEW YORK PUBLISHING AGENT, ASKED TO PROVIDE MICROFILM  
OF APPROPRIATE BACKGROUND FILES FOR PREPARING SCENARIO FOR POSSIBLE  
FILM CONTRACT. BKTRUST TECH WOULD STICK TO HIS COVER IN CONTACT  
WITH UTILITY AND ANY MEMBER HIS FAMILY INVOLVED.

B. UTILITY PROPOSED THAT WE PROVIDE EQUIPMENT; THAT TECH WOULD  
STAY ONLY LONG ENOUGH TO INSTRUCT UTILITY IN USE; AND THAT WE PROCESS  
FILM.

C. L 1 TOLD UTILITY HE WOULD COMMUNICATE OUR DECISION AND

CONTINUED.....

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PAGE TWO CONTINUED

FURTHER DETAILS THROUGH C

3. C SAW C ON 5 APRIL AND BRIEFED HIM ON EXCHANGE WITH UTILITY.

4. RECOMMEND FOLLOWING ACTION:

A. C TECH BE DOCUMENTED AS NYC COMMERCIAL PHOTO-TECH.

COVER NEED ONLY BE NOMINAL AND NO BACKSTOPPING CONSIDERED NECESSARY.

B. C MAKE APPOINTMENT WITH UTILITY FOR TECH WITH EQUIPMENT TO ARRIVE STARNBERG. EQUIPMENT MUST BE NON-ATTRIBUTABLE TO.

C. TECH ARRIVE AND STAY WITHIN COVER STORY IN CONTACT WITH UTILITY. SUGGEST ARRANGE TO HAVE INITIAL LOT PHOTOGRAPHED BY UTILITY AND DELIVERED FOR PROCESSING TO ENSURE NO TECHNICAL PROBLEMS.

D. C SHOULD NOT, EXCEPT IN CONTACTING UTILITY, BE ASSOCIATED WITH EXERCISE. SUGGEST C BE CHANNEL FOR DELIVERY OF FILM FOR PROCESSING AND FOR RETURN OF EQUIPMENT WHEN TASK FINISHED.

5. REQUEST C BASE ARRANGE WITH C HAVE QUALIFIED TECH COME TO MUNICH PER ABOVE AND BE INTRODUCED TO UTILITY BY C. HE SHOULD STANDBY UNTIL PHOTOGRAPHY COMPLETE AND FILMS OBTAINED FROM UTILITY BY C

CONTINUED.....

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6. REQUEST ☒ DEVELOP FILM AND MAKE TWO COPIES FORWARDING ONE SET  
TO HQS AND RETURN ONE SET TO ☒ FOR PASSAGE TO UTILITY.

7. PLS KEEP HQS ADVISED ALL ASPECTS THIS OPERATION. IN LIGHT OF FACT WE  
ANTICIPATE CONSIDERABLE PUBLICITY WHEN ENGLISH VERSION UTILITY BOOK APPEARS,  
REQUEST THIS OP BE ACCOMPLISHED SOONEST. STATION SHOULD NOT RETAIN ANY COPIES  
OF FILM. ANALYSIS WILL BE HANDLED BY HQS.

8. FILE: ☒      ☒  
END OF MESSAGE

EA/DDP ☒

✓ SA/DDP ☒

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Die Gehlen-Story in "Quick"  
Magazine

1. This appeared in an eight-part serialization (each part two to three pages long) in "Quick" during October and November 1971 immediately after the publication of Gehlen's book in Germany.

2. Die Gehlen-Story draws on Gehlen's book; on the Hoehne/Zolling book; interestingly, also on "Moskau Ruft Heinz Felfe," the book written by the BND in answer to an expected book by Felfe (according to Gehlen's English-language edition, Ehmke vetoed the idea); some 20 friends of Gehlen were interviewed; finally "Quick" interviewed Gehlen himself.

3. While the series has the usual stuff about Foreign Armies East, the Vlassov story, the founding of the Org, the Felfe story, the Stashinsky story, it is more a portrait of Gehlen himself. There is one section on his childhood, another on his love for riding, his family, and other personal details. Gehlen supplied a great deal of the material, which does not appear elsewhere, including several photographs, obviously from the family album. The final section in the series is an interview with Gehlen in which he repeats his feelings about the future relationship with international communism, which he expounded in the last three chapters of his book.

4. There is nothing new on Felfe. There is a short section on the Bormann bit. Gehlen was recently interviewed by a Landgerichtsrat on what he had said about Bormann (Soviet agent during the war; reported by two BND agents believed to be alive and well in the USSR ca. 1960 - I can believe the first but not the second.) While the Landgerichtsrat isn't saying much because the whole thing is Geheim, he does not add anything to the story of the two agents. When interviewed by "Quick", he said something like: "When a man with the reputation and experience of Gehlen, who has taken so much trouble to check his sources, makes such a statement, then one cannot lightly dismiss it."

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5. Neither CIA nor USG has any reason to complain. Indeed about the only time we are mentioned is in a caption under a picture of Gehlen's house which says "The DM30,000 house was paid for with a mortgage not--as is often maintained -- by CIA." Unless memory fails me, the price was DM 24,000, but we certainly can't complain.

6. Mr. Critchfield reported that Weßel, the Pastorensohn, was upset because the cover of the last number, containing the interview, had color photographs of no less than 12 pairs of naked breasts (female), and eight which were barely covered. "Quick" goes in for this sort of thing in a big way.

( O/SAC/DDP )

THE MOSCOW NEW TIMES  
MAY 1972

### *Gehlen Faces Prosecution*

The West German press reports that Reinhard Gehlen, former President of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) has been charged with receiving a huge bribe, an offence which carries a penalty of five years hard labour.

A complaint filed with the public prosecutor's office in Munich charges that when he was at the head of the BND, Gehlen received from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency a bribe of 250,000 marks, with which he acquired the luxury villa in Berg am Starnberger See in Bavaria where he now lives. The evidence submitted includes documents from the land registry office and the testimony of seven witnesses. The complaint mentions as a witness the present CIA director Richard Helms.

That Gehlen had bought his villa with money received from the CIA was first reported by the Hamburg weekly *Der Spiegel* in its issue No. 12 for 1971. But it took more than a year for the charges against Adenauer's one-time "favourite" to be filed with the prosecutor's office.

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NEW REPUBLIC

13 MAY 1972

### Social Note

Thirsty? A party for General Reinhard Gehlen is being given by Mr. Christopher Shaw, president of the World Publishing Company, on May 26, in honor of the publication of an edition of the general's memoirs. Editors of reviewing publications have been invited to have a drink with Hitler's former chief of intelligence. The general is the subject of two recent volumes (reviewed in these pages on April 29, "Our Man Beelzebub") describing how he left Hitler when there was nothing to leave and joined forces with the CIA, how he recruited his intelligence forces for penetrating the USSR from the Old Boy network of ex-SS and Gestapo men, how he operated out of a \$300 million Bavarian fortress, and how he dreamt of Russia and America at loggerheads so that Germany could rise again. Cocktails are at 6 p.m.

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15 May 1972  
SAC/DDP NO. 102

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Cancellation of General Gehlen's Visit

I am relieved to report that General Gehlen has written Mr. [ ] a personal letter conveying the decision that he will not be coming to the United States to participate in selling his book. This was clearly the impression Gehlen left me with after our talk in Munich in early April. However, the invitation you received from the Military Intelligence Reserve Officer Society in New York and the fact that State Department officers concerned with Germany have been invited to a reception for General Gehlen by the publisher had raised doubts in my own mind about my personal conversation with him. Mrs. Gehlen has been in the hospital; this will be the excuse for his cancellation.

James H. Critchfield  
SAC/DDP

cc - DDP  
C/EUR

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
## GEHEIMDIENSTE

## Gehlens Bekenntnisse

Für die US-Ausgabe seiner Memoiren gab BND-Gründer Gehlen bisher unbekannte Details aus dem Intimbereich des Bonner Geheimdienstes preis. Im letzten Augenblick strich er die brisantesten Stellen wieder.

**E**in Bündel englischsprachiger Druckfahnen hat Westdeutschlands führende Staatsspione alarmiert: Der Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) sieht sich von einem Mann enttarnt, der bisher fast jede Veröffentlichung über den bundesdeutschen Geheimdienst als Verrat brandmarkte — dem BND-Gründer und Ex-General Reinhard Gehlen.

„Ein Nachrichtendienst braucht nun einmal, und das wird sich nie ändern,



Autor Gehlen, korrigierte Druckfahne „Der BND ist gründlich enttarnt“

ein gewisses Maß an Abdeckung und Abschirmung, wenn er erfolgreich arbeiten soll“, postulierte Gehlen in der deutschen Ausgabe seiner Memoiren. „Der geheime Auslandsnachrichtendienst soll und darf keinen Platz im Blickfeld der Öffentlichkeit haben.“

Die Druckfahnen der britisch-amerikanischen Ausgabe von Gehlens Erinnerungsbuch „Der Dienst“ aber offenbarten den Lesern im Geheimdienst-Camp Pullach, daß der Alt-Präsident seine Position radikal geändert hat. Gehlen nennt der Öffentlichkeit bisher völlig unbekannte Details aus dem Intimbereich des BND: Namen, Zusammenhänge, operative Einzelheiten.

Da wird die Kode-Nummer der Organisation Gehlen (I-1783) für Adenauers Staatssekretär Hans Globke preisgegeben, da erfährt man, daß Gehlen in den fünfziger Jahren in dem General von Mellenthin einen Stellvertreter besaß, der nie genannt werden durfte.

Dabei wird auch die bis in die jüngste Zeit von Gehlen gehegte Legende zerstört, der BND habe niemals bundesdeutsche Politiker ausgeforscht. Gehlen enthüllt:

- ▷ 1968 habe er die Anweisung erteilt, den damaligen Sonderbotschafter Egon Bahr durch BND-Agenten zu beschatten,
- ▷ den amerikanischen Spionageabwehrdienst FBI habe er ersucht, über die kommunistische Vergangenheit des heutigen Kanzler-Beraters Leo Bauer Ermittlungen anzustellen,
- ▷ er habe den jetzigen Verfassungsschutz-Präsidenten Günther Nollau zu einem begrenzten Sicherheitsrisiko erklärt.

Nicht einmal vor dem Freund und Nachfolger Gerhard Wessel mochte Gehlen noch länger haltmachen. BND-Präsident Wessel, so Gehlen, sei „ein ausgezeichnete ‚Zweiter Mann‘“, doch müsse er „bezweifeln, ob er das notwendige Format für eine so hohe Kommandofunktion habe“.

Der jähe Frontwechsel des Memoirenschreibers Gehlen gab den Pullacher Lesern das Rätsel auf, was den alten (70jährigen) Herrn am Starnberger See veranlaßt hatte, Ausländern gegenüber so offenerzig zu sein. Einfach urteilende BND-Analysiker fanden eine Erklärung: Durch eine Flucht nach vorn habe Gehlen der angelsächsischen Ausgabe seiner Memoiren den geschäftlichen Erfolg sichern wollen.

Tatsächlich war fachkundigen Rezensenten die deutsche Ausgabe der Gehlen-Memoiren nach ihrer Veröffentlichung im Herbst vergangenen Jahres als ein „nichtssagendes Buch“ („Stuttgarter Zeitung“) erschienen, auch als ein Akt „publizistischer Selbstverbrennung“ (so „Die Zeit“), keineswegs

aber als „Sensation des Buchmarktes“ (Verlagsankündigung).

Das hinderte freilich den amerikanischen Verlag The World Publishing Company nicht daran, am 21. September 1971 die Weltrechte an dem Werk für über eine halbe Million Dollar (mehr als 1,6 Millionen Mark) zu erwerben. Doch World-Publishing-Präsident Christopher Shaw bemängelte schon bei der Übergabe des Schecks an den deutschen Verleger Volker Hansen den „schülerhaften Stil“ des Gehlen-Werks.


Der Vizepräsident des Verlages Peter Ritner erklärte sich daher bereit, zu Gehlen nach Starnberg zu fahren und mit ihm eine neue Fassung des Buches zu erarbeiten. Doch erwies sich diese Arbeit als so umfangreich, daß der US-Verlag schließlich den britischen Zeitgeschichtler David Irving beauftragte, dem abgedankten Geheimdienstler weitere Einzelheiten zu entlocken und zugleich den „schülerhaften Stil“ aufzubessern.

Unter Irvings Seelenmassage wurde der erstmals so schweigsame General geschwätzig. Unbefangen plauderte er über ehemalige Mitarbeiter, Vorgesetzte und Politiker, gab er Details der Geheimdienst-Arbeit preis.

Gehlen enthüllte Einzelheiten der Nahost-Arbeit des BND in den fünfziger und sechziger Jahren, die Eingeweihten sicher keine Neuigkeiten bieten. Doch könnten die gewissermaßen „amtlichen“ Äußerungen des damals verantwortlichen Geheimdienstchefs den gegenwärtigen noch immer labilen diplomatischen und geheimdienstlichen Verbindungen Westdeutschlands zu Israel und dessen arabischen Gegnern ernstlich schaden.

Der ehemalige BND-Präsident berichtet: „Gebeten von Allan Dulles und dem CIA, taten wir von Pullach aus unser Bestes, dem ägyptischen Geheimdienst Lebendigkeit und Sachverstand beizubringen, und vermittelten ihm ehemalige SS-Führer.“ Er fährt fort: „Nach dem Suez-Krieg 1956 wandten wir unser besonderes Interesse den Israelis zu. Wir gaben ihnen unseren fachmännischen Rat bei der Entwicklung ihres kleinen, aber schlagkräftigen Geheimdienstes. Wir machten ihnen unsere Erfahrungen zugänglich und halfen ihnen. Schlüsselagenten in den arabischen Ländern zu placieren.“

Später habe sich jedoch der BND, beunruhigt durch die zunehmende Ausrüstung Ägyptens mit sowjetischen Waffen, wieder der Gegenseite zugewandt. Da solche Waffenlieferungen „den Empfänger von russischen Ersatzteilen und anderen Hilfslieferungen



Sowjetischer Atomspion Kudryawzew „Wir haben ihn demaskiert“



BND-Präsident Wessel „Ausgezeichneter Zweiter Mann“



Brandt-Berater Bahr, Chef Von BND-Agenten beschattet



ein Detail handelt, das nicht nur für den Leser, sondern auch für die westlichen Partner des BND eine Neuigkeit ist: „Wir demaskierten den Direktor der sowjetischen Atomspionage mit Hilfe einer Photographie.“ Und er fügt hinzu: „Dieser Mann, Sergej Kudrjawzew, ist heute sowjetischer Botschafter in Kambodscha.“

Der einst als Geheimdienst-Sphinx gefeierte General offenbart auch Details seiner nachrichtendienstlichen Praxis. Gehlen: „Nur zweimal wurde ich in Kontakte mit dem russischen Geheimdienst verwickelt.“ Zunächst zielt er sich zwar noch: „Es widerstrebt mir, darüber Einzelheiten zu berichten, weil solche Kontakte von einer mit geheimdienstlichen Erfordernissen nicht vertrauten westdeutschen Öffentlichkeit mißverstanden werden müssen.“ Doch dann beschreibt er eine Episode, die auch Fachleuten bisher unbekannt war:

„Ungefähr 1953 nahmen wir in Italien Kontakte mit einem KGB-Offizier auf und drehten ihn um. Durch ihn erfuhren wir zuerst, daß der Chef des sowjetischen Geheimdienstes Lawrentij Berija liquidiert worden war. Die Nachricht erschien uns so unglaublich, daß wir zunächst nicht wußten, ob wir ernsthaft mit ihm verhandeln könnten. Durch diesen Offizier wollten wir einen direkten politischen Kontakt mit Moskau anknüpfen, aber seine Vorgesetzten müssen den Braten gerochen haben. Nachdem er ein Jahr mit uns gearbeitet hatte, verschwand er spurlos, ehe wir unsere Ideen realisieren konnten.“

Gehlen erwähnt einen zweiten Kontakt zwischen BND und KGB: das Treffen des Obersten a.D. Bogislaw von Bonin mit dem russischen Geheimdienst-Obersten Karpow im Sommer 1955, das der Öffentlichkeit kein Geheimnis mehr ist, seit der sowjetische Partner dem SPIEGEL davon berichtete (SPIEGEL 3/1966). Gehlen über seinen Kriegskameraden Bonin: „Würde ich bei dieser Fühlungnahme irgendeinen Erfolg vorausgesehen haben, so hätte ich einen diplomatisch gewandten Unterhändler geschickt als einen ehemaligen Panzer-Obersten.“

Derart abfällige Urteile tauchten immer häufiger in den Erzählungen der ehemaligen BND-Chefs auf. Frühere Kampfgefährten, Beamte und Politiker wurden mit einem Giftspieß aus dem Starnberger Hinterhalt bedacht.

Dem BND-Präsidenten Wessel unterstellte er, durch „taktlose Bemerkungen“ zu dem Selbstmord seines Rivalen, des Generals Horst Wendland, beigetragen zu haben. Über den Gehlen-Kritiker Nollau weiß er zu berichten, er

• Kudrjawzew wurde im Sommer 1971 aus Kambodscha abberufen

ternommen. Präsident Gehlen zu stürzen; Marwitz verdächtigte einen Kollegen, den Historiker und Analytiker Dr. H., ein von östlichen Gegnern in den BND eingeschmuggelter Agent zu sein, und warf Gehlen vor, den Fall nicht mit gebührender Sorgfalt zu verfolgen.

Doch Gehlen will rasch reagiert haben: „Ich erfuhr von einem zuverlässigen Mitglied meines Stabes, den ich in die Gruppe der Unzufriedenen um Marwitz einschleuste hatte, daß er versuchen würde, meinen vorzeitigen Rücktritt zu fordern.“ Unter solchem Druck hielt es Gehlen für angebracht, den Fall an das Kanzleramt zu melden.

Bonn entsandte den ambitionierten Ministerialrat von Köster als Untersuchungsführer. „Neun Monate lang“, so klagt Gehlen, „wurde im BND-Hauptquartier das Unterste zuoberst gekehrt.“ Gehlen berichtet, Dr. H. sei später vom Generalbundesanwalt rehabilitiert worden.

Reagierte Gehlen in diesen Fällen nur alten, unvergessenen dienstlichen Ärger ab, so charakterisiert er linke Politiker pointierter und aggressiver. Der General erwähnt etwa die kommunistische Spionageorganisation „Rote Kapelle“ und unterbricht die Aufzählung der Länder, in denen sie (angeblich) tätig war, nur bei Skandinavien, um die unzutreffende Bemerkung einzufügen: „Dort war Ernst Wollweber, der Korymbus, dem Herbert Wehner folgte.“

An anderer Stelle erzählt Gehlen, 1968 habe ihn der damalige Sonderbotschafter Bahr in Pullach besucht. Gehlen: „Nachdem er das Gelände verlassen hatte, ordnete ich an, ihm diskret zu folgen. Seine Beschatter berichteten dem Dienst später, daß Bahr in München mit einem führenden Funktionär der italienischen Kommunisten zusammengetroffen war. Nach meiner Vermutung war seine Reise nach Pullach nur ein Vorwand, um von seinem eigentlichen Vorhaben abzulenken.“

Tatsächlich aber hatte Gehlen auf Seite 268 der deutschen Ausgabe seiner Memoiren das Gegenteil behauptet: „Ich bin davon überzeugt, daß nicht eine einzige Meldung (des BND) mit innenpolitischen Aufklärungsergebnissen zu meiner Amtszeit nach Bonn gegangen ist. Ebensowenig haben wir jemals einen deutschen Politiker überwacht.“

Doch diesen Grundsatz wollte Gehlen für Egon Bahr nicht gelten lassen, der ihm als Architekt der neuen Ostpolitik besonders verdächtig ist. Genüßlich bedient er sich einer italienischen Neofaschisten-Postille: „Die einflußreiche Zeitschrift „Il Borghese“ schrieb im September 1971 sarkastisch vom neuen Deutschland, dessen Kanzler „ein früherer norwegischer Partisan“ und dessen Staatssekretär „ein Sowjet-Agent“ sei; und sie gah zu verstehen, es könne andere Motive für ihre Aktivitäten geben, dunklere und schmutzigere Motive, die eines Tages ein Gehlen entschleiern.“

neuem Ärger für den BND, der nach der „Pullach intern“-Aufregung des letzten Jahres wieder zur Ruhe gekommen ist.

Erst als Mitte Mai die ersten Vorausexemplare der amerikanischen Ausgabe der Gehlen-Memoiren vorlagen, konnte die BND-Führung aufatmen. Geheimdienstler Gehlen hatte in letzter Stunde Verbaljurien und einige nachrichtendienstliche Erkenntnisse, die vermutlich noch der Geheimhaltung unterliegen, aus dem Manuskript gestrichen.

Selbst aus den Druckfahnen hatte der Autor noch ganze Absätze entfernt, die ihm nun nicht mehr opportun erschienen. Die seit Montag dieser Woche erscheinende US-Ausgabe der Gehlen-Memoiren wird kaum noch Anstoß erregen: Jeder Seitenhieb auf BND-Chef Wessel fehlt, kaum ein kritisches Wort gegen Mitarbeiter und Vorgesetzte ist stehengeblieben.

Trotz dieser Vorsicht könnten BND-Juristen befinden, daß Gehlens gekürztes Manuskript tatsächlich Amtsgeheimnisse enthält. Denn nach dem Paragraphen 353b des Strafgesetzbuches wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu fünf Jahren bestraft, „wer unbefugt ein Geheimnis, das ihm in seiner Eigenschaft als Beamter ... bekannt geworden ist, offenbart“. Und der Kommentar von Schönke/Schröder lautet ausdrücklich: „Überdies ist, daß ein Geheimnis schon dann offenbart ist, wenn es einer Person mitgeteilt wird“.

Mithin hätte Gehlen, falls er im Gespräch mit seinem Übersetzer Irving Amtsgeheimnisse ausplauderte, den Straftatbestand des Paragraphen 353b bereits erfüllt. Zudem hat der New Yorker Verlag World Publishing Manuskript und Druckfahnen auch jenen ausländischen Verlagen zugänglich gemacht, die von ihm die Nachdruckrechte erworben haben. Die Folge: Gegenwärtig laufen etwa 20 Exemplare der ungereinigten Bekenntnisse Gehlens in aller Welt um.



Brandt-Berater Bauer, Chef: Vom FBI ausgeforscht

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DISP NO - EGNA-43299  
FILE NO - ✓ L AND 32W-2-33/2  
DATE - 31 MAY 1972  
INDEXING - NONE  
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TO - CHIEF, EUR  
INFO - CHIEF OF BASE, C J  
FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, C J  
SUBJECT - C J UTILITY CASCOPE - SPIEGEL SCORES ENGLISH  
TRANSLATION OF GEHLEN'S MEMOIRS  
ACTION - NONE, FYI  
REFS - NONE

DOC. MICRO. SER.  
JUN 1 1972  
MICROFILMED

1. 29 MAY 1972 SPIEGEL HAD TWO AND HALF PAGE SHARP  
CONDEMNATION OF ENGLISH VERSION GEHLEN MEMOIRS WHICH ALLEGEDLY  
CONTAIN INFORMATION NOT PUBLISHED IN GERMAN VERSION AND SOME OF  
WHICH COULD FALL UNDER SECRETS ACT. BASIC STORY IS THAT AFTER  
WORLD PUBLISHING COMPANY PURCHASED WORLD RIGHTS FOR MEMOIRS IN  
SEPTEMBER 1971, COMPANY HAD DAVID I R V I N G GET TOGETHER  
WITH GEHLEN TO DRAW HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED DETAILS AND EVENTS  
FROM RECESSES GEHLEN'S MIND. RESULT WAS THAT U.S. VERSION  
INITIALLY, UP THROUGH PROOF STAGE, HAD NUMEROUS DETAILS,  
INCLUDING NAMES, WHICH ULTIMATELY CENSORED FROM FINAL VERSION  
BOOK. BURDEN OF SPIEGEL'S SONG IS THAT MUCH OF CENSORED IN-  
FORMATION WAS STILL CLASSIFIED AND THAT GEHLEN MAY BE OPEN TO  
PROSECUTION BY FEDERAL AUTHORITIES UNDER PARAGRAPH 353 B OF  
THE STRAFGESETZBUCH, WHICH CARRIES SENTENCE OF UP TO FIVE  
YEARS, FOR DIVULGING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION KNOWN TO HIM AS  
A BEAMTER. FACT THAT HE GAVE IRVING DETAILS SUFFICES, COM-  
POUNDED, ACCORDING TO SPIEGEL, BY FACT THAT SOME TWENTY  
UNEXPURGED COPIES OF PROOFS FLOATING AROUND THE WORLD.  
THESE HAD BEEN MADE AVAILABLE BY WORLD PUBLISHING COMPANY TO

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PAGE 2, EGNA-43299 S E C R E T

FOREIGN PUBLISHING COMPANIES WHO HAD PURCHASED REPRINT AND FURTHER TRANSLATION RIGHTS.

2. MOST BRISANT DETAILS OF CENSORED MATERIAL ARE ACCORDING TO SPIEGEL -

A. CODENAME FOR ADENAUER'S STATE SECRETARY HANS GLOBKE WAS ''I-1783''.

B. GEHLEN HAD BND REPS SURVEILL EGON B A H R IN 1968 AFTER VISIT TO PULLACH AND SAW HIM MEET ITALIAN CP MEMBER.

C. GEHLEN ASKED F.B.I. TO INVESTIGATE COMMUNIST PAST OF BRANDT'S INTIMATE LEO B A U E R.

D. GEHLEN DECLARED PRESENT PRESIDENT OF BFV GUENTHER NOLLAU TO BE SECURITY RISK.

E. BND PRESIDENT GERHARD W E S S E L ''IS AN EXCELLENT NUMBER TWO MAN, BUT DOES NOT HAVE NECESSARY FORMAT TO HOLD IMPORTANT COMMAND FUNCTION''.

F. AT BEHEST OF C.I.A. CHIEF ALLAN DULLES, BND HAD HELPED BUILD UP EGYPTIAN INTEL SERVICE AND SLUICED FORMER SS-OFFICERS THERE TO TRAIN AND HOLD COMMAND POSTS.

G. AFTER SUEZ WAR OF 1956, BND TURNED SPECIAL INTEREST TO ISRAELI SERVICE AND GAVE ''FOREIGN AID'' TO THEM.

H. LATER TURNED TO EGYPT AGAIN AND, TO UNDERMINE SOVIET ROLE AND INFLUENCE, SET UP OWN DEPOTS FOR SOVIET SPARE PARTS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT.

I. MANAGED TO GET FRENCH SERVICE TO STOP REQUESTING LEADING WEST GERMAN PERSONALITIES TO REPORT ON INTERNAL GERMAN AFFAIRS.

J. WHAT, ACCORDING TO SPIEGEL, ALSO NEWS FOR FRIENDLY WESTERN SERVICES - ''THE BND UNMASKED THE DIRECTOR OF SOVIET ATOMIC ESPIONAGE - SERGEJ KUDRJAWZEW, LATER SOVIET AMBASSADOR /UNTIL SUMMER 1971/ TO CAMBODIA''.

7  
K. C A 1953 BND TURNED AROUND KGB OFFICER IN  
ITALY, AND FROM HIM ALSO RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT KGB CHIEF  
BERIJA HAD BEEN LIQUIDATED. AFTER WORKING WITH BND FOR ONE  
YEAR HE DISAPPEARED WITHOUT A "TRACE".

L. ACCUSED WESSEL THROUGH HIS TACTLESS REMARKS OF  
BEING ONE OF CAUSES OF HORST WENDLAND SUICIDE.

M. TELLS TALE OF ALIAS MARWITZ WHO IN 1966 ACCUSED  
COLLEAGUE, HISTORIAN AND ANALYST "DR. H." OF BEING EASTERN  
AGENT IN BND. RESULTANT INQUIRY LASTED NINE MONTHS AND "DR.  
H." LATER REHABILITATED. /COMMENT - ALIAS MARWITZ PROBABLY  
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## Our Man in Pullach

The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen translated by David Irving. World, 400 pp., \$10.00

The General Was a Spy by Heinz Höhne and Hermann Zölling, translated by Richard Barry. Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 347 pp., \$10.00

Gehlen, Spy of the Century by E. H. Cookridge. Random House, 402 pp., \$10.00

### Neal Ascherson

When the Third Reich fell, the Allies were able to make use of a lot of Nazi junk. Like the telex machines in the Reuters office in Berlin, which up to a year or two ago still preserved a special key with the double lightning-flash of the SS, much of Hitler's furniture served the conquerors' purposes until equipment built for new requirements could be introduced. General Gehlen was such a piece of junk. Unfortunately, he stayed in service for another twenty-three years. Long after his espionage machinery had become obsolete and unreliable, the Gehlen keys continued to tap out the only message they knew: Bolshevik Russia is the merciless arch-enemy of human civilization, only a tight-wing authoritarian state can resist the Red Terror, anyone who doubts either of the above propositions is a "Staatsfeind."

Reinhard Gehlen, a small and reticent man with jug ears, was the head of *Fremde Heere Ost* (Foreign Armies East), the German military intelligence service on the eastern front during World War II. After the war, he sold himself, his men, and his files to the Americans on the condition that he be allowed to operate autonomously. In 1955 the "Gehlen Organization" was transferred to the Federal Republic under the name of "*Bundesnachrichtendienst*" (BND). From then until he was pushed into retirement in 1968, after a long series of scandals and official complaints, Gehlen ran a West German espionage service with branches and agents all over the world.

That is the framework. Within it lies a Bosch landscape of swarming, terrifying, terrified figures: an armed parachutist fleeing from Soviet patrols in Lithuania, a double traitor feasting on smuggled lobsters, SS veterans training subversion squads to enter socialist Hungary, and a swan carrying packets

of information under its wings across a Berlin lake. A woman opens her legs to Russian officers in Vienna; another is led to the guillotine in East Germany for high treason. Everywhere, men looking over their shoulders are touting folders of secrets for dog-eared wads of money. All these were Gehlen's creatures. Somehow, looking back on this landscape in his memoirs, he can say: "My own view was that in the long run only he who fights with a spotless shield will triumph."

Such is Gehlen's view of himself. His memoirs were sold in advance for a gigantic sum to the right-wing Springer newspaper chain for serialization, but proved to be so eccentric, and indeed so dull, that the Springer journalists were obliged to pad them out with apologetic notes. Their most startling page claimed that Bormann was a Soviet spy and escaped to the Russians after the fall of Berlin, a claim for which Gehlen advances no real evidence whatever. Gehlen, to the anguish of the Springer press, denies or ignores most of the really sensational anecdotes about his postwar activities. Instead, he delivers interminable, whining discourses about the internal bureaucracy of the BND in its headquarters at Pullach, near Munich, and about its budget grievances.

But Gehlen's memoirs, though utterly unreliable and at times deliberately misleading, retain some historical interest. In the first place, they tell us something about Gehlen's world outlook. Secondly, they confirm beyond doubt the disgraceful unconstitutional campaign waged by Gehlen and his men against the Social Democrats and their "*Ostpolitik*," the patient effort to dismantle the cold war ramparts of legal fiction and paranoia which separated West Germany from Eastern Europe.

Gehlen's own politics, as revealed in this book, remain those of a moderate Nazi. There is, for instance, the characteristic blindness to the torments and feelings of any people other than the Germans. Consider this passage, in which Gehlen is describing the life of the Soviet population under Nazi occupation:

After twenty years of arbitrary injustice and terror, the re-establishment of elementary human rights such as the dignity of man, liberty, justice and the sanctity of property united every inhabitant of the Soviet Union... in a com-

mon readiness to support the Germans.

Incredulous, I read this sentence several times. But yes, this is what Gehlen—who was there—says life was like for the happy Russians and Ukrainians dancing around the traveling gallows under the benevolent gaze of Himmler and Koch, those well-known purveyors of liberty, justice, and the rights of man. Note, too, that "re-establish." Gehlen is referring to the liberty and human dignity universally prevalent under the tsars.

This was the man on whom the Americans relied for their intelligence picture of the Soviet Union after 1945. In another splendid paragraph, he explains how he was able to conclude that the Sofia Youth Festival of 1968 was subversive. The advance publicity called for "the right to education and the democratization of education." These slogans, Gehlen sagely observes, "could only be regarded as 'progressive' in the pejorative sense of the word. They were bound to rouse the suspicions of the cognoscenti."

All these three books demonstrate—but none of their authors can bring himself to admit—that in truth Gehlen was a political idiot. His broad appreciations, colored by fascism and sheer crankiness, were worthless. For a time, no doubt, they were the appreciations that the State Department and later Chancellor Adenauer wished to hear. But when the cold war began to diminish, governments became impatient with Gehlen's morbid view of the Red threat. He sank into self-pity, comforted only by episodes like the escalation of the Vietnam war (although, as he writes, even there the Americans were too squeamish: "our own blitz campaign in France taught us that a massive and crushing use of force always costs less casualties").

The BND carried on a determined rear-guard action against the *Ostpolitik*, before and after Gehlen's own retirement, and a large section of the memoirs is devoted to the "illusions and unsound judgements" of Social Democrat politicians who do not realize that Russia "understands the word 'co-existence' in a purely offensive sense." It is rumored in Bonn that the BND recently played a part in subverting some of the Free Democrat deputies in Chancellor Brandt's governing

Continued

coalition, in the hope of destroying his narrow majority in the Bundestag and bringing the *Ostpolitik* to an end.

If Gehlen was a political idiot, why was he hired? Something of the answer emerges from another absurd Gehlen statement, his assertion that Germany could have been defeated in 1939 by a resolute Allied attack because the Wehrmacht had only "812 trainloads of heavy artillery ammunition—apart from heavy field-howitzer ammunition." Now this statement is nonsense in itself: air strength and the use of tank forces at that stage mattered far more than certain categories of artillery. But, and this is typical of Gehlen, it is a silly strategic conclusion tacked onto a detailed and no doubt reliable piece of concrete information. Gehlen was a master of mosaic work and of finding out facts. He was tireless and exhaustive and forgot nothing. He was a dossier and cross-index man. It was Gehlen's facts that mattered; his appreciations, even on broad military matters, were crude and often quite wrong.

Höhne and Zolling, two journalists from the Hamburg magazine *Der Spiegel*, have produced a long and fascinating book which bears these conclusions out. Originally written as a series in the magazine, it is a book that seems to have resulted from some kind of subterranean deal with the post-Gehlen BND. Its new head, General Wessel, may have felt that it would be worth giving the *Spiegel* men access to a mass of classified detail, and even worth letting them blacken the reputation of Reinhard Gehlen himself, if they would convey the final impression that the BND under Wessel is a reformed, effective, and restrained organization which no German democrat need fear.

The book begins with an excellent essay on German attitudes toward intelligence services, pointing out that the public's traditional fear and dislike of intelligence work has historical grounds which no longer apply. No civil intelligence service ever evolved in the Wilhelmine Reich; such matters were kept in the hands of the military until, during the late Nazi period, they passed entirely into the hands of the SS. The citizenry were left with the impression of an arm of state which was not only totally unaccountable politically but which would send its critics to concentration camps. Against such a background, Gehlen was regarded with superstitious awe, and when the Social Democrats and *Spiegel*

itself finally broke the spell cast on the "Gehlen Organization," many Germans went so far as to say that any secret service was incompatible with a parliamentary democracy.

Gehlen's best work, unmistakably, was his achievement under the Nazis as head of *Fremde Heere Ost* (FHO). Military and economic intelligence, built up from a carefully constructed network of agents behind the Russian lines, among Russian prisoners of war, and in radio stations tapping Soviet communications, fed their data into a comprehensive filing system. (The best part of Gehlen's own book, incidentally, is the introduction by George Bailey which explains the unique importance of intelligence and staff work to the Prussian military tradition: a country without natural frontiers was drawn to the doctrine of preventive war, attack as the means of defense, which in turn entailed precise preparations and knowledge of hostile forces.)

But by 1945, Hitler could no longer stand the pessimistic accuracy of Gehlen's reports, and Gehlen himself was well aware that the war was lost. He and his lieutenants resolved to sell their entire operation to the Western Allies who, as Gehlen knew, lacked a proper intelligence network in Eastern Europe. Files and personnel were loaded up and secretly ferried across Germany to the Bavarian Alps, where Gehlen had the archives buried and where he settled down to wait confidently for the Americans to arrive.

His calculation was successful. Within weeks of the German surrender the Americans were negotiating with Gehlen. Höhne and Zolling observe correctly that these were the first postwar German-American negotiations of any kind, and that the railways, the posts, and the Gehlen Organization were the only three organizations of the Third Reich to have survived the defeat as intact institutions. In August, 1945, Gehlen and several colleagues were flown secretly to Washington. By July, 1946, he was back in Germany, officially installed among his files near Frankfurt. Gehlen's intentions were twofold: to commit the United States to the view that the Soviet Union intended to conquer all Western Europe, and (as he puts it himself) "to recover and reunify Germany's lost territories." In other words, to reverse the verdict of the war with American support.

His first undertaking was to gather military information about the Soviet

Union from returned prisoners of war. He then established a network in the Soviet zone of Germany. Both were at first extremely successful. In the Soviet zone—later the German Democratic Republic—Gehlen was able to recruit agents at the highest level, including Hermann Kastner, a deputy prime minister who enjoyed the special favor of the Soviet authorities. In about 1953, Gehlen was persuaded to be more ambitious and became involved in setting up espionage networks within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Armed men trained in the United States and ferried by British power boats were landed in the Baltic republics and even, it appears, in the Crimea. Meanwhile, Gehlen developed a counterespionage operation at home.

It was on this basis that he made his first firm contact with Adenauer. Counterespionage was a trade which attracted a rabble of ex-SS men and Gestapo veterans to Gehlen's payroll, and inevitably the hunt for communist agents broadened into a witch hunt directed against all those who criticized the policies of West German rearmament in the Fifties. This interested Adenauer, who was inclined to suppose that anyone who opposed him, any Social Democrat especially, might be a crypto-Bolshevik. Through Globke, the drafter of Hitler's anti-Semitic legislation who became Adenauer's faithful state secretary in the Chancellery, Gehlen became indispensable to Adenauer both for his surveillance of political rivals and for his supply of alarming intelligence appreciations about the Soviet Union which could be used to impress the Americans.

It is this middle period of Gehlen's work, the high years of the cold war, that most interests Mr. Cookridge. Although he is less informative than Höhne and Zolling about Gehlen's early years, and inexplicably leaves out any reference to Gehlen's practice of spying on Adenauer's political opponents, Mr. Cookridge is full of anecdotes about clandestine adventures along the Iron Curtain. He is a writer who has produced many books about espionage and no doubt his sources are impressive. If he occasionally inspires mistrust, perhaps this is because one wishes that some of his dreadful stories were not true.

He states, for example, that the embryo of the Green Berets was a force of East European and Ukrainian refugees trained by SS veterans and



used for parachuted operations against the Soviet Union. He says the Gehlen quarters at Pullach had helped the authors with the series of articles in Hungary when Imre Nagy took power in October, 1956, accompanied by "a well-armed shock unit from the CIA's private army in Germany." During the 1953 uprising in East Germany, according to Cookridge, Gehlen directed the movement of his East Berlin agents from street to street by radio. He used the facilities of Radio Free Europe, both the staff and the equipment, for his own purposes whenever it suited him, with the diligent support of American officers from the "Office of Policy Co-Ordination." He spied elaborately on Britain and France and, through American military installations in West Germany, on the United States itself.

Mr. Cookridge takes a robust, uncritical view of the cold war. If the Reds get it in the neck, he cheers, and, being a sportsman, he gives some applause to the best-managed triumphs of the other side. This approach misses some points: For instance, he gives a disagreeably lip-smacking account of the huge sentence handed out to Teodor Szczendzielorz, a member of a Polish spy ring who was the first agent to be tried by a West German court. It would have done Mr. Cookridge credit not to have gloated over this case. The agent, like his master Colonel Kowalski, was a noncommunist Pole who had been, in his country's service before the war. West Germany was rearming with the declared intention of seizing back a third of his country's territory. In such circumstances, Szczendzielorz and his colleagues deserve some honor or at least understanding for what they did.

But in the later Fifties, Gehlen's outfit began to show signs of age. The East Germans methodically infiltrated and rolled up his best networks there, and agent after BND agent appeared at East Berlin press conferences to confess his sins. Gehlen's reports became wilder and less reliable, and his organization became dangerously cozy (Professor Trevor-Roper, in his preface to *The General Was a Spy*, points out that all intelligence services require constant change and renewal if they are not to fossilize). There followed two disasters.

In 1962, as Defense Minister, Strauss arranged for the arrest of the *Spiegel* editors for alleged disclosure of military secrets, and had the *Spiegel* building searched. Gehlen, who disliked Strauss, had to some still disputed degree been in touch with *Spiegel*;

moreover, an emissary from headquarters at Pullach had helped the authors with the series of articles in question. Adenauer had Gehlen brought to Bonn and, in a moment of fury, ordered his arrest. Gehlen, stammering with terror, managed to argue his way out of this, but his relationship with Adenauer never recovered.

The second disaster was the discovery that Felfe, one of Gehlen's senior desk officers at Pullach, had been for years an East German agent. Felfe was a German hero of his times. He and his accomplices, Clemens and Tiebel, were old SS men from Dresden, now in the East, who regarded both half-states of Germany as impostors with fat wallets. In his long career as a double agent, Felfe sold the East to East Berlin or Moscow. Suggestively, Germans tens of thousands of secret documents (confirming one's suspicion that both Germanies know so much about each other that they are unable to make sense out of the mass of information, a common intelligence paradox). His trial in 1963, with its revelations of corruption and incompetence, and its suggestion that Pullach was a nature reserve for old Nazis, brought the whole liberal press down on Gehlen.

The Felfe affair was a terrible blow, from which Gehlen's reputation never recovered. While the BND continued to subvert Middle Eastern scientists, prepare "glowing pictures of Latin American military dictatorships," and send the government intelligence digests full of information that ministers had already seen in their morning papers, the decision was gradually taken that Gehlen must go. This itself turned into a long, dirty fight. Chancellor Erhard threw the BND men out of the Chancellery, where they had lodged themselves like bats in an attic. Chancellor Kiesinger ordered a full report into the BND, which revealed among other facts that Gehlen had given no fewer than sixteen of his relations posts in the service. The old man's intelligence career drew to an ignominious close. Ambitious to the end, he now runs a Protestant church mission in Catholic Bavaria.

But Gehlen can't be blamed for everything. Allied spooks, who after all put him at the head of the BND, have been almost equally hysterical about the Soviet menace and the *Ostpolitik*. Not long after Gehlen retired, the CIA asked Pullach for surveillance on Herbert Wehner, a senior Social Democrat minister whom the CIA supposed to be a KGB agent (the request was thrown into the shredder, which at least shows that the BND's sense of political realism is improving). And when the Social Democrats came to power in 1969, the Allied intelligence services temporarily stopped sharing information with the BND on the assumption that the new government would leak it that story appears in the proof copy of documents (confirming one's suspicion Hühne and Zolling's book, but has been removed from the bound copy.

Part of the trouble lay in the original deal with the Americans. They allowed an intelligence service to be headed by a professional who was politically illiterate. This did not matter, perhaps, while the CIA used Gehlen simply as a source of raw information. But when he became Adenauer's full-blown intelligence chief, this weakness was catastrophic. Much extraordinary information came to Gehlen in the postwar years, only to be evaluated by middle-aged, gentle-men whose outlook on the world had been formed in the service of the Third Reich. One of the saddest comments on the cold war is that such evaluations could seem reasonable to the leaders of the West. □

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1. REVIEW OF PUBLISHED ENGLISH VERSION OF UTILITY BOOK INDICATES MOST SENSITIVE ADDITIONS MENTIONED IN REF B ELIMINATED FROM TEXT PRIOR TO PUBLICATION.

2. ALIAS HARTWIG CONTACTED HQS TO REPORT HE HAD RECEIVED LENGTHY PERSONAL CABLE FROM [ ] REPORTING SUBSTANCE REF C SPIEGEL ARTICLE. [ ]

OBVIOUSLY PERTURBED BY UTILITY ASSESSMENT OF HIM SUCH AS MENTIONED IN PARA

2.8 & REF C. [ ] ASKED ALIAS HARTWIG TO UNDERTAKE STEPS TO OBTAIN COPY OF ORIGINAL ENGLISH MANUSCRIPT CONTAINING THESE DAMAGING ALLEGATIONS.

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SUBJECT <b>[ ]/Reviews of Recent German Literature</b>				MICROFILM		
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES						
<p>Transmitted herewith for [ ] and [ ] are copies of reviews of the recent books having to do with GEHLEN.</p>						
<p><b>ATTACHMENTS: H/W</b> As Stated</p> <p><b>DISTRIBUTION:</b>  2 - COS, [ ] (w/att)  2 - COS, [ ] (w/att)</p>						
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NATIONAL REVIEW  
9 JUN 1972

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## BOOKS IN BRIEF

*Gehlen—Spy of the Century*  
By E. H. Cookridge

Random House, 402 pp., \$10

### HATE-LOVE OF SPOOKERY

WALTER DARNELL JACOBS

Our age does not know just how to assess the professional spy. He is somehow outside the broader circles of gentlemen. He is worthy of respect for his skills and valor but worthy of disdain for the unsavoriness of his calling. He is a source of popular entertainment so long as he is presented in the most shallow and unreal parody. We know we need him but most of us wish that we didn't.

Cookridge's assessment of Reinhard Gehlen is subject to all these conflicts. Cookridge, himself a person with some professional spookery in his background, sees in Gehlen the outstanding spy of this century. He recognizes all the skills that Gehlen possesses and marvels at all (well, nearly all) of the exploits that Gehlen brought off. Still, Cookridge writes about his subject with an animus which has scarcely been equalled since Trotsky wrote Stalin's biography or Gore Vidal described a night with Richard Nixon.

GEHLEN HAS BEEN a director in espionage and intelligence rather than an operator or agent. He has served Hitler, Truman, Eisenhower, Adenauer, Erhard and Kiesinger. He provided Hitler with accurate combat and political intelligence on the USSR during World War II. He then served the United States from his base in the Pullacher Forst, collecting information inside the Soviet bloc when most Western agencies were unable either to penetrate or maintain sources there. When the Federal Republic was created, Gehlen became head of the West German Intelligence Service (BND) and created a worldwide system for Bonn that was also used to some extent by the United States and NATO. Before his retirement in 1968 Gehlen warned that the Soviet Union was eager for an excuse to use force against Czechoslovakia—

but nobody listened.

This series of accomplishments is fittingly admired by Cookridge. He admires, too, Gehlen's ability to work with the Egyptian apparatus and, at almost the same time, to cooperate with the Israelis. He even has some grudging appreciation for Gehlen's operations in France against the Algerian separatists before 1958.

What generates Cookridge's hate-love of Gehlen is something other than a squeamishness at Gehlen's ability to switch sides (Hitler to CIA to Bonn) or to serve both sides (Israel and Egypt). In Cookridge's code the professional spy is expected to be prepared to serve whomever he must in the style of the good British civil servant who can serve Lab or Lib or Tory and do the same competent professional job.

No, the cause of Cookridge's dislike of Gehlen is the fact that the great German spy has lived a life marked by a single-minded application to and entrancement by the Soviet Union. Whether Gehlen found his "subject" in the Soviet Union, as Cookridge asserts, or deduced from study and observation that the USSR was at the center of twentieth-century affairs, as events would seem to argue, is a question for speculation only. Gehlen became the "spy of the century" because he was able to supply more essential elements of information about the USSR than any of his contemporaries.

"Spy of the century" or not, Gehlen remains a most controversial figure even in retirement. The value of Cookridge's work is to take that controversy out of the pages of the sensationalist and reflex liberal press of Germany and the United States and place it almost inside the arena of scholarly research. He makes a reasonable attempt at meeting the standards of respectable research but is handicapped, not only by his feelings of aversion toward Gehlen the person but also by the nature of available sources, which are not entirely those of the political historian, but are, rather, concealed and often dissembled. And even though Cookridge places too much reliance on secondary sources and some questionable polemics (e.g., Wise and Ross), he produces a work that advances knowledge about espionage in general and about the great one, Gehlen.

Still, it is far from a definitive study. Because of the nature of the subject, that study will probably never be produced. Cookridge, however, sees the main lacuna in his attempt at compre-

hensiveness—the role of the Gehlen papers. We now have the Gehlen autobiography in German and it is soon to appear in an expanded English version. Cookridge ridicules the German edition as self-serving and lacking in documentation. He fails to find therein promised sensational disclosures about the Bormann matter. The Gehlen papers, nevertheless, deserve more weight than Cookridge is willing to assign them. Gehlen's version, in either language edition, is perforce a major input in any understanding of Gehlen the spy and Gehlen the man.

Cookridge's is an outstanding effort to contribute to the understanding of Gehlen as a director of espionage. It is pettiness perhaps to have expected more of a contribution to an understanding of Gehlen as a man—or as an imperial friend who has told us so much about the nature and capabilities of the Soviet Union. □

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## Gen. Gehlen's careful shift to the Allies

THE SERVICE: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen. Translated by David Irving. World, \$10.

By K. S. Giniger

A week or two before the European phase of World War II came to its formal close, I was at an airbase in Eschwege, Germany, as an intelligence officer. Watching for a special reconnaissance mission to return to base, I was surprised to see a German Junkers transport flying in low from the east, wheels down for a landing. Our antiaircraft batteries were surprised, too, or asleep, because none fired at the enemy aircraft.

The plane was permitted to land, unharmed, but armed soldiers surrounded the occupants as they dismounted from the craft and took them into custody. We learned on interrogation that they were high-ranking German officers from the Russian front and had come to volunteer their services to us in what they were convinced would be our approaching war with the Russians.

Just about that same time, General Reinhard Gehlen, who had been in charge of German intelligence in the east, was busy transporting two truckloads of his files and his staff to a hideout on the Austrian border about 300 miles to the south. His idea was exactly the same. And his extensive files on the Soviets gave him a bit more bargaining power than his fellow officers to the north.

HIS MEMOIRS tell the story of how he parlayed his convictions about the inevitability of Allied-Soviet conflict and his small staff and collection of file cabinets into an intelligence empire which first operated as a European branch of the CIA and then became the official foreign intelligence service of the new Federal Republic of Germany. And, although 27 years have passed since that armed conflict with the Soviets was a matter of days, he has not changed his opinion about "the ultimate clash with the United States of America." But now, he writes, it won't come until 1980, after

the Russians have eliminated China as a world power.

General Gehlen's book is a work of self-justification rather than the spy thriller the advance notices promised (will the real Martin Bormann please stand up?). But they are worth reading as a lesson in the very real problems of intelligence chiefs.

Allen Dulles once said to me that the publication of the Gehlen memoirs would compromise security, but there is nothing in this book that compromises anything except its author. And one of Dulles' British counterparts, Major General Sir Kenneth Strong, told me at the same time that such a publication would do no harm because most of what Gehlen could tell us was known already.

BUT THESE MEMOIRS do reveal the uncompromising nature of its author's anti-Communist convictions.

In the same exchanges of correspondence and views, Gehlen himself said that he could not publish because what he would say could only expose him and his family to real danger of vengeance, apparently his dislike for the "Ostpolitik" of the present German government of Willy Brandt has prompted him to take this risk, if risk it is.

In his introduction, George Bailey calls the General "a specialist in the salvaging and safeguarding of institutions." He certainly salvaged and safeguarded the one institution he created. It is unfortunate that too much of Gehlen's own book, unlike the others on the same subject, is devoted less to that institution, the Gehlen "Org.," than to the currently unfashionable ideas behind its creation.

K. S. Giniger is president of Consolidated Book Publishers.

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